Annex A: Evaluation ToRs
Independent Evaluation of TradeMark East Africa

INVITATION TO TENDER – VOLUME 3

Terms of Reference and any Additional Information Documents

Closing Date for Tenders: 13 February 2015
Independent Evaluation of Trade Mark East Africa

Terms of Reference

A. Introduction

1. The TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) programme aims to improve trade competitiveness in East Africa by reducing transport time/costs and improving the trade environment. It targets an increase in trade of 10% (above trend 2010-2016), contributing to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. The TMEA agency was officially launched in February 2011 as a specialist not-for-profit agency to implement the TMEA programme. TMEA is currently funded by the UK, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and USA. TMEA’s secured budget to date totals about £330 million ($540m). The first phase of the programme officially runs to June 2016, but funding is likely to continue over a second phase up to 2020.

2. This is a large, high-profile programme in an area of great interest for continued development work, which calls for a robust and independent evaluation. DFID is commissioning this key evaluation as acting Evaluation Manager on behalf of all TMEA donors.

B. Purpose and Objectives

Purpose

3. The evaluation has 2 equally important purposes:

(a) To identify and feed lessons learnt into the management of the remainder of the current programme and the design of any potential continuation of the TMEA programme and/or future regional trade integration programmes (driver: improving trade development programmes and enhancing the global evidence basis);

(b) To account for progress at outcome and impact level in an internationally recognised independent and impartial manner (driver: oversight and accountability requirements).

Objectives

4. This is an evaluation to assess the impact of the TMEA programme on trade, inclusive economic growth, and poverty reduction, and understand causal pathways and the mechanisms at work. As an impact evaluation, it emphasises causality and where possible attribution or at least contribution to outcomes and impacts.

5. Growth and poverty reduction are high level goals. It may not be possible to measure an attributable impact of TMEA on these goals. However, the evaluation will need to analyse pathways and understand the way in which the TMEA programme has affected poor people, and the way in which it has contributed to growth.
6. The core objectives of the evaluation are:

1) Test the Theory of Change (TOC), assessing all causal links and the robustness of underlying assumptions (including links between trade, growth and poverty reduction), and adjusting the TOC to serve as a reliable guide to interpret the programme and to make programme improvements.

2) Analyse and, to the extent possible measure: the regional integration programmes’ impact on regional trade, growth and poverty (and on the various stakeholders, in particular on men and women separately, poor and vulnerable groups, as well as traders and consumers); and sustainability.

3) Assess the effectiveness of the TMEA programme, including organisational effectiveness, and whether the programme represents Value For Money.

4) Throughout, identify lessons learnt relevant beyond TMEA, i.e. insights on enabling and constraining factors, critical actions and gaps which would be generalizable to future programmes or to other contexts.

C. Recipients

7. The primary recipients of the services comprise TMEA’s Programme Investment Committee (PIC) as well as the planned Council and Board¹ alongside the National Oversight Committees which exist in five of the six countries with active TMEA interventions.

8. The evaluation will provide evidence on trade and development of interest more widely. In particular, outputs of the evaluation are likely to attract significant attention from many actors, including the East African Community (EAC), regional governments, regional institutions such as the EAC Secretariat, multilateral and bilateral partners, business and civil society

9. The ultimate beneficiaries are the citizens of partner countries, whose lives should be improved through improved projects and programmes.

D. Background

Context

10. Despite significant growth, East Africa’s share of world exports is below 0.1% - around half the global average on a per capita basis. It costs East African countries twice as much to trade than it does East Asian and developed countries. Transport costs are excessive and especially for landlocked countries – freight costs are more than 50% higher than in the United States and Europe and add nearly 75% to the price of exports from Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. [Nathan Associates, 2011] The problem is not just one of distances – inefficient customs and port processes, excessive bureaucracy and poor infrastructure all impose substantial transport delays and significantly increase costs. These problems are both national and regional and advocate for a regional approach to solutions, focused on developing East Africa’s transit corridors to open up its economic opportunities and reduce the high costs of doing business and trade.

¹ See Governance reforms outlined in Background section.
11. The East African Community (EAC) was re-established in 1999 by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda subsequently joined in 2007. The Customs Union formed in 2005 has led to a 67% increase in trade between EAC countries, but considerable work remains to make it fully effective, such as removing non-tariff barriers, implementing a first point of entry system for the clearance of goods and collection of import duties and implementation of a common trade policy. The Common Market is scheduled to be fully implemented by 2014, although this timing is likely to slip. The EAC is also part of the Tripartite (COMESA-EAC-SADC) initiative, which it chaired from July 2013 to June 2014. The EAC has made the most progress on economic integration of any of the regional economic communities in Africa, and represents a major opportunity for lesson learning across the broader Tripartite through creating a larger market; allowing producers and traders across the region to exploit economies of scale; increasing investment and accelerating the introduction of new technologies. EAC integration is also expected to increase political stability and provide a focus for shared legislative and regulatory reform.

12. Evidence from a range of studies points to improvements in the business environment associated with trade competitiveness leading to improved growth, jobs, incomes and social effects. While the relationship between trade, growth and poverty reduction is complex, very few countries have grown over long periods of time or secured a sustained reduction in poverty without a significant change in competitiveness and a large expansion of their trade. Poverty reduction in broad terms has followed as a consequence of increases in income, employment and government social expenditures. However, there are risks and opportunities in the short and longer term for particular poor groups (and regions) as increased trade transforms livelihood possibilities.

**TMEA**

13. TMEA is a multi-donor funded programme, which was officially launched in February 2011 as a specialist not-for-profit agency to implement programmes to promote trade growth in East Africa. TMEA aims to increase exports (by 10% above trend 2010-2016) through cutting the costs of trade, especially through reduced transport time (by 15%), and a focus on the national implementation of regional trade agreements. This national focus is innovative for a regional programme, and as a result, TMEA has presence in all EAC countries (plus South Sudan, which has applied to join the EAC) with its headquarters in Kenya. TMEA seeks to deploy a wide range of instruments quickly, including financial aid, output-based aid and technical assistance, to tailor interventions to the needs of partners, and to manage fiduciary risk.

**Theory of Change (TOC)**

14. Figure 1 illustrates the TOC for the TMEA programme. A detailed description is available in the business cases and a separate TOC document (see Annexes). There are several layers to TMEA’s TOC. The TOC can be viewed as a hierarchy where various sub-theories link up and across the programme’s focus areas.

15. At the higher end of the TOC it is proposed that three necessary key ‘trade competitiveness’ elements contribute to increasing trade. These elements are increased physical access to markets, enhanced trade environment and improved business competitiveness.
16. Correspondingly, TMEA’s 3 Strategic Objectives are articulated as follows:

SO1 - Increased Physical Access to Markets (around 44% of the budget)
SO2 - Enhanced Trade Environment (around 42% budget)
SO3 - Improved Business Competitiveness (around 14% budget)

17. Increased trade is believed to contribute to increased economic growth and subsequently reduce poverty. Precise effects depend on the nature of trade reforms and how the poor make their living [Winters & Martuscelli, April 2014]. Thus examining localised situations and the pathways to growth and poverty is a key part of this evaluation. Economic growth and poverty reduction do not appear explicitly in TMEA’s overarching TOC since they are very high in the logic hierarchy; however they are captured in some of the donor programme documents.

18. Each of the boxes in Figure 1 is expected to contribute to increased trade, but no one element is sufficient by itself. A number of assumptions underpin the relationship between the black boxes and each strategic objective.

19. These include, on the expected result of “increased trade”, that:
   - There are sufficient buyers who are willing to pay for East Africa’s improved quality products and services;
   - The private sector uses the opportunities of increased affordable market access to increase and/or expand the number and size of exporting firms;
   - The private sector increases the sophistication of exports;
   - The private sector has the capacity and will to utilise opportunities presented by an enhanced trade environment.

20. On the simplified logic on the relationship between “increased market access” and “trade”, that:
   - Current trade costs in East Africa are a deterrent for exporters and importers;
   - Reducing trade costs will make a significant contribution to increasing market access for East African importers and exporters;
   - Transport prices are a major contributor to trade costs;
   - Indirect costs caused by delays are a major contributor to total transport prices;
   - TMEA has greater ability to influence the reduction of indirect costs as opposed to direct costs, e.g. fuel, labour, truck operating costs;
   - East African transport logistics service providers will pass on costs savings brought about by reducing delays to consumers of logistics services;
   - The East African logistics industry is competitive;
   - TMEA interventions will contribute to reducing transportation costs as will other organisations’ interventions, i.e. World Bank, JICA, USAID;
   - Increases in other costs will not be more than any reduced indirect costs.

21. A number of assumptions underpin the simplified logic on the relationship between “enhanced trade environment” and “trade”:
   - Implementing the EAC regional trade agreements will contribute to enhancing the trade environment in the region;
   - There is sufficient demand by partner state parliaments, public sector, private sector and civil society organisations to drive the regional economic community agenda forward;
   - Regional trade policies will be prioritised by partner states over national trade policies and priorities.
22. Within this complicated picture of factors that are necessary to achieve increased trade, TMEA has a more specific focus driven by practical reasons, as indicated through the colour coding (see legend at bottom right of Figure 1). All current projects now fall in either the ‘direct’ or ‘enabling’ category.

**Figure 1**

![Economic Growth](network1)

![Poverty Reduction](network1)

**Increased Trade**

**Increased Physical Access to Markets**

**Enhanced Trade Environment**

**Improved Business Competitiveness**

- Reduced Trade Costs
- More Favourable Trade Agreements
- Improved PAC Trade Policy
- Reduced Non-tariff Barriers to Trade
- Efficient Trade Facilitation
- Enhanced Access to Finance
- Enhanced Business Regulations for Trade
- Developed Export Competencies
- Efficient Trade Logistics Services
- Effective & Innovative Logistics Services
- Improved Quality & Standards
- Increased Trade in Services
- Improved Export Capability
- Improved Investment Climate
- Improved Access to Industry
- Improved Investment Climate
- Improved Access to Finance
- Improved Trade Support Systems & Processes
- Improved Tariff Schedule
- Improved National R&D and Co-ordination
- Improved National - Regional implementation & Co-ordination
- Movement of goods
- Movement of services
- Movement of labour
- Movement of capital
- Increased Physical Access to Markets
- Improved Trade Environment
- Improved Business Competitiveness

23. Each of the strategic objectives is unpacked a bit more in the TOC document (see Annexes), which describes the expected causality chains and key assumptions.

24. Just as one example, the cost of access is seen as a component of the cost of the goods. One key factor contributing to high transport costs is inadequate infrastructure that does not meet current and future traffic needs, resulting in congestion and delay. This delay has a cost. Even where the transport infrastructure is adequate, delay can result from inefficient use of assets. Key causes of unnecessary delay include low labour productivity, bureaucratic inefficiency, poor transport regulation, and corruption. For these reasons, most of TMEA’s activities in this area are designed to reduce unnecessary delay. Yet for activities to have the intended outcome, certain assumptions must hold:

- The activities must actually result in time savings (delay reductions);
- The value of those time savings must be greater than the cost required to achieve those savings;
- The net savings must be passed along from transport services providers to consumers via the price of transported goods;
- The resulting price reductions must induce additional trade in those goods (that is, the demand curve must be elastic).
Governance

25. Currently, a Programme Investment Committee (PIC) supervises the activities of TMEA and provides strategic direction to TMEA to ensure that it achieves its developmental goals. The PIC is supported by a regional (EAC) Programme Coordinating Committee (chaired by a Deputy Secretary General at the EAC Secretariat) and a National Oversight Committee (NOC) for each country\textsuperscript{2} programme. The scope of authority of the PIC is set out in the PIC Constitution and is entrenched in the Articles of Association of TMEA. The PIC is the apex governing body and has primary responsibility for governing the affairs of TMEA. There is also a TMEA Board (required under Kenya company law), which handles financial management and human resource issues, but this is effectively a sub-committee of the PIC as all Board decisions require a “no objection” from the PIC.

26. However, it was recognised recently that there is a need to resolve and simplify the potential overlap between the Board (which has “de jure” liability for TMEA operations but is not the apex body for decision making) and the PIC (which has the decision making power, but not the legal responsibility, although a court is likely to determine that it has “de facto” liability). In November 2014, the PIC approved a new TMEA Constitution (see Annexes) which will in due course establish a Council (mainly handling strategic direction) and a professional Board (mainly handling operational decisions). A recruitment process is now underway to contract Board members. Once complete, a date will be set for the new Constitution to become effective (likely to be mid-2015), at which point the current PIC and Interim Board will be dissolved and replaced by the new Council and Board.

27. A unique feature of the TMEA governance structure is the delegation of oversight roles at the national level. Although these National Oversight Committees (NOCs) are mainly advisory bodies to the PIC, they play an immensely important role in supervising and monitoring the national level programmes. The NOCs are chaired by Permanent Secretaries (the Ministry of EAC) and membership includes all key donors, government agencies, private sector and civil society representatives.

Monitoring and evaluation architecture

28. In August 2013, a revised monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) approach paper was reviewed by the TMEA PIC. It was agreed to incorporate plans for an independent external evaluation into the MEL to ensure complementarity of the internal and external evaluation work and to avoid duplication. A Joint Evaluation Group (chaired by DFID) was established as a sub-committee to the PIC to oversee the evaluation work. Terms of reference for the JEG are attached in the Annexes. The revised MEL approach paper was approved at the PIC meeting in May 2014 and is attached in the Annexes.

29. As set out in the MEL, TMEA’s monitoring and evaluation system is comprised of the following components:

- Overall results framework, a sub-set of outputs from individual project monitoring plan, which serves as an important accountability tool for TMEA donors;
- Individual project monitoring plans;
- Quarterly external progress reports;
- Quarterly internal programme performance review meetings (QuORTs);

\textsuperscript{2} Processes for setting up a NOC in South Sudan are still underway.
• A Management Information System (MIS) that requires TMEA project managers to input and update project work plans and monitoring plans;
• A “Results Meter” has been developed to serve as an aggregate score card to show progress towards targets in the results framework (this Results Meter is likely to be subject to an external quality assurance early 2015);
• An Annual Review commissioned by investors to assess progress against the TMEA results framework;
• An evaluation plan, outlining the division of labour between internal TMEA evaluation work (mainly formative evaluations) and the independent external evaluation work (commissioned here).

30. TMEA also has a research programme (previously involving a call down contract with the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). This has examined the literature on linkages between trade, growth and poverty reduction, as well as simulated modelling on the impact of the EAC customs union. However, it has not conducted any primary data collection on TMEA projects.

31. TMEA organises its information management on the basis of around 200+ project budget lines, of which around 165 were active at August 2014. In some instances, several project budget lines could be seen as sub-components of one ‘intervention’ (eg. support to the revenue authority in Burundi is broken down by categories of expenditure).

**Key stakeholders**

32. Key stakeholders for the evaluation include:
- TMEA donors, who are represented on the Programme Investment Committee (PIC);
- The East African Community Secretariat (the Secretary General sits on the PIC as “Patron”; and a Programme Coordinating Committee in Arusha manages the TMEA-EAC partnership);
- National Oversight Committee (NOC) members (including government, private sector, civil society and donor representatives at the national level);
- Staff involved in oversight and implementation of TMEA projects;
- Implementing partners at regional and national level;
- Ultimate beneficiaries (producers, transporters, clearing and forwarding agents, consumers) of TMEA’s programme support.

**E. Key questions**

33. The key evaluation questions below reflect the 4 core objectives of the evaluation (see section B), which can be summarised as: test the Theory of Change; impact and sustainability; value for money and effectiveness; and lessons learnt relevant beyond TMEA. These are outlined below.

34. In addition, for each of the key evaluation questions, an indicative set of sub-questions is provided in Annex 1.
**Question 1.** How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the Theory of Change (TOC) and does the TOC provide a reliable guide for programme interventions?

As a premise for the evaluation, the full TOC will need to be re-examined. This question will require an analysis of constraints to trade/growth/poverty reduction, an assessment of the robustness of the assumptions underpinning the TOC, and an assessment of whether the logframes, targets and milestones are appropriate and realistic.

This will need to consider carefully the political economy around the programme and trade in the region, economic contextual changes, policy changes, and TMEA’s relationship with related initiatives (both government and private sector). It will also need to consider the relevance of the instruments and mechanisms used.

**Question 2.** What is the likely impact on trade, growth and poor people, and what is critical in order to ensure sustainability of positive impacts?

This question covers the key issue of TMEA’s current and likely impact on regional trade, the links to growth and poverty reduction, and the sustainability of their interventions. Of particular interest will be to understand the mechanisms at work, to identify why and how things worked, who benefited and how, and any potential negative impact. There is a specific interest in understanding how TMEA activities to reduce transport time have impacted on poor people, and how the programme has benefited or harmed women and girls. Of particular interest also is the issue of sustainability, and of identifying the essential components of a future exit strategy.

Analysing and understanding the pathways through which the TMEA programme is likely to have affected poor people (positive and negative, intended and unintended impacts) is a crucial question for the evaluation. As noted above however, measuring TMEA’s impact on regional poverty as a whole programme is not expected to be possible. However, analyses of pathways and measuring localised impact for selected interventions, should be feasible. On the other hand impact on trade is expected to be quantifiable with reasonable attribution, and the evaluation should also verify the programme’s claims to impact on trade.

**Question 3.** Where has the programme been effective and achieved good Value For Money and how could this be improved?

This question will assess effectiveness, economy and efficiency, including whether TMEA activities have produced the outputs anticipated in the results framework, organisational effectiveness whether and where the TMEA programme has provided value for money. This will also require an assessment of the operational model and of the M&E system.

**Question 4.** What are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?

All sections above should contribute to this question. Throughout the evaluation, lessons learnt should be identified that may be relevant beyond TMEA in order to inform future programming as well as contribute evidence towards comparative effectiveness of regional programming. This question is separated out to emphasize the importance of generating learning that is transferable to other programmes (by TMEA donors and others) and which contributes to the global evidence basis, and of capturing this in a way which promotes uptake.
35. OECD-DAC evaluation criteria map onto the questions structure presented in the Annex to a large extent, but are not of equal interest and the evaluation will focus on **effectiveness, efficiency** and **impact** criteria.

36. The set of sub-questions in the Annex is indicative. Sub-questions of particularly high importance to the primary recipients (i.e. PIC and NOCs) are marked with an asterix. Not all questions will apply in equal depth at all evaluation stages. Some questions are for consideration early with more of a formative angle, others only at the end but the evidence needs gathering from the outset. Note also that the indicative sub-questions in the Annex may contribute to more than one objective.

37. The Evaluator will need to review and adjust the set of sub-questions, and consider any other questions required to meet the 4 objectives – while remaining very focused on these objectives and avoiding unnecessary inquiries. The Evaluator will need to consult with stakeholders more widely to refine the evaluation sub-questions during the inception phase, for agreement by PIC.

### F. Scope

38. The independent evaluation commissioned through these TORS consists of one single evaluation. This will include a Theory Based approach located within the TMEA TOC and which includes the pathways to trade and growth and to poverty reduction for the whole portfolio, as well as similar documentation (sub-theories) for individual projects (projects of particular importance would be large investments, those of a catalytic nature, and those targeted to provide livelihood gains to particular groups e.g. small holder farmers and traders).

39. Nonetheless, it is expected that to meet its objectives the evaluation will need to be carefully structured, and comprise various components. As an indication, the evaluation is expected to require the following components, though bidders are free to select whatever structure and approach they feel most appropriate to address the objectives and key questions:

- **A study of impact on poverty**, examining the pathways to poverty across the programme, who is benefitting and who is losing out, and providing a sense of the likely scale of benefits or losses where feasible for example in selected localised areas/interventions.

- **A study of impact on trade**, establishing how trade changed as a result of the TMEA programme, how an increase in trade resulted (if confirmed by the evaluation) or why it did not, key enabling factors and constraints - contextual and programmatic.

- **An institutional assessment of TMEA as an organisation** covering organisational capacity, organisational effectiveness and delivery performance, factors in the wider enabling environment, and partnership analysis across the different partners.

- **A formal evidence synthesis** approach covering the work of the Evaluator, the monitoring, internal evaluations and learning conducted by TMEA, and evidence from other research activities around trade and poverty reduction in East Africa.
40. The following interventions are of particular interest: Mombasa port, Dar es Salaam port, and the One Stop Border Posts (OSBPs). In particular, the evaluation should look at pathways to poverty on the Mombasa port and at least 3 of the OSBPs, and set out baselines and design for looking at impact of work on the Dar port in due time.

41. The evaluation will need to balance of breadth (e.g. to deliver a programme, portfolio level evaluation) and depth (e.g. to understand pathways to poverty impact).

42. Given the project timelines it is expected that the first reports will encompass a substantial formative element.

43. TMEA comprises a number of infrastructure projects. As per key questions, this evaluation examines the effect of the projects, and would exclude engineering inspection type of activities.

**Roles and responsibilities of the independent Evaluator vs TMEA**

44. During inception the Evaluator will need to work with TMEA to determine respective responsibilities monitoring and evaluation activities, particularly for collecting data, for agreement with the PIC (and Council once established). Bids should provide a clear initial approach of how they propose to manage the interface with the TMEA organisation and its work and how they will refine this during inception.

45. Broadly speaking, TMEA is responsible for monitoring against the results framework (including outcome level and impact on trade), for project monitoring, and for internal evaluations as indicated in the Joint Evaluation Plan (JEP). The Evaluator is responsible for quality assuring monitoring data, for quality assuring and triangulating any evidence they use, providing recommendations and guidance to strengthen data quality, and identify and carry out new data collection required specifically for the purposes of the independent evaluation.

**On monitoring data:**

46. Data for monitoring the results framework is the responsibility of TMEA, including both underlying and aggregate data. The Evaluator is expected to review periodically the monitoring data gathered by TMEA (result framework data and other data to be used in the evaluation) and to make prompt recommendations to improve the quality of these data and ensure their suitability for evaluation, and where appropriate to propose complementary data collection measures.

47. The Evaluator will be responsible for the identification and provision of any new primary data needed for the purposes of the independent evaluation – whether as an area not covered by the existing M&E or for triangulation purposes. The Evaluator will need to determine which arrangements would be most cost-effective overall and least burdensome on beneficiaries or programme implementers. If additional data needs to be added to existing TMEA monitoring processes for the purposes of the evaluation, the Evaluator will provide support on methodological development for indicators and data collection.
On evaluations:

48. A Joint Evaluation Plan (JEP) has been agreed by the PIC (see Annexes). Proposed evaluation work has been divided between “internal” (TMEA’s internal evaluation programme, based on learning priorities) and “external” (this independent evaluation).

49. Aside from the overall independent evaluation, the JEP identifies selected key projects under each of TMEA’s three strategic objective (SO) pillars. This independent evaluation will encompass the overall impact evaluation, summative evaluation reports of all three pillars, Mombasa port, Dar es Salaam port, and OSBPs. TMEA will manage internal formative evaluations of selected projects under SO2 and SO3, plus two ex-ante evaluations and summative evaluations needed urgently.

50. For effective learning and consistency of approach, the independent Evaluator and TMEA will need to discuss the internal formative evaluations, to ensure that pertinent issues relevant to the independent evaluation are taken into account such as agreement on indicators, issues to be covered, or exploring relevant challenges.

Links to other programme evaluations

51. The Evaluator will need to consider other evaluations underway in the region, by the TMEA donors or by others, for any substantial overlap or synergies or lesson learning. In particular, the evaluation should consider risks and opportunities faced by the TMEA programme, by learning from evaluative exercises of other trade or integration programmes, such as any IMF or WB regional programme in Africa, DFID’s TMSA, DFID’s AgDevCo, or others.

52. There is also a higher-level evidence question related to the comparative effectiveness of regional programming, which DFID in particular aims to investigate across DFID-funded wealth creation programmes in East Africa. The TMEA evaluation will contribute to this thematic evidence basis (see evaluation questions in Annex 1). This will require flexibility to use a common framework appropriate for future synthesis, while preserving the integrity of the TMEA programme evaluation.

Extensions

53. It is possible that the scope may be extended to some of the internal evaluation work. This will be reviewed during the inception phase.

54. Should there be a new programming phase beyond 2016, it is possible that this Evaluation contract may be extended to cover part or all of the new phase. It is likely that any extension would be for up to 30 months.

G. Methodology

Evaluation approach and methods

55. Bids should provide a clear description of the design and methodology they will use to answer the key questions, including recognised evaluation methods to be used, proposed counterfactuals if/where appropriate, proposed data collection methods, analytical methods, and approach to synthesis. Ideally this would be supported by an illustrative evaluation matrix.
56. This is a complex programme, with multiple countries, multiple multi-layered projects with different stakeholders and beneficiaries. It is critical for bids to explain how the complexity of the programme and of the evaluation will be managed.

57. In particular, careful attention will need to be given to how the evaluation is approached and designed as a coherent whole, anchored on the overarching TOC. It is expected that a range of quantitative and qualitative methods might be necessary. Bids should take care to articulate clearly how the overall design and specific methods and tools fit together. Bids should explain how a potentially large range of elements will fit together to answer the overarching questions, how the synthesis will manage disparate data sources with variable quality and availability, and where and/or how information might be aggregated.

58. Bids should pay particular attention to demonstrating how rigour and credibility will be upheld at all stages throughout the evaluation.

59. In 2012 TMEA commissioned Upper Quartile to undertake a review of options for evaluating the Impact and Value for Money of its activities, to help TMEA decide on options on structuring and implementing its evaluation activity (see Annexes). This identified a selection of projects, which is different from the more recent selection in the JEP. Bidders should note that the context has evolved and the scale of TMEA has increased since the 2012 paper, and that the approach to the independent evaluation is expected to present major differences.

60. Secondary data, including TMEA's own monitoring and evaluation data, should be quality assured. More generally, triangulation of data and/or findings is essential.

61. Bids should set out clearly the extent to which the proposed approach will answer the questions, and limitations.

62. Bids are strongly encouraged to be as specific as possible in their proposals, including in terms of coverage of any method to be used, the quality level that would be achieved, number of projects covered, sample sizes, etc.

**Principles and standards**

63. As per DFID evaluation policy, the evaluation should adhere to international best practice standards in evaluation, including the OECD DAC International Quality Standards for Development Evaluation, the OECD DAC principles Standards for Development Evaluation, and DFID’s Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation. Bids should demonstrate how they will achieve this.

64. In line with Paris Declaration principles, the Evaluator - and TMEA M&E approaches - should take account of national M&E systems, draw on existing data where available, ensure new data collection is complementary to existing systems and that new data are made available to national stakeholders as far as possible.

65. Care should be taken to avoid duplication with TMEA’s own monitoring and evaluation work, while also ensuring the independence and impartiality of the overall independent evaluation.

66. Given the importance both of the relationship with TMEA, and of the need for independence, bids should take particular care to explain how they propose to
manage relationships, and propose suitable management approaches to ensure the success of the evaluation.

67. Disaggregation of data, including by sex, geographical location and income status will be important throughout the evaluation.

68. The Evaluator will need to comply with DFID’s policies on fraud and anti-corruption and cooperate with any checks required from them for the duration of the evaluation e.g. annual audited statements, policies on management of funds, etc.

**Lesson learning and adaptive management**

69. To meet the evaluation’s purpose of identifying and feeding lessons learnt into the programme, it is critical that the Evaluator works with stakeholders to cycle ongoing evaluation results back into the evolution of the programme, through regular feedback and reflective activities. This should include building linkages with the programme management.

70. In particular, to facilitate this, specific points for reflection and decision-making may be identified in addition to programme annual reviews. An element of flexibility from the Evaluator will be essential to maximise evaluation utility and use of the evaluation findings.

71. Bids should demonstrate a good understanding and experience of maximising evaluation utility, and outline a convincing approach.

**Stakeholders**

72. More generally, bids should demonstrate robust thinking as to how stakeholders would be engaged throughout the evaluation.

**H. Existing information sources**

73. Data are expected to become available in line with TMEA’s Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) strategy (see Annexes).

**Results frameworks**

74. The TMEA results framework indicates key data collected for monitoring purposes. The mapping of the theory of change in the first section of the Results Framework allows the overall programme logic to be scrutinised. The Results Framework contains (or could contain) all necessary information to track all relevant programme results. The TMEA Knowledge and Results team has been working with project teams to set up project level results chains and monitoring plans.

75. Further improvements are in progress. The line of sight between project and the programme TOC is being strengthened. Where missing, appropriate measurable indicators are being designed at impact and Strategic Outcome level and at lower levels, together with targets and collated baseline data. The results framework is also currently being updated to show progress against expected results. This work is expected to be completed by early 2015. The Evaluator will need to assess the sufficiency and quality of the results framework data.
76. TMEA prioritises monitoring efforts according to the importance of different projects (following an A/B/C classification where for A projects the target is to ensure that monitoring is in line the DCED guidelines and C only attempts to monitor at output level), and also within projects.

**Baseline data at outcome level**

77. Primary data collection on baseline data on outcomes at project level undertaken by TMEA includes: time and traffic surveys for one stop border posts (OSBPs), on cost and time savings for Single Window Information for Trade (SWIFT) programmes, and baselines for ports.

78. OSBP time and traffic surveys have been undertaken to establish both queuing time and time taken to clear customs at the border post, as well as the number of vehicles passing through the border post. Baseline surveys were undertaken before the start of the construction of each border post, and end-line surveys are planned to be undertaken on a consistent basis three months after completion of construction at each border and six months after the initial survey is undertaken. Surveys are undertaken for a period of seven days, including day and night time traffic, and provide an estimate of average time for (a) customs processing and (b) queuing for trucks (either specific types of trucks, or all trucks, on a consistent basis for each border). A timetable is available on request.

79. Cost and time savings surveys are planned for all SWIFTs. Intermediate outcome indicators include average processing time for applications, transactions volume rates (per day), average processing costs, and average compliance costs incurred by traders to submit applications. Output level indicators include the number of trade agencies integrated within the SWIFT system and/or other agencies as well as percentages of training and communications plans implemented. Data collection will vary dependent on when the system goes live. Baseline data should be completed by the end of October 2014. Time data will then be collected on a quarterly basis while cost data will be collected bi-annually. A timetable is available on request.

80. Both ports annually (June/July) publish usage and performance statistics that include most or all of TMEA’s top-line indicators. Currently Kenya Airports Authority (KPA) publishes an “Annual Review and Bulletin of Statistics” which includes ship turnaround time, ship waiting time, and berth occupancy, all of which are in TMEA’s monitoring plan. The port monitoring plans also include many smaller-scope operational indicators. TMEA has just launched a consultancy at Mombasa port that will (among other things) determine which of these detailed indicators is most important to understanding the overall performance of the port, and assessing the port’s capacity to collect this data. Based on the outcome of this work (first phase due by February 2015) TMEA will consider any revisions of its monitoring plans.

**TMEA Management Information System (TMIS)**

81. TMEA’s on-line Management Information System captures data on financial management, and results performance, while the contracts management system has the detailed information on procurement. TMIS is a programme management tool that requires TMEA project managers to input and update project work plans and monitoring plans. Other functionality includes: summary project descriptions, with key contact details of partners; contact reports e.g. recording discussions;
attaching key documentation; developing and maintaining project risk matrices; quarterly reporting; list of upcoming planned outputs and outcomes to assist the communications team plan communication activities. TMIS assists TMEA to analyse progress against plans across the portfolio of projects and disaggregate according to such categories as strategic outcomes, type of partners and location. TMIS also includes a results page with all the outcomes and outputs that are to set be achieved within different calendar days, and an outcomes page which lists all the outcomes and how they contribute to the TMEA Theory of Change.

82. TMIS Project data is to a great extent already available in TMIS, and by end Dec-14, 90% of all information including monitoring plans and risk plans for all projects should be available on the MIS, populated with targets/milestones, baselines and actual progress data. By June 2015, all projects will have their monitoring plans completed. The Annexes provide an illustrative snapshot of a project monitoring plan as per TMIS. The Evaluator will need to assess the sufficiency and quality of the TMIS data to be used for evaluation purposes.

83. Monitoring procedures are defined in the manual ‘TMEA Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Procedures: how to measure what you are doing, and whether it is working’.

**Progress reports**

84. Quarterly progress reports for projects and responsibility centres have been produced through the MIS, as well as annual project performance reports. While quarterly reports include expenditure versus budget and actual progress against planned progress traffic lights, annual project performance reports require implementers to reflect on changes in assumptions, articulate lessons and outline how future implementation may change as a result. The PIC has since agreed that TMEA will present progress reports every six months from July 2014.

**Results meter**

85. TMEA is developing a results-meter which will aggregate project performance results for key projects to estimate programme results (see Annexes).

**Research on poverty impact**

86. TMEA has recently commissioned a research paper (see Annexes) which explores and maps out direct and indirect linkages between TMEA activities and poverty, together with an analytical framework linking the programme TOC to poverty. The research is expected to be completed by Dec-14.

87. TMEA’s toolkit on mainstreaming poverty (see Annexes) outlines how poverty issues will be explored throughout projects and baseline studies. To date this has fed into 3 studies, related to: women cross-border traders, SWIFT, standards and non-tariff barriers. In the first instance the tool kit will be applied to priority projects in 6 key areas: OSBPs, ports, railways, standards, customs modernization and ICTs, private sector and civil society / advocacy.
I. Deliverables and timeframe

88. This contract is expected to run from March 2015 and end in December 2018. There is a possibility of a 30 month extension depending on supplier performance, on-going programme needs and availability of funds. The scheduling of deliverables takes into account ‘critical moments’. These however may change and new ones may arise. It is possible that this schedule will be reviewed during inception, timing the second impact evaluation report for a later date so as to allow for a longer reference period. In order to maximise usefulness of the findings, the evaluator will need to be flexible to ensure that the evaluation reports come in time to feed into key decision or knowledge sharing opportunities.

Critical moments

89. At present it is anticipated that evaluation findings may feed in the following:
   • Annual Reviews: yearly by mid-Nov.
   • Design of any phase 2 programming: early 2016.
   • Project Completion Report: (date depending on phase 1 completion date, but likely to be due in 2017).

Overview of deliverables

90. The supplier will need to provide the following key outputs, outlined hereunder and further detailed thereafter:

(a) Inception, design and evaluation reports
   • Initial Inception Plan: 6 weeks after contract start
   • Inception Report to include QA of existing data: draft 5 months after contract start, approved report 6 weeks later.
   • Baseline report: draft at 8 months after contract start, approved report 6 weeks later (approx. Mar-16)
   • Impact Evaluation Report 1 to include formative evaluations of Mombasa port, Dar es Salaam port, and impact assessment of One Stop Border Posts (OSBPs): draft by Mar-17, approved report 6 weeks later.
   • Five brief interim reports, at regular intervals to be specified, with contents to be specified during the inception phase.

(b) Support to TMEA on specific M&E issues
   • Fully developed indicators methodology manual or guidance notes for data that are needed to undertake the independent evaluation but are not yet collected through TMEA’s own monitoring and evaluation systems.
   • Quality Assurance of TMEA data as required for evaluation purposes, and implementable guidance on any improvements required.

(c) Communication products
   These will need to be defined in the communications plans and would include at a minimum, for each Impact Evaluation Report:
   • A workshop for the key stakeholders, including the Joint Evaluation Group, explaining the recommendations and agreeing how they can be implemented.
   • A ‘key findings’ communication product presenting evidence relevant to development actors beyond the TMEA programme.
   • Separate reports on selected interventions or issues (notably Dar, Mombasa, OSBPs)
(d) Instruments and data
- An electronic copy of all the instruments used, including research protocols, questionnaires, guidance notes, etc.
- Database(s) with all the qualitative and quantitative data in a commonly used format, together with clear metadata, and which is anonymised and safeguards confidentiality. Copies should be provided at least yearly.

(e) Management reports
- Brief quarterly reports on the ongoing evaluation process including any support provided to TMEA. Submission of these reports will be aligned to PIC meetings as far as possible.

Specific requirements

91. The Inception Plan serves as an intermediate product no longer than 20 pages and should include:
- an initial review, validation and adjustment of the Theory of Change;
- an initial stakeholders engagement approach;
- revised evaluation questions;
- discussion of design issues and approach to completion of the inception phase, particularly to assessing data quality and developing the full evaluation framework.

92. The Inception Report should be no longer than 30 pages excluding annexes and include:
- a review, validation and adjustment of the Theory of Change (including links to growth and poverty reduction);
- a stakeholders engagement approach, supported by a stakeholders mapping;
- a communication and dissemination plan;
- an agreed set of finalised questions and evaluation framework - based on evidence gaps in the Theory of Change, stock-take on the programme to date and requirements of stakeholders of the evaluation;
- the refined evaluation design or design options, a detailed explanation of evaluation methods to be used, exploration and justification of methodological issues, project selection, proposed counterfactuals where appropriate, and proposed data collection methods;
- an evaluation matrix, which maps the proposed evaluation design, methods and analytical plan against the evaluation questions;
- identification of programme monitoring data required from the PMU to meet evaluation needs and timings for this, particularly baseline data;
- full quality assurance of all data to be used from TMEA’s own monitoring and evaluation;
- proposal on collection of new primary data – including new baseline data and triangulation data;
- an agreed division of labour between TMEA and the Evaluator, specific and detailed, down to activity level;
- a description of the scope of findings to be available in the reports, particularly the first report, and a clear delineation of the depth of information to be provided in each of the impact evaluation reports;
- a detailed workplan;
- a final costing for the implementation phase;
- a review of challenges and risks, mitigating actions and fall-back options.
The Baseline Report should be no longer than 40 pages excluding annexes and provide:
- an executive summary;
- description of the methodology;
- baseline for all indicators using secondary data;
- methodologies, instruments and protocols for data collection;
- summary of the analysis, focusing on what is considered to be of direct relevance to adjust the programme or to decisions on future funding, including in particular results to date, impact to date and expected impact, efficiency and effectiveness (details can be annexed);
- evaluation findings to date.

The Impact Evaluation Reports should be no longer than 40 pages for the overall evaluation and 20 pages for pillar or project evaluation, excluding annexes and include: an executive summary, description of the methodology, a full analysis of findings and recommendations tailored to the evaluation questions, and a set of actionable recommendations.

Given the lead times from intervention to impact, the first Impact Evaluation Report will focus on formative issues, outcomes, any immediate impacts, and expected future impact on trade and poverty. It will also take a hard look at sustainability. The second Impact Evaluation Report will provide credible assertions of contribution to impact (in all areas including trade, poverty).

Reports should communicate overall approach findings in an accessible way for non-technical readers, including presentation of data in visually appealing ways, highly structured and rigorous summaries of findings and robust and accessible syntheses of key lessons. Recommendations should be timely, realistic, prioritised, evidenced-based, targeted, accessible and clear, in accordance with OECD-DAC and UN guidelines.

Annexes should include: terms of reference, list of people consulted and interviewed at different stages of the evaluation, list of documents reviewed, any analyses and supporting evidence that is considered to be too detailed for the core section.

Draft reports will be subject to an external quality review, managed in accordance with standard DFID procedures for Quality Assurance. Bidders should note this is subject to a 2-weeks turnaround once submitted by DFID for review.

Break clauses

In line with the unknowns associated with development programming, break clauses will be put in place related to continuation and scope of the programme as well as satisfactory delivery and value for money of future workplans.

The break clauses are likely to be at the end of the inception phase, after the baseline report and at the mid-term point.
J. Challenges and Risks

101. Bids should clearly identify challenges, risks, and propose mitigating actions.

102. Key risks and challenges are likely to relate to:

- Complexity of the programme, including conceptual complexity, scale of the programme across multiple countries and multi-layered projects, complex strategic context;
- Reconciling the need for programme-level conclusion with the fact that causal relationships are typically more easily ‘proved’ at the lower level of the causal chain;
- Managing trade-offs between breadth and causal identification in order to secure both feasibility and credibility/rigour/usefulness of the evaluation;
- Examining impact – pathways to poverty reduction and the difficulties in attributing impact to TMEA;
- Uncertainty about the availability and quality of monitoring data;
- The programme and some projects having already started, without collecting all the baseline data that would ideally be used for evaluation;
- The full impact of certain programme components is likely to occur after the current programme end date and even after the current evaluation reporting dates;
- Differences in the interests of stakeholders;
- Changing political economy.

K. Abilities & Expertise to Deliver This Requirement

103. The team will require a broad set of skills to design and manage a complex evaluation of the TMEA programme. For example, private sector development and advocacy assessments will be very different to infrastructure assessments so a diverse range of expertise will be required.

104. Consortia are strongly encouraged as it is expected that this would be necessary to provide the relevant expertise and presence. They may encompass a range of actors including private companies and/or research organisations and/or evaluation institutes, at local or international level.

105. It is also expected that local expertise, knowledge and access will be essential.

106. Bidders will need to complete a conflict of interest declaration. It is expected that organisations or individuals which have had a major involvement with TMEA would be conflicted out for this independent evaluation. However, given the wide scope and size of work to date on the TMEA programme, it is also expected that a large number of organisations well qualified to contribute to this evaluation assignment may have had prior involvement. Therefore minor implementation involvement or impartial engagement in the area of evaluation or monitoring is unlikely to conflict out a bidder. Bidders should state clearly how they will manage any potential conflict of interest. Potential bidders are welcome to seek informal views from DFID early on.
107. Regarding future TMEA activities it is expected that the successful bidder would be conflicted out of future direct implementation activities that could sway the programme during the lifetime of the evaluation. It is unlikely they would be conflicted out of future monitoring or evaluation TMEA contracts, though it will be important to put in place procedures in case of any potential conflict of interest.

108. The Evaluator should combine the following expertise and experience:

**Management expertise**
Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of:
- designing and undertaking large and complex evaluations, at portfolio level with expertise of rigorous impact evaluations at intervention level; using mixed methods approaches that meet recognised standards for credibility and rigor;
- stakeholders management skills and ability to work flexibly with donors, partner countries, private sector entities; demonstrated ability to manage sensitive relationships tactfully and productively;
- communication skills - being strategic as well as able to communicate complex studies and findings in an accessible way for non-technical people;
- using evaluations as a tool for lesson-learning both during programme implementation and beyond;
- Knowledge management expertise.

**Evaluation expertise**
Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of:
- the strengths and limitations of different designs and how to interpret and present findings accurately to both researchers and non-researchers;
- various quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodologies for demonstrating impact;
- undertaking VfM analysis of complex multi-level programmes, combining quantitative and qualitative techniques;

**Sectoral expertise**
Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of:
- trade issues, including political economy particularly in East Africa, and experience of working on evaluations of trade policies and programmes;
- regional integration and political economy issues in the region, particularly those related to trade, familiarity with public/private dialogue and policy advocacy issues in East Africa, and understanding of social inclusion and gender issues in programming in East Africa;
- the possible impact of trade interventions in a range of areas (e.g. revenues, poverty, vulnerability) on different segments of the population, and ability to generate data to analyse programme effects for these (e.g. women vs. men, low income vs. middle income, rural vs. urban, etc.);
L. Logistics and procedures

109. The Evaluator will be responsible for all logistic arrangements required to conduct the evaluation work. TMEA will facilitate convening of meetings and site visits where necessary. All relevant expenses should be covered by the evaluation contract budget.

M. Reporting and contracting arrangements

Contact points

110. The Evaluator will report to Senior Evaluation Adviser and the Wealth Creation Deputy Programme Manager in DFID’s Africa Regional Department.

Governance

111. A Joint Evaluation Group (JEG) is in place to steer and advise the monitoring and evaluation of the TMEA programme at key strategic points. It provides strategic direction on the independent evaluation, and has a strong coordination and facilitation role across the evaluative exercises and to ensure lessons learnt are taken forward. The JEG comprises three PIC members, three senior staff from TMEA (to include the CEO, Strategic Results Director and one other), and one member from the wider stakeholder constituency.

112. The JEG is an advisory sub-committee of the PIC, TMEA’s oversight body. For the independent evaluation, the Evaluation Manager (i.e. the person responsible for managing the contract for the independent evaluation) receives advice from the JEG but formally reports to the PIC, in order to preserve a minimum level of independence.

113. Once the new TMEA constitution is implemented (see Background section) the JEG will report to the new Council. It has already been agreed that membership of the JEG will also be revised at that time to comprise two Council members, one TMEA Board member, one senior TMEA staff member, and one member from the wider stakeholder constituency.

114. Governance and quality assurance is further strengthened by a Reference Group comprising 2 to 3 peer reviewers and 2 to 3 relevant DFID or other donor evaluation advisers. The role of the Reference Group is to review the scientific and technical quality of the independent evaluation; to ensure that the design and implementation of the evaluation is robust and credible and that the evaluation is independent and stands up to external scrutiny. The Reference Group will be coordinated by the Evaluation Manager within the donor agency (DFID) responsible for contracting the independent evaluation on behalf of the PIC.

115. Further details about the governance structure for the evaluation can be found in the TORs for the Joint Evaluation Group (see Annexes).
Meetings

116. Meetings between DFID (acting as Evaluation Manager) and the Evaluator will be held as required by agreement at contracting point.

117. The frequency and broad timing of meetings between the Evaluator, the Evaluation Manager, the JEG, the PIC, and Reference Group will be agreed between DFID and the Evaluator during the Inception Phase. As an indication, we expect the RG and the PIC to engage at the key report stages ie inception, baseline, some interim findings reports, impact 1 and impact 2. The JEG in its facilitation role might meet more frequently.

N. Budget

118. The budget for this evaluation is between £2.3m and £2.7m, with a maximum budget of £300,000 for the inception phase. If a phase 2 TMEA programme is agreed this contract could be extended to evaluate phase 2 to a maximum total value of £3.5m. Bidders are not required to submit a proposal including the maximum £3.5m but for the budget range of £2.3m-£2.7m described above.

119. Bidders are strongly encouraged to compete on the basis of their commercial proposal, demonstrating value for money, as well as technical proposal.

120. Bidders should set out a separate budget for each of the activities outlined above (Inception, Baseline, Impact 1 and Impact 2, and on-going evaluation support), along with an approach and methodology for each. In addition, bidders are requested to be very clear about methodology providing a detailed breakdown of costs for the different significant activities to be undertaken during the evaluation.

121. Bids should provide fully detailed costing for the inception phase, and as detailed as possible for the implementation phase. Parameters used for costing both phases should be very clear, and any assumption used for costing the implementation phase should be verifiable during the inception phase.

122. It is expected that some adjustment and refinement to budget allocation for the implementation phase may be required based on the inception work. Although the budget allocation across components of evaluation will be flexible to a reasonable extent, it will not be possible to increase the total envelope agreed for the contract (other than to extend the scope beyond the current phase, as indicated above).

123. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) will be agreed between DFID and the Evaluator before formal contracting. Bidders are encouraged to make provisions in their commercial tenders to ensure that their fees are linked and subject to performance.

O. Duty of care

124. The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.
125. DFID will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate. DFID will provide the following: A copy of the DFID visitor notes (and a further copy each time these are updated), which the Supplier may use to brief their Personnel on arrival.

126. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training and complete a UK government approved hostile environment training course (SAFE)\(^3\) or safety in the field training prior to deployment.

127. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

128. Tenderers must develop their tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and the initial risk assessment matrix prepared by DFID (see Annexes). They must confirm in their tender response that:
   a. They fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.
   b. They understand the potential risk and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
   c. They have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

129. If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.

130. Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of Duty of Care capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence. In providing evidence, interested Suppliers should respond in line with the Duty of Care section in the ITT Volume 2.

P. References
Annex 1 – Indicative sub-questions for Key Questions in Section E (appended).
Annex 2 – Duty of Care risk assessment (attached)

Programme information
Annex 3 - TMEA strategy 2013-2016 (attached)
Annex 4 - Propositions underpinning TMEA’s strategy, May 2014 [TMEA Theory of Change & explanatory note] (attached)
Annex 5 - TMEA constitution (attached)
Annex 6 - TMEA Business Plan 2014/15 (attached)

\(^3\) UK Government approved hostile environment training course is known as SAFE (Security Awareness in Fragile Environments). The course should be booked through DFID and factored into the commercial tender.
Programme monitoring and evaluation information
Annex 7 - JEG TORS (attached) * Paragraphs 113 and 114 above reflect the updated position on JEG membership and Reference Group (previously Peer Reviewers)
Annex 8 - MEL approach paper (attached)
Annex 9 - TMEA Joint Evaluation Plan (attached)
Annex 10 - TMEA Results Framework (attached)
Annex 11 - Annual Review 2013 (attached)
Annex 12 - TMEA quarter 1 2014-2015 (Jul-Sep) progress report (attached)
Annex 13 - 2012 Upper Quartile report (attached)
Annex 14 – Project list (attached)

TMEA Poverty research
Annex 15 - Briefing paper; TMEA’s approach to mainstreaming the poverty issue
Annex 16 - Research concept paper

Evaluation policies
DFID Evaluation Policy (on web)
DFID Ethics principles for evaluation and research (on web)

Further supportive documents for information, available on request
DFID Business cases (on web)
DFID Elliot Stern paper (on web)
TMEA Business Plan 2013/14
TMEA quarterly progress reports
OSBP survey timetable
SWIFT surveys timetable
TMIS Overview note
Snapshot of a project monitoring plan as per TMIS
Dar Project Appraisal report
Dar MIS quarterly report
Dar monitoring plan
Mombasa Project Appraisal report
Mombasa MIS quarterly report
Mombasa monitoring plan
OSBPs – sample Project Appraisal report (Kagitumba/Mirama)
OSBPs MIS quarterly report
OSBPs monitoring plan
ANNEX 1 – Indicative sub-questions for Key Questions in Section E

**Question 1.** How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the Theory of Change (TOC) and does the TOC provide a reliable guide for programme interventions?

- To what extent are the assumptions underpinning the TOC evidence-based or verified?
- Are the logframe targets and milestones appropriate and realistic?
- To what extent does the programme support EAC regional trade development priorities and address the right set of issues?
- Are the assumptions underpinning the TOC results and links being verified?
- How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the programme or on its relevance?
- Do TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

**Question 2.** What is the likely impact on trade, growth and poor people, and what is critical in order to ensure sustainability of positive impacts?

**Impact on trade** [*very important]*
- What is the impact of achieved trade cost reductions on increased trade (both intra-regional and extra-regional)?
- To what extent have transport time and cost reductions led to transport price reduction?
- To what extent have the removal of NTBs contributed to an enhanced trade environment and to increased trade?
- To what extent have standards harmonisation, and standards testing, impacted on the trade environment and trade flows?
- How has improved trade policy environment led to increased trade?

**Impact on poverty** [*very important]*
- What is the nature and where possible scale of the likely impact of the overall programme and of key TMEA projects in the portfolio on the poor - direct and indirect? Who is affected by potential short or long-term impact, both positive and negative, how, and how is the causality working?
- In particular, who has benefited from reduced trade costs? How are the benefits in reduced transport time and cost being passed on to poor people through lower prices or lower price increases?
- To what extent does the programme benefit from robust analyses of the link between trade and poverty?
- Are complementary policies being adopted to translate the benefits of increased trade into poverty reduction?
- Are measures being taken and successful in mitigating potential negative impacts on any sub-groups, in particular poor people in localised areas?

**Impact on crosscutting issues**
- To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences on women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations including power and influence between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus? [*important]*
- What has the impact been on corruption across the various components, notably at border crossings?
- What impact has the programme had on other issues, such as gender, extractives and environment/climate?

**Sustainability**
- What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?
- What should be the essential components of a future exit strategy in order to sustain impact? [*important]
- Have individual results and overall impact sustained after existing donors stopped funding, and is there a lasting positive impact on the poor?
- How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

**Question 3. Where has the programme been effective and achieved good Value For Money and how could this be improved?**

**Effectiveness**
- To what extent have TMEA activities led to reduction in transport time?
- Where appropriate, to what extent have TMEA activities led to reduction in trade costs (reduced transport costs, reduced regulatory and operating costs, non-tariff barriers)?
- Is the reduction in time leading to increased physical access to markets?
- To what extent have TMEA activities led to greater standards harmonisation and compliance?
- To what extent has TMEA contributed to improved harmonised policies and programmes of key regional and national actors?
- To what extent have TMEA activities led to increased capacity of key national and regional agencies to implement regional integration commitments?
- Where relevant, how have TMEA activities (including revenue authority reforms as well as activities to promote trade flows) led to increased national revenues?
- To what extent have TMEA activities led to the civil society exercising a positive influence on regional integration, including on policy changes?
- To what extent have TMEA activities led to the private sector exercising a positive or negative influence on regional integration?

**Value for Money (VFM)**
- Is the programme providing VFM?
- In which activities/components and countries does the programme achieve higher VFM than others and what are the lessons learnt for driving greater VFM across the board?
- What is the value added (effectiveness) of the regional dimension of the programme? (Contributes to evidence towards a regional thematic evaluation question)

**Operational model: national and regional levels [*very important]**
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model observed to date?
- Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities? What is the effect of constraining factors?
- To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?
**Operational model: Programme set-up**
- To what extent are the Programme’s institutional mechanisms efficient and effective in delivering programme outputs and regional integration objectives?
- Is using one organisation, a not-for-profit company, the best vehicle for impact on trade, and on poverty reduction through trade? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach?
- To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements, together with its financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes, leading to delivery of high quality and timely outputs in ways which represent value for money?
- Is the operational model at donor level the most appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

**Coherence and coordination**
- Did TMEA align with country systems and agencies in the most effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?
- Are the focus and activities of TMEA consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?
- What sort of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa?

**M&E arrangements**
- Provide independent Quality Assurance of TMEA’s monitoring reports.
- Are the monitoring and evaluation tools and processes in place appropriate, both on results and on finances? How could they be strengthened?
Annex B: ToRs revised for Contract Amendment 2
Independent Evaluation of TradeMark East Africa
PO 7024

Terms of Reference
Revised for Contract Amendment 2

A. Introduction
1. The TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) programme aims to improve trade competitiveness in East Africa by reducing transport time/costs and improving the trade environment. During the first strategy period (“Strategy 1”, which ran from 2011 – 2017) it targeted an increase in trade of 10% (above trend 2010-2016), contributing to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. TMEA was set up as a specialist not-for-profit agency to implement the TMEA programme. TMEA is currently funded by the UK, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and USA. TMEA’s secured budget to date totals about £400 million ($640m). The first phase of the programme ran until July 2017. The second phase (“Strategy 2”) began in July 2017 and will run until the end of June 2023.

2. This is a large, high-profile programme in an area of great interest for continued development work, which calls for a robust and independent evaluation. DFID is commissioning this key evaluation as acting Evaluation Manager on behalf of all TMEA donors.

B. Purpose and Objectives

Purpose

3. The evaluation has 2 equally important purposes:

   (a) To identify and feed lessons learnt into the management to (i) adapt the early implementation of Strategy 2, where there are findings which are useful; and (ii) inform the design of future trade programmes which donors may undertake (driver: improving trade development programmes and enhancing the global evidence basis);

   (b) To account for progress at outcome and impact level in an internationally recognised independent and impartial manner (driver: oversight and accountability requirements).

Objectives

4. This is an evaluation to assess the impact of the TMEA programme on trade, inclusive economic growth, and poverty reduction, and understand causal pathways and the mechanisms at work. As an impact evaluation, it emphasises causality and, where possible, attribution or at least contribution to outcomes and impacts.

5. Growth and poverty reduction are high level goals. It may not be possible to measure an attributable impact of TMEA on these goals. However, the evaluation will need to analyse pathways and understand the way in which the TMEA programme has affected poor people, and the way in which it has contributed to growth.

6. The core objectives of the evaluation are:

   1) Test the Theory of Change (TOC), assessing all causal links and the robustness of underlying assumptions (including links between trade, growth and poverty reduction), and adjusting the TOC to serve as a reliable guide to interpret the programme and to make programme improvements.

   2) Analyse and, to the extent possible, measure: the regional integration programmes’ impact on regional trade, growth and poverty (and on the various stakeholders, in particular on men and women separately, poor and vulnerable groups, as well as traders and consumers); and sustainability.

   3) Assess the effectiveness of the TMEA programme, including organisational effectiveness, and whether the programme represents Value For Money.
4) Throughout, identify lessons learnt relevant beyond TMEA, i.e. insights on enabling and constraining factors, critical actions and gaps which would be generalizable to future programmes or to other contexts.

C. Recipients

7. The primary recipients of the services comprise TMEA’s Council and Board alongside the National Oversight Committees which exist in seven countries with active TMEA interventions.

8. The evaluation will provide evidence on trade and development of interest more widely. In particular, outputs of the evaluation are likely to attract significant attention from many actors, including the East African Community (EAC), regional governments, regional institutions such as the EAC Secretariat, multilateral and bilateral partners, business and civil society.

9. The ultimate beneficiaries are the citizens of partner countries, whose lives should be improved through improved projects and programmes.

D. Background

Context

10. Despite significant growth, East Africa’s share of world exports is below 0.1% - around half the global average on a per capita basis. It costs East African countries twice as much to trade than it does East Asian and developed countries. Transport costs are excessive and especially for landlocked countries – freight costs are more than 50% higher than in the United States and Europe and add nearly 75% to the price of exports from Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. [Nathan Associates, 2011] The problem is not just one of distances – inefficient customs and port processes, excessive bureaucracy and poor infrastructure all impose substantial transport delays and significantly increase costs. These problems are both national and regional and advocate for a regional approach to solutions, focused on developing East Africa’s transit corridors to open up its economic opportunities and reduce the high costs of doing business and trade.

11. The East African Community (EAC) was re-established in 1999 by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Burundi. Rwanda subsequently joined in 2007 and South Sudan is undergoing accession. The Customs Union formed in 2005 has led to a 67% increase in trade between EAC countries, but considerable work remains to make it fully effective, such as removing non-tariff barriers, implementing a first point of entry system for the clearance of goods and collection of import duties and implementation of a common trade policy. The Single Customs territory was launched by Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda in January 2014, with Tanzania and Burundi joining later. The EAC is also part of the Tripartite (COMESA-EAC-SADC) initiative, which it chaired from July 2013 to June 2014. The EAC has made the most progress on economic integration of any of the regional economic communities in Africa, and represents a major opportunity for lesson learning across the broader Tripartite through creating a larger market; allowing producers and traders across the region to exploit economies of scale; increasing investment and accelerating the introduction of new technologies. EAC integration is also expected to increase political stability and provide a focus for shared legislative and regulatory reform.

12. Evidence from a range of studies points to improvements in the business environment associated with trade competitiveness leading to improved growth, jobs, incomes and social effects. While the relationship between trade, growth and poverty reduction is complex, very few countries have grown over long periods of time or secured a sustained reduction in poverty without a significant change in competitiveness and a large expansion of their trade. Poverty
reduction in broad terms has followed as a consequence of increases in income, employment and
government social expenditures. However, there are risks and opportunities in the short and
longer term for particular poor groups (and regions) as increased trade transforms livelihood
possibilities.

TMEA

13. TMEA is a multi-donor funded programme, which was officially launched in February 2011 as
a specialist not-for-profit agency to implement programmes to promote trade growth in East
Africa. Over the life of Strategy 1, TMEA aimed to increase exports (by 10% above trend 2010-
2016) through cutting the costs of trade, especially through reduced transport time (by 15%), and
a focus on the national implementation of regional trade agreements. This national focus is
innovative for a regional programme, and as a result, TMEA has presence in all EAC countries
(plus South Sudan, which is joining the EAC) with its headquarters in Kenya. TMEA seeks to
deploy a wide range of instruments quickly, including financial aid, output-based aid and technical
assistance, to tailor interventions to the needs of partners, and to manage fiduciary risk.

Theory of Change (TOC)

14. Figure 1 illustrates the TOC for the TMEA programme. The TMEA (TOC) was first articulated
in 2011, and substantially updated in 2014; it is this 2014 version that the evaluation uses as a
basis for following programme logic, at least at the highest levels. A detailed description is
available in the business cases and a separate TOC document. There are several layers to
TMEA’s TOC. The TOC can be viewed as a hierarchy where various sub-theories link up and
across the programme’s focus areas.

15. At the higher end of the TOC it is proposed that three necessary key ‘trade competitiveness’
elements contribute to increasing trade. These elements are increased physical access to
markets, enhanced trade environment and improved business competitiveness.

16. Correspondingly, TMEA’s 3 Strategic Objectives are articulated as follows:
   SO1 - Increased Physical Access to Markets (around 44% of the budget)
   SO2 - Enhanced Trade Environment (around 42% budget)
   SO3 - Improved Business Competitiveness (around 14% budget)

17. Increased trade is believed to contribute to increased economic growth and subsequently
reduce poverty. Precise effects depend on the nature of trade reforms and how the poor make
their living [Winters & Martuscelli, April 2014]. Thus examining localised situations and the
pathways to growth and poverty is a key part of this evaluation. Economic growth and poverty
reduction do not appear explicitly in TMEA’s overarching TOC since they are very high in the logic
hierarchy; however they are captured in some of the donor programme documents.

18. Each of the boxes in Figure 1 is expected to contribute to increased trade, but no one element
is sufficient by itself. Within this complicated picture of factors that are necessary to achieve
increased trade, TMEA has a more specific focus driven by practical reasons, as indicated
through the colour coding (see legend at bottom right of Figure 1). All current projects now fall in
either the ‘direct’ or ‘enabling’ category.

19. A number of assumptions underpin the relationship between the black boxes and each
strategic objective, which are described in the TOC document.

Figure 1: TMEA’s TOC (2014)
The TMEA Results Framework (RF) offers more detail in that it breaks down the components into outcomes and outputs that are in turn linked to projects; all levels are measured by indicators shown in the RF, and an intermediary output and outcome structure is shown that ties TMEA’s work to the TOC’s more conceptual structure. That structure is shown in Figure 2, below, where Increased EAC Trade appears as the overarching trade impact of programming, measured by three indicators on trade in orange: reduced costs, reduced time, and increased volumes. These are in turn supported (in green) by the SOs, divided into intermediate outcomes (in blue) and the programme outputs (in peach).

**Figure 2: TMEA’s elaborated TOC, inferred from the levels in the RF**
21. It is important to note that the SOs have different names in the TMEA TOC and the TMEA RF (Figures 1 and 2). SO1 is Increased Physical Access to Markets in the TOC but operationalized as “reduced corridor trade times; increased corridor trade volumes” in the RF. SO2 is Enhanced Trade Environment in the TOC and “increased ease of trading across borders” in the RF. SO3 is Improved Business Competitiveness in the TOC and is broken into three sub-SOs in the RF: “Enhanced business environment for trade”, “Improved export capability” and “Efficient trade logistics services”. Nonetheless the TOC and RF titles do have an internal logic, in that their intent is parallel, but perhaps more concrete in the RF. While the TOC provides a graphic representation of what needs to be done to improve trade, in high-level and somewhat abstract terms around regional integration, the RF shows what the project focuses on in order to achieve a parallel array of targets.

22. The RF is therefore an important basis for the evaluation work. For SO1 and SO2, the language from the RF captures the key TMEA results (reduced corridor trade times, increased corridor trade volumes, and increased ease in trading across borders) and the evaluation will use the RF terms for the SOs in these two cases. SO3 is at a different level of abstraction than are SO1 and SO2 and the RF reflects that in having three sub-SOs. To avoid confusion, the evaluation will use the broader category of “improving business competitiveness” in DEQ2.3, to make that SO more parallel with the other two.

23. TMEA refined its component-level strategies in the form of results chains, which might be thought of as component-level TOCs; these will be consulted as a basis for comparison for the Performance Evaluation pathways under Phase 2, and refined through the evaluation process.

24. It is notable that, despite important cross-cutting and cross-component activities within TMEA, in which work under one component is very important for successful work in another, these relationships are not equally explicit in the component results chains. Alongside work to reconstruct component-level results chains where they do not exist or are weaker, this cross-component element will be a subject of consultation and analysis in the performance evaluation, as part of the effort to respond to evaluation questions and test the TOC, while also examining the effects of that coordinated work on effectiveness.

Governance
25. The TMEA Board supervises the activities of TMEA and the TMEA Council provides strategic direction to TMEA to ensure that it achieves its developmental goals. The Board and Council are supported by a regional (EAC) Programme Coordinating Committee (chaired by a Deputy Secretary General at the EAC Secretariat) and a National Oversight Committee (NOC) for each country programme. The scope of authority of the Council and Board are set out in their Constitutions and entrenched in the Articles of Association of TMEA.

26. A unique feature of the TMEA governance structure is the delegation of oversight roles at the national level. Although these National Oversight Committees (NOCs) are mainly advisory bodies to the Board, they play an immensely important role in supervising and monitoring the national level programmes. The NOCs are chaired by Permanent Secretaries (the Ministry of EAC) and membership includes all key donors, government agencies, private sector and civil society representatives.

**Monitoring and evaluation architecture**

27. In August 2013, a revised monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) approach paper was reviewed by the TMEA PIC\(^{11}\). It was agreed to incorporate plans for an independent external evaluation into the MEL to ensure complementarity of the internal and external evaluation work and to avoid duplication. An Evaluation Committee (DFID is a member) was established as a sub-committee to the Board to oversee the evaluation work. The revised MEL approach paper was approved at the PIC meeting in May 2014 and is attached in the Annexes.

28. As set out in the MEL, TMEA’s monitoring and evaluation system is comprised of the following components:

- Overall results framework, a sub-set of outputs from individual project monitoring plan, which serves as an important accountability tool for TMEA donors;
- Individual project monitoring plans;
- Quarterly external progress reports;
- Quarterly internal programme performance review meetings (QuORTs);
- A Management Information System (MIS) that requires TMEA project managers to input and update project work plans and monitoring plans;
- A “Results Meter” has been developed to serve as an aggregate score card to show progress towards targets in the results framework (this Results Meter was subject to an external quality assurance in 2015);
- An Annual Review commissioned by investors to assess progress against the TMEA results framework;
- An evaluation plan, outlining the division of labour between internal TMEA evaluation work (mainly formative evaluations) and the independent external evaluation work (commissioned here).

29. TMEA also has a research programme (previously involving a call down contract with the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). This has examined the literature on linkages between trade, growth and poverty reduction, as well as simulated modelling on the impact of the EAC customs union. However, it has not conducted any primary data collection on TMEA projects.

30. TMEA organises its information management on the basis of around 200+ project budget lines, of which around 165 were active at August 2014. In some instances, several project budget lines could be seen as sub-components of one ‘intervention’ (e.g. support to the revenue authority in Burundi is broken down by categories of expenditure).

\(^{11}\) Programme Investment Committee (PIC) which supervised the activities of TMEA and provided strategic direction to TMEA to ensure that it achieves its developmental goals before the Board and Council were established.
Key stakeholders

31. Key stakeholders for the evaluation include:
   - TMEA donors, who are represented on the Council;
   - The East African Community Secretariat (a Programme Coordinating Committee in Arusha manages the TMEA-EAC partnership);
   - National Oversight Committee (NOC) members (including government, private sector, civil society and donor representatives at the national level);
   - Staff involved in oversight and implementation of TMEA projects;
   - Implementing partners at regional and national level;
   - Ultimate beneficiaries (producers, transporters, clearing and forwarding agents, consumers) of TMEA's programme support.
E. Key questions

32. The key evaluation questions below reflect the 4 core objectives of the evaluation (see section B), which can be summarised as: test the Theory of Change; impact and sustainability; value for money and effectiveness; and lessons learnt relevant beyond TMEA. These are outlined below. Agreed revisions to the key evaluation questions under Contract Amendment 2 are noted.¹²

33. In addition, for each of the key evaluation questions, a set of detailed sub-questions is provided in Annex 1. The Annex also confirms the evaluation deliverable(s) that will answer each detailed evaluation question and its status as at December 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 1</th>
<th>Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs? How has this been affected by the programme's organisational performance and how could this be improved?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question 2</td>
<td>To what extent has TMEA been effective in achieving expected intermediate outcomes and to what extent has TMEA programme been effective in contributing to achieving programme strategic outcomes? Did the programme bring about any unintended outcomes?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These questions will assess effectiveness, economy and efficiency, including whether TMEA activities have produced the outputs anticipated in the results framework, TMEA’s outcome-level performance, organisational effectiveness, and whether and where the TMEA programme has provided value for money. This will also require an assessment of the operational model and of the M&E system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 3</th>
<th>What is the likely impact of TMEA on trade outcomes and growth, and what factors are critical in order to ensure sustainability of positive impacts?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question 4</td>
<td>What is the likely impact of TMEA on poverty and gender, and what factors are critical in order to ensure sustainability of positive impacts?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These questions cover the key issue of TMEA’s current and likely impact on regional trade, the links to growth and poverty reduction, and the sustainability of their interventions. Of particular interest will be to understand the mechanisms at work, to identify why and how things worked, who benefited and how, and any potential negative impact. There is a specific interest in understanding how TMEA activities to reduce transport time have impacted on poor people, and how the programme has benefited or harmed women and girls. Of particular interest also is the issue of sustainability, and of identifying the essential components of a future exit strategy.

Analysing and understanding the pathways through which the TMEA programme is likely to have affected poor people (positive and negative, intended and unintended impacts) is a crucial question for the evaluation. As noted above however, measuring TMEA’s impact on regional poverty as a

¹² HEQ1 and HEQ2 have been revised since the Inception Report. HEQ1 comprises questions about outputs, while HEQ2 and its DEQs will answer questions about outcomes. The latter is to be answered in the Performance Evaluation, while HEQ1 and its DEQs were answered in the Phase 1 deliverables.

¹³ Replaces original question 1: Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs and outcomes? How has this been affected by the programme’s organisational performance and how could this be improved?

¹⁴ Replaces original question 2: Have the port and OSBP projects been effective in delivering their outputs and achieving their trade outcome objectives?
whole programme is not expected to be possible. However, analyses of pathways and measuring localised impact for selected interventions should be feasible. On the other hand, impact on trade is expected to be quantifiable with reasonable attribution, and the evaluation should also verify the programme’s claims to impact on trade.

**Question 5. How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the Theory of Change (TOC)? What does this imply for the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the programmes, and what are the lessons that are relevant beyond TMEA?**

As a premise for the evaluation, the full TOC will need to be re-examined. This question will require an analysis of constraints to trade/growth/poverty reduction, an assessment of the robustness of the assumptions underpinning the TOC, and an assessment of whether the logframes, targets and milestones are appropriate and realistic.

This will need to consider carefully the political economy around the programme and trade in the region, economic contextual changes, policy changes, and TMEA’s relationship with related initiatives (both government and private sector). It will also need to consider the relevance of the instruments and mechanisms used.

All sections above should contribute to understanding what lessons have been learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA. Throughout the evaluation, lessons learnt should be identified that may be relevant beyond TMEA in order to inform future programming as well as contribute evidence towards comparative effectiveness of regional programming. This question is separated out to emphasize the importance of generating learning that is transferable to other programmes (by TMEA donors and others) and which contributes to the global evidence basis, and of capturing this in a way which promotes uptake.

34. **OECD-DAC evaluation criteria map onto the questions structure presented in the Annex to a large extent, but are not of equal interest and the evaluation will focus on effectiveness, efficiency and impact criteria.**

35. **Sub-questions of particularly high importance to the primary recipients (i.e. Council and NOCs) are marked with an asterisk. Not all questions will apply in equal depth at all evaluation stages. Some questions are for consideration early with more of a formative angle, others only at the end but the evidence needs gathering from the outset. Note also that the sub-questions in the Annex may contribute to more than one objective.**

36. **The Evaluator will need to ensure the questions asked meet the 4 objectives.**

**F. Scope**

37. **The independent evaluation commissioned through these TORS consists of one single evaluation. This will include a Theory Based approach located within the TMEA TOC and which includes the pathways to trade and growth and to poverty reduction for the whole portfolio, as well as similar documentation (sub-theories) for individual projects (projects of particular importance would be large investments, those of a catalytic nature, and those targeted to provide livelihood gains to particular groups e.g. small holder farmers and traders).**

38. **Nonetheless, it is expected that to meet its objectives the evaluation will need to be carefully structured, and comprise various components. As an indication, the evaluation is expected to require the following components to address the objectives and key questions:**

   - **A study of impact on poverty**, examining the pathways to poverty across the programme, who is benefiting and who is losing out, and providing a sense of the likely scale of benefits or losses where feasible for example in selected localised areas/interventions.
• **A study of impact on trade**, establishing how trade changed as a result of the TMEA programme, how an increase in trade resulted (if confirmed by the evaluation) or why it did not, key enabling factors and constraints - contextual and programmatic.

• **An institutional assessment of TMEA as an organisation** covering organisational capacity, organisational effectiveness and delivery performance, factors in the wider enabling environment, and partnership analysis across the different partners.

• **A Value for Money (VfM) study** to assess the value delivered from the investment made in TMEA for Strategy 1 and provide recommendations for further enhancing VfM and VfM reporting in Strategy 2.

• **A formal evidence synthesis** approach covering the work of the Evaluator, the monitoring, internal evaluations and learning conducted by TMEA, and evidence from other research activities around trade and poverty reduction in East Africa.

39. The following interventions are of particular interest: Mombasa port, Dar es Salaam port, and the One Stop Border Posts (OSBPs). In particular, the evaluation should look at pathways to poverty on the Mombasa port and at least 3 of the OSBPs, and set out baselines and design for looking at impact of work on the Dar port in due time.

40. The evaluation will need to balance breadth (e.g. to deliver a programme, portfolio level evaluation) and depth (e.g. to understand pathways to poverty impact).

41. Given the project timelines it is expected that the first reports will encompass a substantial formative element.

42. TMEA comprises a number of infrastructure projects. As per key questions, this evaluation examines the effect of the projects, and would exclude engineering inspection type of activities.

43. The broad scope of the contract remains the same. The evaluation will answer five high-level evaluation questions, which remain as per the Inception Report except for an adjustment to move assessment of programme outcomes under Phase 2 (Q2) instead of Phase 1 (Q1). This adjustment provides a clearer distinction between the coverage of the evaluation to date (Q1) and the remaining evaluation work (Q2-5); jointly, the two phases will address the full original scope of the evaluation.

### Roles and responsibilities of the independent Evaluator vs TMEA

44. During inception the Evaluator will need to work with TMEA to determine respective responsibilities monitoring and evaluation activities, particularly for collecting data, for agreement with the Board and Council. The evaluator should be clear about how they will manage the interface with the TMEA organisation and its work and how they will refine this during inception.

45. Broadly speaking, TMEA is responsible for monitoring against the results framework (including outcome level and impact on trade), for project monitoring, and for internal evaluations as indicated in the Joint Evaluation Plan (JEP). The Evaluator is responsible for quality assuring monitoring data, for quality assuring and triangulating any evidence they use, providing recommendations and guidance to strengthen data quality, and identify and carry out new data collection required specifically for the purposes of the independent evaluation.

#### On monitoring data:

46. Data for monitoring the results framework is the responsibility of TMEA, including both underlying and aggregate data. The Evaluator is expected to review periodically the monitoring
data gathered by TMEA (result framework data and other data to be used in the evaluation) and to make prompt recommendations to improve the quality of these data and ensure their suitability for evaluation, and where appropriate to propose complementary data collection measures.

47. The Evaluator will be responsible for the identification and provision of any new primary data needed for the purposes of the independent evaluation – whether as an area not covered by the existing M&E or for triangulation purposes. The Evaluator will need to determine which arrangements would be most cost-effective overall and least burdensome on beneficiaries or programme implementers. If additional data needs to be added to existing TMEA monitoring processes for the purposes of the evaluation, the Evaluator will provide support on methodological development for indicators and data collection.

On evaluations:

48. A Joint Evaluation Plan (JEP) has been agreed by the PIC. Proposed evaluation work has been divided between "internal" (TMEA’s internal evaluation programme, based on learning priorities) and "external" (this independent evaluation).

49. Aside from the overall independent evaluation, the JEP identifies selected key projects under each of TMEA’s three strategic objective (SO) pillars. This independent evaluation will encompass the overall impact evaluation, summative evaluation reports of all three pillars, Mombasa port, Dar es Salaam port, and OSBPs. TMEA will manage internal formative evaluations of selected projects under SO2 and SO3, plus two ex-ante evaluations and summative evaluations needed urgently.

50. For effective learning and consistency of approach, the independent Evaluator and TMEA will need to discuss the internal formative evaluations, to ensure that pertinent issues relevant to the independent evaluation are taken into account such as agreement on indicators, issues to be covered, or exploring relevant challenges.

Links to other programme evaluations

51. The Evaluator will need to consider other evaluations underway in the region, by the TMEA donors or by others, for any substantial overlap or synergies or lesson learning. In particular, the evaluation should consider risks and opportunities faced by the TMEA programme, by learning from evaluative exercises of other trade or integration programmes, such as any IMF or WB regional programme in Africa, DFID’s TMSA, DFID’s AgDevCo, or others. The Evaluator will also be expected to engage constructively with those undertaking other evaluations commissioned by TMEA and its donors, for example by sharing relevant information on their planned approach, logistics and findings where appropriate to avoid duplication.

52. There is also a higher-level evidence question related to the comparative effectiveness of regional programming, which DFID in particular aims to investigate across DFID-funded wealth creation programmes in East Africa. The TMEA evaluation will contribute to this thematic evidence basis (see evaluation questions in Annex 1). This will require flexibility to use a common framework appropriate for future synthesis, while preserving the integrity of the TMEA programme evaluation.

Extensions

53. Provision was included in the original TORs and OJEU notice to extend the evaluation contract for up to 30 months. With the no-cost extension approved by DFID in November 2018, the contract will be extended for nine months to December 2019.

G. Methodology
Evaluation approach and methods

54. The evaluator should provide a clear description of the design and methodology they will use to answer the key questions, including recognised evaluation methods to be used, proposed counterfactuals if/where appropriate, proposed data collection methods, analytical methods, and approach to synthesis. Ideally this would be supported by an illustrative evaluation matrix.

55. This is a complex programme, with multiple countries, multiple multi-layered projects with different stakeholders and beneficiaries. It is critical for bids to explain how the complexity of the programme and of the evaluation will be managed.

56. In particular, careful attention will need to be given to how the evaluation is approached and designed as a coherent whole, anchored on the overarching TOC. It is expected that a range of quantitative and qualitative methods might be necessary. Bids should take care to articulate clearly how the overall design and specific methods and tools fit together. Bids should explain how a potentially large range of elements will fit together to answer the overarching questions, how the synthesis will manage disparate data sources with variable quality and availability, and where and/or how information might be aggregated.

57. The evaluator should pay particular attention to demonstrating how rigour and credibility will be upheld at all stages throughout the evaluation.

58. In 2012 TMEA commissioned Upper Quartile to undertake a review of options for evaluating the Impact and Value for Money of its activities, to help TMEA decide on options on structuring and implementing its evaluation activity. This identified a selection of projects, which is different from the more recent selection in the JEP. Bidders should note that the context has evolved and the scale of TMEA has increased since the 2012 paper, and that the approach to the independent evaluation is expected to present major differences.

59. Secondary data, including TMEA’s own monitoring and evaluation data, should be quality assured. More generally, triangulation of data and/or findings is essential.

60. The evaluator should set out clearly the extent to which the proposed approach will answer the questions, and limitations.

61. The evaluator is strongly encouraged to be as specific as possible in their proposals, including in terms of coverage of any method to be used, the quality level that would be achieved, number of projects covered, sample sizes, etc.

Principles and standards

62. As per DFID evaluation policy, the evaluation should adhere to international best practice standards in evaluation, including the OECD DAC International Quality Standards for Development Evaluation, the OECD DAC principles Standards for Development Evaluation, and DFID’s Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation. Bids should demonstrate how they will achieve this.

63. In line with Paris Declaration principles, the Evaluator - and TMEA M&E approaches - should take account of national M&E systems, draw on existing data where available, ensure new data collection is complementary to existing systems and that new data are made available to national stakeholders as far as possible.

64. Care should be taken to avoid duplication with TMEA’s own monitoring and evaluation work, while also ensuring the independence and impartiality of the overall independent evaluation.
65. Given the importance both of the relationship with TMEA, and of the need for independence, bids should take particular care to explain how they propose to manage relationships, and propose suitable management approaches to ensure the success of the evaluation.

66. Disaggregation of data, including by sex, geographical location and income status will be important throughout the evaluation.

67. The Evaluator will need to comply with DFID’s policies on fraud and anti-corruption and cooperate with any checks required from them for the duration of the evaluation e.g. annual audited statements, policies on management of funds, etc.

**Lesson learning and adaptive management**

To meet the evaluation’s purpose of identifying and feeding lessons learnt into the programme, it is critical that the Evaluator works with stakeholders to cycle ongoing evaluation results back into the evolution of the programme, through regular feedback and reflective activities. This should include building linkages with the programme management A key lesson learned from management of the contract so far has been the importance in particular of strong ongoing dialogue and engagement with TMEA. A strong focus will need to be maintained on this by the evaluator to deliver a high quality evaluation.

68. In particular, to facilitate this, specific points for reflection and decision-making may be identified in addition to programme annual reviews. An element of flexibility from the Evaluator will be essential to maximise evaluation utility and use of the evaluation findings.

69. The evaluator should demonstrate a good understanding and experience of maximising evaluation utility, and outline a convincing approach.

**Stakeholders**

70. More generally, the evaluator should demonstrate robust thinking as to how stakeholders would be engaged throughout the evaluation.

**H. Existing information sources**

71. Data are expected to become available in line with TMEA’s Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) strategy.

**Results frameworks**

72. The TMEA results framework indicates key data collected for monitoring purposes. The mapping of the theory of change in the first section of the Results Framework allows the overall programme logic to be scrutinised. The Results Framework contains (or could contain) all necessary information to track all relevant programme results. The TMEA Knowledge and Results team has been working with project teams to set up project level results chains and monitoring plans. The Evaluator will need to assess the sufficiency and quality of the results framework data.

73. TMEA prioritises monitoring efforts according to the importance of different projects (following an A/B/C classification where for A projects the target is to ensure that monitoring is in line the DCED guidelines and C only attempts to monitor at output level), and also within projects.

**Baseline data at outcome level**

74. Primary data collection on baseline data on outcomes at project level undertaken by TMEA includes: time and traffic surveys for one stop border posts (OSBPs), on cost and time savings for
Single Window Information for Trade (SWIFT) programmes, and baselines for ports. The remainder of this section describes expectations for baseline data as understood at the start of the contract.

75. OSBP time and traffic surveys have been undertaken to establish both queuing time and time taken to clear customs at the border post, as well as the number of vehicles passing through the border post. Baseline surveys were undertaken before the start of the construction of each border post, and end-line surveys are planned to be undertaken on a consistent basis three months after completion of construction at each border and six months after the initial survey is undertaken. Surveys are undertaken for a period of seven days, including day and night time traffic, and provide an estimate of average time for (a) customs processing and (b) queuing for trucks (either specific types of trucks, or all trucks, on a consistent basis for each border). A timetable is available on request.

76. Cost and time savings surveys are planned for all SWIFTs. Intermediate outcome indicators include average processing time for applications, transactions volume rates (per day), average processing costs, and average compliance costs incurred by traders to submit applications. Output level indicators include the number of trade agencies integrated within the SWIFT system and/or other agencies as well as percentages of training and communications plans implemented. Data collection will vary dependent on when the system goes live. Baseline data was set to be collected by the end of October 2014. Time data will then be collected on a quarterly basis while cost data will be collected bi-annually. A timetable is available on request TMEA has recently commissioned a formative evaluation of SWIFTs.

77. Both ports annually (June/July) publish usage and performance statistics that include most or all of TMEA’s top-line indicators. Currently Kenya Airports Authority (KPA) publishes an “Annual Review and Bulletin of Statistics” which includes ship turnaround time, ship waiting time, and berth occupancy, all of which are in TMEA’s monitoring plan. The port monitoring plans also include many smaller-scope operational indicators. TMEA has launched a consultancy at Mombasa port that will (among other things) determine which of these detailed indicators is most important to understanding the overall performance of the port, and assessing the port’s capacity to collect this data. Based on the outcome of this work (first phase was due in 2015) TMEA was to consider any revisions of its monitoring plans.

TMEA Management Information System (TMIS)

78. TMEA’s on-line Management Information System captures data on financial management, and results performance, while the contracts management system has the detailed information on procurement. TMIS is a programme management tool that requires TMEA project managers to input and update project work plans and monitoring plans. Other functionality includes: summary project descriptions, with key contact details of partners; contact reports e.g. recording discussions; attaching key documentation; developing and maintaining project risk matrices; quarterly reporting; list of upcoming planned outputs and outcomes to assist the communications team plan communication activities. TMIS assists TMEA to analyse progress against plans across the portfolio of projects and disaggregate according to such categories as strategic outcomes, type of partners and location. TMIS also includes a results page with all the outcomes and outputs that are to be achieved within different calendar days, and an outcomes page which lists all the outcomes and how they contribute to the TMEA Theory of Change.

79. TMIS Project data is to a great extent already available in TMIS. By end Dec-14, 90% of all information including monitoring plans and risk plans for all projects was due to be available on the MIS, populated with targets/milestones, baselines and actual progress data. By June 2015, all projects were due to have their monitoring plans completed. The Annexes provide an illustrative snapshot of a project monitoring plan as per TMIS. The Evaluator will need to assess the sufficiency and quality of the TMIS data to be used for evaluation purposes.
80. Monitoring procedures are defined in the manual ‘TMEA Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Procedures: how to measure what you are doing, and whether it is working’.

**Progress reports**

81. Quarterly progress reports for projects and responsibility centres have been produced through the MIS, as well as annual project performance reports. While quarterly reports include expenditure versus budget and actual progress against planned progress traffic lights, annual project performance reports require implementers to reflect on changes in assumptions, articulate lessons and outline how future implementation may change as a result. The PIC agreed that TMEA will present progress reports every six months from July 2014.

**Results meter**

82. TMEA has developed a results-meter which aggregates project performance results for key projects to estimate programme results. This is available on request.

**Research on poverty impact**

83. TMEA has commissioned a research paper which explores and maps out direct and indirect linkages between TMEA activities and poverty, together with an analytical framework linking the programme TOC to poverty. The evaluation team will be able to obtain this from TMEA.

84. TMEA’s toolkit on mainstreaming poverty outlines how poverty issues will be explored throughout projects and baseline studies. This has fed into several studies, including women cross-border traders, SWIFT, standards and non-tariff barriers. In the first instance the tool kit was to be applied to priority projects in 6 key areas: OSBPs, ports, railways, standards, customs modernization and ICTs, private sector and civil society / advocacy.

**I. Deliverables and timeframe**

85. The original contract was expected to run from August 2015 and end in March 2019, with the possibility of a 30 month extension depending on supplier performance, on-going programme needs and availability of funds. Following DFID approval of a no cost extension in November 2018, the updated contract will end in December 2019.

86. The contract extension will enable the deliverables to be completed to the required level of quality following a review of the details of the design for Phase 2 of the evaluation to ensure it meets needs and offers value for money. This includes appropriate sequencing of the remaining work to allow for effective synthesis work to explore and reflect findings from the other studies and additional primary data collection to enrich the evaluation.

**Critical moments**

87. At the time the original ToRs were drafted, it was anticipated that evaluation findings may feed in the following:
- Annual Reviews: yearly by mid-Nov.

The Project Completion Report for the regional funding of TMEA Strategy 1 is now scheduled for completion in February 2019. TMEA Strategy 2 began in July 2017. Annual Reviews for TMEA Strategy 2 are now completed by January of each year.

**Overview of deliverables**
88. The evaluator will need to provide the following key outputs, outlined here under and further detailed thereafter:

- At Annex 3 is the Performance Management Report, which DFID will use to help evaluate each deliverable received.

(a) Inception, design and evaluation reports
- Initial Inception Plan
- Inception Report to include QA of existing data and baseline
- Impact Evaluation Report 1 (interim synthesis report): draft by 19th January 2018, approved report 6 weeks later. This has been replaced by a Preliminary Summary of Evaluation Findings.
- Interim reports drafts by (approved reports 6 weeks later),
  - Communication and stakeholders engagement plan, updated regularly. (1 May 2017)
  - Deliverable 5A: Preliminary poverty assessment (30th September 2017)
  - Deliverable 2A: Preliminary output assessment (15th December 2017)
  - Deliverable 3A Consolidated formative evaluation of the priority SO1 interventions (Mombasa port, Dar port and three OSBPs) (19th December 2017)
  - Deliverables 2C, 2D, 2E: Effectiveness and Outcome assessments of SO1, SO2 and SO3 (19th December 2017). This will incorporate the assessment TMEA M&E systems and of the quality of the data.
  - Deliverable 2B: Institutional assessment of TMEA (8th December 2017)
  - Deliverable 6A: Preliminary relevance and sustainability study (trade policy, PEA, pathway mapping) (12th January 2018)
  - Deliverable 2F: Synthesis of effectiveness and outcome of overall TMEA programme (19th January 2018)

The following deliverables have been ‘re-packaged’ for Phase 2 as follows:
  - Deliverables 3B, 3C, 3D: Summative evaluations of Mombasa port, Dar es Salaam port and the OSBPs
  - Impact Evaluation Report 2 (final synthesis report)
  - Final relevance and sustainability study
- Trade, Poverty and Gender Impact Study: Draft report by July 2019
  - Deliverables 4A, 5B: Design report for impact studies WS4 and WS5
  - Poverty impact study
  - Trade impact study
- VfM Assessment: Draft report by September 2019
  - VfM study

15 Deliverable 3A has since been merged with 2C Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation (Infrastructure investment).
16 2C was merged with 3A as mentioned above and 2D merged with 2E.
18 The M&E system review and the Data Quality Assessment were due in the inception phase but completion to DFID reporting standards has been deferred to the implementation phase.
19 2F was merged with 6B the Interim Synthesis report.
(b) Support to TMEA on specific M&E issues
- Fully developed indicators methodology manual or guidance notes for data that are needed to undertake the independent evaluation but are not yet collected through TMEA’s own monitoring and evaluation systems.
- Quality Assurance of TMEA data as required for evaluation purposes, and implementable guidance on any improvements required.

(c) Communication products
These will need to be defined in the communications plans and would include at a minimum, for each Impact Evaluation Report:
- A workshop for the key stakeholders, including the Joint Evaluation Group, explaining the recommendations and agreeing how they can be implemented.
- A ‘key findings’ communication product presenting evidence relevant to development actors beyond the TMEA programme.
- Separate reports on selected interventions or issues (notably Dar, Mombasa, OSBPs)

(d) Instruments and data
- An electronic copy of all the instruments used, including research protocols, questionnaires, guidance notes, etc.
- Database(s) with all the qualitative and quantitative data in a commonly used format, together with clear metadata, and which is anonymised and safeguards confidentiality. Copies should be provided at least yearly.

Instruments and data should be shared with DFID by December 2018 for work on deliverables included in Phase 1, and by October 2019 for Phase 2 deliverables.

(e) Management reports
- Brief quarterly reports on the ongoing evaluation process including any support provided to TMEA. Submission of these reports should be aligned to the quarterly Evaluation committee meetings, so that a summary presented at the meetings. These will then be shared at subsequent Board and Council meetings.

Specific requirements

89. The Inception Plan serves as an intermediate product no longer than 20 pages and should include:
   a. an initial review, validation and adjustment of the Theory of Change;
   b. an initial stakeholders engagement approach;
   c. revised evaluation questions;
   d. discussion of design issues and approach to completion of the inception phase, particularly to assessing data quality and developing the full evaluation framework:
      i. Including a recommendation whether a single design will be presented that provides confidence all key questions and issues will be addressed, or whether two options will be proposed for consideration.

90. The Inception Report should be no longer than 30 pages excluding annexes and include:
   a. a review, validation and/or adjustment of the Theory of Change (including links to growth and poverty reduction):
      i. If revisions to the TOC were necessary, his should clearly present a revised TOC, and indicate the changes (which should have largely been agreed with the implementer before submission of the report, with any area of contention clearly marked, and which will need to be endorsed by the JEG and the Board on the basis of the report)
      ii. clearly mark for each linkage and each assumption, whether it is already strongly evidenced (with supporting references), whether it will be investigated through the independent evaluation (cross-referencing to the relevant questions),
whether evidence is likely to arise from other sources, or whether it will remain unsupported by evidence.

b. a stakeholders engagement approach, supported by a stakeholders mapping;
   i. a communication and dissemination plan;
   ii. this should list stakeholders, their specific interest in the evaluation, proposed means and timing of communication (which should be considered both ways)

c. an agreed set of finalised questions and evaluation framework - based on evidence gaps in the Theory of Change, stock-take on the programme to date and requirements of stakeholders of the evaluation;
   i. the inception report should list people consulted and in what form, as well as their affiliation

d. the refined evaluation design or design options, a detailed explanation of evaluation methods to be used, exploration and justification of methodological issues, project selection, proposed counterfactuals where appropriate, and proposed data collection methods;
   i. any selection process should be fully transparent, with a list of criteria and a mapping of how all the units (selected and non-selected) against these criteria
   ii. in the case of more than one option, related scope of findings, costs and risks (points 11, 13, 14)
   iii. a framework for synthesis should be provided and particular care taken to demonstrate how the information will be brought together
   iv. an articulation of other designs that have been considered but rejected, and why
   v. a discussion of potential ethical issues arising and how they will be addressed

e. an evaluation matrix, which maps the proposed evaluation design, methods and analytical plan against the evaluation questions;
   i. the evaluation matrix should provide clearly the following details (which could be thought of as column headings):
      1. Evaluation stage or report
      2. Evaluation question to be answered
      3. Methodology
      4. Indicators or analytical plan
      5. Data required to answer the question using the proposed method
      6. Data source, including quality (robustness) assessment
      7. Type of data source: including whether to be collected by the Evaluator, available from TMEA monitoring systems, TMEA internal evaluations, or available from other sources (which should be specified)
      8. Report to be included
      9. When it will be received

f. identification of programme monitoring data required from the PMU to meet evaluation needs and timings for this, particularly baseline data;
   i. identification should be down at indicator level and indicative coverage
   ii. including a timeline for the preparation of guidance and any other support

g. full quality assurance of all data to be used from TMEA's own monitoring and evaluation;
   i. appropriateness of the overall TMEA monitoring and evaluation system for the purposes of the independent evaluation;
   ii. for each full dataset or indicator, a definitive statement of the quality of the data, of what the data can be used for and what they cannot be used for;
   iii. the conclusion should be fully supported by evidence in the quality assurance review against the DQAF or other recognised quality assurance framework as agreed with DFID (including in depth assessment of specific components and of at least 15 projects; ground truthing project level data; and triangulation and/or replication of estimates);

h. proposal on collection of new primary data – including new baseline data and triangulation data;
i. proposals should clearly delineate the scope of the data collection, including in particular but not exclusively the proposed coverage (e.g. sectoral, geographical, demographic if relevant, frequency), and sample size

ii. an agreed division of labour between TMEA and the Evaluator, specific and detailed, down to activity level;

iii. for each M&E activity, the description of the division of labour needs to detail the responsibilities of TMEA, of the evaluator, and of any other party such as the EC.

j. a description of the scope of findings to be available in the reports, particularly the first report, and a clear delineation of the depth of information to be provided in each of the impact evaluation reports;

ii. an overarching table or narrative which provides, against each purpose and key question, a clear sense of the type of answers which the evaluation will provided at specific reporting times.

iii. Ideally this would be accompanied (in inception discussion or in report annexes) by made-up conclusions to ensure key users have a clear understanding of what the evaluation will and will not provide.

iv. in particular but not exclusively: whether the findings would provide a tentative, plausible or definite answer to each of the relevant questions, the level of disaggregation;

v. a detailed specification of the contents of each report.

k. a detailed workplan;

i. including an output specification for all deliverables including evaluation reports

ii. detailing the activities that will take place under each output, the inputs for each activity and budget by month.

l. a final costing for the implementation phase;

i. This should provide estimated costs broken down at activity level, for example in particular:

1. for a specific new data collection, to provide breakdown by data collection exercise (e.g. baseline/mid-term/end-term) by country, cost of sub-contractor (enumeration, data entry, analysis), cost of supervision, of translation, etc.

2. of Quality Assuring TMEA data, and of providing guidance

3. of each field visit by international staff

m. a review of challenges and risks, mitigating actions and fall-back options.

i. A comprehensive risk matrix assessing the likelihood and impact of each risk.

ii. Covering all areas of risk to the programme, including but not limited to: stakeholder, political economy, data quality, complexity, attribution, synthesis, security etc.

iii. Thoughtful mitigation and a residual risk rating applied.

n. Initial baseline assessment:

i. description of the methodology;

ii. baseline for all indicators using secondary data (TMEA monitoring data and other data);

iii. highlighting where the gaps are;

iv. methodologies, instruments and protocols for data collection;

v. summary of the analysis, focusing on what is considered to be of direct relevance to adjust the programme or to decisions on future funding, including in particular results to date, impact to date and expected impact, efficiency and effectiveness (details can be annexed);

vi. confirmation of the extent for all primary data collection (including the freight forwarding survey) and when this baseline data will be presented.

vii. evaluation findings to date.
91. Completion of some of these requirements has been deferred to the implementation phase, and absorbed in other deliverables or contract amendments deliverables specification, notably sections a, b, d, g, h, j, k, l, n.

92. For the deliverables to be covered by Phase 2 of the evaluation, the Design and Work Plan for Phase 2 at Annex 2 and updated proforma, in the Schedule of Prices in Section 5 of this contract amendment, provide an updated agreed basis for j, k, l in particular. These take precedence over the equivalent details originally captured in the Inception Report for the deliverables now included in the Performance Evaluation, Trade, Poverty and Gender Impact Study and Value for Money Assessment.

93. The Final Evaluation Reports should be no longer than 60 pages for the overall evaluation and 40 pages for pillar or project evaluation, excluding annexes and include: an executive summary (self-contained and with diagrams as needed so that it can also serve as a user-friendly standalone document), summary of the methodology, a full analysis of findings and recommendations tailored to the evaluation questions, and a set of actionable recommendations.

94. All reports should communicate overall approach findings in an accessible way for non-technical readers, including presentation of data in visually appealing ways, highly structured and rigorous summaries of findings and robust and accessible syntheses of key lessons. It is acceptable for the technical details to be held within the main part of the reports. Recommendations should be timely, realistic, prioritised, evidenced-based, targeted, accessible and clear, in accordance with OECD-DAC and UN guidelines.

95. Annexes should include: terms of reference, list of people consulted and interviewed at different stages of the evaluation, list of documents reviewed, any analyses, methodology, data and supporting evidence that is considered to be too detailed for the core section.

96. Draft reports will be subject to an external quality review, managed in accordance with standard DFID procedures for Quality Assurance. The evaluator should note this is subject to a 2-week turnaround once submitted by DFID for review. The evaluator should ensure they assess the draft report against the EQUALS checklist prior to submission.

97. Both parties (DFID and OPM) must be in agreement of the final specification of all deliverables prior to the deliverable due date. In addition to the above specifications, the remaining reports will be delivered in line with the Phase 2 Design & Work Plan (version of 13 November 2018 agreed by DFID on 22 November 2018) at Annex 2, the proforma in the Schedule of Prices in Section 5 of this contract amendment and taking into account the criteria set out at Annex A of the illustrative assessment considerations in the Contract Performance Management Report at Annex 3 (Annex 2 in Amendment 1, 2018).

**Break clauses**

98. In line with the unknowns associated with development programming, break clauses will be put in place related to continuation and scope of the programme as well as satisfactory delivery and value for money of future workplans.

99. The break clauses in the original contract were at the end of the inception phase, after deliverable 6B due in August 2017, and after 3B, C and D\(^20\) (summative evaluations) which were due in October 2018.

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\(^{20}\) A correction has been made to the January 2018 ToRs which erroneously referred to 3C, D and E. The summative evaluations are 3B, C and D.
100. Under the revised contract, deliverables 3B, C and D have now been incorporated into the Performance Evaluation deliverable due in May 2019. The remaining break clause in the revised contract is therefore after the Performance Evaluation deliverable in May 2019.

101. DFID reserves the right to not proceed with the impact studies if the design identifies the studies would not be of benefit to the programme.

J. Challenges and Risks

102. Bids should clearly identify challenges, risks, and propose mitigating actions.

103. Key risks and challenges are likely to relate to:

- Complexity of the programme, including conceptual complexity, scale of the programme across multiple countries and multi-layered projects, complex strategic context;
- Reconciling the need for programme-level conclusion with the fact that causal relationships are typically more easily ‘proved’ at the lower level of the causal chain;
- Managing trade-offs between breadth and causal identification in order to secure both feasibility and credibility/rigour/usefulness of the evaluation;
- Examining impact – pathways to poverty reduction and the difficulties in attributing impact to TMEA;
- Uncertainty about the availability and quality of monitoring data;
- The programme and some projects having already started, without collecting all the baseline data that would ideally be used for evaluation;
- The full impact of certain programme components is likely to occur after the current programme end date and even after the current evaluation reporting dates;
- Differences in the interests of stakeholders;
- Changing political economy.
- Fiduciary risk including risk of fraud, corruption or diversion of DFID funds.
- Security risks to staff relating to the operating context.
- Safeguarding risks: Insufficient controls in place mean that individuals working with the evaluators or within the lead or consortium evaluator organisations are exposed to inappropriate behaviour or exploited.
- Staff turnover and difficulties relating to mobilisation and retention of key personnel affect effective delivery of the evaluation.
- Data protection risks, including risks around data being improperly used/stored
- Risks around effective communication with stakeholders resulting in insufficient engagement and information sharing which negatively affects the quality of relationships with stakeholders and the quality of the evaluation.

K. Abilities & Expertise to Deliver This Requirement

104. The team will require a broad set of skills to design and manage a complex evaluation of the TMEA programme. For example, private sector development and advocacy assessments will be very different to infrastructure assessments so a diverse range of expertise will be required.

105. Consortia are strongly encouraged as it is expected that this would be necessary to provide the relevant expertise and presence. They may encompass a range of actors including private companies and/or research organisations and/or evaluation institutes, at local or international level.

106. It is also expected that local expertise, knowledge and access will be essential.
107. Bidders will need to complete a conflict of interest declaration. It is expected that organisations or individuals which have had a major involvement with TMEA would be conflicted out for this independent evaluation. However, given the wide scope and size of work to date on the TMEA programme, it is also expected that a large number of organisations well qualified to contribute to this evaluation assignment may have had prior involvement. Therefore minor implementation involvement or impartial engagement in the area of evaluation or monitoring is unlikely to conflict out a bidder. Bidders should state clearly how they will manage any potential conflict of interest. Potential bidders are welcome to seek informal views from DFID early on.

108. Regarding future TMEA activities it is expected that the successful bidder would be conflicted out of future direct implementation activities that could sway the programme during the lifetime of the evaluation. It is unlikely they would be conflicted out of future monitoring or evaluation TMEA contracts, though it will be important to put in place procedures in case of any potential conflict of interest.

109. The Evaluator should combine the following expertise and experience:

**Management expertise**

Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of:

- designing and undertaking large and complex evaluations, at portfolio level with expertise of rigorous impact evaluations at intervention level; using mixed methods approaches that meet recognised standards for credibility and rigor;
- stakeholder management skills and ability to work flexibly with donors, partner countries, private sector entities; demonstrated ability to manage sensitive relationships tactfully and productively;
- communication skills - being strategic as well as able to communicate complex studies and findings in an accessible way for non-technical people;
- using evaluations as a tool for lesson-learning both during programme implementation and beyond;
- Knowledge management expertise.

**Evaluation expertise**

Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of:

- the strengths and limitations of different designs and how to interpret and present findings accurately to both researchers and non-researchers;
- various quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodologies for demonstrating impact;
- undertaking VfM analysis of complex multi-level programmes, combining quantitative and qualitative techniques;

**Sectoral expertise**

Strong understanding and demonstrated experience of:

- trade issues, including political economy particularly in East Africa, and experience of working on evaluations of trade policies and programmes;
- regional integration and political economy issues in the region, particularly those related to trade, familiarity with public/private dialogue and policy advocacy issues in East Africa, and understanding of social inclusion and gender issues in programming in East Africa;
- the possible impact of trade interventions in a range of areas (e.g. revenues, poverty, vulnerability) on different segments of the population, and ability to generate data to analyse programme effects for these (e.g. women vs. men, low income vs. middle income, rural vs. urban, etc.);
L. Logistics and procedures

110. The Evaluator will be responsible for all logistic arrangements required to conduct the evaluation work. TMEA will facilitate convening of meetings and site visits where necessary. All relevant expenses should be covered by the evaluation contract budget.

M. Reporting and contracting arrangements

Contact points

111. The Evaluator will report to DFID Management Group which consists of: Senior Evaluation Adviser, Senior Trade Adviser and the Prosperity Programme Manager in DFID’s Africa Regional Department.

Governance

112. An Evaluation Committee (EC) is in place to steer and advise the monitoring and evaluation of the TMEA programme at key strategic points. It provides strategic direction on the independent evaluation, and has a strong coordination and facilitation role across the evaluative exercises and to ensure lessons learnt are taken forward. The EC comprises two representatives of Council members, one TMEA Board member, one senior TMEA staff member, and one representative of members of the wider stakeholder constituency.

113. The EC is an advisory sub-committee of the Council. For the independent evaluation, the Evaluation Manager (i.e. the person responsible for managing the contract for the independent evaluation) receives advice from the EC but formally reports to the Council, in order to preserve a minimum level of independence.

114. Governance and quality assurance is further strengthened by an Independent Peer Reviewer and a Donor Reference Group comprising 5 to 6 relevant DFID or other donor evaluation and growth advisers. The role of the Reference Group and Independent Peer Reviewers is to review the scientific and technical quality of the independent evaluation; to ensure that the design and implementation of the evaluation is robust and credible and that the evaluation is independent and stands up to external scrutiny. The Donor Reference Group will be coordinated by the Evaluation Manager within the donor agency (DFID) responsible for contracting the independent evaluation on behalf of the Council.

115. Further details about the governance structure for the evaluation can be found in the TORs for the governance of the evaluation.

Meetings

116. Meetings between DFID (acting as Evaluation Manager) and the Evaluator will be held monthly during the inception phase and then as required. For the remainder of the revised evaluation contract from December 2018 to December 2019, meetings will be held at least monthly.

117. The frequency and broad timing of meetings between the Evaluator, the Evaluation Manager, the EC, the Council, and Reference Group will be agreed between DFID and the Evaluator during the Inception Phase. As an indication, we expect the DRG and the Council to engage at the key report stages i.e. inception, baseline, some interim findings reports, and each of the final evaluation reports. The EC in its facilitation role might meet more frequently.
Management

118. The costed workplan should be shared with DFID’s Deputy Programme Manager by the 25th of every month, confirming actual work undertaken that month and updating forecasts for future periods.

N. Budget

119. The budget for this evaluation is £2,421,697.

120. Bidders are strongly encouraged to compete on the basis of their commercial proposal, demonstrating value for money, as well as technical proposal.

121. Bidders should set out a separate budget for each of the activities outlined above along with an approach and methodology for each. In addition, bidders are requested to be very clear about methodology providing a detailed breakdown of costs for the different significant activities to be undertaken during the evaluation.

122. Bids should provide fully detailed costing for the inception phase, and as detailed as possible for the implementation phase. Parameters used for costing both phases should be very clear, and any assumption used for costing the implementation phase should be verifiable during the inception phase.

123. The original TORs anticipated that some adjustment and refinement to budget allocation for the implementation phase may be required based on the inception work. The TORs stated that the budget allocation across components of evaluation would be flexible to a reasonable extent, but that it would not be possible to increase the total envelope agreed for the contract (other than to extend the scope beyond the current phase, as indicated above).

124. Some refinement to the budget allocation across evaluation components for the implementation phase has been approved through Contract Amendments 1 and 2 based on the inception work and detailed design work for Phase 2. No further substantive changes are expected to the budget allocation across evaluation components for the remainder of the evaluation contract.

125. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are included in the Contract Management Plan. Bidders are encouraged to make provisions in their commercial tenders to ensure that their fees are linked and subject to performance.

O. Duty of care

126. The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

127. DFID will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate. DFID will provide the following: A copy of the DFID visitor notes (and a further copy each time these are updated), which the Supplier may use to brief their Personnel on arrival.
128. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training and complete a UK government approved hostile environment training course (SAFE)\(^{21}\) or safety in the field training prior to deployment.

129. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

130. Tenderers must develop their tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and the initial risk assessment matrix prepared by DFID. They must confirm in their tender response that:
   a. They fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.
   b. They understand the potential risk and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
   c. They have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

131. If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.

132. Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of Duty of Care capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence. In providing evidence, interested Suppliers should respond in line with the Duty of Care section in the ITT Volume 2.

**P. General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR)**

133. Please refer to the details of the GDPR relationship status and personal data (where applicable) for this project as detailed in Appendix A and the standard clause 33 in section 2 of the contract.

**Q. References**

Indicative sub-questions for Key Questions in Section E

Duty of Care risk assessment

*Programme information*

TMEA strategy 2013-2016
Propositions underpinning TMEA’s strategy, May 2014 [TMEA Theory of Change & explanatory note]
TMEA constitution
TMEA Business Plan 2014/15

*Programme monitoring and evaluation information*

JEG TORS • Paragraphs 113 and 114 above reflect the updated position on JEG (now EC) membership and Reference Group (previously Peer Reviewers)
MEL approach paper

\(^{21}\) UK Government approved hostile environment training course is known as SAFE (Security Awareness in Fragile Environments). The course should be booked through DFID and factored into the commercial tender.
TMEA Joint Evaluation Plan
TMEA Results Framework
Annual Review 2013
TMEA quarter 1 2014-2015 (Jul-Sep) progress report
2012 Upper Quartile report
Project list
TMEA Evaluation Inception Report
TMEA Evaluation Phase 2 Design & Workplan (13 Nov 2018)
TMEA Evaluation Schedule of Prices Contract Proforma Variances (10 Dec 2018)

**TMEA Poverty research**
Briefing paper; TMEA’s approach to mainstreaming the poverty issue
Research concept paper

**Evaluation policies**
DFID Evaluation Policy ([on web](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development/evaluation-policy))
DFID Ethics principles for evaluation and research ([on web](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development/ethics-principles-for-evaluation-and-research))

**Further supportive documents for information**
DFID Business cases ([on web](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development/business-cases))
DFID Elliot Stern paper ([on web](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development/elliott-stern-paper))
TMEA Business Plan 2013/14
TMEA quarterly progress reports
OSBP survey timetable
SWIFT surveys timetable
TMIS Overview note
Snapshot of a project monitoring plan as per TMIS
Dar Project Appraisal report
Dar MIS quarterly report
Dar monitoring plan
Mombasa Project Appraisal report
Mombasa MIS quarterly report
Mombasa monitoring plan
OSBPs – sample Project Appraisal report (Kagitumba/Mirama)
OSBPs MIS quarterly report
OSBPs monitoring plan
ANNEX 1 – Detailed Evaluation Questions (DEQ) for High level Evaluation Questions (HEQ) in Section E

The High-level and Detailed Evaluation Questions (HEQs and DEQs, respectively) contained in the tables below have been slightly updated to reflect the changes in implementation, terminology and priority areas for study since the Inception Report was approved. Where DEQs were answered in previous deliverables, this is noted with the deliverable in bold in the right column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ122 and its DEQs</th>
<th>Status and corresponding deliverable(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEQ1: Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs? How has this been affected by the programme’s organisational performance and how could this be improved?</td>
<td>Answered:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.1 To what extent are TMEA programmes’ outputs generally consistent with the programme TOC?</td>
<td>• 2A Preliminary Output Assessment mapped all projects across all three SOs against the TMEA TOC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2C/3A Interim evaluation of SO1 answers the question for SO1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3 answers this question for SO2 and SO3 outputs, based on a sample of 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.2 Were project outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the project output targets within the programme time-span?</td>
<td>Answered:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2C/3A Interim evaluation of SO1 answers the question for SO1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3 answers this question for SO2 and SO3 outputs, based on a sample of 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.3 What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the project outputs? What are the reasons for non-achievement of the outputs?</td>
<td>Answered:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.4 Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?</td>
<td>Answered for SO1:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2C/3A Interim evaluation of SO1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partially answered for SO2 and SO3:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To be completed in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.5 To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. government agencies and the</td>
<td>Answered:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2C/3A Interim evaluation of SO1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 HEQ1 and HEQ2 have been revised since the Inception Report. HEQ1 comprises questions about outputs, while HEQ2 and its DEQs will answer questions about outcomes. The latter is to be answered in the Performance Evaluation, while HEQ1 and its DEQs were answered in the Phase 1 deliverables.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ1.7 To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?</th>
<th>2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATUS PENDING:</td>
<td>- 2B Institution and Organisation Assessment explicitly addresses this question, but some queries have been raised by EQUALS review which are still being addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- There is also detailed information on management, systems and processes in 2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3 for 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ1.8 To what extent do TMEA’s financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATUS PENDING:</td>
<td>- 2B Institution and Organisation Assessment explicitly addresses this question, but some queries have been raised by EQUALS review which are still being addressed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- There is also detailed information on financial and risk management processes in 2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3 for 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- There is also detailed information on financial and risk management process in SO1 in 2C/3A Interim evaluation of SO1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ1.9 To what extent do the processes TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATUS PENDING:</td>
<td>- 2B Institution and Organisation Assessment explicitly addresses this question, but some queries have been raised by EQUALS review which are still being addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- There is also detailed information on organisational learning and good practice sharing in 2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3 for 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ1.10 Are the M&amp;E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in terms of results and in terms of finances? How could they be strengthened?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATUS PENDING:</td>
<td>- Our Assessment of Monitoring and Evaluation Function at TMEA explicitly addresses this question – this was previously included as an annex to the Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report (6B) but will now be included as an annex to the Institutional Assessment (2B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2B Institution and Organisation Assessment includes a section on this question – this is being re-written in response to the EQUALS review, in line with the M&amp;E function assessment annex referred to in the previous bullet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- There is also detailed information on M&amp;E tools and processes in 2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3 for 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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23 “Government agencies” were added to DEQ1.5, given that many TMEA activities partner with national counterparts to implement programming. DEQ1.6 on outcomes has been subsumed into the new HEQ2 on programme and strategic outcomes.
HEQ24,25: To what extent has TMEA been effective in achieving expected intermediate outcomes and to what extent has TMEA programme been effective in contributing to achieving programme strategic outcomes? Did the programme bring about any unintended outcomes?

DEQ2.1 To what extent has TMEA contributed to reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes?26
DEQ2.2 To what extent has TMEA contributed to increasing ease of trading across borders?
DEQ2.3 To what extent has TMEA contributed to enhancing business environment for trade, improving export capabilities and improving efficiency of trade logistics services?
DEQ2.4 Has TMEA caused any unintended outcomes? What are they and who has been affected?

DEQ2.1 To what extent has TMEA contributed to reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes?26
DEQ2.2 To what extent has TMEA contributed to increasing ease of trading across borders?
DEQ2.3 To what extent has TMEA contributed to enhancing business environment for trade, improving export capabilities and improving efficiency of trade logistics services?
DEQ2.4 Has TMEA caused any unintended outcomes? What are they and who has been affected?

Unanswered

Performance evaluation (3B)

HEQ3 and its DEQs

HEQ3: What is the likely impact of TMEA on trade outcomes and growth, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?

Effectiveness: programme-level trade outcomes

DEQ3.1 To what extent have TMEA interventions, including those of a policy nature, led to a reduction in trade times, trade costs and trade risks?27

Unanswered

Trade and growth impact study (5B)

Trade impact

DEQ3.2 What has been the impact of any achieved trade cost reductions from TMEA on trade (both intra- and extra-regional)?28

Unanswered

Trade and growth impact study

DEQ3.3 How has any improved trade policy environment led to increased trade?

Unanswered

Economic growth impact

DEQ3.4 To what extent has any changes in trade resulting from TMEA interventions contributed to economic growth?

Unanswered

Trade and growth impact study

DEQ3.5 What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?29

Unanswered

24 The original HEQ2 dealt solely with OSBP and Ports projects, and was partially answered in the formative evaluation (Deliverable 3A). However, DFID asked to ensure the outcomes question (DEQ1.6) was more completely answered. This proposed new HEQ is the result.
25 Being “effective” in achieving outcomes is added in the Sept 18, 2018 draft at DFID’s request, so the language sounds the same as that from the deleted DEQ1.6.
26 HEQ2 was previously focused only on ports and OSBPs, but is here extended to cover all strategic outcomes. The first three sub-questions were reformulated to correspond to the TOC. DEQ2.4 was added.
27 The former DEQ3.2 was a repeat of this question, only about policy interventions. These have been combined to ensure context and intervention logic and outcomes are considered together.
28 The word “increased” was removed from modifying “trade”, as the impact has not yet been determined. “Increased” presumed an impact.
29 This question, and 4.6, were added in response to DFID’s comment that the HEQ
### HEQ 4 and its DEQs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ4: What is the likely impact of TMEA on poverty and gender, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty impact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.1 What is the nature – and, where possible, scale – of the likely impact of the overall programme and of key TMEA projects in the portfolio on the poor—direct and indirect? Who is affected by potential short- or long-term impacts, both positive and negative, how, and how is the causality working?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.2 In particular, who has benefited from reduced trade costs? How are the benefits in reduced transport time and cost being passed on to poor people through lower prices or lower price increases?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.3 Are complementary policies being adopted to translate the benefits of increased trade into poverty reduction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.4 Are measures being taken, and are they successful, in mitigating potential negative impacts on any sub-groups – in particular poor people in localised areas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-cutting issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.5 To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.6 What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HEQ5 and its DEQs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ5: How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the TOC? What does this imply for the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the programme, and what are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programme relevance: TOC causal links and assumptions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the TOC evidence-based or verified?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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30. It is critical to note that this will be speculative and subject to exogenous distortions. Tracing causality rigorously, this far along the results chain, is outside the scope of the evaluation.

31. We eliminated DEQ5.2 “Are the results framework targets and milestones relevant and realistic?” Given the late advent of this evaluation, a year after the RF was finalised, support mentions sustainability but the DEQs did not.
Preliminary evidence is provided in **6B Interim Evaluation Summary Report**

| DEQ5.3 To what extent does the programme support EAC regional trade development priorities? | Partially answered in **6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment** for outputs; to be completed in the **Performance Evaluation** |
| DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the programme or on its relevance? | Unanswered; to be answered in the **Performance Evaluation** |
| DEQ5.5 Do TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)? | Partially answered in **6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment** for projects; to be completed in the **Performance Evaluation** |

**Coherence and coordination**

| DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model observed to date? | Unanswered; to be answered in the **Performance Evaluation** |
| DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities? | Partially answered:  
- **6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment** for projects;  
- To be completed in the **Performance Evaluation** |
| DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened? | Unanswered; to be answered in the **Performance Evaluation** |
| DEQ5.9 Is using one organisation – a not-for-profit company – the best vehicle for impact on trade, and on poverty reduction through trade? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach? | Unanswered; to be answered in the **Performance Evaluation** |
| DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs? | Unanswered; to be answered in the **Performance Evaluation** |
| DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems? | Unanswered; to be answered in the **Performance Evaluation** |
| DEQ5.12 Did TMEA align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be | Partially answered:  
- **2C/3A Interim evaluation of SO1** |

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to make targets and milestones more relevant and realistic is unhelpful. This is particularly true in light of their new Strategy 2 RF with deeply altered indicators, targets and milestones, and in light of the DFID Annual Reviews’ intensive and detailed suggestions that underpin many of those changes.
DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of TMEA consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

Partially answered:

- **2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5; and
- **2C/3A Interim evaluation of SO1 for SO1**
- To be completed in the *Performance Evaluation*

DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa? 

Partially answered in:

- **2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5; and
- **2C/3A Interim evaluation of SO1 for SO1**
- To be completed in the *Performance Evaluation*

### Sustainability

DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

Partially answered in:

- **6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment** for outputs
- **2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5
- To be completed in the *Performance Evaluation*

DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

Partially answered in:

- **2D/2E Interim evaluation of SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with project-specific detail in Annex 5; and
- **2C/3A Interim evaluation of SO1 for SO1**
- To be completed in the *Performance Evaluation*

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32 Two DEQs here, sub-titled “Cross-cutting”, have been eliminated. The first read: “What has the impact been on corruption across the various components, notably at border crossings?” While the evaluation team will speak with team members about how corruption might have affected their work, this DEQ could be an impact study of its own. However, TMEA did not directly undertake projects on corruption, so looking for their impacts expends resources on a tangential pursuit. The DEQ on unintended consequences will cover this issue as and when it arises. Moreover, corruption is extremely sensitive in the context, as TMEA continue to interact with institutions that would see this as criticism of a very high and offensive order.

Similarly, DEQ5.16 asked “What impact has the programme had on other issues, such as extractives and environment/climate?” which would examine issues well outside TMEA’s areas of influence and focus. While the Mombasa port project worked on “green port” practices, this is the only substantial, direct TMEA activities related to environment and climate. None related to extractives. TMEA has a difficult enough job to influence the areas it is working on directly, and the evaluation to capture them, without seeking impacts in areas where they didn’t intervene. “Other issues” are better covered under the HEQ2 “unintended impact” question, than devoting attention and resources the evaluation team needs for other EQs.

33 DEQ5.18 here read “What should be the essential components of a future exit strategy in order to sustain impact?” Exit strategies were salient at project level (and covered in detail in deliverable 2D/E and its Annex 5), but not at programme level, as TMEA intended to continue operations with or without donor funding. TMEA are currently in Strategy 2 and talking about “Strategy 3” even today. The evaluation will continue to talk about sustainability in DEQ5.17 and especially 5.20, which was are more appropriate to how TMEA operated during Strategy 1, when there effectively was no exit strategy. DEQ5.19 read “What is the likelihood that individual results and overall impact will be sustained after existing donors stop funding, and will there be a lasting positive impact on the poor” which is duplicative of DEQ5.17 and the new question at DEQ4.6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VfM Assessment</th>
<th>Partially answered in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.21 Is the programme providing VFM?</td>
<td>• 2B Institution and Organisation Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To be answered in the VFM study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.22 In which activities/components and countries does the programme achieve higher VFM than others and what are the lessons learnt for driving greater VFM across the board?</td>
<td>Unanswered; to be answered in the VFM study</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex C: Amendments to original TORs
The evaluation has two specific purposes:

- **Accountability**: Assessing TMEA processes, results and overall value in an independent and impartial manner consistent with generally accepted principles and standards for professional evaluation.
- **Learning**: Identifying and feeding lessons learnt into the management of the remainder of the current programme and the design of any potential continuation of the TMEA programme, as well as future regional trade integration programmes.

In addition to the two purposes of the evaluation, the terms of reference (TORs) also identify four core evaluation objectives:

1. Test the **theory of change (TOC)**, assessing all causal links and the robustness of underlying assumptions (including links between trade, growth and poverty reduction), and adjusting the TOC to serve as a reliable guide to interpret the programme and to make programme improvements.
2. Analyse and, to the extent possible, measure: the regional integration programmes’ **impact** on regional trade, growth and poverty (and on the various stakeholders – in particular on men and women separately, poor and vulnerable groups, as well as traders and consumers); and **sustainability**.
3. Assess the **effectiveness** of the TMEA programme, including organisational effectiveness, and whether the programme represents **value for money (VFM)**.
4. Throughout, identify **lessons learnt relevant beyond TMEA**, i.e. insights on enabling and constraining factors, critical actions and gaps which would be generalisable to future programmes or to other contexts.

### 1.1 Amendments to the Evaluation Questions

The initial evaluation design was structured around answering the four high-level evaluation questions (HEQs), which correspond to the four core objectives of the evaluation set out in the TOR. However, the High-level and Detailed Evaluation Questions (HEQs and DEQs, respectively) were revised after the Inception Report was approved, to reflect the changes in implementation, terminology and priority areas for study. These differences are detailed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High-level evaluation questions in the Terms of Reference</th>
<th>High-level evaluation questions addressed by the Independent Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• HEQ1: How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the TOC, and does the TOC provide a reliable guide for programme intervention?</td>
<td>• HEQ1: Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs? How has this been affected by the programme’s organisational performance and how could this be improved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• HEQ2: What is the likely impact on trade, growth and poverty, and</td>
<td>• HEQ2(^1,2): To what extent has TMEA been effective in achieving expected intermediate outcomes and to what extent has TMEA programme been effective in contributing to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^1\) The original HEQ2 dealt solely with OSBP and Ports projects, and was partially answered in the formative evaluation (Deliverable 3A). However, DFID asked OPM to ensure the outcomes question (DEQ1.6) was more completely answered. This proposed new HEQ is the result.

\(^2\) Being “effective” in achieving outcomes is added in the Sept 18, 2018 draft at DFID’s request, so the language sounds the same as that from the deleted DEQ1.6.
what is critical in order to ensure sustainability of positive impacts?  
**HEQ3:** Where has the programme been effective and achieved good Value For Money, and how could this be improved?  
**HEQ4:** What are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?  

achieving programme strategic outcomes? Did the programme bring about any unintended outcomes?  
**HEQ3:** What is the likely impact of TMEA on trade outcomes and growth, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?  
**HEQ4:** What is the likely impact of TMEA on poverty and gender, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?  
**HEQ5:** How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the TOC? What does this imply for the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the programme, and what are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?

The corresponding DEQs were also adapted during the course of the evaluation. Details on each HEQ and DEQ and the deliverables in which they were answered are available in Annex D.

### 1.2 Amendments to Evaluation Design

The Inception Report proposed to meet the evaluation objectives and answer the evaluation questions by organising the evaluation into distinct components, each focused on different steps along the TMEA results chain. Each workstream (and its corresponding deliverables), focussing on a different set of evaluation questions. In other words, each deliverable would address a different set of evaluation questions, and together would answer all the evaluation questions.

This remains the core evaluation design, however, due to a challenging inception phase and the tragic loss of the independent evaluation team leader, the evaluation was unavoidably and significantly delayed. While several key deliverables were submitted to DFID, there was a need to consider changes to the evaluation design.

The key difficulty in this change to the timeline was that one crucial element of the design proposed in the IR was not completed in the first phase of the evaluation: an evaluation of the degree to which any outcomes seen in TMEA’s data can be directly linked to TMEA’s interventions. Showing TMEA’s contribution to these key trade outcomes – cost and time reductions in trade – is the centrepiece of their strategy, of donors’ expectations, and of the evaluation design, and as such is being taken up again with an adjustment to the design of phase 2 of the evaluation.

Another key implication of the delay was the balance initially intended between learning and accountability. DFID and the other donors made the decision to continue funding TMEA for an additional six years, from 2018 to 2023. As a result, the accountability purpose of the evaluation takes on new meaning, as a backward-looking exercise designed to capture the extent of TMEA processes, results and value relative to the scope and potential of its original design and funding.

This has also meant that the role of learning as a foundational purpose for the evaluation was somewhat changed. Where possible, the evaluation will indeed provide lessons learnt in order to inform TMEA’s ongoing work, as well as for developmental efforts beyond TMEA in
trade and regional integration. However, the evaluation will not inform TMEA’s Strategy 2 as anticipated. The evaluation team acknowledges the significant and important learning that TMEA have already undertaken and put into action for their current Strategy 2 activities.

The following slight adjustments were made to the evaluation from what was originally proposed in the Inception Report (November 2016).

1.2.1 Performance Evaluation

The performance evaluation design put forward in the IR was proposed as a summative evaluation only of the ports and OSBPs, as the IR timeline planned for the effectiveness study on intermediate and strategic outcomes as part of an earlier deliverable. As that level of analysis was not possible in the first phase of the evaluation, given the unexpected and compounded challenges discussed above, it was taken up again by the performance evaluation.

This has the effect of stretching out the period in which outcomes and impacts may have matured, which may indeed be helpful in the detection of impacts. Still, the underlying proposed analysis comes from the same school of non-counterfactual, non-experimental evaluation designs:

- While Process Tracing (PT) was proposed at inception, Contribution Tracing (CT) – a method that builds precisely on the logic of PT – was considered a stronger candidate method to substantiate TMEA’s contribution claims.
- One of the elements of the IR design was an exercise to map outcomes according to categories (advocacy and policy advice, knowledge generation and studies, institutional strengthening and training, technical and or financial cooperation, and provision of infrastructure and / or direct services to final users (e.g. SWIFT)) and layers (regional, national and local). In closing the first phase of the evaluation, without the Team Leader who had designed that exercise, the new Team Leader attempted to follow his logic but found it impossible to do so without new data collection – particularly as the majority of projects had finished in the year’s time since the data had been collected. TMEA viewed the resulting draft “pathway” documents as invalid as they were so out of date.
- The categories proposed in the IR, while still valid to describe the closed projects, were nonetheless not useful analytically in the manner proposed. There are no formulas for how these categories would determine or predict success, no “ideal mix” to postulate for lessons learnt. The design focuses on the necessary details to generate lessons learnt, and draws upon the categories and layers as needed in describing findings.
- Given that Strategy 1 projects were completed since the original datasets were compiled, new data collection allows the estimation of outcomes achievement and TMEA contribution to continue through intermediate outcomes levels and to strategic outcomes as well, rather than “stop” at the intermediate outcomes level, as designed in the IR.
- Similarly, the extended period for data collection and analysis on the “full” pathways through their strategic outcomes allows for a stronger analysis of complementarity across TMEA component areas, which was designed in the IR to be done with projects that were not yet completed. This was done to give stronger evidence about synergies across components and support as well the validation and refinement of hypothesized TOC linkages.
1.2.2 Trade and Growth Study

While there are no significant deviations to the approach proposed in the inception report, the current approach has taken a more targeted and measurable approach. The value chain/sector approach proposed will be able to yield more valuable insights into how TMEA interventions have triggered changes, through which channels, and how have the gains been distributed across a sector. While the proposed methodology loses some of the macro approach proposed in the inception report, we have retained the CGE modelling so as to obtain some of the higher-level impacts resulting from change in that sector. We can therefore measure the wider economic benefits arising from the sector’s change, which have been brought about by TMEA’s intervention in areas that have impacted that sector. The tools used in the evaluation will not substantially differ from those proposed in the inception report, namely econometrics (gravity equations in particular for the estimation of AVEs), partial and general equilibrium modelling, and other dynamic economic analysis.

It is important to note the following:

- While we expect to have richer, more relevant and more precise data at the sector level, we would not capture the larger macro-economic gains arising from TMEA. A larger, more comprehensive “macro” approach would have (1) either entailed a number of assumptions and weaker results, particularly with respect to measuring the contribution of TMEA at a large scale; and (2) required substantially larger resources for data collection and a longer time scale.
- The team will rely more heavily on collecting enterprise level data, particularly with respect to inputs, intermediary products, exports and non-tariff information. The team will aim to quantify the effects of barriers that were removed by TMEA, which is aligned to the thinking proposed in the IR.
- We will exploit the richer data available under TMEA’s efforts at compiling road and transport data including those of the Northern Corridor Transport Observatory, and where possible, enterprise and transporters’ data.
- We will avoid duplication with the Impact Model, an ex-ante model which is being elaborated by TMEA, while at the same time finding ways that our findings may improve the reliability and realism of the Impact Model.

1.2.3 Poverty & Gender Impact Study

No significant changes are proposed from that put forward in the IR. However, it does:

- Offer greater detail on the original design, including data sources and analysis methods, including how we plan to use mixed methods to triangulate the qualitative and quantitative streams of data.
- Include comparison with the three OSBP sites visited in 2016, which was not contemplated in the IR but which was made possible by the series of visits eventually undertaken for the PPA.
- Discuss the breakdown of methods and sources by evaluation question
- Proposes to have more countries' national survey datasets included in the quantitative analysis, than were present at the time of the PPA.
1.2.4 VfM Study

No significant deviations to the approach to VfM assessment in the IR was proposed. However, it is important to note the following:

- We will aim to undertake **benchmarking of key cost indicators against other programmes**, if similar programmes can be identified and if we have access to their data. The framework identifies other forms of comparative analysis for some indicators where comparison with other programmes may not be possible, including comparison with original estimates (for example costs in the Business Case or original contract, if available), comparison against TMEA’s KPI targets, and review of annual trends within TMEA data.

- We do not propose to undertake **analysis of costs per output, beneficiary or outcome** because the nature of the outputs and outcomes generated in this kind of programme (e.g. infrastructure reform, process improvement, stronger institutions, policy reform) do not lend themselves to meaningful benchmarking against other programmes, and therefore do not provide useful information for making judgements on VfM.

- **Our economic evaluation at cost-effectiveness level will focus on a breakeven analysis, as described in section 3**, which can be readily performed with limited data. It will be complemented by TMEA’s own cost-benefit analyses, if TMEA has collected the necessary evidence, tracked the assumptions, and repeated the necessary calculations.

- Assessment of the **sustainability of delivery processes** will be based on evidence of TMEA’s transition planning in preparation for the end of Strategy 2 funding. We will not assess the mandates, capacities, resources and frameworks of the public or private institutions which may be expected to take on some of TMEA’s activities.
Annex D: Status and evolution of the evaluation questions
Annex D  Status and evolution of the evaluation questions

The High-level and Detailed Evaluation Questions (HEQs and DEQs, respectively) contained in the tables below have been slightly updated to reflect the changes in implementation, terminology and priority areas for study since the Inception Report was approved. Where DEQs were answered in previous deliverables, this is noted with the deliverable in bold in the right column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ1(^1) and its DEQs</th>
<th>Status and deliverable(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEQ1: Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs? How has this been affected by the programme’s organisational performance and how could this be improved?</td>
<td><strong>Answered:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.1 To what extent are TMEA programmes’ outputs generally consistent with the programme TOC?</td>
<td><strong>Answered:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>2A Preliminary Output Assessment</strong> maps projects censally in the three SOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3</strong> answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects</strong> answer them for SO1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.2 Were project outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the project output targets within the programme time-span?</td>
<td><strong>Answered:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3</strong> answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects</strong> answer them for SO1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.3 What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the project outputs? What are the reasons for non-achievement of the outputs?</td>
<td><strong>Answered:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3</strong> answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects</strong> answer them for SO1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report</strong> summarizes major constraints and reasons for non-achievement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) HEQ1 and HEQ2 have been revised since the Inception Report. HEQ1 comprises questions about outputs, while HEQ2 and its DEQs will answer questions about outcomes. The latter is to be answered in the Performance Evaluation, while HEQ1 and its DEQs were answered in the Phase 1 deliverables.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ1.4</th>
<th>Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Answered: | - **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and  
  - **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects** answer them for SO1 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ1.5</th>
<th>To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. government agencies and the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters?²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Answered: | - **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and  
  - **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects** answer them for SO1  
  - **6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report** provides summary information on capacity building efforts and achievements |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ1.7</th>
<th>To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Answered: | - **2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment** explicitly addresses this question  
  - There is also detailed information on management, systems and processes in **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** for 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ1.8</th>
<th>To what extent do TMEA’s financial (including procurement), human resource and risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Answered: | - **2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment explicitly addresses this question**  
  - There is also detailed information on financial and risk management processes in **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** for 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5  
  - There is also detailed information on financial and risk management process in SO1 in **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects** |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ1.9</th>
<th>To what extent do the processes TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answered:</td>
<td>- <strong>2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment explicitly addresses this question</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² “Government agencies” were added to DEQ1.5, given that many TMEA activities partner with national counterparts to implement programming. DEQ1.6 on outcomes has been subsumed into the new HEQ2 on programme and strategic outcomes.
DEQ1.10 Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in terms of results and in terms of finances? How could they be strengthened?

Answered:
- Report on Monitoring and Evaluation Processes at TMEA explicitly addresses this question
- 2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment includes a section on this question
- There is also detailed information on M&E tools and processes in 2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3 for 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ2 and its DEQs</th>
<th>Status and Deliverable(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEQ2: To what extent has TMEA been effective in achieving expected intermediate outcomes and to what extent has TMEA programme been effective in contributing to achieving programme strategic outcomes? Did the programme bring about any unintended outcomes?</td>
<td>Unanswered: Will be answered in the Performance evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ2.1 To what extent has TMEA contributed to reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ2.2 To what extent has TMEA contributed to increasing ease of trading across borders?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ2.3 To what extent has TMEA contributed to improving business competitiveness?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ2.4 Has TMEA caused any unintended outcomes? What are they and who has been affected?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ3 and its DEQs</th>
<th>Status and Deliverable(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEQ3: What is the likely impact of TMEA on trade outcomes and growth, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?</td>
<td>Unanswered: Will be answered in the Trade and growth study (TGIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness: programme-level trade outcomes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ3.1 To what extent have TMEA interventions, including those of a policy nature, led to a reduction in trade times, trade costs and trade risks?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

3 The original HEQ2 dealt solely with OSBP and Ports projects, and was partially answered in the formative evaluation (Deliverable 3A). However, DFID asked to ensure the outcomes question (DEQ1.6) was more completely answered. This proposed new HEQ is the result.
4 Being “effective” in achieving outcomes is added in the Sept 18, 2018 draft at DFID’s request, so the language sounds the same as that from the deleted DEQ1.6.
5 HEQ2 was previously focused only on ports and OSBPs, but is here extended to cover all strategic outcomes. The first three DEQs were reformulated to correspond to the TOC. DEQ2.4 was added.
6 The former DEQ3.2 was a repeat of this question, only about policy interventions. These have been combined to ensure context and intervention logic and outcomes are considered together.
### Trade impact

| DEQ3.2 | What has been the impact of any achieved trade cost reductions from TMEA on trade (both intra- and extra-regional)?\(^7\) | Unanswered: Will be answered in the *Trade and growth study (TGIS)* |
| DEQ3.3 | How has any improved trade policy environment led to increased trade? | |

### Economic growth impact

| DEQ3.4 | To what extent has any changes in trade resulting from TMEA interventions contributed to economic growth? | Unanswered: Will be answered in the *Trade and growth study (TGIS)* |
| DEQ3.5 | What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?\(^8\) | |

### HEQ4 and its DEQs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ4: What is the likely impact of TMEA on poverty and gender, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?</th>
<th>Status and deliverable(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty impact</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.1</td>
<td>What is the nature – and, where possible, scale – of the likely impact of the overall programme and of key TMEA projects in the portfolio on the poor—direct and indirect? Who is affected by potential short- or long-term impacts, both positive and negative, how, and how is the causality working?(^9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.2</td>
<td>In particular, who has benefited from reduced trade costs? How are the benefits in reduced transport time and cost being passed on to poor people through lower prices or lower price increases?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.3</td>
<td>Are complementary policies being adopted to translate the benefits of increased trade into poverty reduction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ4.4</td>
<td>Are measures being taken, and are they successful, in mitigating potential negative impacts on any sub-groups – in particular poor people in localised areas?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) The word “increased” was removed from modifying “trade”, as the impact has not yet been determined. “Increased” presumed an impact.

\(^8\) This question, and 4.6, were added in response to DFID’s comment that the HEQ mentions sustainability but the DEQs did not.

\(^9\) It is critical to note that this will be speculative and subject to exogenous distortions. Tracing causality rigorously, this far along the results chain, is outside the scope of the evaluation.
### Cross-cutting issues

| DEQ4.5 | To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus? | Partially answered in
- 5A Preliminary Poverty Analysis and
- 2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation
  - SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects
  - Will be completed in Poverty and Gender Impacts Study (PGIS) |

| DEQ4.6 | What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts? | Unanswered; will be answered in Poverty and Gender Impacts Study (PGIS) |

### HEQ5 and its DEQs

#### HEQ5: How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the TOC? What does this imply for the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the programme, and what are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?

**Programme relevance: TOC causal links and assumptions**

| DEQ5.1 | To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the TOC evidence-based or verified? | Partially answered in 6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report; will be completed in the Performance Evaluation. |
| DEQ5.3 | To what extent does the programme support EAC regional trade development priorities? | Partially answered in 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment for outputs; to be completed in the Performance Evaluation |
| DEQ5.4 | How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the programme or on its relevance? | Partially answered in 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment; to be completed in the Performance Evaluation |
| DEQ5.5 | Do TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)? | Partially answered in 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment for projects; to be completed in the Performance Evaluation |

---

10 We eliminated DEQ5.2 “Are the results framework targets and milestones relevant and realistic?” Given the late advent of this evaluation, a year after the RF was finalised, support to make targets and milestones more relevant and realistic is unhelpful. This is particularly true in light of their new Strategy 2 RF with deeply altered indicators, targets and milestones, and in light of the DFID Annual Reviews’ intensive and detailed suggestions that underpin many of those changes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model observed to date?</th>
<th>Partially answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment for outputs;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report through analysis of the model’s TOC;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relevance, coherence and sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To be completed in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?</th>
<th>Partially answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment for projects;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report through analysis of the projects’ relevance, coherence and sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To be completed in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened? | Unanswered; to be answered in the Performance Evaluation |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ5.9 Is using one organisation – a not-for-profit company – the best vehicle for impact on trade, and on poverty reduction through trade? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach?</th>
<th>Partially answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To be updated in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?</th>
<th>Partially answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To be updated in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?</th>
<th>Partially answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To be updated in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ5.12 Did TMEA align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?</th>
<th>Partially answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3 answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects for SO1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To be completed in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of TMEA consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

Partially answered:
- **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and
- **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1** and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects for SO1
- To be completed in the **Performance Evaluation**

DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa?\(^{11}\)

Partially answered in:
- **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and
- **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1** and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects for SO1
- To be completed in the **Performance Evaluation**

**Sustainability**

DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?\(^{12}\)

Partially answered in:
- **6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment** for outputs
- **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5
- To be completed in the **Performance Evaluation**

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\(^{11}\) Two DEQs here, sub-titled “Cross-cutting”, have been eliminated. The first read: “What has the impact been on corruption across the various components, notably at border crossings?” While the evaluation team will speak with team members about how corruption might have affected their work, this DEQ could be an impact study of its own. However, TMEA did not directly undertake projects on corruption, so looking for their impacts expends resources on a tangential pursuit. The DEQ on unintended consequences will cover this issue as and when it arises. Moreover, corruption is extremely sensitive in the context, as TMEA continue to interact with institutions that would see this as criticism of a very high and offensive order. Similarly, DEQ5.16 asked “What impact has the programme had on other issues, such as extractives and environment/climate?” which would examine issues well outside TMEA’s areas of influence and focus. While the Mombasa port project worked on “green port” practices, this is the only substantial, direct TMEA activities related to environment and climate. None related to extractives. TMEA has a difficult enough job to influence the areas it is working on directly, and the evaluation to capture them, without seeking impacts in areas where they didn’t intervene. “Other issues” are better covered under the HEQ2 “unintended impact” question, than devoting attention and resources the evaluation team needs for other EQs.

\(^{12}\) DEQ5.18 here read “What should be the essential components of a future exit strategy in order to sustain impact?” Exit strategies were salient at project level (and covered in detail in deliverable 2D/E and its Annex 5), but not at programme level, as TMEA intended to continue operations with or without donor funding. TMEA are currently in Strategy 2 and talking about “Strategy 3” even today. The evaluation will continue to talk about sustainability in DEQ5.17 and especially 5.20, which was are more appropriate to how TMEA operated during Strategy 1, when there effectively was no exit strategy. DEQ5.19 read “What is the likelihood that individual results and overall impact will be sustained after existing donors stop funding, and will there be a lasting positive impact on the poor” which is duplicative of DEQ5.17 and the new question at DEQ4.6.
| DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account? | Partially answered in:  
- **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and  
- **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1** and **3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects** for SO1  
- To be completed in the *Performance Evaluation* |
| --- | --- |
| DEQ5.21 Is the programme providing VFM? | Partially answered in  
- **2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment**  
- To be updated in the *Performance Evaluation* |
| DEQ5.22 In which activities/components and countries does the programme achieve higher VFM than others and what are the lessons learnt for driving greater VFM across the board? | Unanswered; to be answered in the *Performance Evaluation* |
Annex E: Design and Work Plan
Independent Evaluation of Trademark East Africa

Phase 2
Evaluation Design and Work Plan

Paul Baker, Keri Culver, Frances Hansford, Chris Hearle, Alex Hurrell, Claire Hutchings

October 2018
About Oxford Policy Management

Oxford Policy Management is committed to helping low- and middle-income countries achieve growth and reduce poverty and disadvantage through public policy reform.

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We work in all areas of social and economic policy and governance, including health, finance, education, climate change, and public sector management. We draw on our local and international sector experts to provide the very best evidence-based support.
Preface

This design and work plan represents the evaluation team’s combined approach to the remaining contractual deliverables, with slight adjustment from the Inception Report (November 2016). Though DFID will ultimately decide on this point, we feel this document makes a strong case for the continuity of the original design, rather than significant changes that warrant an additional round of EQuALS approval.

The one key aspect that was not delivered in earlier reporting as set out in the IR is the “outcome-level evaluation” component, which was intended to assess the extent to which TMEA programming can be said to have caused or contributed to outcome targets, through a theory-based exercise to link conclusively the project outputs to programme-level outcomes. The pathway mapping proposed in the IR was not possible without further data collection, which has now begun. This aspect is part of this design and work plan document, as part of the methods proposed to substantiate the hypothesised TMEA impacts and effectiveness. The method proposed in the Inception Report to substantiate strategic outcome contribution claims was Process Tracing, for which the current design substitutes a closely related method called Contribution Tracing.
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5.5 Participatory workshops

5.6 Sources and methods

5.7 Changes to the approach

5.8 Timing

5.9 Hypothetical responses to the evaluation questions

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Annex C Proposed timeline

Annex D Evaluation technical limitations and challenges

Annex E Detail on Contribution Tracing Method

Annex F Differences between the design and the Inception Report

Annex G Bibliography

Annex H Draft long list of projects for contribution tracing

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## Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Appreciative Inquiry (an evaluation method)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVE</td>
<td>Ad valorem equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBA</td>
<td>Cost-benefit analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Cross-border traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPII</td>
<td>Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGE</td>
<td>Computable general equilibrium – economic model</td>
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<tr>
<td>COO</td>
<td>Certificate of Origin</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Contribution Tracing (an evaluation method)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBI</td>
<td>Doing Business Indicator (a World Bank data activity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEQ</td>
<td>Detailed Evaluation Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>(UK) Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DID</td>
<td>Difference in Differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EATH</td>
<td>East Africa Trade Hub (USAID project on trade in the region)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQUALS</td>
<td>Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German cooperation agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTAP</td>
<td>Global Trade Analysis Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEQ</td>
<td>High-level Evaluation Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBTs</td>
<td>Informal cross-border traders</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>International Growth Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund (part of the World Bank Group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Inception Report (of the Independent Evaluation)</td>
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<td>IRR</td>
<td>Internal Rate of Return</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>International Trade Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-TIP</td>
<td>Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (a WTO data activity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key performance indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPI</td>
<td>Logistics Performance Index (a World Bank data activity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Most significant change (evaluation method)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMC</td>
<td>National Monitoring Committees (EAC body tasked to monitor and eliminate NTBs)</td>
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<td>NPV</td>
<td>Net Present Value</td>
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<td>NTB</td>
<td>Non-tariff barriers</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTM</td>
<td>Non-tariff measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Oxford Policy Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSBP</td>
<td>One-Stop Border Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Project Appraisal Review (TMEA project approval process step)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGIS</td>
<td>Poverty and gender impact study</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Preliminary Poverty Analysis (deliverable in Phase 1 of the Independent Evaluation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Private Sector Organisations, also referred to as Business Membership Organisations</td>
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<td>PT</td>
<td>Process Training (evaluation method)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Results Framework (a TMEA spreadsheet of output, outcome and impact indicators)</td>
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<td>ROO</td>
<td>Rules of Origin</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Strategic Objective (in TMEA TOC, the top-most programme goal)</td>
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<td>SROI</td>
<td>Social Return on Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWIFT</td>
<td>Single window interface for facilitating trade</td>
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<td>TFA</td>
<td>Trade Facilitation Agreement (of the WTO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGIS</td>
<td>Trade and growth impact study</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMEA</td>
<td>TradeMark East Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCAP</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPU</td>
<td>Universal Postal Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Value Chain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VFM</td>
<td>Value for Money</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCBTs</td>
<td>Women cross-border traders</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITS</td>
<td>World Integrated Trade Solution (A World Bank activity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction

1.1 The independent evaluation

The Trademark East Africa programme (Trademark, or TMEA) is a high-profile, multi-donor project that seeks to lift existing barriers to trade to bring about positive and sustainable change via a combination of regional and national initiatives and an investment of over $500 million. TMEA is a large and complex programme, with national and regional dimensions and many sub-projects implemented across a number of countries.¹

The independent external evaluation of this programme presents a unique opportunity to gain a detailed understanding of its effects, make recommendations for improvements, and identify lessons for trade reform interventions and policies over the longer term in the region and beyond.

1.2 Evaluation purpose, audience and intended uses

The evaluation has two specific purposes:

- **Accountability**: Assessing TMEA processes, results and overall value in an independent and impartial manner consistent with generally accepted principles and standards for professional evaluation.
- **Learning**: Identifying and feeding lessons learnt into the management of the remainder of the current programme and the design of any potential continuation of the TMEA programme, as well as future regional trade integration programmes.

In addition to the two purposes of the evaluation, the terms of reference (TORs) also identify four core evaluation objectives:

1. Test the **theory of change (TOC)**, assessing all causal links and the robustness of underlying assumptions (including links between trade, growth and poverty reduction), and adjusting the TOC to serve as a reliable guide to interpret the programme and to make programme improvements.

2. Analyse and, to the extent possible, measure: the regional integration programmes’ **impact** on regional trade, growth and poverty (and on the various stakeholders – in particular on men and women separately, poor and vulnerable groups, as well as traders and consumers); and **sustainability**.

3. Assess the **effectiveness** of the TMEA programme, including organisational effectiveness, and whether the programme represents **value for money (VFM)**.

4. Throughout, identify **lessons learnt relevant beyond TMEA**, i.e. insights on enabling and constraining factors, critical actions and gaps which would be generalisable to future programmes or to other contexts.

It is valuable to set the evaluation purpose and objectives in context. At the inception phase, one implicit goal for the evaluation was to provide key inputs into decision-making for any potential follow-on programming for TMEA. Due to a challenging

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¹ This design includes text from the Independent Evaluation Inception Report, November, 2016, where that information remains the same.
inception phase and the tragic loss of the independent evaluation team leader, the
evaluation was unavoidably and significantly delayed; nonetheless, several key
deliverables were submitted to DFID for review, and some have already received
approval.

The key difficulty in this change to the timeline was that one crucial element of the
design proposed in the IR was not completed: an evaluation of the degree to which any
outcomes seen in TMEA’s data can be directly linked to TMEA’s interventions.
Showing TMEA’s contribution to these key trade outcomes – cost and time reductions
in trade – is the centrepiece of their strategy, of donors’ expectations, and of the
evaluation design, and as such is being taken up again with an adjustment to the
design of the current evaluation phase, as will be shown in the performance evaluation
chapter of this document.

DFID and the other donors made the decision to continue funding TMEA for an
additional six years, from 2018 to 2023. As a result, the accountability purpose of the
evaluation takes on new meaning, as a backward-looking exercise designed to capture
the extent of TMEA processes, results and value relative to the scope and potential of
its original design and funding.

This has also meant that the role of learning as a foundational purpose for the
evaluation is somewhat changed. Where possible, the upcoming evaluation cycle will
indeed provide lessons learnt in order to inform TMEA’s ongoing work, as well as for
developmental efforts beyond TMEA in trade and regional integration. At the same
time, the evaluation team acknowledges the significant and important learning that
TMEA have already undertaken and put into action for their current Strategy 2
activities.

1.3 Evaluation questions

This section lists the high-level and detailed evaluation questions (HEQs and DEQs,
respectively) that the evaluation research and deliverables will address. Deliverables
from the earlier phase of the evaluation answered a selection of these, particularly
HEQ1, “Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs and outcomes?
How has this been affected by the programme’s organisational performance and how
could this be improved?”. The evaluation team’s response to this HEQ and its DEQs
will be recapped in the performance evaluation, so readers can follow the logic easily.

The performance evaluation, therefore, will examine HEQ2 and HEQ5; the trade and
impact study covers HEQ3; the poverty and gender impact study is HEQ4; and the
VFM study will answer DEQs 5.21 and 5.22. Their interpretation and the evaluation
response to each is covered in the study-by-study chapters that follow, as well as the
detailed evaluation matrix (by DEQ) in Annex A.

2 The status of each evaluation originally stated in the Independent Evaluation Inception Report (IR) is
presented in Annex B.
Table 1: HEQs and DEQs to be answered in upcoming deliverables.

### HEQ2 and its DEQs

**HEQ2: To what extent has TMEA been effective in achieving expected intermediate outcomes and to what extent has TMEA programme been effective in contributing to achieving programme strategic outcomes? Did the programme bring about any unintended outcomes?**

- **DEQ2.1** To what extent has TMEA contributed to reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes?
- **DEQ2.2** To what extent has TMEA contributed to increasing ease of trading across borders?
- **DEQ2.3** To what extent has TMEA contributed to improving business competitiveness?
- **DEQ2.4** Has TMEA caused any unintended outcomes? What are they and who has been affected?

### HEQ3 and its DEQs

**HEQ3: What is the likely impact of TMEA on trade outcomes and growth, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?**

#### Effectiveness: programme-level trade outcomes

- **DEQ3.1** To what extent have TMEA interventions, including those of a policy nature, led to a reduction in trade times, trade costs and trade risks?
- **DEQ3.2** What has been the impact of any achieved trade cost reductions from TMEA on trade (both intra- and extra-regional)?
- **DEQ3.3** How has any improved trade policy environment led to increased trade?

#### Economic growth impact

- **DEQ3.4** To what extent has any changes in trade resulting from TMEA interventions contributed to economic growth?
- **DEQ3.5** What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?

### HEQ4 and its DEQs

**HEQ4: What is the likely impact of TMEA on poverty and gender, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?**

- **DEQ4.1** What is the nature – and, where possible, scale – of the likely impact of the overall programme and of key TMEA projects in the portfolio on the poor—direct and indirect? Who is affected by potential short- or long-term impacts, both positive and negative, how, and how is the causality working?\(^3\)

---

\(^3\) It is critical to note that this will be speculative and subject to exogenous distortions. Tracing causality rigorously, this far along the results chain, is outside the scope of the evaluation.
**DEQ4.2** In particular, who has benefited from reduced trade costs? How are the benefits in reduced transport time and cost being passed on to poor people through lower prices or lower price increases?

**DEQ4.3** Are complementary policies being adopted to translate the benefits of increased trade into poverty reduction?

**DEQ4.4** Are measures being taken, and are they successful, in mitigating potential negative impacts on any sub-groups – in particular poor people in localised areas?

**Cross-cutting issues**

**DEQ4.5** To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus?

**DEQ4.6** What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?

---

**HEQ 5 and its DEQs**

**HEQ5: How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the TOC? What does this imply for the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the programme, and what are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?**

**Programme relevance: TOC causal links and assumptions**

**DEQ5.1** To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the TOC evidence-based or verified?  

**DEQ5.3** To what extent does the programme support EAC regional trade development priorities?

**DEQ5.4** How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the programme or on its relevance?

**DEQ5.5** Do TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

**Coherence and coordination**

**DEQ5.6** What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model observed to date?

**DEQ5.7** Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

**DEQ5.8** To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

---

4 We eliminated DEQ5.2 “Are the results framework targets and milestones relevant and realistic?” Given the late advent of this evaluation, a year after the RF was finalised, support to make targets and milestones more relevant and realistic is unhelpful. This is particularly true in light of their new Strategy 2 RF with deeply altered indicators, targets and milestones, and in light of the DFID Annual Reviews’ intensive and detailed suggestions that underpin many of those changes.
DEQ5.9 Is using one organisation – a not-for-profit company – the best vehicle for impact on trade, and on poverty reduction through trade? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach?

DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

DEQ5.12 Did TMEA align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of TMEA consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa?

Sustainability

DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

VFM

DEQ5.21 Is the programme providing VFM?

DEQ5.22 In which activities/components and countries does the programme achieve higher VFM than others and what are the lessons learnt for driving greater VFM across the board?

---

5 Two DEQs here, sub-titled “Cross-cutting”, have been eliminated. The first read: “What has the impact been on corruption across the various components, notably at border crossings?” While the evaluation team will speak with team members about how corruption might have affected their work, this DEQ could be an impact study of its own. However, TMEA did not directly undertake projects on corruption, so looking for their impacts expends resources on a tangential pursuit. The DEQ on unintended consequences will cover this issue as and when it arises. Moreover, corruption is extremely sensitive in the context, as TMEA continue to interact with institutions that would see this as criticism of a very high and offensive order. Similarly, DEQ5.16 asked “What impact has the programme had on other issues, such as extractives and environment/climate?” which would examine issues well outside TMEA’s areas of influence and focus. While the Mombasa port project worked on “green port” practices, this is the only substantial, direct TMEA activities related to environment and climate. None related to extractives. TMEA has a difficult enough job to influence the areas it is working on directly, and the evaluation to capture them, without seeking impacts in areas where they didn’t intervene. “Other issues” are better covered under the HEQ2 “unintended impact” question, than devoting attention and resources the evaluation team needs for other EQs.

6 DEQ5.18 here read “What should be the essential components of a future exit strategy in order to sustain impact?” Exit strategies were salient at project level (and covered in detail in deliverable 2D/E and its Annex 5), but not at programme level, as TMEA intended to continue operations with or without donor funding. TMEA are currently in Strategy 2 and talking about “Strategy 3” even today. The evaluation will continue to talk about sustainability in DEQ5.17 and especially 5.20, which was are more appropriate to how TMEA operated during Strategy 1, when there effectively was no exit strategy. DEQ5.19 read “What is the likelihood that individual results and overall impact will be sustained after existing donors stop funding, and will there be a lasting positive impact on the poor” which is duplicative of DEQ5.17 and the new question at DEQ4.6.
1.4 Scope

Evaluation elements along the TMEA results chain

The evaluation research described in this document (as in the IR and the original TORs) is designed in stages to measure achievement and impact along the postulated results chain of the TOC shown above. The performance evaluation focuses on intermediate and strategic outcomes (building on the results from the Phase 1 studies); the trade and growth impact study looks at trade outcomes and impacts (taking into consideration any findings of impact in the performance evaluation); and the poverty and gender impact study builds on the study of trade impacts to postulate links to wider poverty effects uncovered in quantitative and qualitative data. A visual representation of this chain of hypothesised TMEA results in parallel with the related studies is shown in Figure 3 below, in which the methods and evaluation questions to be addressed are part of each label.

Figure 1: TMEA results chain and the related evaluation studies

Source: Authors’ rendering

The performance evaluation will examine pathways for a selection of TMEA components to answer DEQs 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 (effectiveness by SO) and 5.1 (on the robustness of the causal links and assumptions in the TOC). This portion can be thought of as the more in-depth evaluation work. A more traditional mixed methods design will look more broadly across TMEA interventions and results chains to answer DEQs under HEQ5 (on themes of programme relevance (5.1, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5), coordination and coherence (5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14), and sustainability (5.17 and 5.20)) and 2.4 on unintended consequences. In fact, all teams will be tasked with looking for unintended consequences in all phases of the evaluation, as well as evidence of benefits that are more or less likely to be sustained (5.17). The VfM assessment will run alongside and beyond the performance evaluation and trade and growth study, and in terms of timing will be analysed and reported on after all phases have completed. That study will look at DEQs 5.21 and 5.22 on VfM overall and in comparative fashion.

1.5 Timing

The proposed timing for the evaluation studies is detailed in Annex C, and presumes that the design, once approved by DFID, will benefit from a proposed no-cost contract
extension through the end of 2019. In broad terms, the evaluation research will begin once DFID notifies OPM of approval, with secondary data search and the identification of gaps. The team will propose a detailed timeline for the visits to TMEA, to avoid overlap with other external reviews (such as the upcoming DFID Annual Review, in October, 2018) and internal demands, such as board meetings and annual leave periods. A summary timeline is provided in Table 2, below:

**Table 2: Summary schedule**

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<td>Trade and growth study</td>
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<td>Poverty &amp; gender study</td>
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The schedule will depend on timely approval from DFID on the proposed design. Please see Annex F for detail.

Fieldwork is expected to begin for the performance evaluation in December, to coincide with a VFM framework workshop. The performance evaluation will be the first to submit a draft report in March, 2019, followed by the trade and growth study in May. The poverty and gender study will begin data collection for both qualitative and quantitative components in the new year. The latter will include national datasets which are due to become available. From that point, the quantitative study is desk analysis, with no time in the field. The qualitative fieldwork will be prepared in the third full week of January, with arrival to the field at the end of the month, for four weeks. Analysis and reporting for that study, then, extends to mid-year. The VfM study, building on the results from the three studies, undertakes its reporting period in the third quarter.

Each study’s draft report will go through a process of review (with DFID and TMEA, and then with EQUALS) and validation, followed by face-to-face workshops to share lessons learnt. In the case of the VfM assessment, that team will substitute a verification exercise for a final lessons learnt workshop. Their experience indicates that TMEA will benefit more from the opportunity to feed into the conclusions prior to the draft report, than from an additional learning event at the end of the period. Where possible, events will be combined to conserve resources, but in principle they follow successful delivery of each evaluation product.

Often in development evaluations, particularly those related to complex programming and those looking to measure impacts through non-experimental designs, there is a need to schedule second iterations of fieldwork – even if only remotely, by skype or telephone. This is part and parcel of the analytical process, which relies on triangulation of sources, validation by respondents and others, consideration of alternative explanations, painstaking attention to making explicit the connections...
between findings and conclusions, and auditable documentation of the entire process. For this reason, the evaluation team have built in a full quarter of “cushion” before the end of the proposed no-cost extension, while still pursuing the earlier deadlines assiduously.

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2 Performance Evaluation

Within the theme of accountability, the objective of the performance evaluation lies in the key objectives of testing the TMEA TOC (assessing the causal links and the robustness of underlying assumptions), assessing the effectiveness of the TMEA programme (including both its outcomes and organizational effectiveness), and identifying lessons learnt for TMEA and beyond (including insights on enabling and constraining factors, critical actions and gaps which would be generalisable to future programmes or to other contexts.) The performance evaluation design is multi-faceted and mixed-method, to address the broad and complex nature of TMEA programming.

The performance evaluation will answer HEQ2 and HEQ5, focusing on effectiveness at outcomes levels, with a recap of the evaluation’s response to HEQ1 on effectiveness at the project and output levels. The evaluation team will trace both intermediate and strategic outcomes for a selection of specific components within the three strategic objectives (SOs) in the performance evaluation, and look at sustainability and some process issues (complementarity of regional and national operations, coordination and complementarity, and approaches for working with regional institutions in East Africa, per the remaining DEQs shown in Annex B.)

The overall design for the evaluation will employ qualitative and quantitative methods to answer the evaluation questions in combination, to meet DFID standards and answer the evaluation questions comprehensively and rigorously. The complex and variegated nature of the programme presents us with several challenges. Most important is the enormous number of projects in TMEA, each with several possible results paths, which makes it impossible to examine all of them in depth and wasteful to try to do so. At the same time, the great variety of projects in the programme would make any estimate made by scaling up a random sample of results paths hopelessly imprecise. Instead we propose to purposively select results chains with the most probable impact on intermediate and strategic outcomes and thoroughly test the degree to which these can be attributed to TMEA interventions.

Many of TMEA’s 200 projects will not have a sizeable impact, but some are likely to do so: and small improvements to trade processes can generate large impacts. The World Bank’s Development Databank gives EAC economies’ total GDP as $168 bn with imports of $36 bn, and exports of $26 bn. The total cost of TMEA is only $0.5bn so a project that made imports only 1.5% cheaper in time or cost savings could have a economic benefit, every year, larger than the cost of all projects in the programme’s lifetime. At the same time, no TMEA project is likely to offset such gains by having substantial negative effects on trade. The impact of the whole TMEA programme is therefore, to a first approximation, equal to the sum of the impact of its highest impact projects. The issue for the evaluation is whether or not it is possible to make a strong attribution or contribution claim for these few high impact projects. However, trade and economic growth are volatile (see Table 3 below) and affected by many factors.

| Table 3: Annual Growth Rates, $US values, of GDP and imports for EAC countries |
|-----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| GDP             | 9.3%    | 11.8%   | 9.2%    | -2.6%   | -1.4%   |
| Imports         | 5.2%    | 4.0%    | 7.0%    | -13.1%  | -10.8%  |

(Source World Development Indicators)
With 200 TMEA project activities it is almost certain that some will be correlated with improvements in macroeconomic data and indeed with positive intermediate outcomes but correlation is not enough to prove causation. Nor will counterfactual designs be appropriate when we have no alternative East Africa to evaluate. Having reviewed and work-shopped a number of study designs, the team have identified Contribution Tracing (CT) as the most suitable non-counterfactual design for examining TMEA’s effectiveness and the achievement of intermediate and strategic outcomes.

CT strengthens Process Tracing (PT) – an established impact evaluation design that enables strong causal inferences to be made within a single case by ‘tracing’ the observable implications of causal mechanisms through a results chain – with explicit consideration of the **probative value** of the evidence for each link in the chain. Probative value is a legal term expressing the relevance of any item of evidence to prove or disprove an element of a case. It is possible to calculate the probative value of any piece of evidence to strengthen belief in any proposition as a function of three variables:\n
1. The probability of observing that piece of evidence if the proposition **is true**\n2. The probability of observing that piece of evidence if the proposition **is not true**\n3. The **prior** belief that the proposition is true without observing that piece of evidence

Although these variables can only be estimated subjectively, the shift from collecting judgements about the likely truth of propositions to separating propositions and evidence and making judgements about the likelihood of observing each piece of evidence is an effective check on bias. In particular, the constant use of the question “how likely is it that some alternative mechanism has generated this evidence?” - which turns out to be the most important determinant of probative value - is a powerful guard against the pressure on programme staff to promote only positive stories and provides a consistent way of comparing many different types of evidence.

Traditional data collection methods – interviews, focus and discussion groups, observation, and the use of secondary documents and data – will feed this analytical approach, as well as answer evaluation questions beyond those of effectiveness that will be answered by CT. Triangulation – drawing on and weighing varied sources internal and external to TMEA - will be used to minimise bias, quality assure the data and support conclusions based on the range of findings.

CT is described in more detail in this section, and a further annex is provided at Annex E on the statistical and procedural steps required to carry it out conclusively. As a theory-based method, contribution tracing requires an in-depth understanding of the programme’s theory of change at corporate and component levels. Where these were not part of programme design and implementation, or where they were superseded by events, the evaluation team will need to reconstruct them to be able to undertake the analysis.

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9 The formula is a direct application of the definition of probability, known as Bayes rule. See Bayes (1763) *An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances* in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. 53: 370–418, Befani & Stedman-Bryce have bought it into Contribution Tracing, see Befani & Stedman-Bryce (2016) *Process Tracing and Bayesian updating for impact evaluation: Evaluation 1–19*. Other recent applications have been made by OPM and by 3ie.

10 While there are some propositions for which experimental techniques such as randomised controlled trials may provide estimates for some elements of some of the variables, such techniques always rely on untestable auxiliary assumptions chosen using the judgement of the statistician.
2.1 TMEA Theory of Change

The TMEA theory of change (TOC) was first articulated in 2011, and substantially updated in 2014. It is this 2014 version that the evaluation uses as a basis for following programme logic, at least at the highest levels.

Figure 2: Trademark’s Theory of Change

Three SOs describe the structure of the TOC: Increased Physical Access to Markets; Enhanced Trade Environment; and Improved Business Competitiveness. The TMEA Results Framework (RF) offers more detail in that it breaks down the components into outcomes and outputs that are in turn linked to projects; all levels are measured by indicators shown in the RF, and an intermediary output and outcome structure is shown that ties TMEA’s work to the TOC’s more conceptual structure. That structure is shown in Figure 3, below, where Increased EAC Trade appears as the overarching trade impact of programming, measured by three indicators on trade in orange: reduced costs, reduced time, and increased volumes. These are in turn supported (in green) by the SOs, divided into intermediate outcomes (in blue) and the programme outputs (in peach).
It is important to note that the SOs have different names in the TMEA TOC and the TMEA RF (Figures 2 and 3). SO1 is Increased Physical Access to Markets in the TOC but operationalized as “reduced corridor trade times; increased corridor trade volumes” in the RF. SO2 is Enhanced Trade Environment in the TOC and “increased ease of trading across borders” in the RF. SO3 is Improved Business Competitiveness in the TOC and is broken into three sub-SOs in the RF: “Enhanced business environment for trade”, “Improved export capability” and “Efficient trade logistics services”. Though this is a bit confusing on its face, the TOC and RF titles do have an internal logic, in that their intent is parallel, but perhaps more concrete in the RF. The TOC is rather more like a graphic representation of what needs to be done to improve trade, in high-level and somewhat abstract terms around regional integration; the RF, by contrast, is what the project focused on in order to achieve a parallel array of targets.

The RF, then, is an important basis for the evaluation work. For SO1 and SO2, the language from the RF captures the key TMEA results (reduced corridor trade times, increased corridor trade volumes, and increased ease in trading across borders) and the evaluation will use the RF terms for the SOs in these two cases. SO3 is at a different level of abstraction than are SO1 and SO2 and the RF reflects that in having three sub-SOs. To avoid confusion, the evaluation will use the broader category of “improving business competitiveness” in DEQ2.3, to make that SO more parallel with the other two.

TMEA refined its component-level strategies in the form of results chains, which might be thought of as component-level TOCs; these will be consulted as a basis for comparison for the performance evaluation pathways, and refined through the evaluation process.
It is notable that, despite important cross-cutting and cross-component activities within TMEA, in which work under one component is very important for successful work in another, these relationships are not equally explicit in the component results chains. Alongside work to reconstruct component-level results chains where they do not exist or are weaker, this cross-component element will be a subject of consultation and analysis in the performance evaluation, as part of the effort to respond to evaluation questions and test the TOC, while also examining the effects of that coordinated work on effectiveness.

2.2 Background

The previous phase of the independent evaluation undertook extensive research on the range of programming TMEA has carried out, across the range of its TOC. This included mapping the outputs – at project level, for more than 200 projects. These projects are generally carried out by TMEA’s partners in government, quasi-governmental bodies like the port authorities at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, private sector organisations (PSOs, sometimes also called Business Membership Organisations or BMOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), and other subcontracts. Projects were mapped by country and region, SO and strategic outcome, and whether they had direct effects on trade or an enabling effect. Projects include activities such as capacity building, knowledge generation, advocacy and policy advice, institutional strengthening with either soft assistance or hardware; and direct service delivery. Many projects worked in more than one of these categories, and there were some projects focused explicitly on gender, while others included gender as an element of programming.

The next stage of the evaluation included a more in-depth examination of project results, using a sample of 60 projects across the three strategic outcomes. The sample was split between those ‘priority’ projects TMEA selected (17) and those selected purposively by the evaluation team, to cover thematically ‘what TMEA typically does’ by matching TMEA portfolio characteristics, within a set of DFID-approved selection criteria. Forty projects were visited directly, and twenty were covered via a desk review to minimise costs; in some of the latter, phone interviews were added to supplement and clarify the data available in reports. SO2 and SO3 projects were scored against a set of common criteria around their relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

Results of those evaluations in earlier deliverables form the basis of the evaluation team’s understanding of the programme, in particular the way the TOC and results chains were operationalised into a set of activities designed to reach programme goals. The next step in the evaluation process was to examine that operationalisation by understanding the component level results chains, or pathways. TMEA has three Strategic Objectives, which are measured by a set of indicators in the RF. The TOC posits that these objectives will be met by the combined success of eleven Programme Intermediate Outcomes (PIOs) – in blue in the Figure 2 above – which are also measured by RF indicators, and there are one or more programme outputs that feed into the PIOs. Programme outputs represent the hypothesised results of what OPM have called “sub-pathways” – sets of activities designed to lead to the PIOs.

11 OPM: Otter, Thomas and Rasulova, Saltanat. Workstream 2; Deliverable 2A. Preliminary Output Assessment. 31 October 2017
12 Ibid. page 34.
13 Please see the submitted but unpublished OPM document.
that are projects – over 200 – clustered around these key themes, and theorised to support those programme-level outputs.

OPM’s evaluation team found that “under SO1 and SO2 projects and their likely results are more comprehensively built around pathways of change (where project results at one level of a pathway of change towards increased trade can most likely contribute to results at the next level in the same pathway of change), compared to SO3”14, making SO1 and SO2 likelier to achieve higher order outcomes. Two years later, the evaluation team undertook the pathway mapping to test the theory of change. Using the TOC, the RF indicator data, and data collected in the outputs and results mapping processes, the evaluation team examined the set of projects and the degree to which the hypothesised mechanism worked to build from project outcomes to PIOs. The evaluation team completed ten draft pathways pointing to PIOs15; these were couched in contextual expertise on trade and queried vis-à-vis the TOC and the necessity and sufficiency of the projects TMEA selected per pathway. As a body of work they characterise the breadth of TMEA interventions in each pathway and set the stage for the performance evaluation (please see the Key Steps section below (2.4.1), both for the contribution tracing case selection and for the important question on the TMEA TOC regarding the strength of its causal links and assumptions (DEQ5.1, please see below).

It is important to note that the pathways work was carried out almost entirely without fieldwork. In late July and early August, the OPM team held introductory discussions with component and SO leads and identified some results chains documentation. But we have not refined the pathways based on those initial discussions. The OPM team need time to visit with the teams (corporate and a selection of country teams), on each component, to discuss and evaluate evidence of the steps along the pathways. At that point the OPM team will identify weaknesses where they may exist. We will use these detailed and realistic frameworks as a basis for the PE, starting from the work to date, and enhanced by any further evidence generated during the PE process.

The discussions about context in and around the pathways reflect the complexity of the environments in which Trademark works: six countries with highly differing and dynamic political economies, trade and economic contexts, and contention over regional integration. Other donors and actors – governmental as well as private sector – also work to affect trade, meaning that TMEA’s results are likely to be linked very closely to these contextual factors and actors. Examining the possibly multiple causal factors in a ‘package’ that brought about change does not diminish TMEA’s contribution, but rather sets TMEA’s work in a more realistic and interdependent constellation of factors in which the team undertook their work. Very concretely, this means that the evaluation will seek to identify and substantiate TMEA’s contribution to results, rather than attributing results directly and solely to the programme’s actions.

As reported in the evaluation’s Institutional Assessment (Deliverable 2B), TMEA staff have had to negotiate these spaces carefully in order to implement, and have adapted to changing environments throughout the implementation period. Adaptation in such environments brings an additional challenge for evaluation, in that those strategies that might have been intended in initial stages may not have been realised for reasons beyond the programme’s manageable interest, and emergent strategies in response to changed environments might not be accurately included in the TOC. This, too, will be

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14 OPM: Otter, Thomas and Rasulova, Saltanat. Workstream 2; Deliverable 2A. Preliminary Output Assessment. 31 October 2017. p 39
15 One of the original eleven failed to materialise.
part of the evaluation team’s inquiry, to understand how adaptation affected programming and results.

2.3 Scope and objectives

Examining effectiveness and contribution will involve tracing the component results chains through programme intermediate outcomes and strategic outcomes, per the TOC, considering the complexity and adaptation referenced above. The mixed methods evaluation design will seek to substantiate TMEA’s claims about their contribution to results – that is, effectiveness – through collecting and analysing internal and external, primary and secondary data relevant to the results chains to answer HEQ2 and its DEQs (in the table below) on TMEA’s achievement of intermediate and strategic outcomes, and the remaining DEQs under HEQ5 on the links and assumptions of the TOC, and the relevance, coherence, sustainability and lessons learnt of the programme.

Table 4: HEQ2 and HEQ5 and their DEQs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ2 and its DEQs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEQ2:</strong> To what extent has TMEA been effective in achieving expected intermediate outcomes and to what extent has TMEA programme been effective in contributing to achieving programme strategic outcomes? Did the programme bring about any unintended outcomes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ2.1</strong> To what extent has TMEA contributed to reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ2.2</strong> To what extent has TMEA contributed to increasing ease of trading across borders?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ2.3</strong> To what extent has TMEA contributed to improving business competitiveness?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ2.4</strong> Has TMEA caused any unintended outcomes? What are they and who has been affected?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ 5 and its DEQs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEQ5:</strong> How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the TOC? What does this imply for the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the programme, and what are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programme relevance: TOC causal links and assumptions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ5.1</strong> To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the TOC evidence-based or verified?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ5.3</strong> To what extent does the programme support EAC regional trade development priorities?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 We eliminated DEQ5.2 “Are the results framework targets and milestones relevant and realistic?” Given the late advent of this evaluation, a year after the RF was finalised, support to make targets and milestones more relevant and realistic is unhelpful. This is particularly true in light of their new Strategy 2 RF with deeply altered indicators, targets and milestones, and in light of the DFID Annual Reviews’ intensive and detailed suggestions that underpin many of those changes.
**Coherence and coordination**

- DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the programme or on its relevance?
- DEQ5.5 Do TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

**DEQ5.6** What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model observed to date?

**DEQ5.7** Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

**DEQ5.8** To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

**DEQ5.9** Is using one organisation – a not-for-profit company – the best vehicle for impact on trade, and on poverty reduction through trade? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach?

**DEQ5.10** To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

**DEQ5.11** Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

**DEQ5.12** Did TMEA align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

**DEQ5.13** Are the focus and activities of TMEA consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

**DEQ5.14** What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa?17

**Sustainability**

- DEQ5.15 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?18

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17 Two DEQs here, sub-titled “Cross-cutting”, have been eliminated. The first read: “What has the impact been on corruption across the various components, notably at border crossings?” While the evaluation team will speak with team members about how corruption might have affected their work, this DEQ could be an impact study of its own. However, TMEA did not directly undertake projects on corruption, so looking for their impacts expends resources on a tangential pursuit. The DEQ on unintended consequences will cover this issue as and when it arises. Moreover, corruption is extremely sensitive in the context, as TMEA continue to interact with institutions that would see this as criticism of a very high and offensive order. Similarly, DEQ5.16 asked “What impact has the programme had on other issues, such as extractives and environment/climate?” which would examine issues well outside TMEA’s areas of influence and focus. While the Mombasa port project worked on “green port” practices, this is the only substantial, direct TMEA activities related to environment and climate. None related to extractives. TMEA has a difficult enough job to influence the areas it is working on directly, and the evaluation to capture them, without seeking impacts in areas where they didn’t intervene. “Other issues” are better covered under the HEQ2 “unintended impact” question, than devoting attention and resources the evaluation team needs for other EQs.

18 DEQ5.18 here read “What should be the essential components of a future exit strategy in order to sustain impact?” Exit strategies were salient at project level (and covered in detail in deliverable 2D/E and
DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

As a portfolio-type programme, TMEA have undertaken a broad variety of interventions across a range of components designed to improve trade in East Africa. By definition, such programmes are likely to have a range of levels of performance – that is, not all interventions or areas of work would be expected to have the same levels of success in achieving outcomes. This is exemplified by their changing TOC, which underwent major revision in 2013-2014, and again as the TMEA team move forward with their Strategy 2.

The performance evaluation proposes looking *deeply* at a set of pathways that have achieved their proposed outcomes to answer HEQ2, and *broadly* at the programme in its four main countries of operation to answer what remains of HEQ5. The design incorporates in-depth Contribution Tracing (described in the following section) alongside more traditional mixed methods evaluation fieldwork around the HEQ5 themes. This design thus takes advantage of mixed methods without spending considerable resources to capture additional depth on non-performing components. These mixed methods also allow for the emergence of unqueried topics, as illustrated in DEQ2.4 on unintended outcomes, by casting a wider – but of necessity less in-depth – net around the breadth of TMEA programming.

### 2.3.1 Contribution Tracing

The evaluation team will use contribution tracing (CT) to substantiate TMEA results claims for a selection of key outcomes, from projects through programme outputs and PIOs to their strategic outcomes – their pathways. CT is a rigorous non-experimental approach to establishing the validity of contribution claims in impact evaluations.19 It offers explicit criteria to guide evaluators in data collection and in measuring confidence in their findings with regard to an intervention’s contribution.20 CT uses both quantitative and qualitative data to make causal inferences without relying on a counterfactual design.21 The systematic design and previous research using CT provide added credibility to our proposed use of the method.

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CT is a theory-based approach to impact evaluation, with its own comparative advantages among non-counterfactual and non-experimental designs. It is particularly strong at reducing confirmation bias, providing more transparency and predictability to data collection efforts, and ultimately increasing the internal validity and credibility of evaluation findings.\textsuperscript{22} CT provides guidance on what evidence to seek out, or how to assess the strength of evidence, if observed, in relation to a contribution claim. The process has the following steps:

- **Developing a testable claim.** This requires intensive discussions with the project staff to turn vague statements like, “the project has supported the improvement of trade links between country x and country y” into a more specific statement about exactly what was achieved “the project lead to a reduction in average waiting time at the border between x and y from three days to two days”. This is further delineated into a recreation of the actual (rather than theorised) results chain: what the project did (reports prepared, courses held, equipment bought etc.), and the links between the project activities and the results (e.g. we produced a report which caused the government to set up a new unit which put in place a new procedure which reduced waiting times at the border).

- **Identify evidence for each link.** At the first link in the results chain – project activities – evidence of TMEA’s contribution is likely abundant and irrefutable – the evidence accumulated from having planned and carried out an intervention. From the next link onward in the results chain, each link requires two bundles of evidence. First is evidence that something happened (the unit was set up, the new procedure was put in place etc), and second is evidence that whatever happened was caused by the previous link in the chain. This linkage evidence often depends on one of several characteristics:
  - Timing, e.g., “they had been talking about this for years but only did it when we provided the report showing them how”
  - Place: “they only introduced it in the customs posts where we were working”
  - Language: “everything in the regulation is lifted directly from our draft”
  - Correspondence: “they said in the email record/minutes that they were waiting for us to produce the recommendation before making the decision”

Often project staff do not realise that they have such evidence or that it is important until it is pointed out to them.

- **Iterate.** At this stage project/programme staff will sometimes realise that they don’t have evidence for the claim they had wanted to make but do have evidence for another claim.

- **Collect the evidence** for each link and make judgements about the likelihood of seeing that evidence if the claim about the existence of a link (or linkage to the previous link) is true and of the likelihood\textsuperscript{23} of seeing that same evidence if the claim is not true. Taking the standard assumption that any claim considered without evidence is as likely to be true as not these two judgements imply an estimate of the probative value of each bundle of evidence to support each claim.

- **Put both the claim and the judgements about the likelihood of seeing evidence up for challenge.**

\textsuperscript{22} Befani and Stedman-Bryce, 2017.

\textsuperscript{23} It is not sensible to make precise subjective judgements of probabilities. Befani and Steadman-Bryce propose a rubric of seven judgements: Virtually Certain (99-100%), Very Likely (90-99%), Likely (66-90%), About as likely as not (33-66%), Unlikely (10-33%), Very Unlikely (1-10%), Exceptionally Unlikely (0-1%)
• **Iterate** until each link is supported by evidence with high probative value.
• **Present the results chain and attached evidence** as a strongly supported claim. The calculated probative values can go in an annex.

CT uses the principles of PT combined with a branch of mathematics called Bayesian updating.\(^{24}\) CT builds upon two an established social science methods PT and Contribution Analysis, both designed to make causal inferences within a single case. Process tracing builds a results chain and gathers evidence as described above and then uses four “probative tests”\(^{25}\) of that evidence while Contributions Analysis stresses the importance of contesting a contribution claim with alternative explanations. The extra element brought in by CT is the insight from Bayes rule that, if you have a claim \(C\)

\[
\text{The Probability of observing } E \text{ if claim } C \text{ is true ÷ [The Probability of observing } E \text{ if claim } C \text{ is true + The Probability of observing } E \text{ if claim } C \text{ is not true]}
\]

that you initially think is as likely to be true as not, i.e. you start by believing that the likelihood that the claim is true is 0.5, and then get a bundle of evidence \(E\) that relates to that claim then your new belief that the evidence is true should logically be equal to:

In lay terms, we become more confident in a piece of evidence when it is laid out in a logical sequence, such as along the postulated results chain, and paired or grouped with other evidence. When evidence is also “blind” or unbiased unlike, for example, programme M&E reporting, that further strengthens the case. Bayesian updating in CT is a logic and format for laying out and backing up evidence claims along a pathway. A given piece of evidence that might or might not prove TMEA’s contribution can be said to give a certainty of “50-50” – as likely as not. This is called “prior confidence” in Bayesian updating; “posterior confidence” considers as well how likely we are to find that evidence.

“Probative value” or confidence in that evidence emerges from a considered review of all the evidence along the results chain, individually and in combination. By estimating the probabilities around finding one, and then additional, pieces of evidence we can raise that 50-50 level of confidence. The pieces of evidence have to follow a strict structure for that confidence level to rise: first, we must have tangible evidence of the measured outcome, from a trustworthy source usually external to the programme. Second, we need evidence that the programme contributed to or caused that outcome, and not some other cause. As these pieces of evidence are assembled along the results chain, and the theorised results at each step are backed by tangible evidence, we grow more confident that our evidence documents the ‘cause’ of (or contributor to) the ‘effect’ that has materialised.

The clear and unequivocal presentation of the pieces of evidence and the calculations of prior and posterior confidence is essential to the process. By being transparent, the strength of the contribution claim is subject to debate. Within the team this includes expert analysis and ground-truthing about alternative explanations for each bundle of evidence, to ensure that the argument constructed through the evidence base is feasible, *prima facie*. The East Africa trade expertise also helps the team demarcate different contributors – such as other donor or government projects on the same topics.

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\(^{25}\) The four tests, called ‘straw in the wind’, ‘hoop test’, ‘smoking gun’ and ‘doubly decisive’, are described in greater detail in Annex E.
– that are part of the results chain. Transparency continues into the reporting period, so that the pieces of evidence and the conclusions drawn by the team can be queried by interested and knowledgeable readers and, where necessary, refined as a result.

In more statistical language, Bayesian updating is a method of statistical inference which is used to calculate posterior confidence in a contribution claim based on our prior confidence and the review of evidence. In the application of Bayesian logic to process tracing, we consider whether we have to find a given piece of empirical material (sensitivity or certainty of evidence), and if found, whether there are any plausible alternative explanations for finding this evidence (uniqueness of evidence, often referred to as Type I Error).\textsuperscript{26, 27} A mathematical procedure tests the difference between the true positive rate, or ‘Sensitivity’, and the false positive rate, or ‘Type I Error’. The larger the difference between the Sensitivity and the Type I Error, the higher the probative value of an item of evidence in relation to a specific contribution claim.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, the task of the evaluation is to identify evidence with the highest probative value. Annex E includes a deeper discussion of CT in practice, based on recent examples and showing exact steps to be taken.

The CT method requires a contribution claim to test: inherent in that requirement is that the evaluation design start from the results claimed and then work backwards through the results chain or pathway to substantiate the claims. Those indicators in which TMEA have shown substantial results in their RF therefore provide a natural starting point for selection of cases to study in-depth, though with the quality concerns expressed in DFID’s 2016 and 2017 Annual Reviews, we will also need to validate the choices with Trademark before undertaking further research.

As noted above, the portfolio approach inherent in TMEA’s programming reflects and appropriately responds to regional and national political economy, uncertain and dynamic contexts, and emerging opportunities. With its major funding, highly professional team and ability to establish relationships with government partners, TMEA was able to adapt programming to real-time dynamics, emerging champions, and opportunities to intervene where they judged these would make the most difference to trade in the EAC. For this reason, there are areas of intervention which are mature in their achievement of outcomes, and those which are not. Selecting those which TMEA asserts have made significant, measurable gains in purposive sampling allows us to attempt to trace and substantiate those claims, assess their reliability, understand the dimension and implications of those that are substantiated, and draw lessons learnt from the detailed case experiences. The CT analysis will not show what has happened across each and every intervention in, for example, SO1; instead it will show the ones where there have been important gains in reducing corridor trade times.


\textsuperscript{27} A layperson’s read of this might be: “Here sensitivity means the probability of observing an item of evidence if the contribution claim is true. Type I Error is the probability of observing an item of evidence if the contribution claim is not true.”

\textsuperscript{28} Pamoja UK, https://www.pamoja.uk.com/aboutcct/
and/or increasing corridor trade volumes (DEQ2.1). CT will assess the contribution of TMEA to these gains.

Similarly with DEQ2.2, CT analysis on one or two key efforts resulting in what TMEA claims under the SO2 title “increasing ease of trading across borders” will examine the core activities, projects, outputs and outcomes that are hypothesised to have resulted in measurable ease of cross-border trading. Where this is shown to have occurred, the magnitude of that change will be queried in context and with interpretation from trade experts on the evaluation team. For DEQ2.3, on “improved business competitiveness,” selected work in SO3 will be queried for its effects on competitiveness, to substantiate or refute TMEA claims of effectiveness in that area. Given the weaker pathway connection identified in the earlier evaluation work, the team will pay special attention to the scale of that change and its likely impact in the contexts in which TMEA operated.

2.4 Key Steps

Step 1 – Selecting cases

Selection of cases is crucial in light of limited resources and time. Starting from the most substantial results will focus attention on the areas of intervention that are most promising in terms of showing impact at scale that can be reliably imputed to provide return on donors’ investment. The evaluation team will therefore select cases where TMEA identifies its most important results to look at the extent to which TMEA contributed to or caused those results. We will also attempt to determine the significance of their contribution, in light of other contributing factors in the context.

Selection will therefore proceed with additional document review and internal consultation to answer the following questions:

1. For which components (or results chains) do TMEA claim results, and where (regional or national level(s))? As a condition for this criterion, we would also want to see results chains where activities, outputs and outcomes were largely successfully implemented.

2. Was the (claimed) maturity and potential scale of the impact sufficient to be detected by the evaluation?

3. Does the results chain warrant investigation, in terms of scale? Components with materialized, detectable impacts that relate only to a small fraction of the scope of the issue might be disqualified here.

4. Are data likely to be accessible, both within and outside TMEA, to substantiate the contribution claim?

5. Which cases will best answer each of the three SO-related DEQs?

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29 The recent site visit provided a wealth of documentation and data on projects and, importantly, on component strategy and results planning and monitoring. The team also got on a much more positive footing with the TMEA team members (see the discussion of Appreciative Inquiry, below) that will facilitate remote contacts to supplement documentation as necessary during Step One.

30 Data quality is assumed here; wherever possible, data of high quality that is external to TMEA will be necessary to support data provided by TMEA. If there are cases where TMEA have the only data available on a given component or contribution claim, data will be closely assessed for quality.
The last question deals with the mix of cases, rather than just the selection of individual cases: to be successful, the evaluation must select a set of cases which are able to answer the three relevant DEQs on effectiveness by strategic objective: SO1 on reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes; SO2 on increasing ease of trading across borders, and SO3 on improving business competitiveness.

Looking across country programmes and the corporate components, we will propose a selection that includes work in each SO, to be able to answer DEQs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 comprehensively. For example, to answer DEQ2.1 “To what extent has TMEA reduced corridor trade times and increased corridor trade volumes?” we might select two results cited by TMEA in our early interviews: reductions in import times at Mombasa Port, and reductions in border crossing times at OSBPs. Selecting these two results comprise various TMEA efforts under SO1, including infrastructure and capacity building. They also focus on particular countries. The evaluation team would use those parameters to guide conversations with corporate and country TMEA teams, government and other partners, think tanks, and others as outlined in Steps 3 and 4 below. The same process would be undertaken at the same time with SO2 for DEQ2.2, and with SO3 for DEQ2.3. The selection will be validated with TMEA and cleared with DFID before fieldwork begins, as described in Step 2 below.

CT case selection is based on where mature outcomes have been realised, rather than sampling for some other purpose. The selection is not designed to be in some way generalisable to the rest of the SO. The CT design examines this set of cases in depth, rather than all cases more shallowly. A portfolio programme like TMEA is often not successful in all undertakings, but rather uses adaptive management to monitor and make decisions on investments based on working through different results chains that have the potential of success. As a result, CT is an appropriate choice for examining those results chains that are reported to be successful.

The result of this process, including early conversations with TMEA, review of the RF and other data and documents, and consideration of these questions, will be a prioritised list of contribution claims about TMEA programming’s potentially most impactful activities. A draft “long list” of the major project areas is found in Annex H to this document. However, it is useful to remember that the selection will be made not on projects, but on TMEA’s contribution claims from these projects.

The number of outcomes/ claims that can be reliably evaluated will be constrained by time and resources. A list of possible cases will be produced with final selection of cases agreed in conversation with key stakeholders.

On its face, selecting cases based at least partially on TMEA’s own assertions around their best outcomes would appear to have the potential to introduce bias in the selection. With a simpler evaluation design, that might pose a risk. But the proposed design mitigates that possibility in two key ways. First, the CT design looks at outcomes purposively, with the explicit intention of identifying confirmatory or negatory evidence on those claims. Where the team cannot find that evidence, we will return to TMEA to look for a claim lower down the results chain that we can check in a similar fashion. Our intention is, as appropriate in an independent evaluation, neutral with regard to the claims reported by TMEA. The CT process simply starts where outcomes claims are made, with a set of the most salient causal stories from across their interventions.

In the investigation of the individual cases, we will look backward from the claims to the results chains, point by point, to test whether the claim has merit, through the inputs,
outputs, intermediate outcomes and strategic outcomes. There are two tests of the claims at each of these levels: whether the outcome actually occurred, and whether TMEA’s claim of influencing that outcome is warranted. For both we will seek reliable data that minimise the likelihood of bias. The process continues with attention to alternative explanations for the outcomes claims, but the CT method also tests the likelihood of alternative explanations through the calculations of the probative value of the evidence. In this way, the CT method is closer to Process Tracing than Contribution Analysis. The evaluation team’s knowledge of the trade space in East Africa (from team expertise as well as from fieldwork) will help us place TMEA’s potential impact in context. TMEA will likely be one but not the only factor in results chains. The rigour of CT will help us isolate what came from TMEA’s interventions, by its attention to whether each link in a results chain is demonstrably caused by the one prior.

The second way in which potential bias is minimised is that the evaluation team will be looking across the full TOC broadly, to answer evaluation questions under HEQ5. This allows for broad capture of strengths and weaknesses, obstacles and enabling factors, such as in looking at synergies or complementarity among components, where they might exist. It will place the CT findings in the broader context of the programme as a whole, and together with the TGIS and VfM studies detailed later in this document, provide a set of useful perspectives on whether their outcome claims are sufficient in light of the donors’ significant investments. Collectively this design limits bias while allowing for thorough attention across the breadth of TMEA’s ten pathways.

**Step 2 – Validating cases**

Possible cases must be identified and validated with Trademark through discussion, to ensure we focus our attention on the strongest cases for programme outcomes. This process began in July and August with the evaluation team’s visit to the corporate office of TMEA, from a set of interviews that approached the TMEA team from an Appreciative Inquiry (AI) stance, discussed in more detail in Step 4. This method builds on positivist psychological theory, in “seeking what is right in an organization” rather than a more traditional problem-solving approach. While problem-solving methods seek to identify and root out deficits, AI methods begin with questions about the best experiences, proudest accomplishments, or strongest values in an organisation, with the goal of capitalising on those experiences and their positive psychological residue, in a longer-term process of organisational change.

In Nairobi, the evaluation team used AI as a way to open conversations with the TMEA team members. In addition to “ice-breaking”, the questions about proudest accomplishments created an obvious and abrupt change in mindset at TMEA about the evaluation – a relationship which had soured somewhat due to the long delay and what was perceived as a lack of communication on OPM’s part. The approach in effect changed the “relational process of inquiry” for the better, within the opening questions of each interview. The approach was used deliberately for that purpose, but also to

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31 Please see first draft of a “long list” of candidates, stemming from interviews at TMEA, at Annex H.
32 Asking about team members’ “proudest accomplishments” proved a positive and fruitful entrée into deeper discussions. These interviews were carried out with subcomponent leads, results team, senior leadership and senior management team.
elicit frank discussions of projects and components: once respondents felt their accomplishments were appreciated in the conversation, many were openly discussing both the strengths and the limitations of what they had been able to accomplish to date.

These conversations were relatively brief (one to one-and-a-half hours), considering the extent of programming and the number of years most TMEA staffers have been working on the activities. Continuing with the language of AI and taking best advantage of the openness it appeared to create, the evaluation team will need to return to these teams at corporate level, to confirm the outcomes that emerge from the first step described above and deepen the evaluation team’s understanding, following our own internal process. We will also consult with country-level leadership and component teams, to identify country-specific outcomes that have led to the TMEA results.

**Step 3 – Planning for data collection**

The evaluation team expects to use contribution tracing on between four and six significant outcomes or contribution claims. Each SO will be featured in at least one evaluated results chain (DEQ2.1, 2.2 and 2.3), assuming there are claims in each SO that meet the above criteria. At the same time all ten TMEA pathways will be evaluated through the performance evaluation; those results claims that are selected for CT will be studied more deeply through CT, while all ten pathways will be part of the response to performance, relevance, coordination/coherence and sustainability questions as seen in HEQ5 and its DEQs (Table 3 above). We will also seek unintended outcomes across the whole of the research effort (DEQ2.4).

We will look at the ten pathways in each site visit country, allowing for a broad (if not as deep) evaluation of each of those components to understand interpretations and uses of the corporate-level TOC or results chain, its causal links and its realised and unrealised, explicit and implicit, assumptions – which may indeed differ by country (DEQ5.1). For the four countries visited in the evaluation, we will examine the extent to which the programme supports EAC regional trade development priorities (DEQ5.3), changes in policy and political economy and their impacts on the programme (DEQ5.4), and TMEA’s complementariness with other ongoing initiatives (DEQ5.5).

With regard to coherence and coordination, the evaluation will look at strengths and weaknesses of the working model to date (DEQ5.6). We will also look at synergies across TMEA components and between national and regional levels (DEQ5.7), to understand the circumstances under which TMEA has been able to bring “greater results than the sum of its parts” (DEQ5.8), and look at the governance (DEQ5.10), the constraints and enablers of the operational model at donor level (DEQ5.11), and management arrangements such as the not-for-profit company (DEQ5.9), including the strengths and weaknesses of the approach, to provide insights for future programming. This will also hold true for DEQ5.12 on alignment with country systems and agencies and DEQ5.13 on consistency with, additionality to, and improved coordination with, other development programmes in the region (DEQ5.14).

With regard to sustainability, DEQ5.17 on the sustainability of any social and financial programme benefits will be examined through the same fieldwork, along with DEQ5.20 on stakeholder engagement through the programme and beyond its life, including the use of lessons learnt.

Each of these will be undertaken by our field teams during site visits, alongside CT data collection, and this section details the methods used for both.
Prior to arriving for fieldwork, the evaluation team will consult with TMEA team members to establish stakeholder lists for consultation and, to the extent possible, establish contact and make appointments for interviews for all ten pathways. Within TMEA, the evaluation team has established good relations and reference points at the corporate level, with SO leads and their staff members working on individual pathways or components. We have also worked closely with the Results team and with the Senior Management and Senior Leadership team members most critical for the evaluation: Research and Impact Director Anthony Mveyange; Wanjiku Kimamo (newly installed head of inclusive trade); and David Stanton and Mark Priestly. Each team member interviewed has been queried using the Appreciative Inquiry method (described in the next Step) and has offered initial considerations for the most important TMEA achievements that might be evaluated using CT. Their inputs have provided background on the history of the ten pathways that will be considered in HEQ5, and interviewing other corporate component teams and country officers will advance the aims of the traditional evaluation undertaken across the TOC. We will also interview other donors and government actors whose activities may also have affected outcomes; Table 5 below shows an initial assessment of the range of possible interviewees and other sources.

These initial interviews also provided a preliminary basis for understanding the key stakeholders and interlocutors from government, private sector, civil society and other domains who will be vital (though not exclusive) sources for the CT and non-CT inquiries. We also identified a range of data and document resources through the interviews. These include:

**Table 5: Illustrative list of sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SO</th>
<th>Potential informants</th>
<th>Data and document sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SO1</td>
<td>Port authorities and partners, including the 25 agencies who signed the Port Charter and who cooperate with Green Port reform; Revenue, Customs and border/immigration authorities; Donors (African Development Bank, Japan's agency and the World Bank for past and present projects, and DFID, the European Union, European Investment Bank, and French agency for reported TMEA-leveraged funding); National Land Commission in Kenya; advocates from civil society and the private sector; TMEA corporate and national team</td>
<td>Northern/ Central Corridor Observatory data; World Bank 2015 study on trade costs in Central and Northern corridors; EAC trade report and aggregate data on trade volumes and values; revenue administration and Customs platform data; TMEA Results Meter and OSBP data including time measurements (from entry to exit of customs area), time release study and traffic survey on border-to-border corridor time; queuing time (congestion studies); Aurecon report; Maersk “pain points” study (confidential); Price data on storage over time; ICBT studies at central banks and national bureaus of statistics and TMEA ICBT study; Port statistics from Mombasa and Dar authorities; External time, volume, value and cost data from Universal Postal Union, Maersk, FEDEX, others in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO2</td>
<td>EAC Secretariat and national ministries supported by TMEA to work with the EAC; National line ministries and private sector actors using new ICT for Trade tools like electronic cargo tracking and single-window portals</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute studies on NTB costs in the region; EABC business climate research on NTB effects on trade; the Timebound Matrix of NTBs; East Africa Trade Hub (EATH - USAID) for data on their NTB work and E-ping system; TMEA-gathered feedback on testing systems access, records on SME training; lab leadership; drafted policies; EATH on standards harmonisation collaboration with TMEA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The evaluation research for both CT and non-CT analyses will be carried out using standard data collection methods during site visits – interviews, discussion groups, observation – and in desk review of results chains and data, evaluation and other reports, internal and external correspondence and documents, corridor and other external data, among others. These methods will provide the basis for CT analysis in answering the HEQ2 questions, and for more traditional triangulation to answer the remaining HEQ5 questions listed above. Illustrative stakeholders for the evaluation questions are included in the Evaluation Matrix at Annex A. The schedule allows time for team members who are in Nairobi but also at port and OSBP site visits, a proposed visit to Arusha with the EAC Secretariat, and country office visits to four countries.

### 2.5 Sources and methods

#### Step 4 – CT interviews

When the team interviews TMEA and other interlocutors for those results chains that have been selected for CT, a particular method has been developed to ensure the necessary range of data is collected, in line with the particular needs of the approach. The Appreciative Inquiry method, adjusted to suit CT purposes, will elicit TMEA team members’ contribution stories in great detail. These stories are drawn out in narrative form to start, allowing respondents to tell the story in their own way.

Then, for clarity needed for CT, the interviewer probes first for specifics on the concrete activities reported in the story – whether that is infrastructure work, capacity development, systems support, or a combination of several activities – and then for specific pieces of evidence to substantiate the respondent’s claim about the activities. There are two evidence points for each step in the chain. The first is to substantiate the outcome itself, and the second is to connect the outcome with TMEA’s contribution. If the outcome is reduced time for trade in the Northern Corridor, for example, sources for such substantiation would be government or other data that show such a change, or...
results from the TGIS enterprise surveys on changes in the trade times for certain industries. Connecting the outcome with TMEA might be a combination of email trails, contracts, documents produced, meeting attendance sheets and minutes – particularly at key decision points – and other “digital dossier” evidence. This type of evidence, when it exists, is highly unlikely to be present if the activity in question did not happen – thereby providing a strong evidence point around the contribution claim.

The interview continues to explore ever higher levels of the results chain with the same process: story, specificity, evidence, and more evidence. In this way the interviewer hears as well about obstacles and unintended consequences – useful in other ways for the evaluation – while compiling the necessary information to detail and substantiate the contribution claim. This process may be iterative, as necessary, through in-person or electronic means.

As the contribution claim is traced, unbiased data may be more difficult to identify for higher order outcomes. This is a challenge and risk of the CT method, but is not substantially different from other methods, used in countries were data collection is variable and/or political. In such cases, the team will need to return to the respondents from whom the contribution claim originated to identify an adjusted contribution claim, and pursue additional avenues for substantiation. CT may be able to substantiate a lower-level contribution claim, while expert judgement and analysis of different data streams can still provide confidence about conclusions at the highest levels of TMEA’s results framework. OPM staff have used CT in previous evaluations and understand its strengths and limitations; these staff will be available for support during the CT process to ensure we take best advantage of the method in the field, in analysis, and in any necessary iterative work to address data issues.

Steps 4 and 5 may not be simply sequential, but rather parallel and iterative, as necessary. The CT interviews will provide important information to understand what evidence or data we may need to seek out to substantiate or refute the causal claims. At the same time, interviews with external stakeholders may raise important questions that require returning to TMEA team members for additional information.

### Step 5 – Data collection

In addition to the CT data collection method proposed above, the evaluation team will also use its in-country team members to scope out stakeholders or others with knowledge of TMEA’s activities both inside and external to TMEA, who may have divergent perspectives and experiences. The latter include other donors and development actors, watchdog groups and others in civil society, industry organizations, academics working on trade, and others. As is to be expected in

16.5% reduction in trade times

TMEA have disseminated one impressive and concrete finding: a 16.5% reduction in trade times. The calculation of this figure comes from TMEA’s Results Meter, where times are calculated for nodes – ports and OSBPs – where TMEA’s concerted efforts across various programme components were to aggregate their greatest benefits.

The evaluation will examine this claim closely in the evaluation. The 16.5% figure and its components will be part of the CT sample. We will analyse the construction of the formula, how it rules out alternative explanations, and the decision to report on time reduction for parts of corridors (rather than the entire corridor) for inclusion in the calculation.

OPM understands the centrality of this TMEA claim and DFID’s inquiries as to its merits, and will dedicate the necessary scrutiny and appraisal of its components in order to evaluate its merit.

35 Including USAID’s East Africa Trade Hub, German cooperation work with the EAC, World Bank and Japanese International Cooperation Agency work on infrastructure at ports and OSBPs, inter alia.
development evaluation, some respondents will be guarded, others will miss appointments, and still others will offer only testimonials about TMEA. Our experienced team will work reflectively to manage these kinds of difficulties in the field, seek additional sources, and take best advantage of opportunities for unscheduled discussions.

As we will be undertaking this process for the ten TMEA pathways, we will also ask for and actively seek out different interpretations and experiences – unintended consequences (DEQ2.4), outside perspectives, and marginalised voices. That might mean dockworkers at a port, traders at an OSBP who do not belong to a TMEA-supported women’s organisation, and industries who didn’t receive advocacy support from TMEA. While there is no way to guarantee we will cover all those affected by TMEA (as not even all those affected by TMEA will know that this is the case), we will use our local networks and teams to seek out this range of experiences through the sectoral and national/local knowledge of our team, and through paying close attention in fieldwork to actors that emerge in other interviews, site visits, and the like.

Interviews with certain external stakeholders will also be used to substantiate or refute contribution claims, by beginning the interviews in a slightly different way than most evaluation interviews begin: without referencing TMEA. This will not always be possible, such as when TMEA introduces the evaluation team to a TMEA partner, but where we have identified respondents independently, we have this opportunity. Before we introduce the datum that we are researching about TMEA, we might fruitfully ask about outcomes themselves, and let these respondents tell us their thoughts, experiences and evidence about changes and to what they attribute these changes. These are sometimes called bellwether interviews, and they will be used in the performance evaluation and the Poverty and Gender Impact Study as well. Bellwether interviews will be used in both CT and non-CT fieldwork, where the evaluation team is not naturally going to be assumed to be evaluating TMEA (e.g., when we reach out independently to think tanks, other donors, etc.)

Instruments and guides for the fieldwork will be geared towards both operational and strategic questions, where appropriate, in order to look at both CT results chains within pathways, and the explicit and implicit logic of the pathways themselves for HEQ5. Findings in this vein will allow the team to examine the TOC in concrete terms, and from different perspectives, including explicitly considering other possible causes or contributions to the TMEA outcomes claims. Looking in retrospect, the team will be able to explore these questions in light of the full implementation period and a year since its conclusions – almost what would be called an ex-post evaluation – allowing for insights on the causal links and assumptions (DEQ5.1) and the way these were affected by events on the ground.

Findings from the full CT process on a sample of components will allow for more in-depth response on those particular pathways, because these are likely to be mature and to have higher-order outcomes that can be measured. Other pathways, notably the logistics framework component, are not as advanced in terms of the proposed TOC. Still, querying the team members – old and new – who have watched the process develop from design to implementation to monitoring and adaptation, will help to

36 This is similar to the Qualitative Interview Protocol (QUIP) method, in which interview teams themselves do not know about the evaluand, and as such cannot ask respondents about it: instead, respondents are asked to describe changes in their lives and report their own theories about who or what caused any changes. In the Contribution Tracing language, evidence sought this way would have high sensitivity, and lower than usual Type I Error. Copestake, J. 2015. Qualitative Impact Protocol: Guidelines for Use. DFID, Economic and Social Research Council, University of Bath. http://www.bath.ac.uk/cds/projects-activities/assessing-rural-transformations/documents/complete-quip-guidelines.pdf
understand the evolution of their component design, their assumptions about context and political economy, and the obstacles they have overcome or not. The work to map the TMEA pathways to date, and deepening that work during field work, will include reviewing country strategies and component-level results chains; speaking widely to actors internal and external to TMEA, including beneficiaries, to ask about the design and implementation of the design; asking knowledgeable actors about context and exogenous factors; and interviewing industry actors (individuals and business membership organisations), will give a broader perspective on those topics as well. By examining all ten TMEA pathways through traditional mixed methods we will have a thorough response to DEQ5.1, including validating TMEA results claims, which will be augmented by the in-depth interviews and data reviews carried out for the CT fieldwork and analysis.

In answering DEQ5.1 we will follow each pathway from output levels (building on the project-level pathway information we have already compiled and analysed) to trace the degree to which the intermediate and strategic outcomes have been reached, the factors and assumptions that supported and inhibited those achievements, the quality and reliability of data from TMEA on those achievements, and the extent to which TMEA can be said to have contributed to them. We will assess if there are assumptions or elements of the results chains that could be strengthened, particularly in light of the trade expertise on our team. This is an iterative evaluative process that involves data collection and analysis while we work in the field and through the analytical period. We will examine the sector and TMEA’s place in it – a significant place, given funding levels and ways they may have leveraged their influence – and interrogate what we read in results chains and strategy documents, and what we hear from TMEA team members and partners about planned component logic, assumptions made, actual inhibiting and enabling factors, and results.

In SO1, the same process should help to understand how the political economy of Tanzania’s trade sector impinged, for example, on the avenues TMEA could pursue in reform at Dar Port, or, in SO2, the degree to which changing and asymmetric political interests shaped regional integration priorities around which TMEA could intervene with the East African Community (EAC).

Site visits to study CT and all ten pathways in TMEA country offices will also include attention to national and regional complementarity and coordination, taking into account the political nature of integration and the distinctive perspectives, challenges and focus areas that will have emerged for each country (DEQ5.7). This is clear at the outset with the ways TMEA’s regional regulatory support to the EAC was designed to help national authorities to pass and implement legislation relating to regional integration, non-tariff barriers, standards, common immigration and customs procedures, and private sector advocacy. Our team will inquire into each of the ten pathways during field work and analysis with respect to complementarity and coordination. While there is a tendency for programme partners in an evaluation to offer positive “testimony” on abstract concepts like these, the evaluation team will work to plumb the how and why behind any TMEA complementarity and coordination with national, regional and other partners, including weaknesses and strengths.

The same set of evaluation interviews and document review will serve to look for evidence around programme relevance (DEQs 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). For DEQ5.3, interviews will focus on Arusha at the EAC Secretariat and in-country at the ministries responsible for regional integration and accession steps, where TMEA have worked

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37 These layers are so named in the TMEA RF, and lead to the level of strategic objective.
with these bodies. DEQ5.4 is a wider question that has to do with the context around TMEA. In interviews with EAC and other government partners, TMEA themselves, and private sector and civil society partners, we will include questions on policies and political economy changes that have impacted on the programme or its relevance. DEQ5.5 will be investigated through interviews with government and private sector actors working on trade in the region, who we began to access in August of this year. These will provide a fruitful entrée to examine complementarity with other initiatives and our experienced team will probe on these issues to ensure we understand the range of related initiatives and interview their sponsors, whether government or private sector.

As mentioned above, one key area of exploring the TOC during fieldwork will be to examine the ways TMEA have worked across components to achieve coherence and coordination (DEQs 5.6 to 5.14). Some of these have already emerged in initial consultations with the team members at Corporate level in July and August, 2018, in which the team heard how multiple results chains (like Increased Efficiency and Capacity of Trade Infrastructure, ICT for Trade, Civil Society and Private Sector-led Policy Formulation, and Logistics) work in concert on different aspects of trade bottlenecks and opportunities, to reach shared goals on reducing trade times and trade costs. The evaluation will interview TMEA and government counterparts in each of the ten pathways as part of the non-CT fieldwork, as well as other relevant beneficiaries which differ by pathway (please see the “Informants” column in Table 5 above for illustrative list per SO). We will explicitly look for ways to strengthen how programming can be strengthened in the area of coherence and coordination, to answer the set of related questions:

DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model observed to date? As a cross-cutting question, this will be part of interview guides with TMEA, stakeholder/partner, private sector, other donor and civil society interviews.

DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities? This question also gets at TMEA’s cross-cutting ability to meet the goals of its matrix management system, by which thematic areas are implemented in a coherent (though not necessarily identical) way across countries and in its regional relationships and activities. This, too, will be probed across the wide range of interviews, to capture both areas for improvement and examples of where coherence and coordination were successful.

DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened? Answering this question will synthesise data from across the performance evaluation effort, and take best advantage of the analytical skills and sectoral expertise of the team. As the evaluation progresses we will check in with the team to ensure the kinds of information needed to answer this question are being collected successfully across the range of stakeholders.

DEQ5.9 Is using one organisation – a not-for-profit company – the best vehicle for impact on trade and on poverty reduction through trade? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach? Building on the institutional assessment carried out under deliverable 2B of the evaluation, the answer to this question will look at the evolution of the organisation through internal interviews, from the time of the Institutional Assessment to the end of Strategy 1. The goal will be to capture ways in which the vehicle worked or did not, including any strengths and weaknesses.
DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs? Another synthesis question, the answer will rely on further data from the performance evaluation interviews, combined with the team’s assembled expertise on the ways the governance arrangements have enabled and inhibited achievements and delivery.

Certain of TMEA’s efforts have engaged deeply with African regional institutions such as the EAC, and will have important lessons about which approaches work best (DEQ5.14) under which conditions. Adaptive and supportive, relationship-based approaches that flexibly respond to region-led initiatives were mentioned in August 2018 as vital to TMEA outcomes. Providing long-term technical assistance, institutional and individual capacity building, and having the relationships necessary to convene stakeholder groups were some of the strategies broadly defined in these meetings. To more narrowly capture their processes, obstacles and successes, the evaluation will follow this line of inquiry closely especially where regional institutional work was paramount in SO2: with the EAC (e.g., EAC- and ministry-focused support, work on non-tariff barriers and harmonisation of standards, and ICT initiatives.) The East Africa Business Council work done under SO3 will be another area of focused attention for this DEQ. Deeper inquiry into how these TMEA teams were able to take on board regional priorities, while maintaining focus on TMEA goals, will yield detailed information to analyse in triangulated fashion, to answer this evaluation question.

While coherence and coordination are not portrayed in the programme TOC, mapping the way these components work together will likely provide valuable lessons learnt on what was successful and what was less so, for future programming in this sector.

Evaluating the programme benefits that are most likely to be sustained with or without TMEA support (DEQ5.17) and stakeholder engagement and lessons learning (DEQ5.20) will start from discussions with TMEA component teams. Their impressions about stakeholders (individuals and institutions) that have demonstrated greater uptake of capacity and priorities will point the evaluation team towards examples of potential ongoing benefits. The evaluation team will explore these during site visits and the range of interviews scheduled across the evaluation data collection, as illustrated in Table 5, above, in order to have a wide range of perspectives on which to base conclusions and any recommendations. This includes interviews of country- and regional-level government and other partners such as CSOs and PSOs with which TMEA have worked. Though not all projects whose sustainability was sought will be contacted, the evaluation team’s commitment to cover all ten of TMEA’s pathways means that we will follow up on TMEA’s recommendations and pursue our own in the set of interviews and site visits discussed and detailed here (including Table 5 above). This will also make it more likely that the team will be able to detect and document ways in which TMEA’s interventions and their benefits were not sustained, why, and how this could be strengthened.

**Step 6 – Analysis**

The evaluation findings – raw data, “facts”, opinions, experiences, perspectives, segments of documents or other sources – are all triangulated: with CT, this happens within a framework of testing the probative value of pieces of evidence, alone and in

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38 Or re-contacted, as in the sample of projects selected in evaluation deliverables 2C, 2D, and 2E, where sustainability was also discussed; however, these data from the previous interviews and desk reviews will be used as a basis for follow-up on all ten pathways.
concert, around a contribution claim, and undertaking the Bayesian updating of prior probabilities in consequence. This use of Bayes' theorem arrays objectively stronger and weaker pieces of evidence around a contribution claim and aggregates these, in order to determine the confidence we can have in the evidence and ultimately in the contribution claim. These methods are explained in detail in Annex E.

For DEQ2.4 on unintended consequences and HEQ5 questions on the TOC, complementarity, results “greater than the sum of their parts”, regional institutions and sustainability, the team will review data from interviews and site visits, as well as related internal and external data for each pathway, in light of both evaluation findings and contextual, political economic, and trade factors that may have affected implementation and results. As noted in the previous section, examining the strength of TMEA’s TOC is iterative, in that analysis and fieldwork will feed each other. Our previous fieldwork and evaluations, readings of component results chains and strategy documents will inform our understanding of the sector and TMEA’s place in it, which becomes more refined with upcoming in-depth interviews with TMEA team members and partners (national and regional/corporate) about what they planned to do, how they assumed it would play out, what happened in implementation that supported or contradicted those plans and assumptions, and the ultimate results from Strategy 1 to date. This will result in a set of pathway analyses that will reside in evaluation annexes with key lessons emerging as part of the main body of that report. Unintended outcomes are a key area of inquiry for this process, which involves speaking with beneficiaries at national and regional/corporate levels as well as other external sources that have no immediate stake in the evaluation or in TMEA – across all ten pathways.

Discussion and debate among the team and, where necessary, additional expertise brought in for this purpose, are essential to the evaluation. In this way the decisions initially made about the probative value of evidence are tested and, where available, additional information and interpretations can be brought to light. Retaining sufficient time in the calendar for this process is critical for ensuring the strength of evaluative thinking and the way it is expressed in the draft report.

The team draws its conclusions through this process, and extensively documents their relationship to the findings from which they are drawn. The draft report may not contain all those details in its main body, but they will be annexed and referenced. These steps provide the “paper trail” that can be put out for comment, and the stronger this trail, the more unassailable the conclusions. Where recommendations are warranted, these will be put forward alongside lessons learnt for future programming – whether that is TMEA’s own programming, or elsewhere in the sector.

The extent to which the impact results of an evaluation of such a complex, variegated programme as TMEA are generalisable is not high: there is simply too much specificity around the particular contextual issues and dynamics to warrant “application” in another context. However, the clarity sought by the discussions around evidence and probabilities does support detailed storytelling in the report, such that readers from other “similar” programmes elsewhere can decide what, where and when the lessons might be helpful for their own cases.

### 2.6 Changes to the approach

The performance evaluation design put forward in the IR was proposed as a summative evaluation only of the ports and OSBPs, as the IR timeline planned for the effectiveness study on intermediate and strategic outcomes as part of an earlier deliverable. As that level of analysis was not possible given the unexpected and
compounded challenges discussed in the introduction to this report, it is being taken up again in this phase of the evaluation, specifically in the performance evaluation.

This has the effect of stretching out the period in which outcomes and impacts may have matured, which may indeed be helpful in the detection of impacts. Still, the underlying proposed analysis comes from the same school of non-counterfactual, non-experimental evaluation designs:

- While Process Tracing (PT) was proposed at inception, Contribution Tracing (CT) – a method that builds precisely on the logic of PT – is now considered a stronger candidate method to substantiate TMEA’s contribution claims.

- One of the elements of the IR design was an exercise to map outcomes according to categories (advocacy and policy advice, knowledge generation and studies, institutional strengthening and training, technical and or financial cooperation, and provision of infrastructure and / or direct services to final users (e.g. SWIFT)) and layers (regional, national and local). In closing the first phase of the evaluation, without the Team Leader who had designed that exercise, the new Team Leader attempted to follow his logic but found it impossible to do so without new data collection – particularly as the majority of projects had finished in the year’s time since the data had been collected. TMEA viewed the resulting draft “pathway” documents as invalid as they were so out of date.

- The categories proposed in the IR, while still valid to describe the closed projects, are nonetheless not useful analytically in the manner proposed. There are no formulas for how these categories would determine or predict success, no “ideal mix” to postulate for lessons learnt. While it may be that the previous Team Leader had other plans for those categories and layers, unfortunately his intentions were not captured. However, we feel our present design is focused on the necessary details to generate lessons learnt, and will draw upon the categories and layers as needed in describing our findings.

- That new data collection is currently underway (during the recent July-August visit to TMEA by several evaluation team members, and continuing into the performance evaluation data collection scheduled for Q4 2018). Given that Strategy 1 projects were completed since the original datasets were compiled, this allows the estimation of outcomes achievement and TMEA contribution to continue through intermediate outcomes levels and to strategic outcomes as well. This may well be a preferable way to view the pathways, since the strategy and design behind them did not “stop” at the intermediate outcomes level, as designed in the IR.

- Similarly, the extended period for data collection and analysis on the “full” pathways through their strategic outcomes allows for a stronger analysis of complementarity across TMEA component areas, which was designed in the IR to be done with projects that were not yet completed. This may give stronger evidence about synergies across component and support as well the validation and refinement of hypothesized TOC linkages.

### 2.7 Timing

Per the more detailed timeline presented in Annex C, the performance evaluation will be undertaken following DFID approval of the new design contained in this document. The evaluation team will begin preparatory work on identifying and accessing datasets in September, and making plans for fieldwork during October (while the DFID Annual Review team is visiting TMEA). Our fieldwork, then, will begin in the first week of November and last between five and six weeks, to visit four country offices and
projects, and the corporate office as well. Analysis and report writing will last during January and February.

2.8 Hypothetical responses to the evaluation questions

Performance evaluation reporting will include an executive summary in which major conclusions and recommendations are expressed for a wide audience; in the main body of the text there will be more nuanced discussion of mitigating and intervening factors, and a deeper discussion of evidence and sources. The following represents a possible statement the performance evaluation may be able to make for a pathway, in the form of a “contribution story” – the most important aspects related concisely. This is of course completely fictitious: none of Section 2.8 represents any data collection or analysis to date.

Conclusions from CT

The evaluation found that in four of five full results chains or pathways, selected on the basis of their achieved outcomes, strong evidence substantiated the achievement of the outcomes and of TMEA’s substantial contribution.39

Table 6: Illustrative CT conclusion for an SO1 contribution claim

| Contribution claim: TMEA reduced import times by at Mombasa Port by XX% |
| Inputs towards this outcome included infrastructure projects at the port and significant support to reform of procedures and regulations. The evaluation found that dwell times fell by X%, clearance procedures time by X%, and departure time by Z%. TMEA-supported infrastructure and procedural and capacity building improvements account for around half of these time differences, as shown in the full description of this case study in Chapter XX. The time savings aligned with the TMEA Results Meter, but importantly were also corroborated by the Northern Corridor Observatory and Maersk shipping data over the seven years of implementation, as well as an independent logistics survey carried out by the EABC in coordination with the Chamber of Commerce of Great Britain in Kenya that allowed for comparison between the wharves where TMEA worked and other wharves. TMEA contribution to this outcome was substantiated through their overwhelming digital evidence of support to the infrastructure projects (contracts, emails, progress reports, inter alia) and to multi-level government confirmation of the capacity building and procedural support, which was not a focus of other donor efforts. Newspaper reports and government speeches from past years showed that similar reforms had often been proposed but had not been implemented until TMEA. Other infrastructure work also played a role, particularly JICA’s support to the second container terminal, completed in 2018 when times dropped further. Other regulatory efforts were not found to have contributed substantially, as TMEA’s large presence in port work was taken as a deterrent to similar efforts from other donors that might have duplicated efforts.|

The body text might then go on to describe the set of sources at different steps in the TOC, from inputs to (project) outputs and outcomes, and how this aggregated (if it did)

39 Narrative contribution stories and the systematic examination of evidence will be available in the body of the report and its annexes.
with other projects to reach programme level outputs and outcomes, explicitly comparing actual performance and achievement with the detailed results chain/TOC for each step. Data quality and breadth, differences by country and alternative causal paths would be set out for each of the pathways studied, including the “fifth” one in this hypothetical example, in which substantiation for the claim was not found.

**Another example, for DEQ2.2, might look like this:**

**Table 7: Illustrative CT conclusion for an SO2 contribution claim**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution claim: TMEA reduced processing times for export through ICT for Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TMEA’s work in ICT for Trade efforts (Single Windows, Electronic Cargo Tracking, national customs systems) reduced processing times for export for some industries. Greater reductions were found where there were greater baseline demands on industry, such as the tea industry where the 8 days at baseline were reduced to 1.2 days through a combination of these efforts. Notably, variance between industries in the government demands for paperwork has decreased, meaning there are fewer outliers like the flower industry, which faced almost eleven days in processing before TMEA began, now down to 2 days—essential for the perishable produce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There remain differences per country that illuminate some of the institutional barriers TMEA faced in implementing these new systems consistently across the EAC countries. In Tanzania, while several single windows were introduced which reduced paperwork for the A, B and C industries, several other industries were awaiting support (some of which TMEA is scheduled to provide in Strategy 2). Two agencies in Tanzania, the YYY and ZZZ, were less willing or able to reduce their demands on exporters, limiting the extent of the gains there. In this way, for Tanzania the average time across exporters dropped by D% but the variance remained high.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda all had better and more consistent results, as shown in detailed tables in the report text. Both average overall time and the average variance reduced in all three countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And for DEQ2.3, a third example:

**Table 8: Illustrative CT conclusion for an SO3 contribution claim**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution claim: TMEA increased export capability in coffee, tea and staples in Rwanda and Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TMEA’s work in export capability strengthening supported coffee growers in two zones in Rwanda. Exports of coffee to European Union and other markets from the cooperatives where TMEA worked went from a baseline of XX tons in 2015 to YY tons per year in 2017, with an expected continued growth of Z% for 2018, according to official national sources, cooperative records, and buyers’ data. Tea exports increased at a slower but also steady rate, from AA tons before the project to BB tons in 2017, and C% expected exports for 2018. The Government of Rwanda revenue data was provided by the lead officer of the export bureau, AAA BBB, who confirmed there were no other projects operating with those cooperatives. The coffee and tea projects benefited from the single window and national customs systems interventions from TMEA in terms of time to export, which supported the increase and reduced costs to the intermediary organisation, Traidlinks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in Uganda, TMEA supported export capability in processing and standards harmonisation, primarily with maize. Supported farmers reported $XX in sales to the intermediary organisation that TMEA brought to work with them, up from $YY before the project began. Cooperative data supported this finding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These types of answers, in both brief and more elaborated forms, would comprise the response to DEQs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, with separate answers for each of the CT examples in the sample. DEQ2.4, on the other hand, is a synthesis question from among the case study work undertaken in the CT and other evaluation fieldwork. That question will be answered more like the questions under HEQ5, which are covered in the following section.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusions from traditional evaluation methods**

DEQ5.1 on the evidence base and verification of the TOC causal links and assumptions
This question will bring together data from the CT explorations of a sample of pathways, along with the findings and conclusions from all ten pathways that are to be explored in interviews and site visits, compared to the TMEA results chains by pathway. Where this latter information is absent, the evaluation team will reconstruct results chains and assumptions to the extent that TMEA staff and, perhaps, other stakeholders can express the design intentions under which they worked. Our systematic comparison of planned versus actual results chains will highlight areas of strengths and areas that could be improved for Strategy 2 planning. In those results chains where higher level results were not achieved during Strategy 1, we will attempt to assess if there are assumptions or elements of the results chains that could be strengthened. This will be presented in brief form in the report and fully in an annex.

**DEQ5.7** on complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels throughout all programme components and activities, and

**DEQ5.8** on TMEA bringing greater results than the sum of its parts

These two questions are interrelated in that the complementarity and coordination achieved by different components and levels are the points at which their results might actually show evidence of results that are greater than the sum of their parts. Interviews and site visits, alongside the efforts to parse the sub-TOC results chains, will identify qualitative outcomes such as:

- where efforts have converged and supported one another
- where TMEA’s reputation and convening power have facilitated access for the programme
- where TMEA’s clout in regional trade have leveraged national and international support

The evaluation team will also look for missed opportunities for complementary work that might have furthered this aim, in the course of evaluation fieldwork. Conclusions would therefore focus on those places where TMEA took best advantage of complementarities and coordination, and evidence of where that could be strengthened for Strategy 2.

**DEQ5.14** on approaches for working successfully with regional institutions in Africa

Conclusions drawn to answer this question will focus on these efforts among the components working with the EAC Secretariat, EA Business Council, and other such bodies, in order to learn from their experiences – positive and negative – to reach the TMEA goals with those institutions. We will therefore discuss how and where those relationships worked best, under what conditions, and with what ends.

**DEQ5.17** on social and financial benefits from TMEA that are likely to continue post TMEA

This question will similarly emerge from our fieldwork across the evaluation, looking for evidence of ongoing efforts where TMEA projects have ended, in order to identify those benefits that may continue after the programme. These might be within grassroots or civil society organisations that have had strong outcomes and gone on to garner funding; private sector organisations that have been able to use their voice on integration issues; government partners that have carried on efforts like the Green Port initiative in the wake of TMEA support; and other such results.
3 Trade and Growth Impact Study

The objective of the Trade and Growth Impact Study (TGIS) is to analyse and to measure, as comprehensively as possible, the impact and sustainability effects that regional integration programmes might have had on: (1) regional trade, growth, and poverty; and (2) the various stakeholders, in particular on men and women separately, poor and vulnerable groups, as well as traders and consumers. Under this design note, we are focusing on the wider trade and growth economic benefits arising as a result of the TMEA intervention.

The premise of the TGIS is underpinned by a rich body of research which has analysed the impact of Aid for Trade programmes. According to the latest Aid for Trade Report, “poor connectivity is one of the factors keeping people in poverty”\(^\text{40}\). A map has been drawn which relates the incidence of poverty to physical and digital connectivity. It suggests that lack of connectivity limits the ability to move out of poverty. As such, improving soft and hard infrastructure for trade removes a binding constraint for poverty reduction.

It has been observed that regions with lower logistics performance index (LPI) scores have higher incidence of poverty than those with higher LPI scores, as shown in the figure below.\(^\text{41}\)

**Figure 4: Population living in poverty, compared to LPI**

![Graph showing the relationship between LPI and poverty](source)


Similarly, comparing the Enabling Trade Index, collected by the World Economic Forum, with per capita income, also suggests that an improved trade environment is associated with higher per capita incomes, though the direction of causality is unclear. (see figure below).

\(^\text{40}\) OECD-WTO (2017) Aid for Trade Review 2017. OECD-WTO
\(^\text{41}\) Ibid, p. 328

© Oxford Policy Management
Figure 5: GDP per capita, compared to Enabling Trade Index

Streamlining customs processes is believed to have contributed to reducing trade costs and increasing revenues in developing countries. As the Aid for Trade Review 2017 indicates:

enabling automation and reducing the friction in cross-border trade is essential to lower costs and connect producers to markets and value chains. [...] A case story submitted by Trademark East Africa describes how the establishment of a one-stop border post (OSBP) connecting Kenya and Uganda led to an increase in revenue collected of around USD 5.5 million, reduced the average time it takes to cross the border by 80%, boosted cross-border trade for small traders and improved the working conditions for staff and transporters. The Busia OSBP warehousing facilities, for instance, have lowered storage costs for small traders as they wait to clear taxes. Transport costs have also been reduced, allowing several small traders whose goods are being transported to a particular destination to consolidate goods and hire one truck driver. The border post also caters to the needs of the physically challenged, as well as women with children.

The evaluation questions that are to be answered by the TGIS are aligned to those in the original IR, and are illustrated in the table overleaf.
Table 9: HEQ3 and its DEQs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ3 and its DEQs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEQ3: What is the likely impact of TMEA on trade outcomes and growth, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness: programme-level trade outcomes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ3.1 To what extent have TMEA interventions, including those of a policy nature, led to a reduction in trade times, trade costs and trade risks?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade impact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ3.2 What has been the impact of any achieved trade cost reductions from TMEA on trade (both intra- and extra-regional)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ3.3 How has any improved trade policy environment led to increased trade?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic growth impact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ3.4 To what extent has any changes in trade resulting from TMEA interventions contributed to economic growth?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ3.5 What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study builds on the findings from the performance evaluation, as the teams will be working closely together as outcomes emerge from the CT described in the last chapter. Where TMEA outcomes are traceable and could lead to changes in trade overall, these will be particular areas of analysis for the TGIS, with respect to the following design. This is particularly likely should the CT confirm strong outcomes from interventions at Mombasa or Dar Port, the OSBPs, strengthening regional integration ICT for Trade, standards and harmonisation, elimination of NTBs, and export capability – all candidate pathways in the long list of pathways to be considered for in-depth analysis using CT.

While the questions and overall approach differ little from the IR, after careful consideration, we propose to narrow the focus and magnify our understanding of the economic impact of interventions by adopting a sector-based approach that focuses in on two value chains, the findings of which can then be subsequently encoded into a larger macroeconomic study. Combined with this will be an enterprise survey carried out with actors on the two value chains, which is of primary importance for confirming the modelling work and also enriching it. The TGIS proposes to focus much of the effort on considering the following issues, which may triangulate, complete and challenge our results.\(^{42}\)

- **The extent to which TMEA interventions lead to a reduction in trade times, trade costs and trade risks.** The team can measure the drivers and magnitude of effects to reduce these three variables, and use secondary research to investigate the reasons behind this, as well as the pathways (such as market failures, distortions, second best and pareto optimal considerations, etc.) (DEQ3.1)

\(^{42}\) This extensive range of tools to analyse and interpret dynamic economic conditions and effects are, in many cases, dependent upon data availability and quality. While we may not have access to all the necessary data of a necessary standard, the set of proposed analyses will allow us to compensate, even if not every one of these analyses is undertaken.
The evaluation conclusions produced under HEQ2 will provide pathway-specific answers to this question and detail on TMEA’s contributions to particular pathways in terms of time and cost. The study team conceives of risk as an outflow of these factors, plus policy changes that might reduce risk for investors, and we will discuss these reductions in risk where they are identified.

However, at the sector level, we will go into greater depth to see how and where the entire value chain of a sector has been impacted (and through which channels) with a partial equilibrium approach, as explained below in detail in section 3.1. For example, we may find that changes in trade flows have occurred through better access to finance as a result of a better business environment, or it may have occurred through the reduction in inventory, or through fewer informal payments at the border. The purpose of this investigation is to be able to model how TMEA changed the policy and trade environment and how that change led to changes in the cost, risk or time dimensions. We will use this information to estimate parameters for the relationships.

- **The impact of achieved reductions in trade frictions on trade flows.** The team can measure the influence of such reductions on allocative efficiency, terms of trade, use of capital and labour, competition, and effects of trade on productivity. Measuring the magnitude of these effects on investment and productivity would be much more difficult, but still possible using enterprise results, and referring to input-output analysis and a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. (DEQ3.2 and 3.3)

The end result of the study is expected to be able to state what percentage change has occurred in trade flows as a result of a reduction in trade costs. For example, the team is confident that it will be able to estimate that reducing customs clearance time by x days has led to a y% increase in imports and z% increase in exports. This will be relatively accurate at the sector level, as the team will have richer and more detailed data, with better estimates on the effects of NTBs on trade flows, and on the price and supply elasticities (from enterprise surveys). At the macro level, various assumptions (backed by the literature) will be necessary, which will reduce the robustness of results.

- **What interventions have the greatest impact on trade flows relative to the cost of the intervention (i.e. what has been the propensity of each dollar spent in raising trade flows)?** The team will use primary and secondary research to collect

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43 The information on interventions, pathways and outcomes will be collected as part of the performance evaluation, including details of intervention activities, budget spent, geographic locations of impact of those activities (local, national or regional), outcomes indicators (e.g., reduced time to trade, harmonised standards, and others) and other potential influencing factors.

44 The literature, including recent World Bank work, identifies risks as the biggest factor in creating costs. Increased risk means having to build up inventories (with high storage costs especially for perishables), pay for insurance, and increase lead times. We can triangulate findings with insurance and warehousing costs (e.g., Maersk data). Measuring risks requires the variance in times that we have from time release surveys. It is the variance in those times, rather than the average times, that is of interest the study and, in fact, to the business community: it is the wider variance that equates to greater uncertainty and risk.

45 From the PE, those trade time reductions that are substantiated can be converted into cost saved for purposes of this analysis, by calculating the ad valorem costs of reducing given barriers such as reduced documentation needed for export. Ad valorem expenses will be captured through questionnaires with companies (the enterprise surveys) and by regressing flows against these requirements to pinpoint the impact on trade flows. As a secondary plan for this conversion from time saved to cost saved, the World Bank estimate the volume of trade on average per day.

46 Please see hypothetical responses to other evaluation questions in the final section of the chapter.
this information, to be able to evaluate TMEA’s prioritisation and sequencing of interventions, in order to inform for Strategy 2. It will also consider what factors, exogenous to the TMEA interventions, might influence the results. (DEQ3.2 and 3.3)

- The enterprise survey results from the two value chains will be indicative of the value and ranking of different interventions along each value chain. This may yield insights as to how interventions are changing competitiveness. For example, reducing customs inspections through a risk-based management system may benefit imported inputs into the industry more than exports. Changes in the policy environment may affect the quality of domestic supplied raw materials, and be creating growth in upstream industries in the supply chain. The impact of a TMEA intervention on the global production network within and outside East Africa is important in order to calculate the benefits accruing to the sector in question. The answer is thereby disaggregated by different TMEA interventions, at least for those that affect the selected VCs.

- This work supports as well the answers to DEQ3.1 on TMEA interventions’ effects on reductions in times, costs and risks, and rank the reductions in any of these against one another.

- As a secondary step, the team plans to compare the cost of interventions (e.g., standards harmonisation, logistics improvements, customs clearance times, etc.) against the impact, yielding a better understanding of the trade-offs and returns on investment of different policy levers. Having a thorough understanding of how the industry is structured and competes will ensure a better appreciation of the returns of interventions.

- Partial equilibrium analysis (on the VC) will calculate surpluses generated, and some welfare gains (through gains in efficiency). Through consultations and enterprise level data, we will also obtain some information on the allocation of resources and changes in productivity; however, we believe the CGE work proposed in the following section will delve into these areas with greater confidence (notwithstanding the limitations of CGEs).

- The linkages between trade and economic growth. Pathways to growth will be examined. While these have been well documented in the literature in general, recent research provides new insights into localised growth, as well as geography-specific conditions that explain differences in growth accounting. A mix of gravity equations (explained in detail in the following section) will be used. We may also consider using proximity control methods. (DEQ3.4)

- The enterprise survey results will shed light on the impact of the policy environment changes on firm-level growth. The econometric analysis will also be able to capture the firm level’s supply elasticity (turnover growth) to changes in trade costs. While limited in terms of detailed information, TMEA surveys of cross border traders have some information of interest on prices, profits and types of products engaged in cross-border trade (formally and informally). The CGE model already has quite explicit linkages between changes in policy environment and trade and growth, something which can be used to provide simulations of how incremental changes in policies lead to growth. Owing to the more detailed sector information which will be captured in the study, it should be possible to have more disaggregated effects captured in the CGE (using a country CGE model attached to GTAP – described in detail below) in order to have a more refined analysis of the different effects at play and their impact on
trade and economic growth. If the value of data is sufficient, we will use econometric equations to analyse the drivers of regional value chain growth\textsuperscript{47,48}.

- The CGE model will be designed to capture the growth effects of increased trade flows triggered by TMEA’s work specifically, that is, when we model increased trade flows due to reductions in policy frictions in the CGE model, to correspond to estimates of increased trade due to TMEA’s policy environment reform work. This will mean applying what we learn in the two value chains about potential economic costs removed and efficiency gained as a result of TMEA’s interventions, to the economy as a whole in the CGE model.

- Estimating TMEA’s total impact on trade – that is, an economy-wide assessment – requires the use of aggregated information (as we cannot study all value chains). This can introduce inaccuracy, though it is feasible to make assumptions of some of the other VCs and calculate impact on those.

- **The degree of innovation, improvement in quality, and transfer of technology** that can take place through the changes in the trade environment. The team will consider how interventions can expand existing trade (intensive growth), as well as diversify into new products and markets (extensive growth). (DEQ3.2 and contributing to sectoral understanding of overall effects for 3.4)

- The enterprise survey results will be indicative of the innovation, changes in production methods and processes, and improved inputs that have arisen from any changes in the policy environment. The level of productivity changes can also be quantified, provided that enterprises are willing to provide labour and capital input levels and their production levels. Improvements in quality, export survival rates and competitiveness benchmarking of products in the selected value chain will be made against similar countries\textsuperscript{49} using international trade data. The level of sophistication of products can be determined using tested methodologies such as PRODY, which calculates the weighted average per-capita income level associated with products, and EXPY, which is a measure of the productivity level associated with a country’s specialization pattern\textsuperscript{50}. Tracking changes in these two indicators will be used to determine changes in the degree of sophistication of exports.

- **The distributional effects of economic growth** (for the sector, geographical region and potentially by size of operators/income groups). While the literature is relatively rich on the distributional effects of trade, the team will focus on the VC players, as well as employing micro-macro sim modelling techniques on top of the CGE modelling work carried out by the team, subject to data availability. (DEQ3.4)

- The enterprise survey results will provide segmented data by enterprise size (employees and turnover), enabling the evaluation to test how companies of different sizes are impacted by the changes in policy. The team can also estimate changes in inequality between firms.


\textsuperscript{48} CGE is based on GTAP and the equations and relationships already exist for East Africa (except South Sudan and Burundi). Then it is matter of introducing shocks only. For the econometric analysis we start the modelling from nothing and include the necessary data piece by piece.

\textsuperscript{49} We define countries as being similar based on the level of sophistication of their economies, and use the economic complexity index as a measure of this.

• Consider the **sustainability of the intervention on economic growth**, particularly with regard to short-term competitive effects and the sustainability of outcomes given the macroeconomic and policy environment existing in East Africa. (DEQ3.5)
  o The study will consider other factors that could determine whether a sector can continue expanding in the same way, through a mix of qualitative information through enterprise surveys, and consideration of the macroeconomic, environmental and social conditions. Important indicators to be considered include exchange rate effects, subsidies and fiscal policy instruments, environmental conditions (CO2 emissions and pollutant industries), labour cost considerations and labour standards.

The TGIS team is planning to:

• Re-align the scope of the work from “economy-wide impacts” to “sector wide effects”. The findings at the sector level will then be introduced into a CGE model to estimate the wider macro-economic gains from the sector-level changes.

• focus on two **entire value chains**. These will be chosen for a set of TMEA-related characteristics: the VCs should have a regional dimension, as well as links to international markets, and be expected to have been impacted by TMEA. The value chain actors should use trade routes that have been transformed as a result of TMEA interventions. As different expected trade costs are associated with perishable and non-perishable goods, the sample will include one VC in each of these categories.

• delve into the constraints and challenges along the two value chains, from inputs to processing to transportation and storage, to exports, in order to estimate some of the quantifiable estimates of trade frictions in ad valorem terms for the selected value chains. This will make use of partial equilibrium modelling at each stage of the value chain.

• Sector-wide effects will be estimated from the evolution of the two VCs, and by extrapolating to other sectors, for use in the CGE (see below), which would be less able to pick up localised intervention areas but still indicative of the direction and order of magnitude of the changes brought about by TMEA.

• identify the obstacles that TMEA interventions have removed, either through influence or through direct contribution to change.

An important focus on the evaluation is to address the quantification of growth occurring through TMEA interventions, and this focus will also be made on the issue of **causality**. It will be important to determine whether outcomes that were achieved can be attributed to the TMEA programme, or if TMEA’s contribution can be isolated and quantified. This assessment will cover not only intermediate but also strategic

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outcomes of the programme as well as unintended outcomes, including negatives ones.

While TMEA covered countries have experienced trade expansion over the last five years, this has often not been at the benefit of diversification of markets or products and usually entails low levels of value addition\textsuperscript{52}. A mix of different approaches have recently been developed to identify ways in which expansion of trade can take place. The two most prominent methodologies are proposed by International Trade Centre, underpinned by the work of Decreux and Spies\textsuperscript{53}, and of MIT Media Lab Macro Connections, underpinned by the work pioneered by Hidalgo and others\textsuperscript{54}. The operationalisation of their approaches has been used to identify opportunities to intensify export promotion at the margin (intensive margin) and to expand or diversify exports in product clusters (extensive margin). Both are ex ante approaches, and the application of such methodologies can be practically applied to shed some light on the potential for both intensifying and diversifying exports\textsuperscript{55}, as well as moving up the value chain. We will use those approaches to triangulate the findings we obtain through enterprise surveys.

The TGIS team will also try to determine whether sourcing decisions have changed as a result of TMEA interventions. We will look to obtain such insights through industry surveys and analysis of the two value chains. We must also understand other factors which affect the decision to source regionally. A study researching sourcing decisions of firms, using a detailed transaction-level dataset that can filter out many confounding influences, found that preference utilisation induces sorting among exporters on the basis of size and intermediates sourcing\textsuperscript{56}. At the firm level, the study found that preference utilization correlates positively with firm size but negatively with the breadth of input sourcing, suggesting that rules of origin (ROO) constrain the benefits of tariff preference margins\textsuperscript{57}. A recent study shows the potentially distorting effects of ROO\textsuperscript{58}. Another approach which categorises the restrictiveness of ROO in the form of an index

\textsuperscript{52} Statistics on trade in value addition, as opposed to gross trade flows, are woefully inadequate in the region to make an accurate assessment. In the case of South Africa, the expert estimates that the domestic value of gross exports has remained near constant around 40-45% since 2000 (author calculations based on OECD, \textit{Trade in Value Added} database). In the case of EAC countries, one can assume far lower values.


\textsuperscript{57} The relative preferential margin that a country grants to a given country is the difference –in tariff percentage points – that a determined basket of goods enjoys when imported from the given country relative to being imported from any other. See Hoekman, B. & Nicita, A. (2008). \textit{Trade Policy, Trade Costs, and Developing Country Trade}. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 4797.

could also be employed to provide some explanation of the sourcing decisions of firms (whether regional or extra-regional).\textsuperscript{59}

\section*{3.1 Trade costs and impact on trade flows}

Beyond the well-established costs of domestic trade, there are many factors which account for costs incurred in international trade. These costs include the transport costs and communication costs, tariffs measures and non-tariff measures (which include regulatory requirements and non-mandatory requirements), exchange rate risk and search costs. Inadequate infrastructure, limited supply capacity and remoteness lead to some countries facing higher trade costs or trade ‘frictions’\textsuperscript{60}. These frictions that impede international trade flows can be broken down into natural (geographical and exogenous) costs and unnatural (endogenous or policy-induced) costs.

Bergstrand & Egger (2011)\textsuperscript{61} define natural trade costs as, “those costs incurred largely – though not exclusively – by geography”\textsuperscript{62}. In bilateral trade, the measurable geographical distance would be classified as a natural trade cost. In contrast, unnatural or "artificial" trade costs refer to impeding costs that occur in the absence of natural costs\textsuperscript{63}. These man-made impediments to international trade are mainly attributable to the trade policy environment provided by governments. The interventions of TMEA aim principally to resolve the “artificial trade costs”. A combination of these trade frictions can lead to a high degree of barriers to trade and can render exports uncompetitive, by affecting the comparative advantages of countries.

There are principally three types of trade frictions which feature in the exporters’ price to export, as well as in the import demand function. These are:

- Monetary costs associated with the transaction;
- Time for the transaction to reach its destination;
- Risk associated with the transaction.

The trade environment varies greatly between EAC countries in which TMEA operates, with many layers of complexity across regions, within countries and between countries. This poses a challenge in identifying the effects of interventions, but also could jeopardise the impact of second-best solutions, which may create yet more distortions. The markets in East Africa face many market failures and distortions. The size of the informal economy is large and informal trade also takes place across borders, particularly in weaker states.

Recent research on wider economic benefits associated with hard infrastructure investments\textsuperscript{64} yields some interesting insights for a proposed methodological approach


\textsuperscript{60} WTO (2015) Aid for trade at a glance, OECD/WTO


\textsuperscript{62} Gravity Equations and Economic Frictions in the World Economy by Jeffrey H. Bergstrand and Peter Egger

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid

for examining the potential wider economic impact arising from trade facilitation or border management measures. In particular, research most frequently focuses on “economic welfare” as the category of final outcomes and “population and assets” and “trade and productivity” as intermediate outcomes. The study finds that a “transport corridor has potential impacts across multiple outcome variables (economic welfare, social inclusion, equity, environmental quality, resilience). In some cases [...] the corridor boosts both incomes and job creation—thereby leading to synergies, producing beneficial effects for both economic welfare and social inclusion. However, [...] for a given outcome, the impacts across different geographic areas, segments of the population, economic sectors, and the like could vary significantly.

The majority of models on the wider economic benefits of trade corridors are underpinned by economic geography, which rely on reduced-form estimation, which themselves rely on a difference-in-difference (DID) estimator in which the impacts of, for instance, treated subnational regions are evaluated against those of a set of comparison regions before and after the occurrence of the transport infrastructure investment. Meanwhile, around one fifth of papers that analyse the wider economic benefits use a structural model focused on a specific mechanism for triggering impact, which is normally related to internal trade. Finally, one tenth of research papers surveyed use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model.

Econometric analysis will be used primarily to underpin the ex post analysis of the TGIS. The econometric analysis will be based on gravity equations to shed light on the elasticities of different parameters. Gravity equations are a standard tool for modelling bilateral trade flows, which are regressed on a host of explanatory variables such as market size, distances, common languages, common borders and a range of trade frictions. CGE is popular for exploring the impact of trade reforms on growth, as it takes into account the interlinkages within an economy and therefore captures the pass-through effects of one sector’s expansion or contraction on other sectors of the economy. The limitations of CGE models are that, inter alia, (1) they rely too heavily on dated structures of the economy; (2) the data is aggregated and suffers from aggregation bias; (3) the assumptions underlying the GTAP model may not be applicable to a region with large informal cross-border and internal trade, and the distortions will be much larger than would be warranted under perfect competition models; (4) the CGE will not show in a transparent way the pass-through effects of interventions; and (5) CGE data sets are too aggregated and thus cancel out many of the distributional effects taking place at disaggregated levels. Nevertheless, we will still use CGE for wider economic benefits, as it is the most helpful for understanding the interlinkages within the economy and analysis the knock-on impacts of a value chain expansion on the rest of the economy.

The most common tools and mechanisms used to disentangle such impacts are presented in the table below. These tools will underpin the methodology for the TGIS.

| Table 10: Distinct methods for impact studies to answer different questions |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| **Computable General Equilibrium**            | **Partial Equilibrium**                           |
| Modern economies are highly integrated, with  | The partial equilibrium (PE) framework is a       |
| changes in one single market having           | useful modelling tool since it demands a          |
| consequences for, potentially, all other      | minimal amount of data and is relatively easy     |
| markets. A variety of feedback effects come   | to understand and use. Such analysis yields a     |
| into play. General equilibrium models address | clear picture with respect to the direct effects  |
| all these requirements. In the area of trade, | of a specific trade or investment agreement on    |
| the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) is   | the most affected market participants.            |
| the modern workhorse model. It is able to     |                                                  |
|                                                |                                                  |
answer an array of macro-economic questions such as:

- How does a certain trade or investment policy instrument affect real GDP?
- What happens to a country’s trade balance and its terms of trade?
- How is the labour market affected?
- Do consumers benefit?
- Which industries are affected and how?

The standard GTAP model is a static, multiregional, multi-sector, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Bilateral trade is handled via the so-called Armington assumption that differentiates imports by source. Input-output tables reflect the links between sectors. We will use the latest GTAP V10 (2018) edition, which includes I-O tables up to 2014 and trade flows up to 2017.

GTAP is ideally suited for the analysis of changes in trade conditions, which are likely to have inter-sectoral effects. The input-output tables capture the indirect inter-sectoral effects, while the bilateral trade flows capture the linkages between countries.

In this study, we plan to obtain the macro impacts regarding how the changes to the sectors have wider effects across different sectors using a CGE approach.

The PE model attempts to find the set of values of endogenous variables which satisfy an equilibrium condition. A non-linear system of equations is also possible under the PE framework. In both systems, it is possible to solve and obtain the equilibria points and find the equilibrium level of price and quantity. A variety of models exist, such as GSIM, TRIST, ATPSM and SMART. The SMART (Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade) model is an analytical framework embedded into WITS (World Integrated Trade Solutions), a trade database and software suite provided jointly by the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The SMART model is able to address micro-economic questions such as:

- How will imports of a certain product be affected by a particular trade agreement?
- How will certain export markets be affected by a change in trade rules?
- How much trade at the detailed product level will be created from reducing trade barriers?

One the major short-comings of PE is that it fails to take into account the indirect effects of trade on macro and sustainability variables. An advantage of the PE over CGE is that we can produce more detailed analysis (the more macro the analysis, the less reliable are the results, so it is good we have a more focused look at impact and then use a more general approach with lots of assumptions for the CGE).

### Econometric Models

Econometrics can also be used to establish the explanatory power of certain variables, such as the implementation of a trade agreement. In regression analysis, the aim is to establish whether the variation in one variable can be explained in terms of the variation in one or more independent variables.

Econometric analysis is one of the main approaches for the analysis of trade policies and trade or investment agreements. The analyses can be *ex post*, to evaluate existing trade or investment agreements, or can be used to forecast developments. There are a number of

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67 Other often used models are the ATPSM (richer for simulations on the agricultural sectors), TradeSim (easily adapted to different considerations) and TRIST (helpful since it can incorporate real customs revenues as opposed to the theoretical ones in SMART) models.
established approaches and estimation methods available, such as Gravity Models\textsuperscript{68} and Synthetic Control Methods (SCM).\textsuperscript{69}

3.2 Scope and objectives

The TGIS will focus on the achievements made by the TMEA programme under Strategy 1, which was completed in June 2017. The TGIS will provide recommendations for further enhancing impact under Strategy 2, including recommendations for strengthening the pass-through effects of interventions at the value chain/sector level. It will also provide valuable information for the Impact Model that TMEA is currently elaborating under Strategy 2.

Accordingly, the specific objectives of the TGIS are:

- To provide a complete assessment of the impact of TMEA under Strategy 1;
- To provide recommendations to enhance the trade and growth linkages during Strategy 2;
- To provide recommendations for maximising trade and growth in similar future programmes.

It is to be noted that the outputs produced from the TGIS should be valuable in verifying the pathways, elasticities and quantification of parameters in the Impact Model being developed by TMEA. As such, the outcomes from the study may be used to compare and refine the findings of the model construct of the Impact Model.

3.3 Key steps

We are planning a five-stage approach to undertake the Surveys, Econometric, CGE and qualitative analysis. The stages are not necessarily linear and will be interactive, although they will begin in that order, with feedback mechanisms occurring as information is obtained and analysis is carried out.

Step 1 – Refine and finalise the methodology

While the framework and tools to be used are presented in this document, the evaluation team will need to workshop the detailed approach, define clearly the data requirements and prepare the logistical arrangements for data collection. The team will also produce a high-level literature survey, and a robust elaboration of the economic modelling that will be done.

Step 2 – Data Collection

The TGIS team will use the performance evaluation data to inform on the impact of reduced trade costs through increased efficiency of transport infrastructure, and increased capacity of transport infrastructure, including OSBPs and ports. This will


include intervention details and budget spent, geographic locations of impacts uncovered, indicators on the TMEA outcomes, and other potential influencing factors within the EAC context. This information would be taken by the TGIS team to quantify the economic value of the outcome indicators and to delve further in the influencing factors within or outside the TMEA scope. Some qualitative assessment (enterprise responses) of the significance of the intervention would be gathered.

The quantification will then be used to estimate the ad valorem equivalent barriers that were removed through the TMEA intervention. The choice of sectors that will be more deeply examined will also depend on the relevance of the TMEA activities to those sectors. Such detailed work could only be done for the interventions that relate to the business and trade environment of the two value chains. Conducting these in-depth value chain studies on the prices and changes in business costs linked to TMEA interventions will serve as proxies for the wider economy.

The team will make use of existing (SITA 2014 – Burundi and South Sudan; SITA 2013 Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya; and SITA 2011 Rwanda) enterprise surveys as and where those align with the sectors chosen for the TGIS. The team will also undertake enterprise surveys that expand on that data in the two selected value chains, across the four countries: we will design this work to be agile and very responsive to the needs of the TGIS, and will collect data tied to those needs until reaching saturation for the two sectors under study. This will help us to better understand the environment in which TMEA operated, the structure of their production and sourcing requirement, destination markets, prices, etc. These will involve anonymous responses to questionnaires covering key issues on time and cost, productivity, labour, inventory and turnover, and other themes, concordant with the lines of inquiry presented in the introductory section of this chapter. Given that in East Africa there is some secrecy around some of these issues (primarily because of non-payment of taxes) it can be difficult to ensure that business respondents will be candid about their experiences. However, the evaluation team brings strong real-world experience to this undertaking on how to recruit respondents, gain rapport professionally including through industry associations and other gatekeepers, sequence questionnaires in a way that motivates further confidence, and ensure confidentiality in all dealings with respondents. These steps will help us ensure we gather the needed information while protecting our sources.

The next key step will quantify the trade costs. We have a number of approaches which can be used for quantifying the ad valorem equivalent of trade costs. We can use shadow pricing methods, use gravity equations, and regress combined trade restrictiveness indices, such as those produced by UNCTAD, World Bank and others. The effective rates of protection across a value chain were successfully calculated for the leather value chain in Uganda and applied to identify the costs for industry’s competitiveness. A useful approach with respect to quantifying costs is the multidimensional approach to indexing non-tariff measures, which is also an approach

70 These might include other trade agreements and preferential market access arrangements (EPA, AGAO, etc.), global demand and supply shifts, other donor activities and sensitivities of other exogenous factors to estimate TMEA’s residual effects; per phone discussion between the author of this chapter, Paul Baker, and DFID representatives.

we propose\textsuperscript{72}. This has been successfully introduced into a gravity equation in order to calculate estimated trade costs and subsequently introduced into CGE models to measure the trade inducing effects arising from regulatory convergence\textsuperscript{73}. This is particularly relevant to any work on the pharmaceutical value chain or agri-value chains that have significant technical and voluntary standards attached to them.

The team will consider the expected outcomes from the data by considering the commitments made by countries in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). This would be indicative of the degree of commitment for improving trade facilitation conditions in their country. Thereafter, the team proposes to evaluate what was submitted under category listings. Since the principal focus of the TFA is to reduce the time it takes to cross borders, one can estimate the correlates of time in customs. The Doing Business Indicator (DBI) database is collected bi-yearly from freight forwarders on the time and cost for importing or exporting 20-foot full containers\textsuperscript{74}. While still helpful, DBI does not provide the full picture of trade costs, while other indicators, such as those used by Maersk in their survey, FEDEX or the Universal Postal Union (UPU), provide the full transportation times and costs from point of departure to delivery, and can be used to augment the DBI findings. We have a host of other data sources on which to capture data, which are presented in Section 3 “Sources and Methods”).

\section*{Step 3 – Measuring Impacts of TMEA on Value Chain Growth}

Two measurable outcome variables of interest to monitor are time in customs and export volumes and their characteristics. Evidence suggests that trade facilitation expands both existing exports (intensive margin effect) and creates new trade flows (extensive margin effect)\textsuperscript{75}. Reduced time in transit is the second source of reduction in trade costs to be expected from implementing the TFA, since, according to logistics professionals, time savings in customs is the preferred summary indicator of the private sector trade costs associated with clearing goods at the border\textsuperscript{76}. A third associated implication for trade is the reduction of uncertainty or risk arising from changes in the transparency and predictability of border agencies.

Each of these factors – time in customs and export values, time in transit, and the reduction of risk or uncertainty – will be explored in the CT studies of key TMEA pathways described in Chapter 2 of this design. Building closely on this work will be the value chain mapping undertaken in the TGIS, in that the issues will be ground-truthed within the two value chains at the level of individual enterprises in the survey.

\textsuperscript{72} Cadot O, Asprilla A, Gourdon J, Knebel C and Peters R (2015). Deep Regional Integration and Non-tariff Measures: A Methodology for Data Analysis. UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/71. United Nations publication. Geneva. This approach uses data on regulations in different countries combined with the existence of different costs associated with various types of NTMs, and a calculation of how these costs translate into different sectors and to the household level. Models are assembled to predict how much something should cost, given the various NTMs and product and transport costs; when the cost is actually greater than predicted, the researchers examine why, and who ultimately pays those additional costs and who benefits from them. The multidimensional approach further evaluates the impact on household welfare.


\textsuperscript{76} de Melo, J. & Wagner, L. (2016). How the Trade Facilitation Agreement can Help Reduce Trade Costs for LDCs. ICTSD/WEF. January
The value chain mapping proposed for the TGIS has been extensively covered in recent studies, on which our approach would rely, especially with regards to the network of trade nodes that the value chain is integrated within, and detail the inter-sectoral, as well as intra-sectoral, linkages that can be improved as a result of removing trade barriers or policy and regulatory environment barriers. The team will use partial equilibrium models to construct the linkages between each segment of the value chain, per the description of partial equilibrium in the previous section. Partial equilibrium analysis (on the VC) will calculate surpluses generated, and some welfare gains (through gains in efficiency). Through consultations and enterprise level data, we will also obtain some information on the allocation of resources and changes in productivity; however, we believe the CGE work proposed in the following section will delve into these areas with greater confidence (notwithstanding the limitations of CGEs).

A recent impact study on infrastructure on growth unpacks infrastructure distinguishing among different types, such as physical and regulatory infrastructure, and analyses the pass-through effects of cost reductions to consumers and producers. The approach used showed relatively robust results on impacts, by focusing on determinants of efficient logistics services as one essential element for firms’ productivity, for developing and upgrading value chains and to guarantee the pass-through of the benefits of investments in hard infrastructure throughout the value chain.

**Step 4 – Measuring Wider Impacts of TMEA on Trade and Economic Growth**

Under this step, the TGIS team will carry out an analysis in order to observe the wider economic benefits from trade facilitation. The CGE analysis will in particular be helpful in observing expected direction of effects and possible impact on social inclusion and exclusion. Since impacts are expected to vary widely according to income groups, the model should assist in proposing policy option levers for not only maximising the benefits but spreading the gains more evenly.

The direction and magnitude of these impacts will be assessed using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), which has built the world’s leading CGE model. Through the use of a general equilibrium model, it is possible to capture the interactions in the whole economy by linking all the sectors through input-output tables and by linking all countries through trade flows. GTAP is a well-documented, multi-regional, multi-sector model that assumes perfect competition, constant returns to scale and imperfect substitution between foreign and domestic goods, and between imports from different sources. In this analysis, the latest version of GTAP will be used (version 10). The GTAP 2014 model version will be used to examine the effect of introducing shocks from 2014 to 2017 and model the change in growth; this will be compared to actual

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80 For more information on GTAP, see: [https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/](https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/)

changes in growth, and the role of exogenous factors will be considered (including what other donors are doing along the value chains) to tease out what is directly related to TMEA, resulting in a final estimate of growth generated by TMEA. The GTAP database has 121 countries representing 98% of world GDP and 92% of world population, and 65 sectors. The full model cannot be solved with Burundi and South Sudan, so both countries and sectors must be aggregated. The analysis will look at trade and growth specifically (and individually) for Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as overall. This will involve considering input-output tables with about 56 sector aggregates.

The imperfect substitution feature of GTAP makes it well-suited for examining changes in tariff and non-tariff barriers, of which the econometric results in Step 3 will be able to feed into the gains in terms of efficiency (in ad valorem equivalents). It is also possible to make a reasonable estimate as to their likely effects on industry prices and production, consumption and trade.

**Step 5 – Verification and Feedback Loops**

This step consists of identifying a group of key informants and examining case studies to bring insights into the modelling work of Steps 3 and 4, as well as verifying assumptions and parameters used. Case studies and consultations will help in identifying, *inter alia*, (i) how characteristics of project size and specific interventions can interact with characteristics of local settings to affect the size and nature of economic development impacts; (ii) the lags associated with economic development impacts occurring over time; (iii) the political economy dimensions of border management, trade facilitation measures and other trade interventions from TMEA; and (iv) the wider context behind the border measures which may hinder outcome indicators at the border.

In this sense, qualitative methods, such as consultation and multi-criteria analysis, are particularly important, as they favour non-monetary resources and draw on a diversity of stakeholder knowledge input. The key features of our approach include, first, the ability to carry out stakeholder consultations and, second, the use of a wide range of tools to facilitate stakeholder consultations and engagement, such as digital tools (online questionnaire-based surveys and the use of telephone/skype interviews).

The outcomes of the discussions and review of case studies may inform and modify the analysis carried out in steps 3 and 4.

### 3.4 Sources and methods

The following documentary sources will be used for evidence on programme interventions and results:

- TMEA programme activity reports and data;
- TMEA documents (strategy, framework, reports, evaluations), audits, and due diligence assessments;
- Baseline surveys existing within TMEA or other donor programmes for the VC selected;

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82 OECD (2010). Guidance on Sustainability Impact Assessments. OECD.
• Other key donor documents intervening on the value chain (USAID, DFID, European Commission and German cooperation activities);
• Deliverables 2C, 2D and 2E (Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluations, by SO), 3A (Consolidated formative evaluation of ports and OSBPs), and 6B (Interim evaluation synthesis report) from the evaluation’s first phase, and the performance evaluation discussed in this document (Deliverable 3B) which draw on TMEA’s results framework, evaluations, and monitoring data;
• National data sets: country input-output tables, national accounts statistics, price statistics, industry statistics, association statistics;
• Regional data sets: Northern Corridor Transport Observatory; EAC Secretariat surveys on NTMs; and
• Secondary data from studies: Maersk trade costs; Overseas Development Institute (ODI) trucking studies; International Growth Centre (IGC) impact studies; International Trade Centre (ITC) value chain roadmaps.

In addition to those above, Table 5 presents the international datasets that will be consulted.

**Table 11: Potential sources of data for the assignment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade values</td>
<td>• United Nations Statistics Division Comtrade</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• ITC Trade Map <a href="http://www.trademap.org">www.trademap.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tariffs</td>
<td>• ITC Market Access Map <a href="http://www.macmap.org">www.macmap.org</a></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• WTO Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price Elasticities</td>
<td>• GTAP (Hertel et al., 2004). <a href="https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2931.pdf">https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2931.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distances</td>
<td>• Centre d’Études Prospectives d’Informations internationales (CEPIII) GeoDist</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### GDP per capita
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook
- World Bank World Development Indicators

### Population
- World Bank World Development Indicators

### Trade unit values
- CEPII Trade Unit Values

### Port throughputs
- UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index and Port Throughput statistics
- World Bank Logistics Performance Index [lpi.worldbank.org](lpi.worldbank.org)
- World Bank Doing Business Indicators
- [www.doingbusiness.org](www.doingbusiness.org)
- World Bank Governance Indicators

Document review will be supplemented by interviews with key stakeholders in the designated VC, in DFID, TMEA and other key agencies and stakeholders working along the VC. The interviews will focus on the key drivers of impact during Strategy 1, constraints and trade costs, other donor interventions, and other extenuating factors affecting the VC.

### 3.5 Changes to the approach

While there are no significant deviations to the approach proposed in the inception report, the current TGIS approach has been refined to be more targeted and measurable. The sectoral approach to look closely into two value chains proposed here will be able to yield more valuable insights into how TMEA interventions have triggered changes, through which channels, and how have the gains been distributed across a sector. While the proposed methodology loses some of the macro approach proposed in the inception report, we have retained the CGE modelling so as to obtain some of the higher-level impacts resulting from change in that sector, with the same result variables as proposed in the Inception Report. We will collect more detailed sector data for two sectors and no data for other sectors, rather employing data from the GTAP. We can therefore measure the wider economic benefits arising from the sector’s change, which have been brought about by TMEA’s intervention in areas that have impacted that sector. The tools used in the evaluation will not substantially differ from those proposed in the inception report, namely econometrics (gravity equations in particular for the estimation of AVEs), partial and general equilibrium modelling, and other dynamic economic analysis.

It is important to note the following:
• While we would have richer, more relevant and more precise data at the sector level, we would not capture the larger macro-economic gains arising from TMEA. A larger, more comprehensive “macro” approach would have (1) either entailed a number of assumptions and weaker results, particularly with respect to measuring the contribution of TMEA at a large scale; and (2) required substantially larger resources for data collection and a longer time scale.

• The team will rely more heavily on collecting enterprise level data, particularly with respect to inputs, intermediary products, exports and non-tariff information. The team will aim to quantify the effects of barriers that were removed by TMEA, which is aligned to the thinking proposed in the IR.

• We will exploit the richer data available under TMEA’s efforts at compiling road and transport data including those of the Northern Corridor Transport Observatory, and where possible, enterprise and transporters’ data.

• We will avoid duplication with the Impact Model, an ex-ante model which is being elaborated by TMEA, while at the same time finding ways that our findings may improve the reliability and realism of the Impact Model.

3.6 Timing

Data on outcomes and impact will reflect achievements over the period of TMEA’s Strategy 1, starting in 2010 and ending in June 2017, as assessed by the evaluation team. The performance evaluation’s findings, and particularly at the outcome level, will be valuable inputs into this analysis. As such, it is proposed that the study begin mid-November and end after five months (one month being lost due to end-of-year holidays). This time will be necessary to carry out the data collection, modelling and testing and verification of underlying assumptions and parameters of the model, as well as carrying out the CGE analysis.

3.7 Hypothetical responses to the evaluation questions

The TGIS proposes to answer the evaluation questions with the following types of responses. Phrases in italics are fully fictional, chosen simply to illustrate how answers are likely to read. Where limitations or caveats are necessary to ensure that readers interpret the results appropriately, these will be clearly provided, in any summary form of results as well as in more in-depth descriptions of them.

DEQ3.1 (on TMEA interventions leading to reduced trade times, costs, and risks)

TMEA interventions around mutual recognition of standards in the pharmaceutical sector have led to $xx reduction in compliance costs, representing x% of price. TMEA intervention (in conjunction with USAID efforts – in case we cannot disentangle the impact of each) in conformity assessment procedures in East Africa lead to an x% drop in costs for enterprises in the sector. TMEA intervention in creating a single window reduced the number of documents by 3, representing a $xx reduction in costs related to border compliance, representing x% of price, a yy days reduction in time to compile the necessary documentation and a zz% reduction in risk (measured in standard deviation of time divided by the arithmetic mean). TMEA investment in port infrastructure improved access to refrigerated warehousing at more affordable cost, resulting in a x% drop in costs for importers and x for exporters, reduced waste at the port by w% leading to a cost reduction of x% for importers and x for importers, a reduction in risk by zz% (waste as percentage of total port throughput). TMEA investment in border clearance time led to x% drop in costs for importers and x% drop in cost for importers, reduction of y days for importers and y days for exporters,
and a drop in risk of z% (standard deviation of days divided by the arithmetic mean). The metrics will be gathered for the different stages of the value chain and for those areas where TMEA is thought to have influenced the conditions to trade.

DEQ3.2 (on impact of any achieved trade cost reductions from TMEA)

These follow on the findings in DEQ3.1. Reducing customs clearance time by x days has led to a y% increase in imports and z% increase in exports. This will be relatively accurate at the sector level, as the team will have richer and more detailed data, with better estimates on the effects of NTBs on trade flows, and on the price and supply elasticities (from enterprise surveys). At the macro level, various assumptions (backed by the literature) will be necessary, which will reduce the robustness of results. We will provide results for each country (except Burundi and South Sudan), as well as for the two sectors, and for the whole economy.

DEQ3.3 (on improved trade policy environment leading to increased trade)

The answers to this DEQ will flow from the findings in DEQ3.2 where the interventions studied are those that affected policy most acutely. Policies where this is likely to have happened include those related to non-tariff barriers, ICT for trade, integration and harmonisation of standards, and border post procedures. Using CGE modelling, we can test the impact of the different policy levers to obtain insights such as these. An x% reduction in regulatory divergence has led to a y% increase in trade. An x% reduction in TBTs has led to a y% increase in trade. Adopting customs measures in line with the WTO TFA has led to a y% increase in trade.

DEQ3.4 (on trade changes contributing to economic growth)

Answers to this question will emerge from the partial equilibrium analysis at the sector level economic growth, and from the use of CGE modelling for macro-level economic growth. For example, an x% reduction in regulatory divergence has led to a y% increase in trade, but also to a z% increase in investment and a w% increase in GDP. Adopting customs measures in line with the WTO TFA has led to a x% increase in trade, and a y% increase in GDP. Adopting community level standards has led to x% growth in trade, and y% increase in GDP. Like with questions above, this will be connected to TMEA contributions identified in the performance evaluation as well as to context such as other donors’ efforts, according to the insights gained in field work.

DEQ3.5 (on critical factors to ensure sustainability of positive impacts)

As responses to this question require synthesis of a set of findings and analysis of their relative importance and ability to be sustained, these responses will be narrative in nature, drawing upon strong enterprise survey findings and the economic results picked up in the modelling.
4 Poverty and Gender Impact Study

The Poverty and Gender Impact Study (PGIS) report will be produced in second and third quarter of 2019, using the design proposed and approved in the Inception Report in 2016. The timeline will allow for national datasets to be released and included in the analysis. The study will have two components, quantitative and qualitative, the results from which will be triangulated during the analysis phase.

Trademark’s own results framework or theory of change reaches the level of trade and economic growth impacts that are to be measured in the TGIS, and no further. However, there is a hypothesis that TMEA’s work on trade would, eventually, affect the economy in such a way as to improve the lot of poor people, particularly those working in sectors affected by international trade. In this design document these are called the “long chain” poverty effects.

If this long chain is to materialise, the trade impacts must be substantiated before any poverty gains can be postulated. For this reason, the trade impacts under study in the TGIS in the last chapter will be important inputs to the PGIS process: where impacts are more substantial, whether in a value chain or along a corridor or emerging from a localised intervention such as an OSBP, this information will be conveyed to the PGIS team for consideration as they review quantitative and qualitative data around poverty and gender to draw their conclusions, in an end of the results chain characterised by exogeneity (external factors that may help or hinder changes in poverty, for good or ill, or both) and a multidimensional, multigenerational set of challenges around poverty. Notwithstanding those very real challenges to detecting and isolating poverty impacts, understanding if and how trade impacts occurred will support the PGIS team.

The literature catalogues primary research carried out over the years on how such a relationship would work, but provides little definitive evidence of such a connection between growth in trade and reduction in poverty. There are significant debates, in fact, about that link, including regarding the direction of change. The PGIS will not be able to resolve the issue or conclude definitively about TMEA’s effect on poverty, though our efforts are in line with the literature in the hopes of adding to the evidence base and informing future efforts. The PGIS will involve a mixed methods design that uses secondary quantitative data from national household surveys and other sources, and primary data collection in areas nearer to and farther from the trade corridors, in an effort to triangulate any long-chain effects that might be identified, and to give poorer and wealthier people an opportunity to voice their understandings of the sources of any changes they themselves have identified.

At the same time, TMEA made efforts to affect people living in poverty directly in Strategy 1, notably in the Women in Trade activities under SO3, and also in physical areas around the infrastructure projects undertaken in SO1, where reductions in wait times affected the livelihoods of some communities. Such direct efforts will also be a focus of the PGIS, in that the team will examine qualitatively the effects on beneficiaries of those efforts with site visits, focus groups, and participatory methods. The following sections describe these

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83 The design for this study has not changed greatly since inception. Portions of this section have been included from the Inception Report.

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different evaluative components and how they will answer the evaluation questions from the Inception Report.

**Background**

As a point of departure, the independent evaluation team carried out a Preliminary Poverty Assessment (PPA) which started in February 2016 and a report was submitted in June 2016. The purpose was to give a first indication of how TMEA-induced changes in trade might affect poverty in the countries where TMEA operates, as well as to provide an initial assessment of how TMEA has approached assessing and improving its impact on poverty reduction.

The PPA drew upon household and enterprise survey data to simulate the potential impact of trade-related changes in prices, wages, employment and public expenditure on poverty. The causal pathways assumed in the quantitative work were explored in more depth through a set of interviews with key stakeholders in affected communities and a small number of focus group discussions (FGDs).

In addition, the PPA drew on information collected from interviews with TMEA programme staff and TMEA documents to provide a preliminary assessment of TMEA’s efforts to maximise the poverty impact of its work. It used the findings from the field visits to Mombasa port and Taveta-Holili OSBP to provide a preliminary assessment of potential impact of these major SO1 projects at an early stage. The quantitative and qualitative analyses were synthesised and integrated into one report.

Two lessons learned from the PPA will be explicitly integrated into the PGIS. First, in the PPA our team selected only poorer groups of men and women for focus groups, to understand system-wide changes. However, in choosing the poor there is a likelihood of speaking to those for whom things have not gone well, whose perceptions are by definition more negative. They may also be unrepresentative perception of how the local economy is faring. Therefore, in this round of research we will speak with wealthier and poorer groups of people. Second, in the PPA we only had participants from a single livelihood group in each FGD to understand the system-wide changes, which gave us a partial understanding of the local economy. In this round of research we will expand to interview a more diverse set of actors in the labor market during this round of research.

**The current study**

The two facets of research have the following approaches, essentially unchanged since the IR. The quantitative research is desk-based, using datasets from national panel surveys. The qualitative research is primarily field-based. Both build heavily on the literature and research done on the links between poverty and trade.

Qualitative and quantitative research in these two facets will run in tandem over several weeks, in order to capitalise on potential synergies. This means that the two parts of the study team will be in communication around their findings in real time. One way this might work is that the quantitative team may discover wage trends among household heads working in tradeable sectors; to understand the trends better, they would ask the qualitative team to direct adjusted questions to certain types of respondents, to inform the quantitative work. Alternatively, the qualitative field team may find, for example, unexpected parallels in perceptions of prices of consumables, between households on and far from the trade corridor. They would then point the quantitative team towards the price
figures available in the household and enterprise survey data, to test whether their findings were widespread. At the same time, the qualitative team would direct further inquiry towards possible explanations for the unexpected findings among exogenous factors, such as evidence of informal imports, high yields owing to fertiliser inputs from a development programme, or other explanation.

As a whole, the study is geared to ensure detailed and triangulated responses to the evaluation questions, which are shown in the next section. It is for this reason that the study teams will consistently communicate around their findings, and support one another to unpick explanations for them, as part of the analytical process.

### 4.1 Scope and objectives

This study will answer HEQ4 and its DEQs as shown in the following table:

**Table 12: HEQ4 and its DEQs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ4: What is the likely impact of TMEA on poverty and gender, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ4.1</strong> What is the nature – and, where possible, scale – of the likely impact of the overall programme and of key TMEA projects in the portfolio on the poor—direct and indirect? Who is affected by potential short- or long-term impacts, both positive and negative, how, and how is the causality working?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ4.2</strong> In particular, who has benefited from reduced trade costs? How are the benefits in reduced transport time and cost being passed on to poor people through lower prices or lower price increases?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ4.3</strong> Are complementary policies being adopted to translate the benefits of increased trade into poverty reduction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ4.4</strong> Are measures being taken, and are they successful, in mitigating potential negative impacts on any sub-groups – in particular poor people in localised areas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-cutting issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ4.5</strong> To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEQ4.6</strong> What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact on gender is a key focus of this study, and will be mainstreamed throughout the questions and data collection.

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84 It is critical to note that this will be speculative and subject to exogenous distortions. Tracing causality rigorously, this far along the results chain, is outside the scope of the evaluation.
The quantitative component:

The PGIS begins from the premise that TMEA, oriented towards trade benefits that would be detected in the performance evaluation and TGIS, may have long-chain indirect effects on poverty and gender, but that no counterfactual design is possible because there is no adequate comparator group. This constraint gave rise to a design based on related literature and the links the literature posits between increased trade and poverty reduction.

The PPA allowed the evaluation team to test and refine the design for the PGIS. The refined design described in this chapter is built on the hypotheses identified in the PPA report:

1) poverty will decrease faster closer to the trade corridor
2) poverty should improve faster in tradeable sectors. If possible, households will also be divided according to skill levels and sources of income (e.g. sales, wages, etc.).
3) poverty will decrease faster in households that produce / consume more tradeable goods

The PGIS will examine the actual, ex-post changes that have taken place in each country over the life of TMEA (using datasets as close to the start and end of TMEA’s Strategy 1 as possible) by comparing poverty indicators at the two points in time. These data will be disaggregated as proposed in the following detailed sections. The design will also take into account other changes in the economy (e.g. economic growth) that may have improved the situation across all sectors.

TMEA works to increase trade through increasing trade efficiency. The literature around trade and poverty theorises that more open trade would lead to convergence towards one price – the world price – for commodities that poor people and others purchase. The link is not uniform nor simple, as detailed in the literature review in the PPA; whether households are involved in tradeable or non-tradeable sectors, whether they are net producers or net consumers, whether they are on the trade corridor or far from it, and other contextual factors influence whether trade openness alleviates poverty. The literature suggests three key channels through which changes in trade can affect poverty: through changes in prices, in wages or employment, and in government expenditures that support poor people. Prices are the most direct channel, while wages/employment and pro-poor government spending are more indirect.

The quantitative design suggested by the evaluation team makes use of national household survey datasets from the treated countries at two points in time (please see Table 13 below for detail) to attempt to track these conditions and changes in them over time. First, the evaluation team identifies households based on the sector in which they’re employed:

1. Tradeable – such as fuel and commodities
2. Non-tradeable – such as service providers
3. Hybrid – unclear or mixed sectors (this category is not part of the analysis; rather, these households are removed from analysis.)

The design further identifies households by their proximity to trade corridors. This was done in the PPA using GIS data in the national household survey datasets. For this, too, there are three groups:

1. On the trade corridor
2. Adjacent to the trade corridor (this category is not part of the analysis; rather, these households are removed from analysis, providing a clearer distinction between nearness to the trade corridor and remoteness from the benefits it is theorised to provide.)
3. Remote from the trade corridor

These disaggregations allow the quantitative evaluation to discern if, as theorised, households in tradeable sectors and those on the trade corridor have better poverty outcomes than those in non-tradeable sectors and those far from the trade corridor. The chief analytical tool will be a differences-in-differences analysis comparing change over time based on these differences. Where necessary, regressions will be employed – as they were in the PPA – or decomposition by income sources or sectors, to see which ones are most associated with poverty reduction. However, these techniques are not in themselves central to the design. The strength of the design comes from its strong basis in theory, as described in this chapter.

Wherever possible we will assess if there have been differential effects on men and women with disaggregated data and whether separate effects on socially and economically marginalised groups can be identified. Contextual inputs from the performance evaluation and TGIS will also inform the analysis, in a process of elimination of looking at the hypothesised channels and exogenous factors that could explain changes in poverty identified in the household survey data. If there are reductions in poverty, the quantitative analysis will be able to relate:

- Whether poverty has reduced more for households closer to or further from the trade corridor
- Whether poverty has reduced more for households in tradeable sectors
- Whether poverty has reduced more for female-headed or male-headed households

While the analysis will not establish with certainty whether any effects on poverty are due to TMEA’s interventions, we will be able to say whether what has happened is what we would have expected based on the theories. In decomposing these findings about poverty we will look at the hypothesised channels of producer and consumer prices, employment and wages, and government expenditures, while also taking into account important exogenous factors that may have also contributed to effects.

There are limitations to the methodology proposed. As noted in the TORs, and detailed in Annex D, precisely measuring TMEA’s impact on regional poverty as a unitary programme is not possible. Whilst the proposed approach will be able to identify changes in poverty – and association with changes that trade reforms may induce – it will not be able to connect these directly with TMEA’s activities.

**Qualitative:** The qualitative component of the research will include begin with desk review of existing programme documentation and strategies on poverty and gender, and speaking with TMEA country and HQ staff about how these were employed for strategic and decision-making purposes. How gender mainstreaming tools, the gender analysis of Mombasa Port, social impact assessments and the Gender Policy have been used will be
one subject of these interviews. Where applicable, the PGIS team will interview country office staff about any country-specific gender action plans and their outcomes, if any.

The PGIS will build on the evaluation’s review of a sample of projects (Deliverables 2C, 2D and 2E on results) that shows how gender and poverty were assessed at TMEA’s internal Project Appraisal Report stage, where there are poverty- and gender-sensitive indicators (and where these do not exist), and how gender and poverty outcomes are reported, where this is happening.

The qualitative fieldwork on the long-chain poverty impact is designed to identify potential causal pathways through which changes in trade may have affected poverty. The fieldwork will consist of direct interviews, focus groups and participatory methods with poorer and wealthier people along the transport corridors. While it is unlikely that respondents will link changes in their economic circumstances to TMEA projects in a direct way, their perspectives on why their economic lives have changed proved to be very astute in the PPA.

On the other hand, the team will also conduct interviews with those respondents affected by TMEA’s direct activities will be able to reveal direct localised impacts; as important as any such impact would surely be to those affected, such as women involved in cross-border trade, these would not be generalisable to the broader population.

While the PPA conducted research in Kenya and its borders with other EAC countries, the PGIS will take a regional approach. Taking into account the different levels of intensity in TMEA’s work across the region and some security concerns (South Sudan and Burundi) we propose to collect primary data in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda. We suggest concentrating on SO1 projects given their centrality in the Strategy 1 budget and SO3 projects which work directly with local people. Both have localised, direct impacts on poverty and gender; long-chain effects are theorised to have emerged as a result of the magnitude of TMEA programming as a whole. We will provide poverty, trade and economic profiles for each of the countries that will be visited which will be an opportunity to triangulate findings from the qualitative research to what is reported at the macro-level.

- **SO1**: Revisit sites (Mombasa port, Taveta/Holili OSBP, Busia OSBP, and Mirama Hills/Kagitumba) visited in the PPA to compare changes which may have been influenced by TMEA interventions, and to visit Dar Port given critical political economy challenges there. We would also like to conduct research with women and men further away from the trade corridors (at 50km or more away) to see if they have experienced any changes in prices, wages/employment and public services and ask them the reasons for this. This will be with those in the trade sector and others who could have been indirectly affected by shifts in prices, wages, employment and public services. This is testing the ToC assumption that reduced transport costs lead to reduced poverty rates for men and women, and we will query people from a range of livelihood groups. We will visit the same communities that we went to as part of the

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86 As SO2 interventions were at procedural levels, they were less focused on gender themes.

87 In the PPA research took place Mombasa port, Taveta/Holili OSBP, Busia OSBP, and Mirama Hills/Kagitumba took place but for the purposes of the PPA report only findings from Mombasa port and Taveta/Holili were analysed and written about. This is because DFID were interested in gaining a rapid understanding of poverty and gender dynamics from TMEA interventions. For the PGIS we will use the findings from all sites visited in the PPA (those reported and not) to understand changes over time.
PPA and we will attempt to speak with the same community members and key informants that we interviewed in 2016 (since we have their names) but we cannot guarantee that they will be available when the research is taking place. There is also a strong possibility that there has been staff turnover.

- **SO2**: we do not propose to do any work directly on these interventions but we will ask SO2-related questions while collecting data on SO1 and SO3 interventions where relevant. For example, asking small-scale women traders about their experiences with barriers to trade, their response to such barriers, and any changes in those barriers that helped or hindered their own lives. Another example would be to ask about certification of goods, where TMEA has worked to facilitate this process for small traders: what effects, if any, were there on clearance time, their costs, and the prices of their goods at market.

- **SO3**: Understanding TMEA’s broader work on poverty and gender will require looking closely at the Women and Trade programme which is a flagship USD5m programme on poverty and gender that was expected to reach 25,000 women. We propose to look into the work carried out with cross-border traders, urban traders, women in processing and women in export. This would test the TMEA ToC assumption that working with these women in these sectors leads to improved business competitiveness.

### 4.2 Key steps

#### Step 1 – Constructing poverty profiles

The first step of quantitative work is constructing updated detailed poverty profiles for the countries that will be studied in depth. These are likely to be Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, and possibly South Sudan, where suitable household survey data of reasonable quality are available (please see Table 13 below on the details of this availability). This was completed as part of the PPA exercise but will be reviewed prior to embarking on the quantitative work for the current study. These profiles show the distribution of poverty by region and by each sector of economic activity.

The PGIS team will use data comparable to those used in the PPA, wherever possible from later waves of the same national household surveys in each country. In an ideal situation, datasets from each country would frame TMEA interventions – before and after – and include the same measures of interest, measured in the same way, with the same level of quality. Ideally new data would be available at predictable intervals as well. However, each country makes its own decisions about data collection and release, and are quite different in terms of the quality and availability of data. For example, though Tanzania was included in the PPA with national panel survey data from 2012 reported in 2013, the country did not carry out the survey in the intervening years. On the other hand, South Sudan has expanded their High Frequency Survey that is now representative for all but the most conflict-affected states in the country, but earlier data are from unrepresentative pilots. The data expected to be available are as follows in Table 13:

### Table 13: Datasets used in the PPA and expected for the PGIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and dataset</th>
<th>Used in the PPA</th>
<th>Likely to be used in the PGIS</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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These datasets are likely to be relevant for estimating poverty trends in general terms, particularly where data are available from two points in time. In the PPA, the datasets that were used included information on prices, wages/employment (including ways to separate by tradeable versus non-tradeable sectors), and use of government services. Datasets also included the sex of household head and household members and geocoordinates, or the means to estimate them (please see following section on how these data were used in the PPA). The panel surveys will include such data in this latest round as well, allowing for the proposed analyses. The data will be analysed based on these categories and comparisons made between the earlier and later datasets, by gender, by tradeable and non-tradeable sectors of the household head’s employment, and by whether the household is on or far from the trade corridor.

As was done in the PPA, the analysis begins from a strong and straightforward design – including the design work of preparing the data for the geographic comparison – to make the comparisons over time and between the key categories of on and remote from the trade corridor, tradeable and non-tradeable sectors of employment of the household head, and sex of the household head. In addition to being agreed upon at the time of the Inception Report, this design also proved useful in the PPA, and the OPM team remains confident in the approach.

A brief description of the changes in prices, employment, wages and public expenditure in each country over the period since the PPA will be combined with a short account of the macroeconomic and trade performance for each country to enable a narrative account of the ways in which trade may have influenced poverty in each country. The TGIS conducted just prior will also have estimates of these changes, if any, to feed into the

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89 Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda should have data from two points in time. Tanzania will not, as they have not carried out another measurement since the national panel survey data from 2012/2013. South Sudan’s high frequency survey data has data from both points in time, but the earlier data were collected as part of a pilot and the samples during the pilot are not representative.
PGIS. The PGIS will provide an indication of the extent to which identified changes in poverty are consistent with those trade-influenced intermediate factors (prices, employment, wages and public expenditure) which TMEA has sought to affect.

**Step 2 – Disaggregating the changes in poverty in each country**

The PGIS begins from the premise that TMEA, oriented towards trade benefits that would be detected in the performance evaluation and TGIS, may have long-chain indirect effects on poverty and gender, but that no counterfactual design is possible because there is no adequate comparator group. This constraint gave rise to a design based on related literature and the links the literature posits between increased trade and poverty reduction.

The PPA allowed the evaluation team to test and refine the design for the PGIS. The refined design described in this chapter is built on the hypotheses identified in the PPA report:

1) poverty will decrease faster closer to the trade corridor
2) poverty should improve faster in tradeable sectors. If possible, households will also be divided according to skill levels and sources of income (e.g. sales, wages, etc.).
3) poverty will decrease faster in households that produce / consume more tradeable goods

The PGIS will examine the actual, ex-post changes that have taken place in each country over the life of TMEA (using datasets as close to the start and end of TMEA’s Strategy 1 as possible) by comparing poverty indicators at the two points in time. These data will be disaggregated as proposed in the following detailed sections. The design will also take into account other changes in the economy (e.g. economic growth) that may have improved the situation across all sectors.

TMEA works to increase trade through increasing trade efficiency. The literature around trade and poverty theorises that more open trade would lead to convergence towards one price – the world price – for commodities that poor people and others purchase. The link is not uniform nor simple, as detailed in the literature review in the PPA; whether households are involved in tradeable or non-tradeable sectors, whether they are net producers or net consumers, whether they are on the trade corridor or far from it, and other contextual factors influence whether trade openness alleviates poverty. The literature suggests three key channels through which changes in trade can affect poverty: through changes in prices, in wages or employment, and in government expenditures that support poor people. Prices are the most direct channel, while wages/employment and pro-poor government spending are more indirect.

The quantitative design suggested by the evaluation team makes use of national household survey datasets from the treated countries at two points in time (please see Table 13 above for detail) to attempt to track these conditions and changes in them over time. First, the evaluation team identifies households based on the sector in which they’re employed:

1. Tradeable – such as fuel and commodities

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2. Non-tradeable – such as service providers
3. Hybrid – unclear or mixed sectors (this category is not part of the analysis; rather, these households are removed from analysis.)

The design further identifies households by their proximity to trade corridors. This was done in the PPA using GIS data in the national household survey datasets. For this, too, there are three groups:

1. On the trade corridor
2. Adjacent to the trade corridor (this category is not part of the analysis; rather, these households are removed from analysis, providing a clearer distinction between nearness to the trade corridor and remoteness from the benefits it is theorised to provide.)
3. Remote from the trade corridor

These two delineations allow the quantitative evaluation to discern if, as theorised, households in tradeable sectors and those on the trade corridor have better poverty outcomes than those in non-tradeable sectors and those far from the trade corridor.

The analysis will be carried out using the Foster-Greere-Thorbeck (FGT) poverty index for poverty incidence (P0) and depth of poverty (poverty gap ratio - P1), as the outcome variables, calculated based on real household consumption per adult equivalent. At a minimum, in order to answer the research questions, the results will be disaggregated by sector of employment of the household head (tradeable versus non-tradeable sectors), and distance from the trade corridor (that is, on the corridor versus more than fifty kilometres from the corridor). Depending on data availability and sample size, we may disaggregate further by relevant socio-economic characteristics, such as education level, ethnicity, or disability status. In this way we will tease out factors contributing to poverty reductions and to what extent these were due to changes in prices, employment and expenditure, and look at alternative hypotheses such as donor or government efforts to construct roads, among others.

The specific techniques to be used in each case will be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on quality and structure of the data. Our first preference would be to use a difference-in-differences ("diff-in-diff") technique, comparing changes in poverty between treatment groups (who are exposed to trade) and control groups (who are not exposed to trade). However, since we are using secondary data, we will have to be flexible to adapt our estimation techniques depending on the challenges we encounter in each country’s datasets. Even when diff-in-diff type methods are used, this will not be comparable to the standards of a diff-in-diff structured as an RCT, since the underlying data was not designed to answer our research questions.

Because this is a contribution analysis, as opposed to an attribution analysis or RCT, the results obtained from the analysis of the outcome variable (poverty) will only be indicative of possible underlying relations between trade and poverty. In order to firm up our findings, and increase our confidence that changes in poverty are indeed due to changes in trade conditions, we will therefore need to study each of the channels through which trade is hypothesised to affect poverty outcomes, as well as looking at possible alternative factors that may have affected poverty during this period (e.g. climate shocks or political changes).

The three channels we will be looking at are derived from trade theory:
- Changes in prices: downwards convergence of prices of tradeable goods towards world prices would positively affect net consumers of those goods, but may negatively affect net producers.
- Changes in employment: increase trade as a result of larger export markets may open up employment opportunities in tradeable sectors, but uncompetitive sectors could also be negatively affected.
- Changes in public spending: increased public revenue as a result of increased trade and economic activity could enable increased spending on social sectors that tend to benefit poverty reduction.

In the first instance, this analysis will be a descriptive analysis, where we use descriptive statistics to describe how each of these variables has changed for each of the groups of interests. This will give us an initial indication of what may be driving changes in poverty. In the PPA the OPM team used a micro-simulation of future outcomes to predict what changes might occur; as the team will now be using actual data, the micro-simulation is replaced with the diff-in-diff design showing disaggregated descriptive tables to highlight any important changes. This contribution analysis will start by examining outcomes to see if they look like we would expect: that is, that poverty is decreasing faster closer to trade corridors and in households where the household head works in a tradeable sector. Then we look at the three theorized channels to see if any of those are consistent with the theory, and which one or ones explains the change in outcome. Finally, we also look at other factors that might have affected the outcome, such as drought, political instability, infrastructure development, and others, to eliminate other possible explanations.

We will then decide on a case-by-case basis whether and what additional analysis may be appropriate to answer the research questions, depending on the initial findings and data conditions. Additional techniques may include poverty decompositions and regression analysis, for instance, controlling for income and household composition. We will here examine which factors have contributed to generating the observed outcomes, for example regressing changes in poverty on changes in prices and employment. It is important to note that this last step may or may not be possible, given data quality. The previous analyses may also make additional analysis irrelevant, where we have already found well-substantiated evidence to answer the evaluation questions.

The public spending channel is the most indirect, where associations are least likely to be readily evident. However, building on those changes to trade and economic growth identified in the TGIS, particularly in tradeable sectors, the team will look for associated increases in spending on social sectors. We will also examine whether social spending has increased more in groups where poverty has decreased more, per the household-level analysis described above.

The analysis carried out at baseline suggests that it should be possible to carry out this analysis and to disaggregate by the relevant criteria in all countries. We are confident the datasets will permit the disaggregations or granularity as proposed here – by households’ status vis-à-vis the corridor, by tradeable versus non-tradeable sector of the household heads’ employment, and by sex.

The chief analytical tool will be a differences-in-differences analysis comparing change over time based on these differences. Where necessary, regressions will be employed – as they were in the PPA – or decomposition by income sources or sectors, to see which ones are most associated with poverty reduction. However, these techniques are not in themselves central to the design, and in fact bring in assumptions and limitations of their
own. The strength of the design comes from its strong basis in theory, as described in this chapter.

Wherever possible we will assess if there have been differential effects on households headed by men and by women with disaggregated data and whether separate effects on socially and economically marginalised groups can be identified. Contextual inputs from the performance evaluation and TGIS will also inform the analysis, in a process of elimination of looking at the hypothesised channels and exogenous factors that could explain changes in poverty identified in the household survey data. If there are reductions in poverty, the quantitative analysis will relate:

- Whether poverty has reduced more for households either on or far from the trade corridor
- Whether poverty has reduced more for households in tradeable sectors
- Whether poverty has reduced more for female-headed or male-headed households

While the analysis will not establish with certainty whether any effects on poverty are due to TMEA’s interventions, we will be able to say whether what has happened is what we would have expected based on the theories. In decomposing these findings about poverty we will look at the hypothesised channels of producer and consumer prices, employment and wages, and government expenditures, while also taking into account important exogenous factors that may have also contributed to effects.

The analysis of the market price data in the PPA will be deepened for each country in the PGIS by gathering the latest round of enterprise or price survey data nearest to 2018. Market price data that is applicable for the more rural areas along the trade corridors is likely the most difficult to source. However, the evaluation team is currently seeking these data through established channels with National Bureaus of Statistics, international donors and academic or “think tank” sources like Intracen and the Food and Agriculture Organisation. As “national” data on prices are often overly urban in sourcing, there is national and international effort to improve price data quality for the populations living in poverty (e.g., the African Development Bank’s Open Data for Africa initiative and World Bank efforts) particularly in rural areas, whether by collecting disaggregated data or calculating a likely factor of the difference between rural and urban consumer prices.

Prices are the most immediate and direct route by which trade is hypothesised to affect the lives of people living in poverty. Changes in trade may have both positive and negative effects on food prices, and households may be affected either positively (lower costs of consumption) or negatively (higher costs of household consumption) or both, when the same households are also producers of agricultural products for sale in the market. In such cases, increases in trade may depress the prices the households get for their

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91 Enterprise survey data might also be used in this analysis, subject to some limitations. Enterprise surveys available for the PGIS will include the DFID-funded SITA battery in 2014 and the enterprise surveys of two value chains proposed by the TGIS. The former is earlier than the 2016 PPA and as such probably too dated to be helpful; the latter will support the evaluation but is on a smaller section of the economy.

92 Price data in Africa suffers from at least one element of what the World Bank calls the Consumer Price Index bias. See Dabalen, Andrew, et al, 2016. Some data are available on trading prices and intermediary markets because of efforts like the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research’s FoodNet and on market prices via the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Price Tool, though for East Africa the only data available are wholesale prices at major markets. Donor value chains projects may be one source for retail prices in the areas under study.
produce at market, while also paying less in consumption costs. Or, greater prices they earn for their agricultural output may be offset by higher prices for their own consumption. Each of these scenarios is also affected by the “mix” of goods produced and consumed by households, as well as the goods that are involved in any increase of trade.

Data on these trends will be tabled and/or graphed by country to show changes over time, similar to the following graph from South Sudan’s Pulse study. The OPM team will seek data that is sufficiently disaggregated to look at geographic location (on trade corridors and far from them) as well as examining the categories of tradeable and nontradeable goods comparatively.

![Figure 6: Market Price Index trends, compared to inflation; South Sudan](http://www.thepulseofsouthsudan.com/data/)

Price pass-through is a key element of this analysis, in that prices at highly aggregated levels in which international trade occurs may change but effects on poverty are not seen as a result. This can be because the cost savings of increased trade are not “passed through” to retail market prices, meaning that the benefit is captured up-stream. The TGIS will also look at this question, providing a useful input for the PGIS, but the PGIS team itself will look at this issue in qualitative research by asking knowledgeable local actors about price changes, including households, and comparing their responses to data on wholesale prices – which, coincidentally, are more readily available for our study countries.

An additional set of analyses will be around pro-poor government expenditure. The literature hypothesises that another channel for potential trade effects on poverty may come about because the economy is growing, which expands the tax base generally and through revenues collected on imports. The increase in income can then be used for pro-poor spending, particularly on education and health.

The TGIS data on economic growth will inform this line of inquiry, as will the reviews of key policy changes in both the TGIS and PGIS. Data on broad categories of government spending are often available, such as the Uganda data recently provided to the OPM team, as shown in the table below.
As can be seen in the example of data above, the categories are indeed broad and only general trends are available on which to base quantitative analyses, alongside figures on increases in trade from the TGIS, if these have occurred. Also, data are often more readily available on budgets, rather than on actual expenditures, and these often differ. However, in interviews, the desk review and policy review that are part of the performance evaluation, the TGIS and the PGIS, the evaluation team will seek additional perspectives and more detailed data on the degree to which pro-poor spending (often coupled with particular policies) might have increased in the study countries. We will use all means available, such as DFID, OPM, and partner and peer relationships with line and finance ministries in the study countries, to gather detailed data on the change in pro-poor government expenditures over the life of TMEA’s Strategy 1. TMEA’s own ministry connections will also provide avenues that the evaluation team will pursue to access such data for these analyses. The evaluation team includes the necessary expertise to disentangle government expenditure data around functional and thematic areas such as health, education, and social services, where pro-poor spending is likeliest to occur. Most of the study countries have increased the use of social transfers in the same time period, for example, which could have important effects on poverty across categories to be studied in the PGIS.

Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, provided to the authors through DFID

Figure 7: Ugandan government spending, 2008 - 2018

- Government FCE (on public admin, Health & Education) (Billion shillings)
- Public Administration (Billion shillings)
- Education (Billion shillings)
- Human Health & Social Work (Billion shillings)
4.3 Sources and methods

Step 4 – Explaining poverty changes

Whilst the quantitative data will show what has changed, it is important to understand why these changes have taken place. A set of stakeholder interviews and FGDs will ask poorer and wealthier people what has changed for them and will learn about their understanding of the causal pathways through which these changes have come about. Qualitative and quantitative research are planned during one shared time frame, so that each can supplement their findings with the other. The quantitative team may ask the qualitative team in-country to adapt questions, or the field team findings may launch varied queries of the quantitative data.

This will help in understanding the extent to which the observed poverty changes for both men and women have been driven by changes in prices, wages, employment or public expenditure, the three main pathways described in the literature on the link between trade and poverty.\(^{93}\) This will complement the simulations conducted in the PPA to show how prices, wages, employment and public expenditure actually changed; to what extent this, in turn influenced poverty in each site; and whether any observed changes can be linked to changes in trade and hence the TMEA programme. Reduced costs of trade in the TMEA ToC under SO1 do not necessarily lead to decreased prices, increased wages, increased employment levels and enhanced public services, and this strand of work will test this assumption.

The questions in the FGDs will take a similar pattern as to that of the PPA. Broadly, the first question will ask how prices, wages, employment levels, public services etc. have changed since 2016 (when the PPA took place), and secondly the reasons for this change will be queried. It could be that changes in poverty are due to factors that are exogenous to trade (such as climate change or security issues) or factors closely related to trade (such as the cost of shipping). If there are any trade-related reasons these will be followed up to glean more information. We will take a semi-structured approach to the FGDs and follow up on any answers that are relevant to answering the evaluation questions.

This qualitative work to reveal the pathways through which trade may be affecting the poor will be done by conducting FGDs with poorer and wealthier men and women in four countries (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania), both in areas likely to be affected by trade reforms (trade corridors\(^{94}\)) as well as those less likely to be strongly affected, generally farther away from such corridors. Such facilitated discussions often bring to light new, previously neglected pathways of impact, or change our understanding of existing pathways, thereby adding to the evidence base around them.

Issues of gender differentials in outcomes or benefits and corruption will also be explored in these discussions. We will attempt to involve the poorest people in each location, as well as people from wealthier groups. We will take a structured approach to the sampling, meeting initially with umbrella or representative groups and other CSOs to help understand

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\(^{94}\) The literature supports the working assumption that the benefits of trade tend to be stronger nearer to the trade corridor.
the general context and identify and secure the participation of different types of poor men and women.

The FGDs are intended to be a way of understanding the changes experienced by poorer and wealthier households and of exploring the causal pathways that have given rise to the changes experienced. We will explore the three main causal pathways identified in the literature: i.e. prices, wages/employment and public expenditure and any other unanticipated pathways.

The study will conduct FGDs (6-10 people each; see box below for sampling) in the first quarter of 2019. This will allow us to ask retrospective questions about changes over a parallel period of time as that covered by the quantitative data, to better align the insights about causality from the FGDs with the aggregate changes observed in the nationally representative surveys.

**Box 2: Selection of locations for qualitative work**

For the exploration of pathways through which poverty has changed, we originally proposed to undertake 24 FGDs (6 six countries x near/far from the trade corridor x men/women). We propose to carry out FGDs in four countries (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda), near corridors (around OSBPs and ports) and in places greater than 50 km from these. This design will maximise VFM, by combining the ‘near trade corridor’ visits with visits to the three OSBPs and Mombasa port. FGDs will be held with groups of men and women from different economic levels (please see the text for selection plans) to understand how changes in prices, wages, employment and public spending might have affected their lives. FGDs will be homogenous by gender and socio-economic group inssofar: we will have FGDs with “poorer men” and “poorer women” and “wealthier men” and “wealthier women”. Interviews with select leaders as described in the text will also be included in site visits to triangulate the opinions expressed in the FGDs in which we explore the channels of potential changes in poverty. The diagram provides a simple schematic of the nine selected locations.

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95 These figures are not intended as strict sample sizes. The ranges offered reflect the reality of research in situ: numbers of days may change, availability of key respondents may vary, and FGDs may be richer in one site than another – such as where there are groups of people for whom household economies have changed significantly. Overall numbers of FGDs may be more useful at 15 than 25, depending on candor, attendance and content; our intentions are to saturate key categories.
The below table illustrates our sampling frame for the “pathway” FGDs, showing how we will utilize homogenous FGDs according to gender and socio-economic group, to understand the changes in prices, wages/employment and public services. These respondents will not necessarily be in the trade sector. This shows that we will conduct approximately 28 “pathway” FGDs.

**Table 14: Sites and FGDs by gender and wealth category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women Wealthier</th>
<th>Women Poorer</th>
<th>Men Wealthier</th>
<th>Men Poorer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa port</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar port</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taveta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holili</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busia (Kenya)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busia (Uganda)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagitumba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirama Hills</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50km from Taveta-Holili OSBP in Kenya</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50km from Taveta-Holili OSBP in Tanzania</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50km from Kagitumba-Holili border in Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50km from Kagitumba-Holili border in Uganda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The FGDs will be complemented with additional interviews with key stakeholders in the vicinity, to put the changes reports reported by the FGDs into a broader context. These stakeholders will include associations of farmers, traders and others, civil society organisations supporting poor people in the area, local authorities, and private sector associations as available. Our most important interviews will be with border or port officials and staff, senior national and local level government ministers, and women’s cross border trade association leaders. Revenue authorities, village leaders and elders and civil society leaders may be important “bellwether” respondents who can speak to the larger scale causes behind changes in poverty.

Questions to these informants will depend on their role and responsibility, but will touch on their views on how local men and women, boys and girls, have been affected in terms of changes in poverty (through prices, wages/employment, and public services) and the perceived sources of those changes. In the PPA, the OPM team found that respondents were willing and able to speak in concrete terms about these changes and their provenance, with insights about the magnitude and the endurance of the changes and the effects on their families and communities. We will therefore continue in that vein for the PGIS.

To the extent applicable for given informants, we will also about their experiences with TMEA. We will ask about those who have been directly impacted (i.e. who are working in the trade sector), and those who are indirectly impacted (e.g. those who may have been relocated due to road expansion projects). The evaluation team will have an interview guide which will contain general questions but field researchers will be trained to probe and clarify when necessary, and steer discussions on topics about which respondents feel most able and comfortable to speak.

Our focus in these encounters will be identifying people in trade and those who do not work in trade, and through a concerted effort with local organisation leaders, we will ask to
speak with those most affected by changes – positive and negative – to ensure we are canvassing the range of experiences.

We will also provide economic, trade and poverty profiles using existing secondary data (academic and grey literature, as well as statistics reported on the World Bank Open Data website). This is similar to what the evaluation team did during the PPA, and will be an opportunity to use more recent data and information to update the PPA analysis, where newer data are available. Information will be on employment and GDP trends, as well as trade and poverty- and gender-related data. Where the literature and data suggest changing trends in poverty in the study countries, we will include this in our analysis.

**Step 5 - Assessing local (micro-level) poverty impacts of TMEA interventions**

With regard to the direct TMEA interventions, a greater proportion of the qualitative data will come from women small-scale cross-border traders given that OSBP construction has formed a large part of SO1 investment and it is cross-border traders who are mostly targeted in the women in trade programme. These include women and men who are directly in the trade sector, and those that could be affected indirectly. We would also speak with the TMEA-supported Joint Border Committees, including the women members reported by TMEA, and the trade information desk at Busia border to help women traders access and use the Simplified Trade Regime that TMEA supported. The Women and Trade efforts in several countries and regionally are therefore a specific focus of the qualitative research for micro-level impacts. (Please see Box 3.)

We would like to disproportionately speak with as many traders as possible with disabilities (female or male) to ask if the OSBP has affected their lives, and if so, how. We would also speak with family members of traders to see whether there are spillover effects from shifts in women’s work in the trade sector (questions on unpaid work, access to healthcare and education, intra-household decision making, changes in household productive and non-productive assets, consumption and expenditure patterns, etc.) For ethical reasons, we would only speak with household members who are eighteen years of age or older. In each location, we will sample a different socio-economic group from the pathway FGDs, as can be seen in the table below, to ensure a mix of methods and respondent types.

**Table 15: Participatory methods and their respondent types**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Stories of change</th>
<th>Walking ethnography</th>
<th>Mapping exercise</th>
<th>Family group interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa port</td>
<td>Poorer woman (indirect)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wealthier woman (indirect)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar port</td>
<td>Poorer woman (indirect)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wealthier woman (indirect)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taveta</td>
<td>Wealthier woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wealthier woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holili</td>
<td>Poorer woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poorer woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busia (Kenya)</td>
<td>Wealthier woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wealthier woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busia (Uganda)</td>
<td>Poorer woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poorer woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kagitumba</td>
<td>Wealthier woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wealthier woman (direct)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The participatory methods mentioned in the above table will be important to ensure we hear from respondents not only what we ask to hear, but what they want to tell us – this would include mapping daily journeys before and after the advent or reconstruction of an OSBP; capturing stories of change experienced as a result of TMEA interventions from different types of respondents, and accompanying traders as they cross the border in walking ethnographies. For each site, we will endeavour to carry out two-four stories of change specifically around TMEA direct interventions. As such, we may hear cases of “graduating from” poverty among these women and men, the causes of which (whether or not trade-related) would be of interest to the long-chain research. We would also seek two walking ethnographies per site and one mapping exercise in OSBP locations, with which we would ask questions about their experiences with crossing the border for market days, quantities and qualities they carry, changes over time, bribes or other payments they feel are illegitimate, and the size and use of their earnings.

These three participatory methods are complementary in that they allow the research team to be flexible in how they reach out to respondents, develop rapport, and elicit commentary that may be very positive, or less so, about TMEA interventions, from different stories. Where OSBPs have expedited border crossings, walking ethnography allows the respondent to demonstrate that rather than offer a “testimonial”. In cases where community members have been displaced or actors inconvenienced, drawing maps may be a more neutral and yet more concrete way to answer sensitive questions about changes that may not benefit all equally. These support the overall research effort because our adept field teams can call on a variety of tools to reach respondents and hear their stories.
Complementary to these interviews, we will also conduct key informant interviews but also homogenous focus group discussions and/or participant observation, such as at market days near OSBPs, if the opportunity arises. Discussions will centre on the micro-impacts of TMEA interventions, but also to triangulate opinions from the “pathway” FGDs on changes
to prices, wages/employment and public service provision. Respondents are likely to include:

- Border and port officials and staff
- Government ministers
- Border committees
- Revenue Authority
- Eastern African Sub-regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI) and other women in trade networks
- Women in Informal Cross Border Trade associations
- Local government officials, Village Chiefs, elders and religious leaders
- Truckers\(^\text{96}\)
- Bureau of Standards
- Highways Agencies
- Hotel and restaurant owners, and female market sellers
- Clearing and forwarding agents and the International Freight and Warehousing Association
- Local people and business owners resettled due to road construction or port expansion
- Boda-boda drivers
- Police
- Fisherfolk
- CSOs working with communities affected by the interventions

Note: The respondents in italics are the “must see” respondents, assuming they are present and available in each of the sampled locations. The respondents who are not in italics are the “nice to haves” that will be interviewed if there is sufficient time.

The PPA delivered in June 2016 provides some concrete preliminary evidence about the likely direct local poverty and gender impacts of two of TMEA’s major initiatives (Mombasa Port and Taveta/Holili OSBP). This was done by interviewing a wide range of stakeholders around Mombasa Port and Taveta/Holili OSBP, including: port/OSBP officials, local government officials, port workers, shipping associations, labour unions, traders outside the port area/cross-border traders near OSBPs, local fisherfolk, construction workers, truck drivers, and CSOs working with local communities affected by the interventions (e.g. those displaced by the port, or those potentially benefitting from increased trade across OSBPs). The aim was to construct a rich picture of the localised impact of the intervention on poor groups in the vicinity, including gaining a good understanding of how it has affected men and women and other sub-groups distinctly (DEQ4.3 and 4.5). We discussed with TMEA and implementing partner staff the extent to which complementary and compensatory policies were adopted to maximise the benefits or minimise the harm to poor communities from the interventions (DEQ4.4). At this stage in the study, we will return to those sites to see if that materialised, and if so, how.

**Step 6 - Poverty reduction policy assessment**

It is often necessary for complementary policies to be put in place to ensure that negative impacts of trade reform are mitigated and to maximise the benefits experienced by the poor from such reforms. The evaluation team will be looking at evidence about whether

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\(^\text{96}\) We would ask truckers whether transport costs have fallen or not, and what has been driving these decreases in transport costs. Truckers may know where reduced transport costs (see ToC, SO1), have been passed onto to others or have been captured by trucking company owners.
TMEA interventions have influenced adoption of policies that are linked to poverty reduction for women and men. For example, boosting productivity and stimulating growth may require not only a conducive trading environment, but also better roads, reliable power, a reasonable level of education, and a healthy workforce. It may require construction of complementary infrastructure or active labour market policies to include poor and marginalised groups. Measures to tackle the multiple deprivations indicated by Multidimensional Poverty Indices can be important for ensuring that poor households benefit from trade reforms. Questions that could be asked include (a) have the negative impacts of trade reforms been mitigated against? and (b) have the benefits of TMEA interventions on poor people and on women been maximised? How?

The team will access information regarding policies – including changes in policies – through legal and sector policy strategy documents and interviews with TMEA and partners or stakeholders knowledgeable of policy changes in the study countries (for responding to DEQ4.3). The TGIS will also be looking at policy change, and will therefore inform the PGIS team about their findings, and share related documentation.

The proposed approach of policy interventions will be reviewed in comparison with the nature and scope of changes in poverty that are theoretically linked to changes in trade. OPM has identified at least two international recommended frameworks for the assessment of social policies, the ISPA tool for social policies (designed jointly from a pool of development partners, among them UKAID) and the UNESCO analytical framework for inclusive policy design. Both tools propose a set of analytical approaches, concepts and judgement criteria for assessing the adequacy of a given policy approach concerning specific problems of social exclusion and need for protection (both closely related with poverty). Once the nature and scope of trade-related poverty effects is known, the best set of assessment criteria can be selected from these documents for reviewing existing policies.

### 4.4 Changes to the approach

The present design proposes no significant changes to that put forward in the IR. On the other hand it does:

- Offer **greater detail on the original design**, including data sources and analysis methods, including how we plan to use mixed methods to triangulate the qualitative and quantitative streams of data.
- Include **comparison with the three OSBP sites visited in 2016**, which was not contemplated in the IR but which was made possible by the series of visits eventually undertaken for the PPA.
- Discuss the breakdown of methods and sources by evaluation question
- Propose to have **more countries’ national survey datasets included** in the quantitative analysis, than were present at the time of the PPA.

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97 [https://ispatools.org](https://ispatools.org)
• Include an analysis of the Women and Trade programme as a major TMEA intervention that addresses the needs of women traders. This programme had not begun when the IR was written.

4.5 Timing

The work for the PGIS will be undertaken from Q1 through mid-year, 2019. We are already seeking access to the second round of household, enterprise, price and fiscal data to enable the before and after comparisons discussed above. Once these data have been obtained, the quantitative analysis will be conducted. Qualitative and quantitative analyses and findings will be shared across the teams, to explore parallels and divergence between individuals’ and communities’ experiences exposed through the FGDs, and the aggregate groupings in the quantitative data.

4.6 Hypothetical responses to the evaluation questions

This section offers hypothetical responses to the evaluation questions related to the PGIS (HEQ4 and its DEQs).

DEQ4.1 on the nature and scale of likely impact of TMEA programming on the poor, either directly or indirectly? How is the causality working and who are affected by short- and long-term, positive and negative impacts?

The study finds that poverty has decreased more quickly in areas close to the trade corridor than in areas that are far away from the trade corridor, particularly in X country. The effect exists in Y and Z countries as well but with less strength. Furthermore, the study finds that the decrease in poverty has been more pronounced amongst households employed in the tradable sectors. This finding is prominent in all X, Y and Z. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis TMEA has had beneficial effects on poor households, likely through one or both of two pathways: employment/wages and prices.

When combined with the qualitative findings, which show that those near the corridors tended to report the greatest increases in income and reductions in market prices, this gives us a high level of confidence that poverty measures are improving, and more so nearer TMEA interventions than farther from them. While we cannot attribute the change to TMEA, it is likely that some of the improvements have occurred because of positive changes in the trade environment. The evidence to support this conclusion is clearly laid out in Chapter #.

DEQ4.2 on who has benefited from reduced trade costs, and how benefits from reduced transport time and cost passed on to poor people, if at all.

The study finds that retail prices of tradeable goods have increased less quickly than non-tradeables99. This suggests that reduced trade costs are passing through to consumers. Furthermore, we find that the price convergence is greater in areas located closer to the trade corridors than outside the corridors. This is consistent with the hypothesis that friction from

99 Tradeable and non-tradeable categories are part of the PGIS design, per the use of these terms in the PPA. They refer to goods that are more or less likely to pass through Trademark-supported channels, respectively.

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transport costs and other trade-related costs continue to hamper price convergence in peripheral areas, while in TMEA-supported corridors those costs are diminishing.

The relative decrease in the prices of tradeable goods has negatively affected net producers of maize, such as Countries X and Z, as confirmed in the qualitative fieldwork.

The national survey data comparison with the data from 2012 shows XX% increase in employment in tradeable sectors, and some indication of income increase at about YY% nearer the corridors and none far from the corridors. This suggests that poor households are also benefiting from decreased trade costs through the growth/employment channel.

DEQ4.3 on the adoption of any complementary policies to translate benefits from increased trade into poverty reduction

The third channel through which trade is hypothesised to affect poverty is through government spending. While a reduction in tariffs may have direct negative effects on government revenue, it is likely that the increased economic growth will in time compensate for this loss by generating additional revenue – which could be used for pro-poor spending.

The data show that government revenues have increased more rapidly over the studied period than in preceding years in countries W, X and Z. Furthermore, the increase has been higher than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. It is not possible to quantify how much of this might be directly attributable to TMEA, but notable that the changes occurred in three TMEA countries along the Northern Corridor, where programme effects have been shown to be stronger (please see the OPM Performance Evaluation, Chapter #.)

The share of pro-poor government expenditures has risen in Countries W and X between 2011 and 2017, per the World Development Indicators collected by the World Bank. In Countries Y and Z, government expenditures have been less pro-poor, partly offsetting the benefits of increased public revenue (Data for Countries A and B are not available).

DEQ4.4 on mitigating measures for any potentially negative impacts on subgroups, including poor people in localised areas

Neutral and negative outcomes were identified in the quantitative analysis in sites farther from the trade corridors relative to those nearer the corridors, in all four countries, but especially in Countries X, Y and Z. The policy research included as part of the qualitative research finds no evidence of policy-based mitigation in any of the three countries, while in Country W, government policies have been proactive in increasing support to the poor with the nationwide roll-out of its cash transfer programme. Country W started this programming in those more peripheral areas farthest from services, which would seem to indicate their intent to support those with the most trenchant poverty conditions. Country W’s smaller population and physical extension is not closely comparable to larger, more populous Countries X and Y, where these zones far from the corridor are much more extensive.

At the same time, Country Y’s political context was less stable over the period of TMEA’s potential influence, with two presidential elections and multiple changes in cabinets and other high positions, such that policy mitigation for pro-poor spending was likely low on the list of priority actions.

Trademark’s own mitigation work included the case of Mombasa Port, where they identified potentially negative impacts arising as a corollary to the infrastructure upgrades. TMEA worked with the X, Y and Z stakeholders to design a plan to mitigate negative consequences,
including relocation and vocational support. Qualitative fieldwork with beneficiaries of this programming found mixed results. Evidence of TMEA’s inputs to support the communities and economic activity displaced by the port work was present, including the vocational training offer. But for the most part the community members in the destination site could not identify individuals who had relocated from the Mombasa Port area. The rationale behind this unexpected outcome is unknown, as no members of that prior community could be located for interviews.

DEQ 4.5 on specific programme benefits or negative consequences for women and girls, including impacts on relations such as power and influence, and on how the programme might increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus

The qualitative research found evidence of substantial programme benefits as well as of negative consequences for women and girls in the site visits, interviews, focus groups and other methods used. The Women And Trade programme activities were lauded for the successes of women traders, entrepreneurs, and organisation leaders that emerged. Respondents reported that their trade quantities and values had increased, leading to greater income. Particular interventions that addressed localised needs were often mentioned: the creche constructed at ZZZ OSBP; the trade information desk and Certificate of Origin support at YYY; the warehouse where traders were allowed to bring their goods throughout the week for sorting and aggregating at XXX OSBP; the voice the women had gained by participating on the Joint Border Committees (JBCs) at WWW, XXX, YYY and ZZZ.

These findings are buttressed by the quantitative research showing greater parity of women heads of households’ (WHH) incomes with those of men (MHH) in the quantitative analysis of households on the corridors. Data from the non-corridor sites retained the sharp differences between WHH and MHH. While it is surely the product of more than just TMEA interventions, the corridor locations were more prosperous in general, with a higher level of employment and income for women, combined with a better price structure that favoured agricultural households’ solvency.

Respondents also shared positive experiences from within their families, such as greater voice in family decision-making that came along with the greater resources they were bringing home; support within the family for child care and eldercare; and intra-family respect for their economic and other efforts. Women who served on the JBCs had gained a larger perspective and learned to feel like “leaders of our communities,” as one group reported. Such responses were prevalent in all OSBPs visited.

There were a handful of responses that were less positive, including about continuing harassment of women and theft of women’s trading goods at CCC border post (reported by six independently contacted respondents). Some families were less positive about the change in breadwinning status that increased cross-border trading brought about: among the 165 women who took part in interviews or focus groups with the evaluation team, seven reported that they faced difficulties at home because their families – most often their husbands – were uncomfortable with their new status. Many more noted that they were still responsible for housework despite having increased the family income significantly and spending more time trading; this was seen as a double burden. The negotiation of women’s status or place in the family appears to be an open question in many households. A women’s port workers’ association also cited continuing sexual harassment at work in port offices, and an inability to break what they called the “glass walls” of lower-salaried office work.

DEQ4.6 on critical factors for sustaining any positive impacts.
This question will synthesise lessons learnt throughout the PGIS, with conclusions designed around any positive impacts that are definitively identified – like changes in women’s status and earnings through the Women In Trade programme, mitigating measures that worked in non-corridor areas, effective pathways for reducing costs and frictions for trade along the corridor, etc.
5  VfM Study

This VfM assessment builds on DFID’s Approach to VfM. Accordingly, it examines the “Four Es” of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and equity set out in DFID’s approach. These concepts, as defined in DFID’s guidance, are differentiated along the logic chain of an intervention from inputs to impact. A further dimension of VfM relates to cost-effectiveness, that is, the ratio of outcomes or impact to total costs incurred.

Figure 8: VFM conceptual framework

While the Four Es provide a conceptual foundation for systematically assessing and reporting on VfM, their use in a specific programme and setting requires further explanation of how these concepts relate to the programme’s design and performance. Furthermore, the Four Es alone do not provide a transparent basis for distinguishing ‘good’ VfM from ‘excellent’ or ‘poor’ VfM. This VfM assessment is based on agreed definitions for these terms, aligned with the programme TOC, supporting robust judgements and transparency in the assessment and reporting of VfM.

We adopt an evaluation-specific approach to VfM in this assessment. The approach involves making transparent, evidence-based judgements about how well resources are being used, and whether the value derived is good enough to justify the investment. The discipline of evaluation is underpinned by a logic of evaluative reasoning that enables valid judgements to be made from empirical evidence. Explicit evaluative reasoning enhances

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the credibility and use of evaluation for accountability, learning and adaptation, by providing a transparent and agreed basis for making judgements.\textsuperscript{104}

5.1 Scope and objectives

The VfM assessment will focus on the VfM achieved by the TMEA programme under Strategy 1, which finished in June 2017. This is because the evaluation of TMEA’s achievement of its intended outcomes and impact by the external evaluation team will use outcomes data under Strategy 1, following the TOC set out under Strategy 1. However, the assessment will also provide recommendations for further enhancing VfM under Strategy 2, including recommendations for strengthening VfM assessment and reporting by TMEA during Strategy 2. It will also highlight recommendations for maximising VfM on other similar future programmes.

The VfM assessment will answer DEQs 5.21 and 5.22 under HEQ5, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VFM DEQs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.21 Is the programme providing VFM?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.22 In which activities/components and countries does the programme achieve higher VfM than others and what are the lessons learnt for driving greater VfM across the board?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accordingly, the specific objectives of this VfM assessment are:

1. To provide a complete assessment of VfM for the whole programme under Strategy 1 and recommendations on how VfM can be strengthened at whole programme level under Strategy 2;
2. To examine the costs of key inputs and outputs and the VfM of selected key programme components under Strategy 1, providing independent verification that the resources put into Strategy 1 were worthwhile;
3. To provide recommendations to enhance VfM and to strengthen TMEA’s own VfM assessment and reporting during Strategy 2;
4. To provide recommendations for maximising VfM on similar future programmes.

The assessment will be undertaken from a donor perspective: it focuses on resources from TMEA’s principal donors\textsuperscript{105} channelled directly through TMEA and the achievements of outputs and outcomes by TMEA specified by those donors. It does not explicitly consider what VfM would look like from the perspective of the EAC, relevant East African governments, or the communities and beneficiaries targeted by the programme.


\textsuperscript{105} The Governments of the UK, Finland, Denmark, USA, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands.
5.1.1 Complexity and adaptation

TMEA is a complex programme working to create systems change in a complex political economy. This influences the way we need to look at VfM. TMEA is expected to be responsive to the evolving context in East Africa. There will be some aspects that are planned (‘intended strategy’) but do not take place (‘unrealised strategy’). At the same time, new approaches (‘emergent strategy’) will be adopted. Rather than looking for simple links between activities, outputs and outcomes, the VfM assessment will determine whether adaptive management is occurring and is effective, and account for unrealised and emergent strategy. This will be done by:

- **Efficiency level**: assessing delivery of outputs and noting deviances against workplan and budget; assessing whether deviances represent failure to deliver, or sound adaptation in response to evolving conditions (opportunities and risks), political economy, and learning about ‘what works’ from programme MEL and other sources; and noting how resources are reallocated across programme components (e.g. across Strategic Outcomes or intermediate outcomes within and across countries), in order to maximise programme performance.

- **Effectiveness level**: assessment of key drivers of effectiveness includes whether TMEA regularly reviewed, updated and responded to political economy analysis, had processes in place to regularly identify and mitigate risks, and has MEL systems and processes in place to learn and adapt; our assessment of achievement of outcomes will take into account changes to the expected outcomes, as identified in the ToC and results framework, and whether those changes are an appropriate response based on adaptive management, and helped to enhance programme performance and achieve better results.

5.1.2 Alignment with TMEA’s VfM

TMEA has invested much time and resource in progressively formalising and monitoring its programme VfM. An Action Plan was presented to the Board and VfM key performance indicators (KPIs) were approved in the 2015/16 financial year (FY), and have since been added to. Regular audits by KPMG (2013, 2015) and TMEA’s own internal audits (2016, 2017) have reported on select Economy indicators (mainly expenditure on travel, workshops, conferences, accommodation, *per diems*, and administrative costs) and donor Annual Reviews have assessed TMEA’s VfM against Effectiveness, Efficiency and Economy criteria.

We have sought to align our VfM framework with TMEA’s VfM strategy, framework, indicators and targets. We indicate whether and how we are integrating the KPIs into our framework under the relevant criteria in the framework. We will not conduct our own analyses against the KPIs, but will report those that are available in TMEA’s own reports.

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106 Accordingly, the standard for excellent might be: “TMEA can demonstrate that it enhanced programme performance significantly through adaptive management, and can provide evidence as to how this led to better results.”
As part of our assessment of Effectiveness, we will also review TMEA’s own VfM strategy, assessment and reporting, and provide recommendations for strengthening them under Strategy 2 (i.e. objective 3, above).

5.2 Key steps

The key steps in the VfM assessment are summarised in the figure below, followed by an explanation of each.

**Figure 9: Overview of our evaluation-specific approach to VfM**

![VfM Framework Design and Reporting Diagram](source: King & OPM (2018))

**5.2.1 Framework development (steps 1-4)**

We are currently in the process of developing the VfM framework. This has involved reviewing key programme and evaluation documents, an internal workshop with OPM staff and consultants (including the consultant responsible for deliverable 6B, which made an early assessment of TMEA programme VfM), and calls with key TMEA and DFID staff, to provide an overview of our approach and check details on TMEA programme and operations and data availability. The steps below outline the process we have followed.

**Step 1 – Theory of Change (TOC)**

A TOC explains how activities are understood to produce results (e.g., reduced trade costs, improved trade facilitation, enhanced business regulation for trade) that contribute
to achieving intended impacts.\footnote{Rogers, P. (2014). \textit{Theory of Change}. Methodological Briefs: Impact Evaluation 2. Florence: UNICEF.} In VfM assessments, we use the TOC to assist in the identification of sub-criteria, standards and indicators that are relevant to the programme’s results chain. We have examined the programme ToC and aligned our VfM criteria with programme outputs (for the assessment of efficiency), outcomes (for the assessment of effectiveness) and impacts (for the assessment of cost-effectiveness).

**Steps 2-3 – Sub-criteria and Standards**

The complexity of development programmes often means their performance cannot be judged solely on the basis of indicators, devoid from any evaluative judgement. Well-reasoned judgements of the quality and value of results are required. Sub-criteria and standards provide an agreed transparent basis for interpreting the evidence and arriving at sound judgements. In this context:

- **VfM sub-criteria** are selected dimensions of performance that are relevant to the programme – i.e., programme-specific definitions of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and cost-effectiveness. The sub-criteria describe, at a broad level, the aspects of performance that need to be evidenced to support an evaluative judgement about VfM. Table 12 shows an example (note that this is not specific to the TMEA programme).

**Table 17: Example of programme-specific definition and sub-criteria for Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of Economy criterion:</th>
<th>The X programme manages resources economically, buying inputs of appropriate quality at the right price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Sub-criteria for Economy criterion: | • Programme X followed good practice to manage key economy drivers  
• Evidence of good costs management  
• Average costs of key inputs of appropriate quality compare well with benchmarks  
• Spend on indirect costs (as defined by the programme) as percentage of total cost are within predetermined target |

- **VfM standards** provide defined levels of VfM (i.e., excellent, good, adequate, and poor) for each of the criteria. Table 13 shows an example (note that this is not specific to the TMEA programme).

**Table 18: Example of programme-specific standards for Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Sub-criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Excellent   | The programme can demonstrate that it is has consistently maximized value in its procurement practices by following international best practice guidelines, drawing on multiple criteria which go beyond price alone  
And meets all criteria under ‘good’ performance |
The programme can demonstrate results of good cost management, such as partner contributions, effective procurement and good contract negotiation
Average unit costs for key inputs generally meet agreed benchmarks
Management costs as percentage of total costs *generally at or below* agreed benchmark
And meets all criteria under ‘adequate’ performance

Adequate
Average unit costs for key inputs do not consistently or materially exceed agreed benchmarks
Management costs as percentage of total costs *generally near* agreed benchmark
The programme verifiably followed good practice to manage key economy drivers

Poor
Any of the conditions for adequate are not met

The rubrics (sub-criteria and standards) against which TMEA will be judged will be discussed and agreed in a workshop in Nairobi before any evidence is collected (see below for more information on the workshop).

**Step 4 – Identifying evidence required**

In a logical and sequential process of evaluation design, we will identify the evidence needed, and the methods to collect the evidence, after defining the VfM sub-criteria and standards. The preceding steps are important to help ensure that the evidence is relevant, measures the right changes, and is appropriately nuanced.

We will use a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence. Indicator-based (quantitative) measurement makes a valuable contribution to evaluating programme performance and VfM. Indicators alone, however, are insufficient to support well-reasoned evaluative judgments. Broader contextual (including qualitative) evidence is also important, to provide additional information about performance and support appropriate interpretation of the indicators.

The use of mixed methods and data sources and types, and triangulation across findings, helps to extend the comprehensiveness of the assessment (breadth and depth of understanding) and enhance the validity and credibility of the assessment.

**5.2.2 VfM assessment (steps 5-8)**

**Steps 5-8 – Gathering evidence, analysis, synthesis and judgements**

After agreement on the rubrics and the evidence for the assessment, we will gather the necessary evidence. The documents and data required will be defined immediately after the Nairobi workshop. We will meet with TMEA staff immediately following the workshop to
collect as much evidence as we can; we will continue to gather any remaining evidence remotely.

When carrying out the VfM assessment, we will first analyse the stream of evidence for, and make a judgement against, each criterion (the ‘E’s). Synthesis will then be undertaken to triangulate and consider the totality of evidence across the criteria collectively and give an overall VfM assessment of TMEA. The evidence and judgements will be discussed and agreed in a participatory workshop involving key stakeholders from DFID and TMEA before the report is finalised.

**Additionality and contribution analysis:** VfM assessments need to take into account the counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened if an intervention had not taken place – the ‘do nothing’ scenario) and make a judgement regarding attribution. Attribution is about demonstrating whether the observed outcomes came about as a result of the programme intervention or due to other factors. In the TMEA context there is no experiment (e.g. a randomised control trial) to assess impacts against a measured counterfactual. Instead, some *ex post* ‘detective work’ is necessary to assess the outcomes and impacts of the programme against the evidence of activities, outputs and outcomes specified in the TOC, consider alternative explanations for attribution (e.g. another programme), and present a conclusion based on a transparent, logical, reasoned argument.

Additional economic concepts such as those shown in Table 2, which draws on concepts from additionality\(^ {108}\) as well as the SROI’s Guide to Social Return on Investment\(^ {109}\) are also important in any VfM assessment. Using these concepts helps to facilitate an assessment of the plausible contribution of TMEA while avoiding over-claiming the programme’s impact.

**Table 19: Framework of economic considerations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>How it is applied in the TMEA assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deadweight</td>
<td>Would the observed outcomes have occurred without intervention?</td>
<td>Outcomes and impact under the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared effects/contribution</td>
<td>Did other (non-TMEA) interventions or programmes also influence changes, e.g. other infrastructure investment by TMEA or other donors?</td>
<td>Outcomes and impact under the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains through positive externalities</td>
<td>Did the programme contribute to verifiable indirect benefits, e.g. increased investment/leverage of resources, more</td>
<td>Outcomes and impact (unplanned positive effects)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The VfM study will draw on OPM’s Phase 2 evaluation studies (the performance evaluation and its contribution tracing method, and the trade and growth and poverty and gender impact studies) to the extent that they address these issues. The findings and conclusions around substantiation of TMEA contribution claims and econometric and other models will enhance the detective work mentioned above, to give greater confidence to the claims against which VfM will be weighed. The evaluation studies are not designed to address the issue of deadweight (i.e. what proportion of the observed impacts would have happened in the absence of the TMEA programme). The VfM assessment will make a very light-touch assessment of deadweight by looking at a key proxy indicator such as pre-TMEA level of trade growth in the region. This will be used to ensure our assessment of TMEA’s contribution to change is not overestimated.

5.3 Possible rubrics for the TMEA programme

The programme-specific rubrics will be discussed and agreed in a workshop in Nairobi involving key stakeholders from DFID and TMEA. Tentatively, based on our conversations and analytical work to date, and subject to discussion in that workshop, we suggest that the sub-criteria may include:

**Economy**

- Good management of key economy drivers (e.g., staff recruitment and remuneration processes and policies, consultant fee-setting processes and policies, procurement practices)
- Average costs of key inputs of the right quality, such as staff salaries and consultant fees (to be confirmed at the Nairobi workshop) compare well with benchmarks.
- Indirect costs as a percentage of total programme costs

**Efficiency**
• Good management of key efficiency drivers (e.g., staff and consultant composition and management (including outsourcing decisions), management of partner/grantee relationships (appraisal and selection, monitoring, results management)
• Delivery of programme outputs to workplan and budget, allowing for deviations for adaptive programming and contextual factors (technical efficiency and dynamic efficiency)
• Comparison of unit costs on five OSBPs; benchmarked against the costs of other OSBPs, if costs are available in published studies (technical efficiency)
• Evidence that the programme has enhanced its performance and achieved better results through good adaptive management, i.e. delivery is responsive to context, opportunities and risks, and ongoing learning about what works, including moving resources around across programme components (e.g. across Strategic Outcomes or intermediate outcomes within and across countries), in order to maximise programme performance (dynamic efficiency) and there is evidence of a systematic process to weigh up choices about how to allocate resources/spend money to create a balanced portfolio with potential to generate all intended outcomes and impacts (allocative efficiency)
• Quality of CBAs undertaken by TMEA on key programme components (Dar and Mombasa Ports and a sub-sample of the OSBPs) (allocative efficiency)

Effectiveness

• Good management of key effectiveness drivers (political economy analysis, risk management, programme VfM strategy, reporting and management)
• Achievement of outcomes (intermediate and strategic) against the programme ToC and results framework, taking into account changes to stated outcomes and targets as evidence of adaptive management

Cost-effectiveness

• TMEA is on course to create more value than it has consumed (breakeven analysis) (see description in section 5.4.1) and has generated additional non-monetised outcomes
• Comparative VfM on a selection of key programme components
• Outcomes and impact are judged to be sustainable, and TMEA is developing a transition plan which considers sustainability of delivery processes after Strategy 2

Equity

• Equity and gender considerations were present in TMEA’s research and analysis and support to projects
• TMEA contributed to gains for key vulnerable groups at outcome and impact levels.

5.4 Levels of analysis

5.4.1 DEQ5.21: Is the programme providing VFM?

This question will be answered by examining evidence and making judgements on all rubrics in the framework for the TMEA programme as a whole. Cost data will be examined in the aggregate, and disaggregated by Strategic Objective. This will include examination
of staff salaries, as they are set centrally with one set of scales applicable in all countries. We will use the comparators reported in the Remuneration Survey undertaken by Deloitte (June 2016) and report how TMEA responded to the findings and recommendations of that survey. The analysis will include assessment of the impact of cuts in staff salaries at the beginning of Strategy 2 on staff retention.

Key economy, efficiency and effectiveness drivers will be examined at corporate level (i.e. performance in Nairobi HQ).

Delivery of outputs (for efficiency), achievement of outcomes (for effectiveness), contribution to impacts (for cost-effectiveness and equity), and additionality concepts (shared effects, unintended positive and negative outcomes and sustainability) will be examined in the aggregate against the corporate-level ToC and results framework, drawing on evidence in the OPM evaluation studies.

Assessment against the equity rubrics will draw on findings in the Poverty and Gender study, showing which groups appear to have benefited and/or lost out in terms of the employment/wages and prices effects of the TMEA interventions, and pro-poor spending by governments due to increased revenue, while taking into account difficulties with the attribution of these effects to TMEA. Winners and losers may include different groups of poor households, women and men, consumers and net producers, depending on their location, sector, employment status, skills, access to resources and so on. The assessment will also review evidence specifically on benefits for women and girls in terms of employment, wages and prices, and shifts in the relative power and influence of women in their homes and communities as a result of changes in their participation in trade and in associated processes such as policy formulation. The breakeven analysis will also be undertaken for the whole programme, based on whole programme ex-ante CBAs in the original Business Case. Breakeven analysis enables rapid assessment, using limited data, of the prospect of programme benefits equalling or exceeding costs, without needing to conduct a full cost-benefit analysis. Ex-ante CBAs (Pogorelsky, 2012) on defined aspects of TMEA indicate that TMEA, if effective, should generate a high return on investment – and provide a general indication of the level of impact at which benefits would start to exceed costs. Break-even analysis will examine whether the assumptions in these CBAs are still reasonable and whether TMEA’s contributions to sustainable outcomes and impacts are sufficient to break even. Importantly, we will only be able to undertake breakeven analysis if the assumptions in the 2012 calculations are broadly still valid. Data on benefits (i.e. time savings and induced trade) will be taken from the OPM performance evaluation and the Trade Impact Study. Those studies will review the quality of the results data sourced from the TMEA Results Meter and Corridor Observatories; we will make note of any issues with the quality of the data in our report.

We will also provide external validation of the quality of the methodologies used for the ex-ante CBAs undertaken or commissioned by TMEA on key Strategy 1 infrastructure projects. This will cover the CBAs on the two ports and two of the five OSBPs. We will discuss selection criteria for the OSBPs at the Nairobi workshop. They may include who conducted the CBAs (TMEA vs other named contractors), the costs and perceived risks of each OSBP, and if there are particular concerns such as underperformance relative to original expectations. We will seek access to the spreadsheets used for the CBAs and our Trade Economist will review the methodology used and the assumptions made for each CBA. The review is likely to involve interviewing the analysts responsible for the CBAs to understand features of the analyses that are not obvious from our review of documents and data.
The purpose of this analysis will be to provide lessons from Strategy 1 and recommendations to maximise VfM under Strategy 2 for the whole programme.

5.4.2. DEQ5.22: In which activities/components and countries does the programme achieve higher VfM than others and what are the lessons learnt for driving greater VfM across the board?

1. Comparison of key costs data across projects/country programmes

1.1 Data on costs (5 country offices)

The key cost drivers that we propose to analyse are staff salaries and consultant fees. This will be confirmed at the Nairobi workshop. Staff salaries are set centrally with one set of scales applicable in all countries, hence this analysis will be at corporate level (answering DEQ5.21, as described above). Consultant fees are project-specific, proposed in competitive tenders and assessed in the tender evaluation process. This means they vary across projects depending on market rates for different countries and kinds of projects.

We will decide which kinds of TMEA projects should be included in the analysis in the Nairobi workshop (likely to include a selection from SO1, SO2 and SO3), and then identify a set of comparable non-TMEA projects in the region against which to benchmark consultant fees. We will look for projects of a similar nature (including trade and infrastructure projects) funded by DFID or other donors, implemented by OPM or other contractors, and which span the countries in which TMEA works. A list of potential projects is shown in Annex I. We will seek permission to access and use the data needed for our comparisons: DFID assistance may be helpful. The analysis will take into account the different cost structures of different country economies and qualitative assessment of other factors which may account for differences.

The purpose of this analysis will be to understand if TMEA expenditure appears reasonable relative to expenditure in other comparable programmes, bearing in mind differences in context.

2. Comparison of unit costs on OSBPs

We will produce cost calculations for the construction and set-up of each of the 5 OSBPs. The costs will include direct project costs and apportionment of indirect costs (e.g. central overheads at 9%, a proportionate share of running and staff costs for the TMEA managers who manage the OSBP projects, and possibly costs for TMEA regional staff providing technical and advisory support) using a top-down approach. We will include the contributions of other partners, if TMEA has this data. We will make comparisons across the five OSBPs in order to understand if some were achieved at lower costs than others without compromising on their stated objectives.

We will also compare the costs of the TMEA-facilitated OSBPs with other OSBPs in the region, if costs can be found in published studies. We will use the 2nd edition of the One Stop Border Posts Sourcebook (May 2016) produced by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as a starting point to identify suitable comparators (the source book identifies 25 OSBPs in East Africa). Criteria for selecting suitable comparators will be decided

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at the Nairobi workshop and may include: location, geographic features, physical facilities, management operation type (e.g., public PPP), and scale (for example, traffic/trade volumes).

Both analyses will take into account the different cost structures of different country economies and qualitative assessment of other factors which may account for differences.

3. Comparison across some key programme components

We will undertake a qualitative assessment of VfM in key programme components using the matrix in Annex J and standards set out in a generic rubric. The assessment will draw on the following data:

(a) What went in and what came out?

- Approximate spend/band of expenditure (e.g., high/medium/low): the level of precision will depend on the selection of components and TMEA’s ability to apportion costs accordingly;
- Headline results (outcomes/impact of selected component): extracted from OPM evaluations (2C3A and 2D2E and the performance evaluation);
- Evidence from economic evaluations, if available: see more information below.

(b) VfM assessment criteria

- Relevance and significance of the issue addressed to TMEA objectives (high/medium/low): extracted from OPM evaluations (2C3A and 2D2E, 6A and the performance evaluation);
- Magnitude/significance of component outcomes/impact relative to cost or expectations (high/medium/low);
- Expected sustainability of component outcomes/impact (high/medium/low): extracted from OPM evaluations (2C3A and 2D2E, 6A and the performance evaluation).

(c) VfM judgement: an overall judgement on VfM of each component based on a generic rubric

A programme component is understood to be a collection of projects (possibly with some activities implemented directly by TMEA) that together aim to contribute to any of the intermediary outcomes. The criteria for selecting key programme components for the exercise will be discussed and agreed at the framework workshop. Selection criteria may include:

- Components with the largest share of TMEA budget and/or projects (using data in deliverable 2A);
- At least one component in each SO;
- Perceived VfM performance during Strategy 1 (some high and some low-performing components)
Data on results, relevance and sustainability is readily available in OPM reports.\textsuperscript{111}

For SO1, these criteria may conceivably result in selection of the Mombasa and Dar ports, and the three OSBPs assessed in the SO1 effectiveness evaluation (2C3A). This would allow for useful intra-component comparisons, i.e. which of the ports, and which of the OSBPs, represent better VfM and why, taking into account any relevant contextual differences in context and implementation. We expect the results of economic evaluations to inform the analysis of SO1 projects; we will not undertake any economic evaluation of our own, but will report the findings of analyses undertaken by (or commissioned by) TMEA, along with the relevant assumptions and limitations.\textsuperscript{112}

For SO2 and SO3, the possible selection is less clear, given the wide-ranging and disparate nature of the projects contributing to each SO. The potential to make useful intra-component comparisons is also less clear. For these SOs, we will discuss the purpose and value of any potential analyses in the framework workshop; if it is agreed that there is value to the analyses, we will agree selection criteria and identify potential components. Perceived VfM performance may be the primary selection criteria here, allowing us to review key factors underpinning good and poor VfM.

The matrix allows us to make a VfM judgement against each component. This, theoretically, allows us to make cross-component comparisons of VfM, e.g. how do the ports compare with the OSBPs in terms of their VfM? However, these comparisons need to be carefully qualified, taking into account differences in the nature of the projects, the enabling political and economic environments and other implementation differences.

The matrix will be populated based on document review. The evidence and proposed judgements will be discussed in an expert workshop with key TMEA and DFID staff.

**Rationale for our choice of analyses.** The analyses to respond to DEQ5.22 will allow us to understand if TMEA expenditure on key inputs and key outputs (OSBPs) appears reasonable relative to expenditure in other comparable programmes, and to identify examples of good VfM in selected key programme components. Both analyses will be useful in informing good VfM practice under Strategy 2. As the information in the table below demonstrates, the assessment features both internal (within-programme) comparisons and external benchmarking against other programmes. We will undertake benchmarking against external comparators at two levels – key costs (economy level), and unit costs of OSBPs (efficiency level), if comparable data and studies are available and accessible. These benchmarking assessments will be contextualised with qualitative data around the nature of each programme, including the kinds of activities undertaken, the nature of expertise required of staff and consultants, the political economy context associated with trade reforms, and so on.

**Table 20: Internal and external benchmarking**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rubric (criteria/sub-criteria)</th>
<th>Internal comparisons</th>
<th>External comparisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\textsuperscript{111} This means the components would need to be composed largely if not completely of projects in the sample for deliverables 2C3A and 2D2E.

\textsuperscript{112} The Phase 1 OPM evaluation of SO1 projects (deliverable 2C3A) reports the findings of economic and financial evaluations (net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR)) carried out in 2016 for the infrastructure projects at the Mombasa and Dar ports based on reports by Ernest Young (Economic and Financial Analysis for Selected berth Upgrade projects at the Port of Mombasa, November 2016) and MTBS.
| Economy (average costs, spend on management) | Consultant costs on sub-sample of projects. | Key inputs costs (staff and consultants) from similar programmes in the same countries, if data on the same indicators are available and accessible |
| Economy and efficiency (all sub-criteria) | Comparison of unit costs across 5 OSBPs | Costs of other OSBPs in the region, if data are available in published studies |
| Cost-effectiveness | Whole programme breakeven analysis relative to original programme-level CBA in the Business Case; VfM across key programme components in SO1, SO2 and SO3, including reported economic evaluations (CBAs) of large infrastructure projects, if available | |

### 5.5 Participatory workshops

We will conduct three participatory workshops involving TMEA and DFID staff during the course of our VfM assessment.

**Workshop 1: VfM Framework**

The workshop to discuss and agree the VfM framework will be rescheduled, once we have identified a trade economist to join the team. It will be facilitated by members of the VfM team and attended by TMEA staff members with sound knowledge of Strategy 1 programming and operations (members of the Senior Leadership Team, SO leaders and the Results lead), key DFID representatives, and members of the OPM evaluation team. The draft framework will be sent to all participants ahead of the workshop.

We will discuss and agree the following during the workshop:

- The proposed rubrics (sub-criteria and standards) for each E
- Selection criteria for the sub-sample of TMEA projects for analysis of input costs, the OSBPs for review of CBA methodology, and the key programme components for VfM assessment
- Possible evidence and indicators, and data availability
- Other programmes which may be used as comparators for economy (input costs) and efficiency (costs of OSBPs) indicators

During the same mission to Nairobi we will meet with key TMEA staff in the Results team and Corporate Services team to clarify the documents and data needed for the assessment, gather as much evidence as possible, and identify key counterparts who can identify and send further evidence after we return home.

**Workshop 2: Expert Review Workshop**
We will hold a one-day workshop part way through the assessment. The principal objective of the workshop will be to discuss the matrix used to make judgements on the VfM of key programme components. The workshop will also be used to verify our early analyses and fill in gaps we have identified during document and data review.

The workshop will be attended by key TMEA with sound knowledge of Strategy 1 programming and operations and DFID staff.

**Workshop 3: Verification/Judgements Workshop**

We will hold a final verification workshop towards the end of the assessment, once we have assessed and collated all of the evidence. The draft report will be sent to attendees ahead of the workshop. During the workshop we will discuss the evidence and agree judgements against each E and come to a summative judgement for the programme as a whole. The workshop will be attended by key TMEA with sound knowledge of Strategy 1 programming and operations and DFID staff.

### 5.6 Sources and methods

The VfM assessment is undertaken primarily on the basis of desk review. The assessment is designed to draw heavily on the OPM evaluation without duplicating the work undertaken by the evaluation team. The nature and extent of information on results available to us will therefore be defined by the final design and scope of the evaluation studies.

The following documentary sources will be used for evidence on programme costs, practices, and results:

- TMEA programme financial data, using templates provided by our team;
- TMEA VfM documents (strategy, framework, reports on VfM KPIs and other indicators), external and internal audits, and due diligence assessments;
- TMEA organisational handbooks, manuals, and policy documents
- TMEA cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) (programme and infrastructure projects);
- The TMEA monitoring data and results framework, Results Meter, and evaluations (including country programme evaluations and others not reported in OPM evaluation reports);
- Key TMEA programme documents, e.g. DFID’s Programme Memorandum (2008) and Business Case (2013), TMEA’s annual reports, donor Annual Reviews (whole programme and country level), as relevant;
- Relevant reports from the OPM evaluation, such as Deliverable 2B (Institutional and organisational assessment of TMEA, with an assessment of M&E systems and a preliminary VfM review), Deliverables 2C/3A and 2D/2E (evaluation of outcomes against SO1, SO2 and SO3) and the performance evaluation and two impacts studies described in this document, all produced by the external evaluation team.

Our document review will be supplemented by a small number of interviews with key stakeholders in DFID and TMEA. The interviews will focus on TMEA’s adherence to good practice around the key economy, efficiency and effectiveness drivers during Strategy 1, evidence of adaptive management and processes for resource allocation and how they
have improved programme performance and results, the additionality concepts set out in the table above, and additional information needed for the breakeven analysis. These interviews will be conducted by Skype or phone, and/or in person at the same time as the Expert Review Workshop, after we have analysed the information available in documentary sources.

5.7 Changes to the approach

While there are no significant deviations to the approach to VfM assessment, it is important to note the following:

- **Our economic evaluation at cost-effectiveness level for the whole programme will focus on a breakeven analysis, as described in section 5.3,** which can be readily performed with limited data. It will be complemented by TMEA’s own cost-benefit analyses on the whole programme or components of the programme (e.g., infrastructure projects, if TMEA has collected the necessary evidence, tracked the assumptions, and repeated the necessary calculations.

- **Assessment of the sustainability of delivery processes** will be based on evidence of TMEA’s transition planning in preparation for the end of Strategy 2 funding. We will not assess the mandates, capacities, resources and frameworks of the public or private institutions which may be expected to take on some of TMEA’s activities

5.8 Timing

Data on outcomes and impact will reflect achievements at the end of Strategy 1 in June 2017, as assessed by the evaluation team. Data on costs will cover the period from the start of the programme in 2010 until the end of Strategy 1 (June 2017). As the VfM assessment draws on the evaluation findings, the final VfM assessment will be delivered approximately six to eight weeks after the evaluation team’s final deliverables. This will ensure good VfM in the process by facilitating coherence between the evaluation and VfM assessment, and by avoiding duplication of effort.

5.9 Hypothetical responses to the evaluation questions

Below we explain how our findings, conclusions and recommendations will be summarised in the Executive Summary, and briefly discuss how they will be presented in the main body of the final report.

DEQ5.21

The summary findings of the VfM assessment of the whole programme will be reported in a table like the one below. The table contains an evaluative judgement and a summary of the evidence on which this is based for each of the Es individually, and then for the programme as a whole. The evidence reported will depend on the sub-criteria and indicators included in the final framework. The information in the table represents a very brief summary of findings which will be reported in much greater depth in the main report, with a section for each of the Es. The examples in the table are purely illustrative and do not represent any analysis undertaken to date.
The table will be followed by a summary of our recommendations on (1) how the whole programme can improve VfM under Strategy 2; (2) how the programme can improve its VfM assessment and reporting; and (3) how our lessons may be useful for other similar programmes in the region.

Finally, we will outline any caveats and limitations that apply to the analysis, such as concerns over the quality of data used in the analysis, limitations to the comparisons that can be made with other programmes, limits to ascertaining the extent of TMEA’s contribution to outcomes which are shared with other actors.

Table 21: Example of table with VfM assessment for the whole programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VfM criterion</th>
<th>Evaluative judgement</th>
<th>Basis for judgement (illustrative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>The programme has consistently followed good practice to manage key cost drivers, secure savings, and keep costs down. These efforts ensured that key input unit costs were consistently below agreed benchmarks. Spend on indirect costs remained within the pre-defined target of x%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Deliverables generally met the required quality and timeliness within budget, and the programme has been managed adaptively, thereby extending results, but there was a small shortfall against x output targets and some internal delays. The programme had sound procedures in place to assess the alignment of potential projects with the programme ToC, but evaluation of outputs suggests that some (x%) projects were not clearly aligned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>The programme has followed good practice to enhance its effectiveness, including developing a good understanding of political economy and managing relationships well. It improved its MEL systems over time, although there were concerns over monitoring data against its results framework. Internal VfM assessment and reporting was infrequent and lessons have not yet informed better VfM practice. The independent evaluation indicated that the programme achieved most of its expected outcomes, with some notable shortfalls against targets. These can be partly explained by contextual factors such as X and Y. The evaluation also identified x unplanned positive outcomes, and x unplanned negative outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost-effectiveness</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Our breakeven analysis indicates that the programme is on course to provide a positive NPV by 2020; it has also generated important additional non-monetised outcomes not included in the breakeven analysis. Key stakeholders expressed concerns over the sustainability of key activities beyond the current funding cycle; the programme has started transition planning to address these concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Consideration to equity and gender was inconsistent in the programme’s own planning and in appraisal of funded projects. The independent evaluation was able to identity some benefits for key vulnerable groups in terms of price reductions on key commodities and wage increases, but the benefits were highly concentrated in a few localised groups and more can be done to ensure that benefits extend further. There is limited evidence that girls and women’s interests have been progressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole programme VfM</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Comparison of key TMEA costs data across projects/country programmes and with other similar programmes

We will report average costs of key inputs across a sub-sample of TMEA projects and on other similar programmes. Our commentary will summarise and contextualise the findings. For example: “consultant fees were consistently lower in TMEA’s capacity-building projects compared to its infrastructure construction projects by an average of x%. This was the same across all country programmes with these types of projects. We found a similar differential to exist in other similar programmes (A and B) in the region. Consultant fees paid on TMEA’s capacity-building projects were broadly similar to those paid by similar programmes in the region, but fees paid on TMEA’s infrastructure projects were generally higher, by a margin of x%. The differences may be accounted for by, for example, specific types of expertise required in TMEA’s infrastructure projects”.

2. Comparison of unit costs on OSBPs

We will report the cost of setting up each of the 5 OSBPs, and the costs of other comparable OSBPs in the region. Our commentary will summarise and provide detailed contextualisation of the findings. For example: “x and y OSBPs were set up at lower cost than the other three OSBPs, with no compromise on the original stated objectives. The higher costs on OSBPs a, b, and c were due respectively to factors such as, implementation delays on OSBP a, poor forecasting of costs on OSBP b, and the need for much closer oversight and management by TMEA staff in the case of OSBP c. We compared TMEA’s costs of setting up the OSBPs with similar OSBPs in comparable locations. We found that OSBPs a and y were constructed at lower cost than the OSBPs constructed under the A and B Programmes funded by XY. The differences seem to be due to TMEA’s close oversight of project management and costs, compared to a more arms-length approach by Programmes A and B. On the other hand, OSBPs b, x and z were constructed at higher cost that OSBPs constructed under the C Programme. The differences are largely explained by factors such as, the lower specification and smaller overall scale of the OSBPs constructed under the C Programme.

3. Reporting on key programme components

For the key programme components, the summary findings will be reported in the matrix shown in Annex J. Our commentary will consider:

(1) Intra-component comparisons; for example, Port A had, at the end of Strategy 1, achieved greater VfM than Port B, as demonstrated by the IRRs on each project, which reflect the different level of results: although both ports have stalled on the issue of port reform and modernisation, only Port A has made good progress on infrastructure and improved productivity. The lower level of benefits at Port B needs to be contextualised by the particularly complex political economy surrounding issues of port reform in country B.

(2) Cross-component comparisons: for example, work on the OSBPs had, at the end of Strategy 1, demonstrated higher VfM than work on the ports. This reflects the particular challenges associated with port reform and the adoption of the landlord model, which poses a challenge to key vested interests. The OSBPs do not face
these same challenges, and also require lower investment from country governments; they have therefore generally been met with greater political support and engagement.

This will be followed by a summary of our recommendations on how VfM can be strengthened in particular programme components during Strategy 2.

Finally, we will outline any caveats and limitations that apply to the analysis, such as concerns over the quality of data used in the analysis, or limitations to the comparisons that can be made with other programmes.
Annex A    Evaluation Matrix

Please see attached Excel sheet for the evaluation matrix.
## Annex B  Status and evolution of the evaluation questions

The High-level and Detailed Evaluation Questions (HEQs and DEQs, respectively) contained in the tables below have been slightly updated to reflect the changes in implementation, terminology and priority areas for study since the Inception Report was approved. Where DEQs were answered in previous deliverables, this is noted with the deliverable in bold in the right column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ1113 and its DEQs</th>
<th>Status and deliverable(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEQ1: Has the programme been effective in delivering its outputs? How has this been affected by the programme's organisational performance and how could this be improved?</td>
<td>Answered:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.1 To what extent are TMEA programmes’ outputs generally consistent with the programme TOC?</td>
<td>• 2A Preliminary Output Assessment maps projects censally in the three SOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3 answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects answer them for SO1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ1.2 Were project outputs achieved in accordance with plans/expectations and within budget? For ongoing projects, what is the likelihood of achieving the project output targets within the programme time-span?</td>
<td>Answered:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3 answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects answer them for SO1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1113 HEQ1 and HEQ2 have been revised since the Inception Report. HEQ1 comprises questions about outputs, while HEQ2 and its DEQs will answer questions about outcomes. The latter is to be answered in the Performance Evaluation, while HEQ1 and its DEQs were answered in the Phase 1 deliverables.
| DEQ1.3 What constraints were/are encountered in achieving the project outputs? What are the reasons for non-achievement of the outputs? | Answered:  
- **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and  
- **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects** answer them for SO1  
- **6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report** summarizes major constraints and reasons for non-achievement |
| DEQ1.4 Who were/are the main beneficiaries of the outputs? Are there organisations or groups of people who are negatively affected by the outputs? | Answered:  
- **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and  
- **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects** answer them for SO1 |
| DEQ1.5 To what extent have supported organisations (i.e. government agencies and the implementing partners) built capacity and capability on relevant trade-related matters? | Answered:  
- **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and  
- **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects** answer them for SO1  
- **6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report** provides summary information on capacity building efforts and achievements |
| DEQ1.7 To what extent does TMEA have the management arrangements, systems, processes and human resources appropriate for carrying out its mission (i.e. how suitable are these for the purposes of carrying out its activities)? | Answered:  
- **2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment** explicitly addresses this question  
- There is also detailed information on management, systems and processes in **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** for 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5 |
| DEQ1.8 To what extent do TMEA’s financial (including procurement), human resource and | Answered:  
- **2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment** explicitly addresses this question  
- There is also detailed information on management, systems and processes in **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** for 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5 |

114 “Government agencies” were added to DEQ1.5, given that many TMEA activities partner with national counterparts to implement programming. DEQ1.6 on outcomes has been subsumed into the new HEQ2 on programme and strategic outcomes.
risk management processes enable it to efficiently and effectively manage its contractual relationships with implementing partners?

- **2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment explicitly addresses this question**
- There is also detailed information on financial and risk management processes in **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** for 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5
- There is also detailed information on financial and risk management process in SO1 in **2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects**

DEQ1.9 To what extent do the processes TMEA has in place promote organisational learning and sharing of good practices?

Answered:

- **2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment explicitly addresses this question**
- There is also detailed information on organisational learning and good practice sharing in **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** for 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5

DEQ1.10 Are the M&E tools and processes in place appropriate, both in terms of results and in terms of finances? How could they be strengthened?

Answered:

- **Report on Monitoring and Evaluation Processes at TMEA** explicitly addresses this question
- **2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment** includes a section on this question
- There is also detailed information on M&E tools and processes in **2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3** for 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ2 and its DEQs</th>
<th>Status and Deliverable(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEQ2115,116: To what extent has TMEA been effective in achieving expected intermediate outcomes and to what extent has TMEA programme been effective in contributing to achieving programme strategic outcomes? Did the programme bring about any unintended outcomes?</td>
<td>Unanswered: Will be answered in the Performance evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ2.1 To what extent has TMEA contributed to reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes?117</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

115 The original HEQ2 dealt solely with OSBP and Ports projects, and was partially answered in the formative evaluation (Deliverable 3A). However, DFID asked to ensure the outcomes question (DEQ1.6) was more completely answered. This proposed new HEQ is the result.

116 Being “effective” in achieving outcomes is added in the Sept 18, 2018 draft at DFID’s request, so the language sounds the same as that from the deleted DEQ1.6.

117 HEQ2 was previously focused only on ports and OSBPs, but is here extended to cover all strategic outcomes. The first three DEQs were reformulated to correspond to the TOC. DEQ2.4 was added.
**HEQ3 and its DEQs**

**HEQ3**: What is the likely impact of TMEA on trade outcomes and growth, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?

**Effectiveness: programme-level trade outcomes**

DEQ3.1 To what extent have TMEA interventions, including those of a policy nature, led to a reduction in trade times, trade costs and trade risks?\(^{118}\)  

**Trade impact**

DEQ3.2 What has been the impact of any achieved trade cost reductions from TMEA on trade (both intra- and extra-regional)?\(^{119}\)  

DEQ3.3 How has any improved trade policy environment led to increased trade?

**Economic growth impact**

DEQ3.4 To what extent has any changes in trade resulting from TMEA interventions contributed to economic growth?  

DEQ3.5 What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?\(^{120}\)

**Status and Deliverable(s)**

Unanswered: Will be answered in the Trade and growth study (TGIS)

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**HEQ4 and its DEQs**

**HEQ4**: What is the likely impact of TMEA on poverty and gender, and what factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts?

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\(^{118}\) The former DEQ3.2 was a repeat of this question, only about policy interventions. These have been combined to ensure context and intervention logic and outcomes are considered together.

\(^{119}\) The word "increased" was removed from modifying "trade", as the impact has not yet been determined. "Increased" presumed an impact.

\(^{120}\) This question, and 4.6, were added in response to DFID’s comment that the HEQ mentions sustainability but the DEQs did not.
### Poverty Impact

| DEQ4.1 What is the nature – and, where possible, scale – of the likely impact of the overall programme and of key TMEA projects in the portfolio on the poor—direct and indirect? Who is affected by potential short- or long-term impacts, both positive and negative, how, and how is the causality working? | Partially answered in 5A Preliminary Poverty Analysis; will be completed in Poverty and Gender Impacts Study (PGIS) |
| DEQ4.2 In particular, who has benefited from reduced trade costs? How are the benefits in reduced transport time and cost being passed on to poor people through lower prices or lower price increases? | Partially answered in 5A Preliminary Poverty Analysis; will be completed in Poverty and Gender Impacts Study (PGIS) |
| DEQ4.3 Are complementary policies being adopted to translate the benefits of increased trade into poverty reduction? | Partially answered in 5A Preliminary Poverty Analysis; will be completed in Poverty and Gender Impacts Study (PGIS) |
| DEQ4.4 Are measures being taken, and are they successful, in mitigating potential negative impacts on any sub-groups – in particular poor people in localised areas? | Partially answered in 5A Preliminary Poverty Analysis; will be completed in Poverty and Gender Impacts Study (PGIS) |

### Cross-cutting issues

| DEQ4.5 To what extent has the programme benefited women and girls (noting that the programme design did not purport to benefit them equally)? Have there been any negative consequences for women and girls? Has the programme had an impact on relations, including power and influence, between girls/women and boys/men? How could the programme increase benefits to women and girls within its trade focus? | Partially answered in 5A Preliminary Poverty Analysis and 2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects; will be completed in Poverty and Gender Impacts Study (PGIS) |
| DEQ4.6 What factors are critical in order to ensure the sustainability of positive impacts? | Unanswered; will be answered in Poverty and Gender Impacts Study (PGIS) |

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121 It is critical to note that this will be speculative and subject to exogenous distortions. Tracing causality rigorously, this far along the results chain, is outside the scope of the evaluation.
### HEQ5 and its DEQs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ5: How robust and verified are the causal links and assumptions in the TOC? What does this imply for the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the programme, and what are the lessons learnt that are relevant beyond TMEA?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Programme relevance: TOC causal links and assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the TOC evidence-based or verified?</th>
<th>Partially answered in 6B Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report; will be completed in the Performance Evaluation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.3 To what extent does the programme support EAC regional trade development priorities?</td>
<td>Partially answered in 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment; to be completed in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the programme or on its relevance?</td>
<td>Partially answered in 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment; to be completed in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.5 Do TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?</td>
<td>Partially answered in 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment for projects; to be completed in the Performance Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Coherence and coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model observed to date?</th>
<th>Partially answered:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?</td>
<td>Partially answered:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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122 We eliminated DEQ5.2 “Are the results framework targets and milestones relevant and realistic?” Given the late advent of this evaluation, a year after the RF was finalised, support to make targets and milestones more relevant and realistic is unhelpful. This is particularly true in light of their new Strategy 2 RF with deeply altered indicators, targets and milestones, and in light of the DFID Annual Reviews’ intensive and detailed suggestions that underpin many of those changes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?</td>
<td>Unanswered; to be answered in the <em>Performance Evaluation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.9 Is using one organisation – a not-for-profit company – the best vehicle for impact on trade, and on poverty reduction through trade? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this approach?</td>
<td>Partially answered: • <em>2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment</em> • To be updated in the <em>Performance Evaluation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?</td>
<td>Partially answered: • <em>2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment</em> • To be updated in the <em>Performance Evaluation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?</td>
<td>Partially answered: • <em>2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment</em> • To be updated in the <em>Performance Evaluation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.12 Did TMEA align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?</td>
<td>Partially answered: • <em>2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3</em> answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and • <em>2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects</em> for SO1 • To be completed in the <em>Performance Evaluation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of TMEA consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?</td>
<td>Partially answered: • <em>2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3</em> answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and • <em>2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects</em> for SO1 • To be completed in the <em>Performance Evaluation</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa?

**Partially answered in:**
- 2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3 answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and
- 2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects for SO1
- To be completed in the Performance Evaluation

### DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

**Partially answered in:**
- 6A Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment for outputs
- 2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3 answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5
- To be completed in the Performance Evaluation

### DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

**Partially answered in:**
- 2D/2E Effectiveness and Outcome-level evaluation SO2 and SO3 answers these questions for SO2 and SO3 outputs of a sample of 40 projects, with detail project-by-project in Annex 5; and

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123 Two DEQs here, sub-titled “Cross-cutting”, have been eliminated. The first read: “What has the impact been on corruption across the various components, notably at border crossings?” While the evaluation team will speak with team members about how corruption might have affected their work, this DEQ could be an impact study of its own. However, TMEA did not directly undertake projects on corruption, so looking for their impacts expends resources on a tangential pursuit. The DEQ on unintended consequences will cover this issue as and when it arises. Moreover, corruption is extremely sensitive in the context, as TMEA continue to interact with institutions that would see this as criticism of a very high and offensive order. Similarly, DEQ5.16 asked “What impact has the programme had on other issues, such as extractives and environment/climate?” which would examine issues well outside TMEA’s areas of influence and focus. While the Mombasa port project worked on “green port” practices, this is the only substantial, direct TMEA activities related to environment and climate. None related to extractives. TMEA has a difficult enough job to influence the areas it is working on directly, and the evaluation to capture them, without seeking impacts in areas where they didn’t intervene. “Other issues” are better covered under the HEQ2 “unintended impact” question, than devoting attention and resources the evaluation team needs for other EQs.

124 DEQ5.18 here read “What should be the essential components of a future exit strategy in order to sustain impact?” Exit strategies were salient at project level (and covered in detail in deliverable 2D/E and its Annex 5), but not at programme level, as TMEA intended to continue operations with or without donor funding. TMEA are currently in Strategy 2 and talking about “Strategy 3” even today. The evaluation will continue to talk about sustainability in DEQ5.17 and especially 5.20, which was are more appropriate to how TMEA operated during Strategy 1, when there effectively was no exit strategy. DEQ5.19 read “What is the likelihood that individual results and overall impact will be sustained after existing donors stop funding, and will there be a lasting positive impact on the poor” which is duplicative of DEQ5.17 and the new question at DEQ4.6.
- 2C Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation SO1 and 3A Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects for SO1
- To be completed in the Performance Evaluation

### VfM Assessment

| DEQ5.21 Is the programme providing VFM? | Partially answered in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 2B Institutional and Organizational Assessment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To be updated in the Performance Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| DEQ5.22 In which activities/components and countries does the programme achieve higher VFM than others and what are the lessons learnt for driving greater VFM across the board? | Unanswered; to be answered in the Performance Evaluation |
## Annex C  Proposed timeline

### Performance evaluation (3B)
- Refining Phase 2 Design (DFID/OPM)
- EQUALS review
- Secondary data review, identifying gaps
- Preparing for data collection
- Primary data collection
- Data analysis
- Report writing
- TMEA and DFID report review
- Verification/learning workshops
- EQUALS review

### Trade and Growth (1B)
- Data collection
- Data analysis
- Report writing
- TMEA and DFID report review
- Verification/learning workshops
- EQUALS review

### Poverty and gender (1B)
- Qualitative data collection
- Data analysis
- Report writing
- TMEA and DFID report review
- Verification/learning workshops
- EQUALS review

### FINA Assessment
- Framework preparation and workshop
- Data collection
- Report writing
- TMEA and DFID report review
- Verification workshop
- EQUALS review

### Learning/verification missions
Annex D  Evaluation technical limitations and challenges

The text that follows was included in the annexes to the IR and it is updated here to reflect the ways the present design plans to manage the specialised risks and challenges that come with attempting to assess impact down such a long causal chain.

Contextual factors

There are a range of contextual factors that will influence the poverty and gender study. Most important among these will be the wider changes in the economies of the six TMEA countries. The overall economic performance of the economies will be influenced by trade and, therefore, potentially by the activities of TMEA. However, there are a very large number of other factors that will influence the performance of the individual country’s economy over the period of the study. These include: fiscal and monetary policy, including exchange rate movements during the period; the broader political context, including the security issues currently prevailing in South Sudan and Burundi, as well as the threats from terrorism in some countries; external economic shocks, including the prices of key commodities on the world markets; social policy – and policy choices on the distribution of expenditure and the extent to which it complements trade reforms and/or mitigates negative effects of such reform. Finally of course there are the shifts in trade policy itself which, whilst influenced by TMEA, are not entirely predictable and cannot be determined by TMEA’s activities. Disentangling the impacts of these wider changes on men and women and on poverty in a precise way will be impossible. Hence, the best that we can hope to achieve is to provide persuasive evidence about the sort of contribution that TMEA interventions may have made towards these objectives (Mayne, 2011)\textsuperscript{125}.

Moreover, the data requirements for conducting these analyses are demanding. We hope to obtain timely household, enterprise, price and fiscal data to match what was done for the PPA, but clearly the timing of the availability of future survey data cannot be assured. Moreover, data in some areas (e.g. wages and employment) are very weak, even though shifts in wages and employment may be an important part of the impact of TMEA’s activities.

As noted, it is highly unlikely that we will be able to establish clear pathways of how TMEA projects have affected poverty and gender outcomes. We will therefore be relying on a mix of quantitative analysis of groups before and after TMEA interventions (making a distinction between groups that are likely to have been directly affected and those that have not), supplemented with qualitative evidence from extensive interviews and FGDs to explore the nature of the underlying causal mechanisms at play.

There are clear limitations to such an approach. First, whilst it is likely that we will be able to show the changes in poverty, and how these are gendered over time – and there is a reasonable prospect of being able to link these changes to changes in prices and other intermediary variables – it is much less likely that we will be able to provide a clear causal link between TMEA’s activities and the changes observed in intermediate variables. Second, whilst the design of the qualitative interviews will conform to best practice in comparative studies, the groups selected will clearly not be a representative sample of the populations of the countries from which they come. As a result, it is possible that the pathways this purposive sample describes may not be the same as those experienced by others who were not selected.

**Risks and challenges**

In the Inception Plan we anticipated a number of risks and challenges associated with the proposed approach to this research.

First, whilst there is an established approach to estimating the broader impact of trade on poverty, as elaborated in the proposal, measuring the poverty impact of specific TMEA interventions will be complex and determining attribution almost impossible. The best outcome is likely to be evidence that indicates the extent to which TMEA's activities have contributed to the poverty objectives that it has set. Second, there is a risk that the data do not exist or are not accessible, for one or more countries, to support a conclusive investigation of the impact of TMEA's projects on poverty.

Both of these risks are likely. With few exceptions, the nature of TMEA’s hypothesised impacts of on poverty (and upon men and women) is through indirect channels. Whilst we anticipate that it will be possible to gather evidence, particularly on the direct poverty and gendered impacts of some TMEA projects, for most it will not be possible to determine clear attribution.

The evaluation team has planned two important responses to meet these risks head-on. First, the evaluation will collect sufficient and appropriate evidence on direct impacts of TMEA, where appropriate. Whilst the poverty impact of TMEA projects may be primarily indirect, some of TMEA’s projects are designed to have direct impacts on local communities and individuals, and it is there we will explore direct impact on poor men and women affected by the project.

Second, to attempt to discern the size of any indirect impact of trade-related changes on the poor we will focus our attention in the study on actual changes. Whilst the PPA had to rely on simulations, because of the length of time over which the evaluation is taking place, we have an important opportunity to measure actual changes in trade, prices, wages, employment and poverty over a relatively long period. This will be the focus of our quantitative study.

**Limitations in the performance evaluation methods**

Availability of accurate, independent evidence for contribution tracing (CT) will be the key difficulty in data collection and analysis. Preparing for data collection well before fieldwork will provide an extended opportunity to capture these pieces of data, and to cast our net more widely across different stakeholders, watchdogs, monitors and others where
reasonable expectations exist for the existence of relevant data. But it is important to recognize that it is possible we will not be able to independently substantiate some claims in which TMEA strongly believe their contribution is established. One further contingency is the full range of additional data collection methods and sources included as part of the performance evaluation. Where evidence useable by a CT analysis is not forthcoming, making a strong and defensible case through triangulation of sources and systematic elimination of alternative explanations may also help to strengthen contribution stories.

Survey or evaluation fatigue is another potential limitation for the performance evaluation. TMEA's own evaluations, DFID Annual Reviews and audits, and the independent evaluation total a significant burden on TMEA and counterparts' time and energy. Knowledgeable individuals in revenue authorities or ports, for example, will have answered numerous requests for information on their participation this year, and TMEA already reports they are concerned about the burden this imposes. Nevertheless the importance of the accountability exercise this independent evaluation represents cannot be eliminated; it is a vital exercise around a very large investment. As such the evaluation team will have to work to minimise burdens where we can, work around the schedules of our interlocutors, and maximise the Appreciative Inquiry and active listening techniques that can make respondents feel appreciated.

TMEA team members say that their work should all be pointed towards reduction in trade costs, and reductions in time. In theory this might focus scrutiny on two indicators that can then show robust progress that reflects efforts across this wide and varied programme. In reality, however, it will be very difficult to link some of their important strands of work – policy work, capacity building, soft support to processes – to those two indicators, and even less so to quantify the impacts of that work on those indicators. Fortunately, there are other impacts that are as important to detect as changes in trade costs and time, and those are what our performance evaluation will seek to show.

The reduction in trade times indicator appears to be far more challenging to collect and calculate than it might seem at first blush. Time to enter a port, transfer goods to trucks, transit out of the port, and through the corridor – often passing through OSBP's – is actually a figure with many separate components that can all vary on a large number of variables. This will be a vital area to unpick, and it will not likely be answered in a definitive and unambiguous way, because of the range of variables involved. Still, the evaluation team recognises the centrality of this indicator and will work to codify how it works, and its advantages and disadvantages.

External validity of this study is likely to be very limited, as mentioned in the text, because of the singularity of the cases and the political economy and other context circumstances that have helped or hindered them. Our best response to this limitation is to include important detail – particularly through the CT interview and evidence processes – that can be instructive for readers who may be looking to apply some of TMEA's lessons in another context.

The timing of the evaluation also presents something of a limitation, in that the programme being evaluated ended a year ago. The greatest difficulty is likely to be the degree to which our questions and focus areas are “out of step” with TMEA respondents’ pressing new responsibilities. At the same time, this timing allows for very nearly an ex-post look at more matured impacts, where these may exist.
Annex E  Detail on Contribution Tracing Method

‘Contribution Tracing’ (CT) is one of the rigorous non-experimental approaches to establishing the validity of contribution claims in impact evaluation. It is based on the principles of both Process Tracing and Bayesian updating probabilities and offers explicit criteria to guide evaluators in data collection and in measuring confidence in their findings with regard to the contribution of an intervention. CT uses both quantitative and qualitative data collected by means of a range of methods – interviews, document reviews, focus groups, observation, and the like.

CT is a theory-based impact evaluation design, with its own comparative advantages among other non-counterfactual and non-experimental designs. It is particularly strong at reducing confirmation bias, providing more transparency and predictability for data collection efforts and ultimately increasing the internal validity and credibility of evaluation findings (Befani and Stedman-Bryce, 2016). CT provides guidance on what evidence to seek out, and how to assess the strength of evidence, if observed, in relation to a contribution claim.

CT uses the principles of Process Tracing (PT) combined with a branch of mathematics called Bayesian Updating. PT is an established social science method that enables causal inferences to be made within a single case. CT also makes use of the logic of the four probative tests of Process Tracing by using Bayesian updating to quantify the confidence that an intervention has contributed to an outcome.

The four probative tests are called ‘straw in the wind’, ‘hoop’, ‘smoking gun’ and ‘doubly decisive’ tests, and they refer to the strength of a piece of evidence to support or refute a hypothesis. Another way to think of these tests is the degree to which the evidence thus tested is necessary and sufficient for causation. The table below lays this out.

Table 22: The four probative tests of PT\textsuperscript{126}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is the evidence necessary to establish causation?</th>
<th>Is the evidence sufficient to establish causation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Straw in the wind</strong></td>
<td><strong>Smoking gun</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence that points toward accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, but is not enough</td>
<td>Evidence that confirms your hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hoop test</strong></td>
<td><strong>Doubly decisive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence that, if absent, disproves the hypothesis</td>
<td>Evidence that both confirms the hypothesis and eliminates other hypotheses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{126} Adapted from Collier, 2010, based on Bennett, 2010 which builds on concepts from Van Evers, 1997.
In CT, the logic around these probative tests undergirds the calculation of probabilities of posterior confidence, as described below.

Bayesian updating is a method of statistical inference used to calculate posterior confidence in a contribution claim based on prior confidence. A mathematical procedure tests the difference between the true positive rate, or ‘Sensitivity’, and the false positive rate, or ‘Type I Error’. Here, sensitivity means the probability of observing an item of evidence if the contribution claim is true. Type I Error is the probability of observing an item of evidence if the contribution claim is not true. The larger the difference between the Sensitivity and the Type I Error, the higher the probative value of an item of evidence in relation to a specific contribution claim. Thus, the evaluator’s task is to identify evidence with the highest probative value.

Bayes theorem comes from the fact that the ‘conditional probability’ of claim C being true, given observed evidence E (indicated by P(C|E)) is defined by a particular relationship: that (P(E) multiplied by the probability that evidence E is observed is equal to the probability that claim C is true and evidence E is observed, or in symbols;

\[ P(C|E) \times P(E) = P(E \text{ and } C) \]

Now notice that

\[ P(C|E) \times P(E) = P(E \text{ and } C) = P(E|C) \times P(C) \]

which is known as Bayes theorem.

Also notice that the probability of observing evidence E is equal to the probability of observing it and claim C being true plus the probability of observing it and the claim not being true, i.e.:

\[ P(E) = P(E \text{ and } C) + P(E \text{ and } \text{not } C) \]

and plugging this into Bayes theorem gives

\[ P(C|E) = \frac{P(C) \times P(E|C)}{P(E)} = \frac{P(C) \times P(E|C)}{P(E|C)P(C) + P(E|\text{not } C)P(\text{not } C)} \]

where

- P(C) is referred to as the “prior” confidence of claim C being true i.e., one’s confidence in it before knowing whether evidence E is observed or not.
- P(C|E) is the “posterior” confidence in the claim being true after having observed evidence E;
- P(E|C), the probability of observing E given that C is true is referred to as “sensitivity” and
- P(E|\text{not } C), the probability of observing E given that C is not true is referred to as “type 1 error”

It is common to assume that the prior confidence in claim C is 0.5, meaning ‘as likely as not’. This gives us:
\[
P(C|E) = \frac{P(E|C)}{P(E|C) + P(E|\sim C)}
\]

It is immediately apparent that a low Type 1 error \(P(E|\sim C)\) will give high posterior confidence, while the sensitivity \(P(E|C)\), appears on the top and bottom of the expression and will largely cancel out. Even with a \(P(E|C)\) as high as 1 (that is, evidence that must be observed if a claim is true); if the evidence \(E\) is just as likely to be seen as not when the claim is not true (i.e., \(P(E|\sim C) = 0.5\), our confidence in that claim is only 0.66 or ‘about as likely as not’.

Unfortunately, this sort of evidence is very common in evaluations, while evidence with a low \(P(E|\sim C)\) is much harder to find. Note however that there is some hope in combining multiple pieces of evidence – if that evidence is independent. Consider two independent pieces of evidence \(E_1\) and \(E_2\). The probability of observing both of them if the claim \(C\) is not true is \(P(E_1 \text{ and } E_2|\sim C)\) and if they are independent this is equal to \(P(E_1|\sim C) \times P(E_2|\sim C)\). Even if both pieces of evidence are “as likely to be seen as not” when the claim is false i.e. \(P(E_1|\sim C) = P(E_2|\sim C) = 0.5\), the probability of seeing both is 0.25 which becomes ‘unlikely’.

Table 9 below shows the probative value of evidence with various combinations of sensitivity and Type 1 error.
Table 23: Confidence in claim C after seeing evidence E under various combinations of subjective probabilities of seeing evidence E if claim C is not true (Type 1 error) and seeing evidence E if claim is true (sensitivity)

| Sensitivity P(E|C) | Virtually Certain | Very Likely | Likely | About as likely as not | Unlikely | Very Unlikely | Exceptionally Unlikely |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|--------|------------------------|---------|--------------|------------------------|
| Virtually Certain | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | Likely | Very Likely | Virtually Certain |
| Very Likely       | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | Likely | Very Likely | Virtually Certain |
| Likely            | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | Likely | Very Likely | Virtually Certain |
| About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | Likely | Very Likely | Virtually Certain |
| Unlikely          | Unlikely          | Unlikely    | Unlikely | Unlikely              | About as likely as not | Likely | Very Likely |
| Very Unlikely     | Very Unlikely     | Very Unlikely | Very Unlikely | Very Unlikely       | Unlikely | About as likely as not | Very Likely |
| Exceptionally Unlikely | Exceptionally Unlikely | Exceptionally Unlikely | Exceptionally Unlikely | Exceptionally Unlikely | Very Unlikely | Very Unlikely | About as likely as not |

Combinations that provide strong support for the claim are shown in blue.
Implementing Contribution Tracing

The key steps in implementing CT are the following:

1. **Develop a testable claim**

Developing a testable claim requires developing a claim which is detailed and measurable. Initial claims may need to be refined to make them more testable. For example:

- Untestable: The campaign supported reforms in the health system
- More testable: The campaign has shown the current health insurance-based system to be ineffective in delivering universal healthcare
- Testable: The campaign led the Government of Ghana to revise its methodology for calculating membership of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)\(^{127}\)

The more detailed the claim the easier it is to make, as it is tailored to a specific case and therefore unique. Claims around impact are harder to test and attribute solely to the intervention. However, testable claims can be made at the level of outputs and different types of outcomes of the project (immediate and long-term outcomes). The number of claims to test will depend on the resources available.

The choice of any claim can be done together with the ‘evaluand’ (the implementing agency) based on their view of their most important achievements according to their TOC. We ask for their proudest accomplishments, most important achievements, or other appropriate wording, and write a brief summary of that story in the template (see figure below). This enables us to make the best use of limited resources by identifying those outcomes that were materialised and which have contributed to longer term outcomes or impact or have greater potential to do so. By doing so, we can also assess any unintended outcomes of the intervention that were not necessarily planned at the beginning.

The longer version of that story that emerges from the in-depth interview is maintained separately for evaluation records and can be returned to it later on; this can be helpful if there is significant difference from the story told by the implementing partner or agency and what is finally validated through the CT process.

Excellent interviewing skills – proposed in this study using an Appreciative Inquiry approach – are crucial to get all the necessary details of the story and uncover where it can be tested. By asking questions for every step we then gradually build up the story and complete the template. The basic template is below, which is then adapted and step names changed to fit each outcome story.

\(^{127}\) Stedman-Bryce, 2013.
2. Identify evidence for each step

Once contribution claims and their steps are identified, the next step is to identify evidence for each step to have been materialised. In other words, we follow the stated TOC (which may or may not align with project documentation TOCs) of the outcome of interest and then identify what evidence we want to see for each step (which corresponds to a TOC level: i.e. activities, inputs, outputs, and finally outcomes of interest). In so doing, we ask the evaluand for available evidence which would support their claims about each step taking place, and about the results of those steps having materialised as claimed.

When searching for evidence, it is important to remember about Type 1 error and sensitivity of each evidence. For example, emails/letters and meeting minutes and ‘digital exhaust’ have lowest Type I errors, $P(E|\neg C)$ and quite high sensitivity, $P(E|C)$. Minutes are written, there is no interviewer mediation, nor any one-on-one interaction with an interviewer. They are “private”, meaning the project teams were not having a meeting because of the evaluation. In contrast, key informant interviews (especially if they were part of the network), have high Type I error values. However, independent KIIIs are helpful and would have lower Type 1 error. Surveys often have high Type 1 error because there are lots of ways an outcome could have been achieved.

When we have all the evidence needed, for each step we establish a prior level of confidence. We ask for evidence for steps 1-3 and fill evidence boxes 1, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b. We also ask for judgements of probability for the evidence in each box, as shown in the next figure. These are qualified by the implied belief in each claim, together with the
evaluand. We focus on one specific piece of evidence at a time, and estimate both the sensitivity and the Type 1 Error of that piece of evidence E for that claim C. In our template, we have added drop-down boxes to ensure the selection is in our standard CT language; this also helps the interviewer and the evaluand to sense-check their selection against those closest to it in the lists.

**Figure 11: Steps and evidence in support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 2: Changes In Government Institutions</th>
<th>Evidence 2a Evidence For Claim That Institutions Changed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>P1: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is True</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>P2: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is NOT true</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Belief in Claim given Evidence implied by P1 and P2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence 2b: Evidence For Claim That Change was caused by Project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>P1: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is True</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>P2: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is NOT true</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Belief in Claim given Evidence implied by P1 and P2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting that the same piece of evidence can have – in fact will most likely have – different values of sensitivity and Type I error for different claims. That is because its probative value is specific to one claim. Confidence in the same claim will change differently according to which pieces of evidence are and are not observed.

We use the following qualitative descriptors of confidence to estimate probability of seeing evidence if claim is true and not true. In CT, the sensitivity of an item of evidence relates to the probability of observing it, **if** the contribution claim is true. Therefore, not observing such evidence **lowers** our confidence in a claim. The Type I Error of an item of evidence relates to the probability of observing it, **if** the contribution claim is NOT true. The higher the Type I Error (value closer to 1), the **less** unique that item of evidence is in relation to the claim under investigation.

- Virtually certain 99-100%
- Very likely 90-99%
- Likely 66-90%
• About as likely as not 33-66%
• Unlikely 10-33%
• Very unlikely 0-10%
• Exceptionally unlikely 0-1%

If we are more likely to observe an item of evidence if the contribution claim is true (sensitivity), than if the contribution claim is not true (Type I Error), then this evidence increases our confidence in the claim. Conversely, if we are more likely to observe an item of evidence if the contribution claim is not true (Type I Error), then this evidence weakens our confidence in the claim. And if the item of evidence is just as likely to be observed if the claim is true or false, then this evidence does not alter our confidence in the claim. Essentially, evaluators start with a confidence level of 0.5 (no information, about as likely as not) and search for evidence that helps to increase their level of confidence.

Finding evidence for inputs and outputs steps is relatively easy. It is 2b – when we ask about confidence that a change was attributable to the evaluand – when we will face challenges in finding evidence with low Type 1 Error. Type 1 Error will grow as we move from the first steps (activities and outputs) to the last step around the outcomes and the biggest problem we will face is lack of evidence with low Type 1 Error, or, often, inaccessibility of such evidence.

In order to increase the confidence of evidence for attribution, we will look for other factors which might have contributed to achieve the same step and then eliminate these (where possible). This elimination would be supported by our expert knowledge and relevant literature at hand, particularly in later evaluation stages. If some other factors remain at play as major contributing factors to the outcome under scrutiny then we can assess the contribution of our intervention of interest together with the others as one joint causal package.

3. Collect data and update confidence about claim

Once we have done the estimates for each evidence, we need to check evidence mentioned and analyse that evidence to assess whether or not evidence meets our prior confidence (seeing the evidence) and then update the prior probability with the posterior probability using the Bayes formula - the likelihood of claim CC being true given that evidence E has been observed. Here Table 1 above is helpful to identify whether or not our combination of evidence provides strong support for the claim.

Here we can use qualitative methods of data analysis to work with secondary or primary qualitative data. In this case we will not only have a CT table template with steps and evidence and confidence level but also findings from qualitative data analysis of evidence giving more context to the table.

4. Iterate

The steps discussed above then are iterated for each outcome and each piece of evidence as many times as needed. It remains a transparent process, with evaluands’ and experts’ inputs included as necessary.
5. Put claim and judgements up for challenge

After the calculations are done, the evaluation team will discuss our agreement with sensitivity and Type 1 Error scores. This is a discussion – debate – consensus process within the team.

Criteria for reaching judgments

When conducting CT, the main judgment involved is judgment about probability of seeing evidence in different circumstances using the qualitative markers. Contrary to PT, it does not involve quantifying sensitivity and Type 1 error prior and posterior after we have seen the evidence under scrutiny. Instead, the judgement is about probability of seeing the evidence and then, after seeing the evidence, deciding whether or not our C claim is true or false.

However, Fairfield and Charman (2015) found that giving assignments for the likelihood of observing each piece of evidence if a particular hypothesis is correct required multiple rounds of revision before they became reasonably stable, and there is no guarantee that they would have arrived at similar values had they initially approached the problem from a different yet equally valid starting point (i.e. a different sequencing of the evidence). Given these issues it makes sense to put the claim and judgments up for challenge and then agree or disagree on the final decisions.

The combined judgement about evidence implies a belief about the validity of the claim given that the evidence was observed. This step is carried out by a Excel model.

Figure 12: A summary table of evidence collected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P1: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Activities if Claim is True</th>
<th>P2: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virtually Certain</td>
<td>VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Likely</td>
<td>VL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As likely as not</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>UL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely</td>
<td>VUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionally Unlikely</td>
<td>EUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourteen Possible combinations; P1>UL>P2 : ALN, P1 = UL =P2 : ALN, P1 = VUL =P2 : ALN, P1 = EUL =P2 : ALN, P1>UL, P2=UL : L, P1>UL, P2=VUL : VL, P1>UL, P2=EUL : VC, P1 = UL, P2> UL : UL, P1 = VUL, P2> UL : VUL, P1 = EUL, P2> UL : EUL, P1 = UL, P2=UL or VUL : VUL, P1 = UL or VUL, P2= EUL : VL
CT therefore offers less arbitrariness in assigning qualitative markers than other methods such as PT, which involves assigning numerical values to the likelihoods when attempting to quantify inherently qualitative data.

**Nature of findings expected to be produced**

In presenting the findings of CT we will aim at achieving a balance between the findings and conclusions, and the methodological details. CT will also make it possible to make each step visible to the reader and allow him/her to understand and see how judgments were made and on the basis of what evidence.

The ultimate product of CT is a precise contribution story that is backed up by evidence and can be tested. Such a contribution claim will be unpacked and discussed in more detail for every outcome assessed. The analysis tables will be provided in an Annex with necessary signposting in the main text.

It will also be possible to present both claims i.e. the initial and the final and demonstrate how precise, accurate and evidence-based the claim has become as it involves and changes throughout the CT process. Through qualitative data analysis, we can also cite particular pieces of evidence that help us contextualise and detail the contribution claim.
Annex F  Differences between the design and the Inception Report

Performance evaluation

The performance evaluation design put forward in the IR was proposed as a summative evaluation only of the ports and OSBPs, as the IR timeline planned for the effectiveness study on intermediate and strategic outcomes as part of an earlier deliverable. As that level of analysis was not possible given the unexpected and compounded challenges discussed in the introduction to this report, it is being taken up again in this phase of the evaluation, specifically in the performance evaluation.

This has the effect of stretching out the period in which outcomes and impacts may have matured, which may indeed be helpful in the detection of impacts. Still, the underlying proposed analysis comes from the same school of non-counterfactual, non-experimental evaluation designs:

- While Process Tracing (PT) was proposed at inception, Contribution Tracing (CT) – a method that builds precisely on the logic of PT – is now considered a stronger candidate method to substantiate TMEA’s contribution claims, as it will enable us to: reduce cognitive bias by focusing interviewees on evidence rather than causal claims; produce and use posterior estimates to guide how we combine and interpret different sorts of evidence; reach a judgement about the strength of evidence supporting causal claims; and be more transparent with our analysis.

- In closing the first phase of the evaluation, without the Team Leader who had designed that exercise, the new Team Leader attempted to follow his logic but found it impossible to do so without necessary new data collection – particularly as the majority of projects had finished in the year's time since the data had been collected. TMEA viewed the resulting draft “pathway” documents as invalid as they were so out of date.

- That new data collection is currently underway (during the recent July-August visit to TMEA by several evaluation team members, and continuing into the performance evaluation data collection scheduled for Q4 2018). Given that Strategy 1 projects were completed since the original datasets were compiled, this allows the estimation of outcomes achievement and TMEA contribution to continue through intermediate outcomes levels and to strategic outcomes as well. This may well be a preferable way to view the pathways, since the strategy and design behind them did not “stop” at the intermediate outcomes level, as designed in the IR.

128 A conditional probability that is assigned after the relevant evidence or background is taken into account
• Similarly, the extended period for data collection and analysis on the “full” pathways through their strategic outcomes allows for a **stronger analysis of complementarity** across TMEA component areas, which was designed in the IR to be done with projects that were not yet completed. This may give stronger evidence about synergies across component and support as well the validation and refinement of hypothesized TOC linkages. Where categories and layers were proposed to support these lessons learnt in the IR (see next bullet), the appreciative inquiry proposed to garner evidence on complementarity seems more likely to find the types of results that will be helpful.

• One of the elements of the IR design was an exercise to map outcomes according to categories (advocacy and policy advice, knowledge generation and studies, institutional strengthening and training, technical and financial cooperation, and provision of infrastructure and/or direct services to final users (e.g. SWIFT)) and layers (regional, national and local).

• The categories proposed in the IR, while still valid to describe the closed projects, are nonetheless not useful analytically in the manner proposed. There are no formulas for how these categories would determine or predict success, no “ideal mix” to postulate for lessons learnt. While it may be that the previous Team Leader had other plans for those categories and layers, unfortunately his intentions were not captured. However, we feel our present design is focused on the necessary details to generate lessons learnt, and will draw upon the categories and layers as needed in describing our findings.

**Trade and Growth Impact Study**

While there are no significant deviations to the approach proposed in the inception report, the current approach has taken a more targeted and measurable approach. The value chain/sector approach proposed here will be able to yield more valuable insights into how TMEA interventions have triggered changes, through which channels, and how have the gains been distributed across a sector. While the proposed methodology loses some of the macro approach proposed in the inception report, we have retained the CGE modelling so as to obtain some of the higher-level impacts resulting from change in that sector. We can therefore measure the wider economic benefits arising from the sector’s change, which have been brought about by TMEA’s intervention in areas that have impacted that sector. The tools used in the evaluation will not substantially differ from those proposed in the inception report, namely econometrics (gravity equations in particular for the estimation of AVEs), partial and general equilibrium modelling, and other dynamic economic analysis.

It is important to note the following:

• While we would have **richer, more relevant and more precise data** at the sector level, we would not capture the larger macro-economic gains arising from TMEA. A larger, more comprehensive “macro” approach would have (1) either entailed a number of assumptions and weaker results, particularly with respect to measuring the contribution of TMEA at a large scale; and (2) required substantially larger resources for data collection and a longer time scale.

• The team will rely more heavily on collecting **enterprise level data**, particularly with respect to inputs, intermediary products, exports and non-tariff information. The team
will aim to quantify the effects of barriers that were removed by TMEA, which is aligned to the thinking proposed in the IR.

- We will exploit the richer data available under TMEA’s efforts at compiling road and transport data including those of the Northern Corridor Transport Observatory, and where possible, enterprise and transporters’ data.
- We will avoid duplication with the Impact Model, an ex-ante model which is being elaborated by TMEA, while at the same time finding ways that our findings may improve the reliability and realism of the Impact Model.

**Poverty and Gender Impact Study**

The present design proposes no significant changes to that put forward in the IR. On the other hand it does:

- Offer greater detail on the original design, including data sources and analysis methods, including how we plan to use mixed methods to triangulate the qualitative and quantitative streams of data.
- Include comparison with the three OSBP sites visited in 2016, which was not contemplated in the IR but which was made possible by the series of visits eventually undertaken for the PPA.
- Discuss the breakdown of methods and sources by evaluation question
- Proposes to have more countries’ national survey datasets included in the quantitative analysis, than were present at the time of the PPA.

**Value for Money Assessment**

While there are no significant deviations to the approach to VfM assessment, it is important to note the following:

- We may undertake benchmarking of key cost indicators against other programmes, if similar programmes can be identified and if we have access to their data. The framework identifies other forms of comparative analysis for some indicators where comparison with other programmes may not be possible, including comparison with original estimates (for example costs in the Business Case or original contract, if available), comparison against TMEA’s KPI targets, and review of annual trends within TMEA data.
- We do not propose to undertake analysis of costs per output, beneficiary or outcome because the nature of the outputs and outcomes generated in this kind of programme (e.g. infrastructure reform, process improvement. stronger institutions, policy reform) do not lend themselves to meaningful benchmarking against other programmes, and therefore do not provide useful information for making judgements on VfM.
- Our economic evaluation at cost-effectiveness level will focus on a breakeven analysis, as described in the chapter on VfM (section 3), which can be readily performed with limited data. It will be complemented by TMEA’s own cost-benefit
analyses, if TMEA has collected the necessary evidence, tracked the assumptions, and repeated the necessary calculations.

- Assessment of the **sustainability of delivery processes** will be based on evidence of TMEA’s transition planning in preparation for the end of Strategy 2 funding. We will not assess the mandates, capacities, resources and frameworks of the public or private institutions which may be expected to take on some of TMEA’s activities.
Annex G    Bibliography


OECD (2010). Guidance on Sustainability Impact Assessments. OECD.  
Pamoja UK, https://www.pamoja.uk.com/aboutct/


WTO (2015) Aid for trade at a glance, OECD/WTO
# Annex H

## Draft long list of projects for contribution tracing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component and activity</th>
<th>Potential countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO1: Improved transport laws and infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa Port infrastructure and reform support</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar Port infrastructure and reform support</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSBPs infrastructure and reform support (one or more)</td>
<td>Busia (Kenya/Uganda) to complement women in trade research; others per successes identified in TMEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO2: Increased ease of trading across borders</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Strengthening EAC regional integration: long-term TA for the EAC and two Ministries of EAC Affairs at national level</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania or Kenya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Effective trade systems, agencies and procedures: Single window/electronic single windows, automation of tea auction</td>
<td>Tanzania, Rwanda or Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Effective NTB Mechanisms: EAC policy support and NTB reporting hotline; two national monitoring committees</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania or Kenya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Effective EAC Trading Standards: EAC support; country-level projects with two national standards bureaus</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania or Kenya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO3.1: Enhanced business environment for trade</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 Improved processes for traders, especially women: EASSI; export TA for SME, Busia WCBTs, street sellers</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda/Kenya, Burundi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO3.2: Improved export capability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 Improved quality and standards of goods and services: Traidlinks; regional visa and tourism promotion</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, Burundi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please note that this list is of the major component projects in TMEA’s portfolio. When the OPM proposes a selection for the contribution tracing (see Step 1 in the Performance Evaluation chapter and Annex E), we will select from their contribution claims related to these (or possibly other) projects or groups of projects. For example, one of TMEA’s likely contribution claims is that their work at Mombasa Port has reduced time to import and export through that port, through the combination of projects they’ve carried out, by a certain figure (amount or percentage of time). It is that claim we will investigate using CT.
Annex I  Possible projects for benchmarking costs

We have identified the following projects in the East Africa region/TMEA countries as possible comparators against which to benchmark key costs. As far as possible, we have sought projects in the same sector and roughly the same time period from a variety of funders and implementers. We have also included a selection of OPM-implemented projects in different sectors as a fall-back, should it be difficult to get access to data from projects implemented by others. We consulted the following sources: DFID Development Tracker, https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/; World Bank ‘Projects’ site, http://www.projects.worldbank.org/; JICA, Project data site, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/index.html; USAID projects site, https://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/africa; EU projects site, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/economic-growth/regional-integration_en; OPM’s Project Database.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Sector/focus</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Total value</th>
<th>Funder</th>
<th>Implementer</th>
<th>Countries of Implementation (TMEA countries)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Competitiveness and Trade Extension Programme (COMPETE)/East Africa Trade Hub (EATH)</td>
<td>Regional integration, business competitiveness, investment and trade facilitation</td>
<td>2009-2014</td>
<td>US$102.8M</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Chemonics International Inc.</td>
<td>Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and limited assistance to South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>World Bank Trade Facilitation Facility</td>
<td>Trade facilitation, infrastructure, capacity building, regional integration, improving trading environment</td>
<td>2009-2015</td>
<td>£34.3M</td>
<td>DFID (£12.5 million); the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Programme Description</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Implementing Body</td>
<td>Contributing Bodies</td>
<td>Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Regional Infrastructure Programme for Africa (RIPA)</td>
<td>Technical capacity building, investment support (in infrastructure), trade facilitation, improving trading environment (i.e. procedures and regulations) and regional coordination</td>
<td>2012-2016</td>
<td>£79.25M</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>AfDB (IPPF); EU (ITF); ICA</td>
<td>Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi in East Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project</td>
<td>Regional integration, capacity building, investment support (in infrastructure), trade facilitation</td>
<td>2008-2015</td>
<td>US$340.4M</td>
<td>World Bank, AfDB, DFID, TMEA, Govts</td>
<td>Govts of recipient countries; Rift Valley Railway Company</td>
<td>Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Supporting Indian Trade and Investment for Africa</td>
<td>Trade and investment facilitation, institutional support, capacity building in selected value chains, improving trading environment (i.e. procedures and regulations)</td>
<td>2014-2020</td>
<td>£19M</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>International Trade Centre; evaluated by OPM</td>
<td>Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Corridors for Growth</td>
<td>Investment in public and private infrastructure (port); technical and institutional support</td>
<td>2016-2021</td>
<td>£71M</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>WB and TMEA</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Focus Area</td>
<td>Implementation Period</td>
<td>Funding Source(s)</td>
<td>Implementing Organization</td>
<td>Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Regional Economic Integration Support (REIS) Programme</td>
<td>Regional integration; trade facilitation, improving investment climate</td>
<td>2013-2018</td>
<td>€19.6M</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI) Directorate; SADC, including Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Trade Facilitation Support Programme</td>
<td>Technical support to reforming trade facilitation practices, including laws, procedures, processes and systems</td>
<td>2014 - ongoing</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Mid-term stocktaking to be conducted by OPM</td>
<td>Over 40 countries (with 28% in sub-Saharan Africa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>MCF Savings at the Frontier</td>
<td>Improving the delivery channels and agents of formal financial services</td>
<td>2015-2021</td>
<td>£11.5M</td>
<td>Mastercard Foundation</td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Kenya Extractives</td>
<td>Natural Resources Governance; public sector capacity building</td>
<td>2015-2018</td>
<td>£4.5M</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>GEFA Int. WASH Results Programme</td>
<td>Sustainability and process evaluation of the result-based financing WASH interventions</td>
<td>2013-2018</td>
<td>£4.4M</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE)</td>
<td>Research on education systems and systems reform; capacity building; institutional support</td>
<td>2014-2023</td>
<td>£36.9</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>UNAIDS Technical Support Mechanism</td>
<td>Technical and institutional support, capacity building</td>
<td>2017-2022</td>
<td>£9.7M</td>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>DFID (MAINTAIN) Shock Response Essential Services</td>
<td>Operationally relevant research on contingency planning, disaster response and disaster risk financing</td>
<td>2017-2023</td>
<td>£14.8M</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Kenya, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Strengthening Education Systems for Improved Learning (SESIL) Programme</td>
<td>Institutional support, technical assistance to the education assessment system; institutional coordination</td>
<td>2016-2021</td>
<td>£5M</td>
<td>DFID/Mott MacDonald</td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Annex J  Matrix for assessing VfM across programme components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Approximate spend/spend band (date e.g Dec 2016)</th>
<th>Headline results (component outcomes/impact)</th>
<th>Evidence from economic evaluation, if available (date) (e.g. IRR)</th>
<th>Relevance and significance of the issue addressed to TMEA objectives</th>
<th>Magnitude/significance of component outcomes/impact relative to cost/expectation</th>
<th>Expected sustainability of component outcomes/impact</th>
<th>VfM judgement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SO1: Ports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>US$47.55m (Dec 2016) (2C3A)</td>
<td>Good progress on infrastructure and productivity; stalled on port reform</td>
<td>IRR = 19.3% (berth reconstruction); comparison to other similar programme</td>
<td>High: deep sea cargo ports are a critical area necessary part of international trade facilitating infrastructure… (2C3A)</td>
<td>High: investment has reduced dwell time significantly (2C3A); good potential to increase trade traffic and volumes</td>
<td>Medium: needs more attention to port reform and modernisation (2C3A)</td>
<td>e.g. good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar</td>
<td>US$12.72m (Dec 2016) (2C3A)</td>
<td>Failed to achieve strong results in any area</td>
<td>IRR = ?; comparison to other similar programme</td>
<td>High: deep sea cargo ports are a critical area necessary part of international trade facilitating infrastructure… (2C3A)</td>
<td>Low: little tangible benefit derived from investments (2C3A)</td>
<td>Low: needs more attention to infrastructure improvement, productivity and port reform and modernisation (2C3A)</td>
<td>e.g. poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO1: OSBPs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Busia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mirama Hills</td>
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<td>SO2:</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO3:</td>
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</table>
Annex F: Methods
Annex F Methods

The independent evaluation

DFID contracted OPM to undertake a set of evaluation studies, several of which are completed and are or will soon be available from DFID. The evaluation studies mapped TMEA’s 200+ projects; examined project-level outputs and outcomes for a sample of 60 projects; provided a technical formative evaluation of the ports and border posts; and conducted an institutional assessment.

There was also a preliminary poverty assessment as well as a relevance and sustainability assessment and an interim evaluation synthesis.

The present design was approved in November, 2018 in the Independent Evaluation Design and Work Plan (Annex B), building on the Terms of Reference (Annex A) and Inception Report (2016) but also superseding these in light of the evolution of TMEA and DFID’s requirements for the evaluation.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) has developed a set of evaluation criteria that are widely used to evaluate development programming. These criteria are relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The independent evaluation carries out a focus on the last four of these across the set of evaluation studies listed above, given that the question of relevance was closely considered in the earlier set of evaluation reports from this contract. Since Strategy 1 is complete, considering relevance systematically at this point would be inappropriate.

The evaluation deliverables include the following. The criteria that are being considered in depth in each are marked in blue:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Study</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Performance Evaluation (PE): tracing TMEA Strategy 1 achievements, and important process questions about the theory of change, coherence and coordination, and sustainability. This research was an important input for the studies that follow.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Trade and Growth Impact Study (TGIS): examining the degree to which TMEA’s outcomes can rigorously be said to have led to trade impacts, through a rich set of economic methods and data sources, including primary data collection on three value chains.</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 OPM: Otter, Thomas and Rasulova, Saltanat. Workstream 2; Deliverable 2A. Preliminary Output Assessment. 31 October 2017
4 OPM. Workstream 2 – Deliverable 2B: Institution and Organisation Assessment. (forthcoming)
5 OPM: Neil McCulloch, Sebastian Silva-Leander, Chris Hearle, Alastair Haynes. Preliminary Poverty Assessment. 7 June 2017
6 OPM: Thomas Otter with support from Robert Kirk, Peter Omondi, Chris Hearle and David Smith. Preliminary Relevance and Sustainability Assessment. (forthcoming)
3. **Poverty and Gender Impact Study (PGIS):** qualitative and quantitative research on households and communities near and far from trade corridors, to assess potential impacts related to TMEA interventions.

4. **Value for Money Assessment (VFM):** a targeted review of TMEA expenditures and outcomes to assess economy, efficiency, effectiveness, equity and cost-effectiveness of the intervention, primarily based on programme financial data and interviews.

This set of reports bundles the deliverables in the original contract in a manner that is different from the original terms of reference (TORs). For full details on the differences from the original TORs, please see Annex A for the original TORs, Annex B for the 2019 contract amendment, and Annex C for a discussion of differences.

**Evaluation elements along the TMEA results chain**

The evaluation research parallels a postulated TMEA results chain. The PE focuses on intermediate and strategic outcomes (building on results from the Phase 1 studies); the TGIS looks at trade outcomes and impacts (taking into consideration any findings of impact in the performance evaluation); and the PGIS builds on the study of trade impacts to postulate links to wider poverty effects uncovered in quantitative and qualitative data. The reports answer a set of high-level evaluation questions (HEQs), and the detailed evaluation questions (DEQs) that are included in each.

A diagram of this chain of hypothesised TMEA results in parallel with the related studies is shown in Figure 1 below, in which the methods and evaluation questions to be addressed are part of each label.

**Figure 1:** TMEA results chain and the related evaluation studies

Source: Authors’ rendering

The PE examined pathways for a selection of TMEA components to answer DEQs 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 (effectiveness by Strategic Objective). A traditional mixed-methods design looked more broadly across TMEA components to answer an evaluation question on the robustness of the causal links and assumptions in the TOC (DEQ5.1), on themes of programme relevance (5.1, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5),

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This study is in line with the literature around the effects trade may have on poverty, but does not attribute to TMEA any effects found. It contributes to the evidence base on trade and poverty. The PGIS examines effects of TMEA’s direct projects with poor households, communities, and associations.
coordination and coherence (5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14), and sustainability (5.17 and 5.20) and 2.4 on unintended consequences. In fact, all teams were tasked with looking for unintended consequences in all phases of the evaluation, as well as evidence of benefits that are more or less likely to be sustained (5.17). The VfM assessment ran alongside and beyond the performance evaluation and trade and growth study, building on those findings. That study looked at DEQs 5.21 and 5.22 on VfM overall and in comparative fashion.

This evaluation report is for the Performance Evaluation.

**Purposes of the evaluation**

The overall evaluation (i.e., the four studies listed above, taken together) has two specific purposes:

- **Accountability:** Assessing TMEA processes, results and overall value in an independent and impartial manner consistent with generally accepted principles and standards for professional evaluation.
- **Learning:** Identifying and feeding lessons learnt into the management of the remainder of the current programme and the design of any potential continuation of the TMEA programme, as well as future regional trade integration programmes.

In addition to the two purposes of the evaluation, the terms of reference (TORs) also identify four core evaluation objectives, described here:

1. Test the **theory of change (TOC)**, assessing all causal links and the robustness of underlying assumptions (including links between trade, growth and poverty reduction), and adjusting the TOC\(^9\) to serve as a reliable guide to interpret the programme and to make programme improvements.
2. Analyse and, to the extent possible, measure: the regional integration programmes’ **impact** on regional trade, growth and poverty (and on the various stakeholders – in particular on men and women separately, poor and vulnerable groups, as well as traders and consumers); and **sustainability**.
3. Assess the **effectiveness** of the TMEA programme, including organisational effectiveness, and whether the programme represents **value for money (VFM)**.
4. Throughout, identify **lessons learnt relevant beyond TMEA**, i.e. insights on enabling and constraining factors, critical actions and gaps which would be generalisable to future programmes or to other contexts.

All four of the studies identified and discussed lessons learnt (objective 4), while objective 1 was examined most closely in the Performance Evaluation, where sustainability (objective 2) and effectiveness (objective 3) were also objects of focus. The TGIS and PGIS looked at impacts (objective 2) and sustainability, while the VFM assessment focused on value for money (objective 3).

It is valuable to set the evaluation purpose and objectives in context. At the inception phase, one implicit goal for the evaluation was to provide key inputs into decision-making for any potential follow-on programming for TMEA (that is, Strategy 2 as described above). Due to a challenging inception phase and the tragic loss of the independent evaluation team leader, the evaluation was unavoidably and significantly delayed. The evaluation timing was pushed forward to finish in 2019,

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\(^9\) Now, the Strategy 2 TOC, rather than that of Strategy 1.
with the understanding that the evaluation deliverables should serve the accountability function and, to the extent possible, the learning purpose as well.

The key difficulty in this change to the timeline was that one crucial element of the design proposed in the IR was not completed: an evaluation of the degree to which the outcomes TMEA claim from Strategy 1 can be directly linked to TMEA’s interventions. Showing TMEA’s contribution to these key trade outcomes – cost and time reductions in trade – is the centrepiece of their strategy, of donors’ expectations, and of the evaluation design, and as such is being taken up again in the performance evaluation.

DFID and the other donors made the decision to continue funding TMEA for an additional six years, from 2018 to 2023. As a result, the accountability purpose of the evaluation takes on new importance, as a backward-looking exercise designed to capture the extent of TMEA processes, results and value relative to the scope and potential of its original design and funding.

This has also meant that the role of learning as a foundational purpose for the evaluation is somewhat changed. Where possible, the evaluation products in this phase of the contract provided lessons learnt in order to inform TMEA’s ongoing work, as well as for developmental efforts beyond TMEA in trade and regional integration. At the same time, the evaluation team acknowledges the significant and important learning that TMEA have already undertaken and put into action for their current Strategy 2 activities.

Given these circumstances and the focus on accountability, the chief audiences for the evaluation are DFID London, the Africa Regional Department, DFID Country Offices in East Africa, the trade team and parallel audiences from among the fellow donors. TMEA is also an important audience for the evaluation, to the extent that the evaluation team can offer useful insights from Strategy 1 for the design and implementation of Strategy 2. Secondary audiences include users from other trade programming for whom the experience of this important programme could be instructive, as well as scholars of the theorised links between trade and poverty reduction.

Annex D lists the evaluation questions for the full set of evaluation studies, including those from HEQ2 and HEQ5 addressed by the Performance Evaluation. The list includes amendments that have happened over the life of the contract. The timeline for the evaluation is found in Annex L.
Performance evaluation (PE) design and methods

Background

The TMEA TOC is at a very high and conceptual level, while at the operational level, individual project results chains are not systematically linked up to programme outputs, outcomes and SOs. The TMEA Results Framework (RF) does provide a structure that attempts to link these levels. Drawing on the ToC and the RF, the previous phase of the independent evaluation mapped project level outputs for the more than 200 projects carried out by TMEA,\(^{10}\) and the PE team used the resulting reports to build an understanding of the programme logic.

SO1 projects generally featured infrastructure on the one hand and productivity improvement on the other. SO2 and SO3 projects included capacity building, knowledge generation, advocacy and policy advice, institutional strengthening with soft assistance or hardware; and/or direct service delivery. Some projects focused explicitly on gender, while others included gender as an element of programming.

The evaluation then (2016-2017) examined a sample of 60 project results in-depth\(^ {11}\) that were scored against common criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. The findings formed the basis of the team’s understanding of the programme, in particular the way the TOC and results chains were operationalised into a set of activities designed to reach programme goals. These results are can be accessed in full in the relevant reports,\(^ {12}\) and are summarised in the PE in each answer to HEQ2 on effectiveness.

The next step in the evaluation process was to understand the intermediary logic behind how TMEA designed its project clusters to lead to their Programme Intermediate Outcomes (PIOs) which are measured by RF indicators. OPM’s evaluation team found that “under SO1 and SO2 projects and their likely results are more comprehensively built around pathways of change (where project results at one level of a pathway of change towards increased trade can most likely contribute to results at the next level in the same pathway of change), compared to SO3”\(^ {13}\), making SO1 and SO2 likelier to achieve higher order outcomes. The evaluation team then examined those hypothesised mechanisms from project outcomes to PIOs within the development and political economic contexts in the region, completing ten\(^ {14}\) draft ‘pathways’ documents that trace those mechanisms in context and characterise the breadth of TMEA interventions in each pathway, setting the stage for the performance evaluation.

The discussions about context in and around the pathways reflect the complexity of the environments in which Trademark works: six countries with highly differing and dynamic political

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\(^{10}\) OPM: Otter, Thomas and Rasulova, Saltanat. Workstream 2; Deliverable 2A. Preliminary Output Assessment. 31 October 2017


\(^{13}\) OPM: Otter, Thomas and Rasulova, Saltanat. Workstream 2; Deliverable 2A. Preliminary Output Assessment. 31 October 2017. p 39

\(^{14}\) TMEA ultimately undertook ten components.
economies, trade and economic contexts, and contention over regional integration. Other donors and public and private actors also work to affect trade. TMEA’s results are likely to be linked very closely to these contextual factors and actors. Examining the possibly multiple causal factors in a ‘package’ that brought about change does not diminish TMEA’s contribution, but rather sets TMEA’s work in a more realistic and interdependent constellation of factors in which TMEA undertook their work. Concretely, the evaluation worked to identify and substantiate TMEA’s contribution to results, rather than attributing results directly to the programme.

TMEA staff have negotiated these relationships and adapted to changing environments. This brings an additional challenge for evaluation: intended strategies may not have been realised for reasons beyond the programme’s manageable interest, while emergent strategies might not be accurately included in the TOC. The evaluation team has worked to understand how adaptation affected programming and results. As a portfolio-type programme, TMEA undertook many interventions and a range of components. Not all interventions or areas of work would be expected to have the same levels of success in achieving outcomes.

The evaluation team comprises international methodological, regional and sectoral experts; sectoral team members in each country; and a small group of experienced qualitative coders. The team reported no conflicts of interest, save one former team member who had carried out one short consultancy for TMEA in 2012 (reporting on a legal draft). His work was limited to analyses of other components and written inputs to an earlier evaluative process (the “pathways”).

One national team member was employed by an apex body that was an implementing partner for the Tanzania Country Programme (TCP), though the team member’s own work had no connection to TCP. The team member was not part of analysis of TCP’s work with that apex body.

The evaluation team was and is alert to any biases or conflicts of interest. Our design considerations (described in detail below and in the Annexes) require additional team scrutiny of rating probabilities and the probative value of certain pieces of evidence, in order to test each member’s analyses through professional discussion of the merits. The evaluation team leader is a member of relevant evaluation networks and subscribes to the principles of professional behaviour those bodies require.

### Evaluation Framework

As a theory-based evaluation, the PE requires a thorough understanding of TMEA’s TOC against which to compare outcomes and the mechanisms around expected and actual change. A simplified version of the three strategic objectives and the programme intermediate outcomes (PIOs) that feed them is shown in the box below. SO1 comprised hard infrastructure at two ports and 15 border posts, and soft infrastructure support to improve procedures and processes. SO2 included interventions at government levels including working with the EAC and with country-level systems to facilitate trade processes such as permits and setting standards, and strengthening national and regional systems to eliminate Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). SO3 worked with private sector and civil society actors to strengthen their trade advocacy, with women and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TMEA’s S1 Strategic Objectives and Programme Intermediate Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO1 Increased physical access to markets</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard and soft infrastructure investments at:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Mombasa Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Dar es Salaam Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 One-stop Border Posts (OSBPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO2 Enhanced ease of trading across borders</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Strengthened EAC regional trade integration capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Effective trade systems, agencies and procedures (ICT for Trade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Efficient national and regional NTB mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4 Harmonise product standards.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SO3 Improved business competitiveness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Private sector- and civil society-led policy formulation (advocacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 Improved processes for traders, especially women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Strengthened export capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Effective and efficient logistics services</td>
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</table>
grassroots-level traders and business people, and with the logistics industry.

Within the theme of accountability and to capture lessons learnt, the objective of the PE lies in testing the TMEA TOC (assessing the causal links and the robustness of underlying assumptions), assessing the effectiveness of the TMEA programme (including both its outcomes and organizational effectiveness), and identifying lessons learnt for TMEA and beyond (including insights on enabling and constraining factors, critical actions and gaps which would be generalisable to future programmes or to other contexts.) The design is multi-faceted and mixed-method, to address the broad and complex nature of TMEA programming. The design is different for answering the two HEQs, as described below.

The PE answers HEQ5 on a set of questions on relevance, sustainability and implementation, per the DEQs: the validity of the theory of change, coherence with national and regional trade priorities, coordination of regional and national operations, sustainability, and approaches for working with regional institutions in East Africa. This involved a traditional mixed-method evaluation design, including document review, in-depth interviews and site visits.

The PE also answers HEQ2 on outcome effectiveness by tracing outcomes for a selection of components from the three SOs, based on a selection process approved in the Design and Work Plan and validated in February, 2019 when the selection was made.\(^\text{15}\) The design for this part of the PE is innovative and warrants further explanation.

TMEA operated through over 200 projects in Strategy 1; it would be impossible to examine all of them in depth and wasteful to try to do so. At the same time, the great variety of projects in the programme would make any estimate made by scaling up a random sample of results paths hopelessly imprecise. Instead we have purposively selected a set of results chains with the most likely impact on intermediate and strategic outcomes and thoroughly tested the degree to which these can be attributed to TMEA interventions.

The World Bank’s Development Databank gives EAC economies’ total GDP as $168 bn with imports of $36 bn, and exports of $26 bn. The total cost of TMEA is only $0.5bn so a project that made imports only 1.5% cheaper in time or cost savings could have an economic benefit, every year, larger than the cost of all projects in the programme’s lifetime. At the same time, no TMEA project is likely to offset such gains by having substantial negative effects on trade. The impact of the whole TMEA programme is therefore, to a first approximation, equal to the sum of the impact of its highest impact projects. The issue for the evaluation has been whether or not it is possible to make a strong attribution or contribution claim for these few high impact projects.

With 200 TMEA project activities it is almost certain that some would correlate with improvements in macroeconomic data and indeed with positive intermediate outcomes but correlation is not enough to prove causation. Nor are counterfactual designs appropriate when we have no ‘alternative East Africa’ to evaluate. The evaluation team have identified Contribution Tracing (CT) as the most suitable non-counterfactual design for examining TMEA’s effectiveness and the achievement of intermediate and strategic outcomes.

CT strengthens Process Tracing (PT) – an established impact evaluation design that enables strong causal inferences to be made within a single case by ‘tracing’ the observable implications of causal mechanisms through a results chain – with explicit consideration of the probative value of the evidence for each link in the chain. Probative value is a legal term expressing the relevance of any item of evidence to prove or disprove an element of a case. It is possible to calculate the probative

\(^\text{15}\) Please see Annex G on the sample selection for detail.
value of any piece of evidence to strengthen belief in any proposition as a function of three variables:\(^16\);

1. The probability of observing that piece of evidence if the proposition is true
2. The probability of observing that piece of evidence if the proposition is not true
3. The prior belief that the proposition is true without observing that piece of evidence

Although these variables can only be estimated subjectively, the shift from collecting judgements about the likely truth of propositions to separating propositions and evidence and making judgements about the likelihood of observing each piece of evidence is an effective check on bias. In particular, the constant use of the question “how likely is it that some alternative mechanism has generated this evidence?” - which turns out to be the most important determinant of probative value - is a powerful guard against the pressure on programme staff to promote only positive stories and provides a consistent way of comparing many different types of evidence.

Traditional data collection methods – interviews, focus and discussion groups, observation, and the use of secondary documents and data – fed this analytical approach. Triangulation – drawing on and weighing varied sources internal and external to TMEA – was used to minimise bias, quality assure the data and support conclusions based on the range of findings.

Through this triangulated analysis the evaluation team was able to reach consistent conclusions about the probative value of evidence using Table 1 below.

**Table 1:** Determining the probative value of evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virtually Certain</td>
<td>VC, VL, L, ALN, UL, VUL, EUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Likely</td>
<td>VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>VL, L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About as likely as not</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>UL, ALN, L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely</td>
<td>VUL, UL, ALN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionally Unlikely</td>
<td>EUL, EUL, VUL, ALN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NB: The acronyms in the chart come from the list in the chart: VC=Virtually Certain, VL=Very Likely, L=Likely, ALN=As Likely As Not, UL=Unlikely, VUL=Very Unlikely, EUL=Extremely Unlikely.*

The probability of seeing a piece of evidence was assessed along the scale in this table – from virtually certain to extremely unlikely – to arrive at the probative values. The same analysis is carried out twice: once for the existence of the outcome and once for TMEA’s contribution to it, resulting in tables that show both probative values.

For example, the existence of an output of improved container capacity featured first in the Mombasa Port case study in the main report is evidenced by before-and after photos and Google Earth satellite shots, as well as evaluation interviews and analyses for the PE and in the earlier

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\(^{16}\) The formula is a direct application of the definition of probability, known as Bayes rule. See Bayes (1763) *An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances* in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. 53: 370–418, Befani & Stedman-Bryce have bought it into Contribution Tracing, see Befani & Stedman-Bryce (2016) *Process Tracing and Bayesian updating for impact evaluation*: Evaluation 1–19. Other recent applications have been made by OPM and by 3ie.
Formative Evaluation. Seeing that evidence if the claim was not true would be extremely unlikely (EUL). Seeing the evidence if the claim is true is virtually certain: the outcome did happen. Then, we look at evidence for TMEA’s contribution in the same way. TMEA has ample contractual and project data that shows what it spent, through which contractors, during what time frame to pave the yard spaces. It is EUL that that evidence would exist if TMEA had not been involved; and it is VC that we would see the evidence if the claim is true.

This example is quite straightforward, but where the evaluation team found any doubt we sought additional evidence, such as evaluation interviews, extant data, observation, or documents that strengthened or challenged given claims. When pieces of evidence at a lower probability are combined, the calculable probability of seeing both or all three pieces of such evidence is stronger than that of one piece of evidence. Contradictory pieces of evidence would lower the probability. One such avenue pursued throughout the CT cases was evidence of other donors’ or government programming or activities that could explain the output or outcome.

As a theory-based method, contribution tracing requires an in-depth understanding of the programme’s theory of change at corporate and component levels. Where these were not part of programme design and implementation, or where they were superseded by events, the evaluation team had to reconstruct them to be able to undertake the analysis.

**Stakeholder involvement and transparency**

The delay in the evaluation process had an alienating effect on the stakeholders at TMEA, and OPM’s initial task in re-starting the evaluation process included listening closely in an effort to be responsive to any concerns. TMEA staff and, especially, leadership were worried about the timing and burden of the evaluation, asking the team to finish as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 2018. It was not possible to accommodate that request given the iterative revisions to the Design and Work Plan (Annex B), but the team worked to be as efficient as possible during fieldwork. No changes were made to the PE design based on TMEA concerns, but the time taken to listen and answer questions about design was useful for building necessary relationships.

One method used to facilitate this deep listening was to begin initial interviews with all TMEA staff with a question about their “proudest achievement”, a technique used in Appreciative Inquiry that is based on the idea that key informants in an institution or programme are more receptive and responsive when approached about how to build on successes, than when asked to identify system failures. The entire team was asked to do so, for consistency, and it seemed to be a positive way to begin to broach the evaluation questions again from the position of the new design. OPM continued close contact throughout the evaluation fieldwork while in country, which allowed for informal “check ins” with key team members. When OPM heard of any difficulties in the field, such as a dissatisfaction with the evaluation strategy in Tanzania or with the evaluation tactics in Rwanda, the team reached out to talk through the issues in the hopes of easing unnecessary burdens and/or gaining a bit of cooperation on one or another interview or site visit. One case seemed to be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction, while in another, the country staffer did not answer outreach attempts.

The evaluation research was done while TMEA teams were already a year or more into Strategy 2, which meant that interviews relied on recall, and that the evaluation was burdensome on some team members. This included especially the results team at headquarters and in Uganda, country directors, and component leads at headquarters and in country offices. Positive relationships tended

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to carry the day, but some TMEA team members did not respond to repeated requests for information or specific data.

**Data sources and key variables including justification**

The PE data sources included extensive document review (please see Annex H for the bibliography – secondary data); site visits to ports, border posts, and the headquarters of the EAC (primary data); and 350 in-depth interviews with TMEA and their partners in five countries and external individuals or firms with important perspectives of the work TMEA undertook (also primary data). We asked permission for interviews (of non-TMEA respondents) and offered confidentiality to each person. The ethical and methodological parameters for the study were closely explained to each team member, and any deviations were discussed immediately. We hoped to model best evaluation practices for the respondents with whom we interacted.

Each open-ended interview guide was built by the team and based around the PE evaluation questions from HEQ2 and HEQ5. After the first three days of interviews with our open-ended question guides, the full team met to critique the content, wording, sequencing, and scope of the interview guides, and made important revisions. The evaluation team was conscious of the need to elicit responses from respondents that they might not immediately offer, such as their nuanced opinions about process, outcomes, inhibitors and challenges. For this reason the interview guides were designed to flow from less sensitive to more sensitive questions. The evaluation team are also experienced in building rapport with interviewees through assuring confidentiality and not sharing information from other interviews, using open body language, and adapting the language of the interview guides to suit respondents’ comfort levels. The interview guides are included at Annex I.

As noted above, the evaluation team included questions for HEQ5 and for HEQ2 (results) on every HEQ5 instrument – that is, on all instruments for the various respondent types (these are listed in [Error! Reference source not found. below]). These were tailored for each respondent – a TMEA staff member or partner who worked on an ICT for Trade intervention was queried about results for that intervention, and, as applicable, about knock-on effects on, for example, OSBPs or export capability. In this way, the HEQ5 interviews served as introductions to results that were later plumbed more deeply in CT case studies, involving separate interviews (often more than one with given individuals), using the separate instrument for that purpose.

For HEQ2, the CT cases were coded first on individual instruments by component and country, for a total of 18, which involved an additional 39 interviews with TMEA staff, using the CT instrument. Often, the team interviewed these individuals, or returned with further queries, multiple times to each respondent, because of the depth of information needed. These were complemented with 60 interviews with partners, private sector beneficiaries or interested parties, other donors and other sectoral actors, in which the team acquired additional data on the case, checked information from the interviews with TMEA actors, and/or inquired about alternative explanations. We also took advantage of data collected for HEQ5 to triangulate what we were told about the CT cases, and were in contact with an additional 15 government sources for data, outside of those we interviewed. With the exception of these 15, all the other figures in this paragraph are included in Table 3 figures, below.

Interview guides were targeted towards TMEA staff and management, government partners, private sector partners, civil society partners, TMEA donors and other donors working in trade, and external perspectives. The last category were most often private sector firms with particularly useful perspectives on TMEA results – such as logistics firms and shippers, including exporters working with disadvantaged groups to aggregate production to exportable quantities and quality. The evaluation team attempted to have at least two viewpoints for each component about which we were interviewing; we sought more viewpoints for the CT cases in particular, as well as in cases
where initial interviews or documentation were less informative. The strategy was designed to allow us to triangulate in analysis, and to answer crucial questions around outcomes from the perspectives of disinterested users of systems and infrastructure.

The team sought varied viewpoints for each question and component, particularly for CT cases, for four countries (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda), as in the Design and Work Plan (Annex E). The PE team was able to add at very low cost a set of interviews in Juba and at the border post in Nimule, as well, bringing the total number of countries to five. The range of types of respondents allowed triangulation from among stakeholders but also from disinterested users of systems and infrastructure. The interview guides were directed to the types of respondents shown in the sample table below.

The team looked broadly across the full range of components for HEQ5, while for HEQ2, the team conducted an in-depth look at components for which TMEA claimed important outcomes. (Please see information on sampling for HEQ2 in the following section, and in Annex G.) For HEQ5, sampling was purposive in each country, with an attempt to reach partners from all components in each country. In each visit, TMEA staff planned an initial set of interviews, including those within TMEA. The internal interviews served as entry points to discuss projects and components; uncover key actors, reports and potential data sources; compare that to the project database and components; and ensure coverage of the components. With over 200 projects in S1, the evaluation did not expect to visit all of these, but rather worked within the team to identify projects and groups of projects that should be covered, and to pursue those interviews.

The international consultants visited Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania twice each, and Kenya for one longer visit, given the need to reach the regional elements of programming that were housed there. Between the first and second visits to the other three countries, the team met in Nairobi to strategise and prioritise around coverage. Each team member ‘specialised’ in one SO and one country (i.e., visiting twice), and the team lead provided backup coverage across the SOs, as she had visited all four countries. National team members in each site pursued appointments with the partners, making use of their networks as well to sample private sector firms that were either unconnected with TMEA or that were Authorised Economic Operators (AEOs). These team members continued interviewing after the shorter visits by the international team, to maintain VfM in the evaluation, based on prioritised lists developed by each country team ‘specialist’.

Visits to the ports and border posts used blended sampling, including visits arranged by TMEA and those sought by the team independently, in order to cover a cross-section of interested stakeholders, including private sector users of these facilities. Team members visited Mombasa Port three times and Dar Port twice, and Busia, Mirama Hills, Kagitumba, Nimule and Elegu OSBPs during fieldwork. This is in addition to port and border post visits carried out by the PGIS field team, but since the timings were close together, the PE team was able to make some use of PGIS field visit notes to supplement information for this report, particularly around Women and Trade interventions and those in the Export Capability component. The sample of interviews in the following table represents only those undertaken specifically for the PE, by the respondent type.
Table 2: The sample: Overall PE respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>HQ &amp; EAC</th>
<th>KE</th>
<th>RW</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>TZ</th>
<th>UG</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management, results and leadership</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trademark component teams</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government partners</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector partners</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society partners</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMEA donors</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External donors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External private sector firms/individuals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil society and private sector overlap in the case of Women in Trade organisations, where the organisations have a civil society purpose while also supporting women's economic pursuits. The category TMEA management includes SO leads, results and START team members, and the inclusive and sustainable development director. The category here also includes five interviews from among top TMEA leadership.

Evaluation teams visited the Arusha headquarters of the EAC twice, partners at Mombasa Port three times, at Dar Port twice, and visited three OBSPs. Other interviews were primarily at government offices in capital cities, or in the case of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. The team also availed itself of the data returning from the PGIS in raw form, for information from site visits, interviews, focus groups and hard data. The figures on sample for that work are included in the PGIS report.

There were more men than women in the sample. Among all respondents, 239 were men and 111 were women. Trademark leadership was somewhat more balanced with 17 men and 12 women. Among East African government respondents, 77 were men and 25 women. Donor respondents (including non-TMEA donors) were represented by 26 men and 16 women, while among private sector and civil society partners, 60 were men and 30 women. The private sector respondents who were not involved with TMEA but kindly responded to our interview requests included 22 men and five women. These gender differences reflect the trade sector, which is traditionally populated by more men than women.

Data quality and limitations

The data collection methods are well-tested and include: sectoral and evaluation experts conducting in-depth interviews and site visits across TMEA projects. The evaluation team developed a coding framework to capture convergence and divergence. The team also made use of extensive TMEA data and reports from regional and country levels, along with those data that were able to be sourced from government, private sector, and civil society partners. Care was taken to ensure systematic and rigorous triangulation across data sources.

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18 HQ and EAC are combined, reflecting the regional HQ work, as with regional apex bodies; most are headquartered in Nairobi.
A number of limitations are common to studies of this type, and the team worked proactively to mitigate them:

1. The scope of TMEA’s interventions is broad, and has changed over time. Recreating the thought processes around theories of change and strategy from as long ago as 2010 based on respondents’ recall is likely incomplete. The very sad loss of TMEA’s SO1 Lead, George Wolf, in December 2018 also affected the evaluation, since his own thinking about programme strategy was clearly central to TMEA’s intellectual history. Hearing from a range of respondents is one way the evaluation mitigated this challenge; the team also recognised this possibility early on, and placed importance on documentation, where it existed, of earlier thinking from the TMEA HQ and country teams, rather than on recall alone.

2. The evaluation TORs required that the PE team examine 21 evaluation questions, ten components, four countries plus the regional EAC programme and corporate programming, using the human and other resources available, inevitably resulting in some gaps in the team’s knowledge and analyses. There may be insufficient quantity and quality of data to reach credible conclusions on all points. A comprehensive review of the draft report by DFID and TMEA will help to identify these, but it is possible that not all will be able to resolved.

3. Some limitations reinforce each other, such as the significant scope of the present evaluation and the evaluation fatigue expressed at TMEA. TMEA and partners often had a prepared power point presentation to save time on the multiple requests for repeated evaluation interviews like ours. Interviews were scheduled for 60 minutes and respondents often had something else scheduled just after the interview; it was therefore often impossible to get the necessary time to cover the scope of the evaluation questions. While respondents were gracious, the additional demands of such a broad evaluation, and in particular of the extensive data and additional interview requests for the CT cases, were burdensome, particularly for TMEA and for their most important partners – revenue authorities, ministries working on EAC affairs, port authorities, and key private sector groups. Survey or evaluation fatigue in such cases has a cost in terms of VfM – lost time on task – and in terms of the quality of responses. Practiced responses might not be germane to the evaluation questions, or may tend towards more superficial answers rather than thoughtful insights into processes, which the evaluation intended to elicit. The PE followed closely after the DFID Annual Review process, and the team learned of two other upcoming evaluations in process during fieldwork. Mitigating against survey fatigue or evaluation fatigue involved limiting interviews wherever possible, expressing gratitude and describing the utility of their responses, respecting the time limits respondents placed on the interviews, gently interrupting presentations to return to interview questions, asking teams rather than individuals for follow-on data for the CT cases, and double-checking some more superficial or unclear responses through follow-up emails. The evaluation team has also worked to note where evidence is weaker, particularly in the CT cases. It is notable, however, that responses tapered off after the team left the region, with ever greater need for TMEA’s own leadership to help us get responses and additional data.

Interpreting evaluation results should always be realistic based on the resources available for that evaluation, among other parameters; in this case, the resources were quite limited next to the grand scope of evaluation questions to be answered, and of the evaluand’s thematic and geographic breadth. The evaluation fatigue expressed by respondents, in the judgement of the evaluators, causes somewhat more concern, because of the multiplier effect of finding that fatigue in many respondents. Uncertain or unclear responses result in softer, less categorical answers to evaluation questions. Readers, particularly those involved in this or similar programming, might consider unequivocal and unambiguous responses more useful. Still, our conclusions and recommendations do contain key themes and stress points.

4. Risks of bias are always present, including social desirability bias in which respondents wish to please the interviewers, sometimes with the wish to ensure funding continues; sponsor bias in which responses are conditioned by interviewees’ independent perceptions of donors, donor countries, or of TMEA; and on the part of researchers, confirmation bias, in which
prejudgements about research findings cause the team or a team member to overlook contrary or unexpected findings. For the former two possibilities, the experienced team attempted to build rapport to gain genuine and thoughtful responses; in the case of confirmation bias, the team agreed to and worked to challenge one another’s ideas using the evidence gathered, as well as their sectoral and regional experience.

5. The evolving political economy in each country undermines simple responses to outcome questions, particularly since S1 ended almost two years ago. While that affords a period of time to be able to evaluate sustainability, it also introduces countless new variables as politics, bureaucracies, economies and societies undergo change. This is not a challenge that can be mitigated, but the team did stick closely to the evaluation questions in the effort to limit the amount of additional information to consider. At the same time, it would be a wasted opportunity if we didn’t consider what had happened since, and this consideration leads to some of the conclusions and recommendations around sustainability. Since HEQ2, for example, is such a key piece of the evaluation response, taking extra time to find data on how these outcomes evolved was deemed necessary and worthwhile.

6. Respondents are reluctant to speak about corrupt practices, though an understanding of these is essential to understand how transport systems actually function in the region. The team kept abreast of public developments in these issues at Mombasa Port, key agencies, and government leadership, in part to mitigate the closed reactions to questions about corruption in interviews. The issue, however, is mostly underground. As such, readers are cautioned not to forget the impact of the many types of corruption – on a spectrum, perhaps, from overt bribery to the ways governments can focus resources and attention on issues that may benefit them – and how these impact trade and limit gains for marginalised people.

7. Significant documentary data comes from TMEA itself; the team has worked to balance this evidence with external views. International organizations’ data is often not specific enough, and public sector reports were found to be wanting. Government sources were reluctant to provide detailed data in many instances. There are important deficiencies in government data management and use. Documents and data are subject to critical team review by the team and data quality commentary is included where relevant.

8. Despite repeated requests, some data sets (TMEA data, as well as data they might have to request of their partners) have not been provided. During the review process, the OPM team continues to pursue these data to enhance the strength of findings and conclusions. Where these remain missing at the close of the evaluation process, the lack of key data will be noted in the final report, and readers are cautioned to note their absence.

**Contribution Tracing**

‘Contribution Tracing’ (CT) is one of the rigorous non-experimental approaches to establishing the validity of contribution claims in impact evaluation. It is based on the principles of both Process Tracing and Bayesian updating of probabilities and offers explicit criteria to guide evaluators in data collection and in measuring confidence in their findings with regard to the contribution of an intervention. CT uses both quantitative and qualitative data collected by means of a range of methods – interviews, document reviews, focus groups, observation, and the like.

CT is a theory-based impact evaluation design, with its own comparative advantages among other non-counterfactual and non-experimental designs. It is particularly strong at reducing confirmation bias, providing more transparency and predictability for data collection efforts and ultimately increasing the internal validity and credibility of evaluation findings (Befani and Stedman-Bryce, 2016). CT provides guidance on what evidence to seek out, and how to assess the strength of evidence, if observed, in relation to a contribution claim.

CT uses the principles of Process Tracing (PT) combined with a branch of mathematics called Bayesian Updating. PT is an established social science method that enables causal inferences to
be made within a single case. CT also makes use of the logic of the four probative tests of Process Tracing by using Bayesian updating to quantify the confidence that an intervention has contributed to an outcome.

The four probative tests are called ‘straw in the wind’, ‘hoop’, ‘smoking gun’ and ‘doubly decisive’ tests, and they refer to the strength of a piece of evidence to support or refute a hypothesis. Another way to think of these tests is the degree to which the evidence thus tested is necessary and sufficient for causation. The table below lays this out.

### Table 3: The four probative tests of PT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is the evidence <strong>sufficient</strong> to establish causation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Is the evidence necessary to establish causation?</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| NO                   | **Straw in the wind**  
                      | Evidence that points toward accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, but is not enough |
| YES                  | **Hoop test**  
                      | Evidence that, if absent, disproves the hypothesis |
|                      | **Smoking gun**  
                      | Evidence that confirms your hypothesis |
|                      | **Doubly decisive**  
                      | Evidence that both confirms the hypothesis and eliminates other hypotheses |

In CT, the logic around these probative tests undergirds the calculation of probabilities of posterior confidence, as described below.

Bayesian updating is a method of statistical inference used to calculate posterior confidence in a contribution claim based on prior confidence. A mathematical procedure tests the difference between the true positive rate, or ‘Sensitivity’, and the false positive rate, or ‘Type I Error’. Here, *sensitivity* means the probability of observing an item of evidence if the contribution claim is true. *Type I Error* is the probability of observing an item of evidence if the contribution claim is not true.

The larger the difference between the Sensitivity and the Type I Error, the higher the probative value of an item of evidence in relation to a specific contribution claim. Thus, the evaluator’s task is to identify evidence with the highest probative value.

Bayes theorem comes from the fact that the ‘conditional probability’ of claim C being true, given observed evidence E (indicated by \( P(C|E) \)) is defined by a particular relationship: that \( P(E|C) \) multiplied by the probability that evidence E is observed is equal to the probability that claim C is true and evidence E is observed, or in symbols:

\[
P(C|E)*P(E) = P(C \text{ and } E)
\]

Now notice that \( P(C|E)*P(E) = P(C \text{ and } E) = P(E \text{ and } C) = P(E|C)*P(C) \) so

\[
P(C|E) = P(C)*P(E|C)/ P(E)
\]

which is known as Bayes theorem.

Also notice that the probability of observing evidence E is equal to the probability of observing it and claim C being true plus the probability of observing it and the claim not being true, i.e.:

\[
P(E) = P(E \text{ and } C) + P(E \text{ and not } C)
\]

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19 Adapted from Collier, 2010, based on Bennett, 2010 which builds on concepts from Van Evers, 1997.
and plugging this into Bayes theorem gives

\[ P(C|E) = \frac{P(C)P(E|C)}{P(E|C)P(C) + P(E|\neg C)P(\neg C)} \]

where

- \( P(C) \) is referred to as the “prior” confidence of claim C being true i.e., one’s confidence in it before knowing whether evidence E is observed or not.
- \( P(C|E) \) is the “posterior” confidence in the claim being true after having observed evidence E;
- \( P(E|C) \), the probability of observing E given that C is true is referred to as “sensitivity” and
- \( P(E|\neg C) \), the probability of observing E given that C is not true is referred to as “type 1 error”.

It is common to assume that \( P(C) \), the prior confidence in claim C, is 0.5, meaning ‘as likely as not’. The 0.5 assumption for prior beliefs in Bayesian updating is variously referred to by statisticians as “neutral”, “objective”, or “non-informative”; as any other belief is “non-neutral”, “subjective”, and “informed”. Only the last of these qualities is acceptable in an evaluation. A decision to use a prior other than 0.5 therefore presupposes the existence of some evidence to inform this non-neutral and begs the question of why this evidence could not be bought into the updating framework. If \( P(C) = 0.5 \), \( P(\neg C) \) is also 0.5 which gives us:

\[ P(C|E) = \frac{P(E|C)}{P(E|C) + P(E|\neg C)} \]

It is immediately apparent that a low Type 1 error \( P(E|\neg C) \) would give high posterior confidence, while the sensitivity \( P(E|C) \), appears on the top and bottom of the expression and would largely cancel out. Even with a \( P(E|C) \) as high as 1 (that is, evidence that must be observed if a claim is true); if the evidence E is just as likely to be seen as not when the claim is not true (i.e., \( P(E|\neg C) = 0.5 \)), our confidence in that claim is only 0.66 or ‘about as likely as not’.

Unfortunately, this sort of evidence is very common in evaluations, while evidence with a low \( P(E|\neg C) \) is much harder to find. Note however that there is some hope in combining multiple pieces of evidence – if that evidence is independent. Consider two independent pieces of pieces of evidence E1 and E2. The probability of observing both of them if the claim C is not true is \( P((E1 \text{ and } E2)|\neg C) \) and if they are independent this is equal to \( P(E1|\neg C)P(E2|\neg C) \). Even if both pieces of evidence are “as likely to be seen as not” when the claim is false i.e. \( P(E1|\neg C) = P(E2|\neg C) = 0.5 \), the probability of seeing both is 0.25 which becomes ‘unlikely’.

Table 9 below shows the probative value of evidence with various combinations of sensitivity and Type 1 error.
Table 4: Confidence in claim C after seeing evidence E under various combinations of subjective probabilities of seeing evidence E if claim C is not true (Type 1 error) and seeing evidence E if claim is true (sensitivity)

| Sensitivity P(E|C)       | Virtually Certain | Very Likely          | Likely               | About as likely as not | Unlikely          | Very Unlikely | Exceptionally Unlikely |
|--------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------------|
| Virtually Certain        | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | Likely            | Very Likely    | Virtually Certain      |
| Very Likely              | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | Likely            | Very Likely    | Virtually Certain      |
| Likely                   | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | Likely            | Very Likely    | Virtually Certain      |
| About as likely as not   | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | About as likely as not | Likely            | Very Likely    | Virtually Certain      |
| Unlikely                 | Unlikely          | Unlikely             | Unlikely             | Unlikely              | About as likely as not | Likely          | Very Likely          |
| Very Unlikely            | Very Unlikely     | Very Unlikely        | Very Unlikely        | Very Unlikely         | Unlikely          | About as likely as not | Very Likely          |
| Exceptionally Unlikely   | Exceptionally Unlikely | Exceptionally Unlikely | Exceptionally Unlikely | Exceptionally Unlikely | Very Unlikely     | Very Unlikely | About as likely as not |

Combinations that provide strong support for the claim are shown in blue. Note that only evidence that is either very unlikely or exceptionally unlikely to be seen if the contribution claim is true can provide strong support for a claim. Even evidence that you would be virtually certain to see if a claim was true is not, in itself, good enough.

Tables 4 and 5 below show the calculation of the numerical values of expression (4) corresponding to and underlying the qualitative labels in the table above. The correspondence between the qualitative labels “virtually certain” to “exceptionally unlikely” and probability ranges is drawn from Befani & Stedman-Bryce (2016) Process Tracing and Bayesian updating for impact evaluation: Evaluation 1–19 sagepub.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1177/1356389016654584. The pattern is inspired by the standard normal distribution with very narrow probability bands in the tails and a large band in the centre of the distribution.
Table 5: Table of calculated values for beliefs in claim after seeing evidence, i.e. $P(E|C) \div [P(E|C) + P(E| not C)]$ for different values of $P(E|C)$ and $P(E| not C)$

| P(E|C): Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is True | P(E| not C): Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is not True | VC | VL | L | ALN | UL | VUL | EUL |
|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|---|-----|----|-----|-----|
| Virtually Certain(VC) 99-100%                         | Range Midpoint                                               | 99.5% | 78.5% | 94.5% | 50.0% | 21.5% | 5.5%  |
| Very Likely(VL) 90-99%                                |                                                             | 78.5% | 44%  | 50%  | 45%  | 61%  | 79%  |
| Likely(L) 66-90%                                      |                                                             | 94.5% | 49%  | 55%  | 50%  | 65%  | 81%  |
| About as likely as not(ALN) 33-66%                   |                                                             | 50.0% | 33%  | 39%  | 35%  | 50%  | 70%  |
| Unlikely(UL) 10-33%                                    |                                                             | 21.5% | 18%  | 22%  | 19%  | 30%  | 50%  |
| Very Unlikely(VUL) 1-10%                              |                                                             | 5.5%  | 5%   | 7%   | 6%   | 10%  | 20%  |
| Exceptionally Unlikely(EUL) 0-1%                      |                                                             | 0.5%  | 1%   | 1%   | 1%   | 2%   | 8%   |

The mid-point of each probability range, as shown in the table below, is used in the calculation.

Table 6: Table with values for beliefs in claim after seeing evidence replaced by the qualitative labels for the ranges those values fall into

| P(E|C): Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is True | P(E| not C): Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is not True | VC | VL | L | ALN | UL | VUL | EUL |
|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|---|-----|----|-----|-----|
| Virtually Certain(VC) 99-100%                         | Range Label Midpoint                                         | 99.5% | 94.5% | 78.5% | 50.0% | 21.5% | 5.5%  | 0.5% |
| Very Likely(VL) 90-99%                                |                                                             | 94.5% | ALN  | ALN  | ALN  | ALN  | L    | VL   | VC   |
| Likely(L) 66-90%                                      |                                                             | 78.5% | ALN  | ALN  | ALN  | ALN  | L    | VL   | VC   |
| About as likely as not(ALN) 33-66%                   |                                                             | 50.0% | ALN  | ALN  | ALN  | ALN  | L    | VL   | VC   |
| Unlikely(UL) 10-33%                                    |                                                             | 21.5% | UL   | UL   | UL   | UL   | ALN  | L    | VL   |
| Very Unlikely(VUL) 1-10%                              |                                                             | 5.5%  | VUL  | VUL  | VUL  | VUL  | UL   | ALN  | VL   |
| Exceptionally Unlikely(EUL) 0-1%                      |                                                             | 0.5%  | EUL  | EUL  | EUL  | EUL  | VUL  | VUL  | ALN  |

* Strictly speaking, the value of 66.6 % Rounds to 67% which should be L but it is right on the border and so is allocated to ALN for symmetry.
Implementing Contribution Tracing

The key steps in implementing CT are the following:

1. **Develop a testable claim**

Developing a testable claim requires developing a claim which is detailed and measurable. Initial claims may need to be refined to make them more testable. For example:

- **Untestable**: The campaign supported reforms in the health system
- **More testable**: The campaign has shown the current health insurance-based system to be ineffective in delivering universal healthcare
- **Testable**: The campaign led the Government of Ghana to revise its methodology for calculating membership of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)$^{20}$

The more detailed the claim the easier it is to make, as it is tailored to a specific case and therefore unique. Claims around impact are harder to test and attribute solely to the intervention. However, testable claims can be made at the level of outputs and different types of outcomes of the project (immediate and long-term outcomes). The number of claims to test depends on the resources available.

The choice of any claim can be done together with the ‘evaluand’ (the implementing agency) based on their view of their most important achievements according to their TOC. We ask for their proudest accomplishments, most important achievements, or other appropriate wording, and write a brief summary of that story in the template (see figure below). This enables us to make the best use of limited resources by identifying those outcomes that were materialised and which have contributed to longer term outcomes or impact or have greater potential to do so. By doing so, we can also assess any unintended outcomes of the intervention that were not necessarily planned at the beginning.

The longer version of that story that emerges from the in-depth interview is maintained separately for evaluation records and can be returned to it later on; this can be helpful if there is significant difference from the story told by the implementing partner or agency and what is finally validated through the CT process.

Excellent interviewing skills – proposed in this study using an Appreciative Inquiry approach – are crucial to get all the necessary details of the story and uncover where it can be tested. By asking questions for every step we then gradually build up the story and complete the template. The basic template is below, which is then adapted and step names changed to fit each outcome story.

---

$^{20}$ Stedman-Bryce, 2013.
Figure 2: Contribution Story template

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution Story:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Probabilities: Virtually Certain (VC), Very Likely (VL), Likely (L), As likely as not (ALN), Unlikely (UL), Very Unlikely (VUL), Exceptionally Unlikely (EUL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative Summary:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1 Project Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports written, training provided etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2: Changes in Government Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New structures or changed laws or regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence 2b Evidence For Claim Change was caused by Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emails, Timing, Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3 Improvements in Planning and Budgeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New or improved procedures or processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4 Improvements in Service Delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in the government’s delivery of services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5 Improvements in Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Household Welfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Identify evidence for each step

Once contribution claims and their steps are identified, the next step is to identify evidence for each step to have been materialised. In other words, we follow the stated TOC (which may or may not align with project documentation TOCs) of the outcome of interest and then identify what evidence we want to see for each step (which corresponds to a TOC level: i.e. activities, inputs, outputs, and finally outcomes of interest). In so doing, we ask the evaluand for available evidence which would support their claims about each step taking place, and about the results of those steps having materialised as claimed.

When searching for evidence, the first priority is their relevance to the particular claim being tested. However, there is an interesting pattern among different types of evidence, with respect to their use in CT. It is important to remember about Type 1 error and sensitivity of each evidence. For example, emails/letters and meeting minutes and ‘digital exhaust’ have lowest Type I errors, \( P(E|\neg C) \) and quite high sensitivity, \( P(E|C) \). Minutes are written, there is no interviewer mediation, nor any one-on-one interaction with an interviewer. They are “private”, meaning the project teams were not having a meeting because of the evaluation.

In contrast, key informant interviews (especially if they were part of the network), have high Type 1 error values. However, independent KIIs are helpful and would have lower Type 1 error. Surveys often have high Type 1 error because there are lots of ways an outcome could have been achieved.

When we have identified all the evidence needed, for each step we establish a prior level of confidence. We ask for evidence for steps 1-3 and fill evidence boxes 1, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b. We also ask for judgements of probability for the evidence in each box, as shown in the next figure. These are qualified by the implied belief in each claim, together with the evaluand.

We focus on one specific piece of evidence at a time, and estimate both the sensitivity and the Type 1 Error of that piece of evidence E for that claim C. In our template, we have added drop-down boxes to ensure the selection is in our standard CT language; this also helps the
interviewer and the evaluand to sense-check their selection against those closest to it in the lists.

Figure 3: Steps and evidence in support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 2: Changes In Government Institutions</th>
<th>Evidence 2a Evidence For Claim That Institutions Changed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As likely as not (ALN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P2: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is NOT true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As likely as not (ALN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belief in Claim given Evidence implied by P1 and P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P1&gt;UL, UL&gt;P2 : ALN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence 2b: Evidence For Claim That Change was caused by Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As likely as not (ALN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is NOT true</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As likely as not (ALN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Claim given Evidence implied by P1 and P2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1&gt;UL, UL&gt;P2 : ALN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting that the same piece of evidence can have different values of sensitivity and Type I error for different claims. That is because its probative value is specific to one claim. Confidence in the same claim changes according to which pieces of evidence are and are not observed.

We use the following qualitative descriptors of confidence to estimate probability of seeing evidence if claim is true and not true. In CT, the sensitivity of an item of evidence relates to the probability of observing it, if the contribution claim is true. Therefore, not observing such evidence lowers our confidence in a claim. The Type I Error of an item of evidence relates to the probability of observing it, if the contribution claim is NOT true. The higher the Type I Error (value closer to 1), the less unique that item of evidence is in relation to the claim under investigation.

- Virtually certain 99-100%
- Very likely 90-99%
- Likely 66-90%
- About as likely as not 33-66%
- Unlikely 10-33%
- Very unlikely 0-10%
- Exceptionally unlikely 0-1%

If we are more likely to observe an item of evidence if the contribution claim is true (sensitivity), than if the contribution claim is not true (Type I Error), then this evidence increases our confidence in the claim. Conversely, if we are more likely to observe an item of evidence if the contribution claim is not true (Type I Error), then this evidence weakens
our confidence in the claim. And if the item of evidence is just as likely to be observed if the claim is true or false, then this evidence does not alter our confidence in the claim. Essentially, evaluators start with a confidence level of 0.5 (no information, about as likely as not) and search for evidence that helps to increase their level of confidence.

Finding evidence for inputs and outputs steps is relatively easy. It is 2b – when we ask about confidence that a change was attributable to the evaluand – when challenges arise in finding evidence with low Type 1 Error. Type 1 Error grows as we move from the first steps (activities and outputs) to the last step around the outcomes. Evidence with low Type 1 error was often rare or inaccessible.

In order to increase the confidence of evidence for attribution, we sought other factors which might have contributed to achieve the same step and then eliminate these (where possible). This elimination was supported by our expert knowledge and relevant literature at hand, particularly in later evaluation stages. When other factors remained at play as major contributing factors to the outcome under scrutiny then we assessed the contribution of the TMEA intervention of interest together with the others as one joint causal package.

3. Collect data and update confidence about claim

Once we have done the estimates for each evidence, we need to check evidence mentioned and analyse that evidence to assess whether or not evidence meets our prior confidence (seeing the evidence) and then update the prior probability with the posterior probability using the Bayes formula - the likelihood of claim CC being true given that evidence E has been observed. Here Table 1 above is helpful to identify whether or not our combination of evidence provides strong support for the claim.

Here qualitative analysis has also given more context to the table, including about alternative explanations, or joint causal packages.

4. Iterate

The steps discussed above then are iterated for each outcome and each piece of evidence as many times as needed. It remains a transparent process, with evaluands' and experts' inputs included as necessary.

5. Put claim and judgments up for challenge

After the calculations are done, the evaluation team discussed our agreement with sensitivity and Type 1 Error scores. This is a discussion – debate – consensus process within the team.

Criteria for reaching judgments

When conducting CT, the main judgment involved is judgment about probability of seeing evidence in different circumstances using the qualitative markers. Contrary to PT, it does not involve quantifying sensitivity and Type 1 error prior and posterior after we have seen the evidence under scrutiny. Instead, the judgement is about probability of seeing the evidence and then, after seeing the evidence, deciding whether or not our C claim is true or false.

However, Fairfield and Charman (2015) found that giving assignments for the likelihood of observing each piece of evidence if a particular hypothesis is correct required multiple rounds of revision before they became reasonably stable, and there is no guarantee that they would have arrived at similar values had they initially approached the problem from a different yet equally valid starting point (i.e. a different sequencing of the evidence). Given
these issues it makes sense to put the claim and judgements up for challenge and then agree or disagree on the final decisions.

The combined judgement about evidence implies a belief about the validity of the claim given that the evidence was observed. This step is carried out by an Excel model.  

**Figure 4: A summary table of evidence collected**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P1: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Activities if Claim is True</th>
<th>P2: Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virtually Certain Very Likely</td>
<td>VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As likely as not Unlikely</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>VL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As likely as not Unlikely</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely</td>
<td>VL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionally Unlikely</td>
<td>EUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUL</td>
<td>EUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUL</td>
<td>VUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUL</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourteen Possible combinations;  
P1>UL>P2 : ALN, P1 = VL =P2 : ALN, P1 = VUL =P2 : ALN, P1 = EUL =P2 : ALN,  
P1>UL, P2>VL : ALN, P1 = VL =P2 : UL, P1 = VUL =P2 : UL, P1 = EUL =P2 : UL,  
P1>UL, P1 = VL =P2 : VUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : VUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : VUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : VUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>UL : VUL, P1 = VL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>VL : VUL, P1 = UL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>VL : VUL, P1 = UL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>VL : VUL, P1 = UL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>VL : VUL, P1 = UL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>VL : VUL, P1 = UL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>VL : VUL, P1 = UL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>VL : VUL, P1 = UL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>VL : VUL, P1 = UL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL,  
P1 = EUL, P2>VL : VUL, P1 = UL =P2 : EUL, P1 = VUL =P2 : EUL, P1 = EUL =P2 : EUL.

CT therefore offers less arbitrariness in assigning qualitative markers than other methods such as PT, which involves assigning numerical values to the likelihoods when attempting to quantify inherently qualitative data.

**Nature of findings expected to be produced**

In presenting the findings of CT we aimed at achieving a balance between the findings and conclusions, and the methodological details. CT also made it possible to make each step visible to the reader and allow him/her to understand and see how judgments were made and on the basis of what evidence.

The ultimate product of CT is a precise contribution story that is backed up by evidence and can be tested. These contribution claims were unpacked and discussed in more detail for every outcome assessed. The analysis tables were provided in an Annex with necessary signposting in the main text.

Through qualitative data analysis, we also cite particular pieces of evidence that help us contextualise and detail the contribution.
Annex G: Contribution Tracing Sample
1. Discussion of the proposed sample

1.1 Introduction

The Independent Evaluation of TradeMark East Africa is currently engaged in the performance evaluation component. Initial fieldwork was conducted in 2018 to Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. One goal of this initial fieldwork was to select a sample for the Contribution Tracing subcomponent of the performance evaluation. This document presents that sample for discussion.

1.2 Performance evaluation

The performance evaluation addresses the key evaluation objectives of testing the TMEA TOC (assessing the causal links and the robustness of underlying assumptions), assessing the effectiveness of the TMEA programme (including both its outcomes and organizational effectiveness), and identifying lessons learnt for TMEA and beyond (including insights on enabling and constraining factors, critical actions and gaps which would be generalisable to future programmes or to other contexts.) The performance evaluation design is multi-faceted and mixed-method, to address the broad and complex nature of TMEA programming.

Examining effectiveness and contribution will involve tracing the component results chains through programme intermediate outcomes and strategic outcomes. The mixed methods evaluation design will seek to substantiate TMEA’s claims about their contribution to results – that is, effectiveness – through collecting and analysing internal and external, primary and secondary data relevant to the results chains to answer HEQ2 and its DEQs in the table below on TMEA’s achievement of intermediate and strategic outcomes, and the presence or absence of unintended outcomes.

Table 1: HEQ2 and its DEQs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ2:</th>
<th>To what extent has TMEA been effective in achieving expected intermediate outcomes and to what extent has TMEA programme been effective in contributing to achieving programme strategic outcomes? Did the programme bring about any unintended outcomes?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEQ2.1</td>
<td>To what extent has TMEA contributed to reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ2.2</td>
<td>To what extent has TMEA contributed to increasing ease of trading across borders?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ2.3</td>
<td>To what extent has TMEA contributed to improving business competitiveness?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEQ2.4</td>
<td>Has TMEA caused any unintended outcomes? What are they and who has been affected?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The performance evaluation will trace a sample of specific components within the three strategic objectives (SOs) using Contribution Tracing (CT), captured and expressed through qualitative and quantitative means, to test the strength of the outcomes as well as the degree to which they can be attributed to TradeMark. While it is not possible, precise, or cost-effective to follow the hundreds of projects TMEA undertook in Strategy 1, the evaluation team has selected results chains with the most likely impact on intermediate and strategic outcomes, as described in detail in this document.

With 200 TMEA project activities it is almost certain that some will be correlated with improvements in macroeconomic data and indeed with positive intermediate outcomes but
correlation is not enough to prove causation. Nor will counterfactual designs be appropriate when we have no alternative East Africa to evaluate. Having reviewed and work-shopped a number of study designs, the team have identified Contribution Tracing (CT) as the most suitable non-counterfactual design for examining TMEA’s effectiveness and the achievement of intermediate and strategic outcomes. CT is further described in Chapter 2 of OPM’s Design and Work Plan and in Annex E to that document.

1.2.1 Contribution Tracing Sample

The evaluation team will use contribution tracing (CT) to substantiate TMEA results claims for a selection of key outcomes, from projects through programme outputs and PIOs to their strategic outcomes – their pathways. To do so, the evaluation team will conduct the following steps:

- **Develop a testable claim.** This requires discussing with TMEA staff to turn vague statements like, “the project has supported the improvement of trade links in the region” into a more specific statement about exactly what was achieved: “the project led to a reduction in average waiting time at the borders from three days to two days”. The causal story recreates the actual (rather than theorised) results chain: what the project did, and the links between the project activities and the results.

- **Identify evidence for each link.** Evidence of TMEA’s contribution to project activities is likely abundant and irrefutable. Each remaining link in the results chain link requires two bundles of evidence: evidence of the step itself, and evidence of the causal influence of TMEA through the linked steps.

- **Iterate.** At this stage project/programme staff will sometimes realise that they don’t have evidence for the claim they had wanted to make but do have evidence for another claim.

- **Collect the evidence** for each link and make judgements about the likelihood of seeing that evidence.

- **Put both the claim and the judgements about the likelihood of seeing evidence up for challenge.**

- **Iterate** until each link is supported by evidence with high probative value.

- **Present the results chain and evidence,** including the probative values in an annex.

The CT method requires a contribution claim to test; inherent in that requirement is that the evaluation design start from the results claimed and then work backwards through the results chain or pathway to substantiate the claims. Those indicators that show substantial results in the TMEA RF provide a natural starting point for selection of cases to study in-depth. CT will not show what happened in each and every intervention, but instead will show where there have been important gains in achieving programme intermediate outcome and strategic outcome results (for the full TOC where these outcomes are named, please see the Design and Work Plan).

1.3 Selecting cases

The Independent Evaluation Design and Work Plan cites the following criteria for selecting cases for the CT subcomponent of the evaluation.

1. For which components (or results chains) do TMEA claim results, and where (regional or national level(s))? For each result for which TMEA claimed credit, we would also want to see results chains where activities, outputs and outcomes were largely successfully implemented.
2. Was the (claimed) maturity and potential scale of the impact sufficient to be detected by the evaluation?

3. Does the results chain warrant investigation, in terms of scale? Components with materialized, detectable impacts that relate only to a small fraction of the scope of the issue might be disqualified here.

4. Are data likely to be accessible, both within and outside TMEA, to substantiate the contribution claim?¹

5. Which cases will best answer each of the three SO-related DEQs?

The last question deals with the mix of cases, rather than just the selection of individual cases: to be successful, the evaluation must select a set of cases which are able to answer the three relevant DEQs on effectiveness by strategic objective: SO1 on reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes; SO2 on increasing ease of trading across borders, and SO3 on improving business competitiveness.

CT case selection is not designed to be in any way generalisable, but rather examines the subset of cases in depth. Selection is also not designed to be randomised or otherwise to capture the range of levels of success; instead, the purpose of the CT exercise is to test those areas of intervention that have a compelling claim to both strong outcomes and significant TMEA contribution. The CT process will examine these claims of outcomes and contribution neutrally, through the full results chains (or “pathways”) leading to each.

The evaluation team’s knowledge of trade in East Africa (from team expertise as well as from fieldwork) will help us place TMEA’s potential impact in context. TMEA will likely be one but not the only factor in results chains. The rigour of CT will help us isolate what came from TMEA’s interventions.

The other key subcomponent of the performance evaluation, answering evaluation questions under HEQ5, will allow for the broader capture of strengths and weaknesses, obstacles and enabling factors, such as in looking at synergies or complementarity among components, where they might exist. In that way the evaluation looks in-depth at these selected cases (with potential of significant outcomes and traceable TMEA contribution) as well as more broadly across the TMEA activities for nuance, context, and important lessons learnt.

### 1.3.1 Sampling frame

The evaluation team set out the potential areas of intervention to be included in CT through desk review of TMEA documentation and interviews with the corporate team in Nairobi in 2018. These potential areas are the pathways of TMEA’s Theory of Change, which lead to the three Strategic Objectives. Table 2 below maps these pathways to the countries where the activities are located. The selection process is described in subsequent sections, using the same table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Potential areas of intervention to be sampled for CT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO1: Reduced corridor times; increased corridor volumes</strong> (through improved transport laws and infrastructure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Mombasa Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Dar Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 OSBPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SO2: Increased ease of trading across borders, through:</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

¹ Data quality is assumed here; wherever possible, data of high quality that is external to TMEA will be necessary to support data provided by TMEA. If there are cases where TMEA have the only data available on a given component or contribution claim, data will be closely assessed for quality.
2.1 Strengthened EAC regional trade integration X X X X X
2.2 Effective trade systems, agencies and procedures (ICT4Trade) X X X X X
2.3 Effective NTB mechanisms X X X X X
2.4 Effective EAC trading standards X X X X X

| SO3: Enhanced business environment for trade; improved export capability; and efficient trade logistics services |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1.1 Private sector-/civil society-led policy formulation (advocacy) X X X X X |
| 3.1.2 Improved processes for traders, esp. women X X X X X |
| 3.2 Export capability² X X X X X |
| 3.3 Effective and innovative logistics services X X X X X |

1.3.2 Selection: SO1

TMEA spent 42% of its budget on Strategic Objective 1 in Strategy 1. This work is the highly visible “face” of TMEA’s infrastructure efforts. The work on Mombasa and Dar Ports and on the One Stop Border Posts (OSBPs) also included significant efforts in soft support to align systems and improve efficiencies and effectiveness through systems integration and capacity building. TMEA defined the strategic outcomes for this work as reduced corridor times and increased corridor volumes.

TMEA has measured SO1 outcomes through corridor nodes (i.e. ports and OSBPs). Their Results Framework (RF) indicators, set at the outset of Trademark and altered only slightly over the course of S1, tell a mixed story: some nodes have improved, while others have not. The TMEA Results Meter tracks the set of related outcomes at nodes, emerging with one key indicator: an average reduction of 16.5% in time to transit goods (compared to a target of 15% over the life of the programme). The Results Meter actually calculates a total reduction in time of 51% since 2010, but through TMEA’s own calculations, they feel they can substantiate 16.5 points of that overall gain.

If true, that time reduction would translate into significant cost savings for firms using all or part of the corridor. Initial evaluation responses from a handful of private sector users confirm that they have indeed seen some time and cost reductions. In terms of improving physical access to markets, which was the goal of Strategic Objective 1 in Strategy 1, these gains are very positive. This will be further tested in the performance evaluation as well as in the Trade and Growth Impact Study. A Rwandan transporter (unconnected to TMEA) cited a reduction in time to transport: “From Mombasa it took 10 days in 2013 to get goods here, now it’s 7 days. Dar es Salaam is three to five days [now], though clients continue to prefer Mombasa Port.” The respondent said the OSBPs were part of the time savings. Other freight forwarders echoed these findings, and all agreed the single window online was easier and faster than previous manual processes. Being able to pay online (instead of going to the bank) was one area they thought would improve the system further.

A Ugandan exporter said that the fastest they used to be able to ship coffee from Kampala to Mombasa had dropped from “8 to 10 days” to 4 days now; the average time, others said, had dropped from 15 days to 10 days. Exporters cited a benefit of decreased requirements for working capital. On the other hand, they noted that political and weather-related challenges in the region (particularly Kenya and, with respect to conflict, in South Sudan, Burundi and DRC) sometimes slowed transport, while on the Uganda side, sometimes the

² Pathway “3.2: Export capability” is a portmanteau of the three pathways originally planned in this section of the theory of change. The original pathways do not constitute significant efforts singly, because these areas received lesser, and later attention in programming. Combined, however, they represent a set of export capability efforts.
URA system might be down “for a week at a time,” or that printers would run out of ink to print needed certificates, or internet or electricity would go down.

Early indications from these and other respondents, on the whole, tend to confirm reductions in transit time and costs. However, while reductions in time and cost at Mombasa port and along the northern corridor appear unambiguous, details of these reductions at Dar es Salaam port and along the central corridor are more mixed. Certainly TMEA’s own reporting on this subject reflects those differences, with both quantitative and qualitative assessments. Donors, HQ and country leadership, and component teams note that the current status of Dar Port work (which has been waiting since mid-2018 for an MOU to be able to continue) shows the more challenging environment for operations and for infrastructural and procedural reforms.

Improved border crossing times at the TMEA OSBPs have been verified in a set of Time and Transit Surveys, the latest of which (2017-2018) shows a sample of eight border posts with time reductions of 55% to 87% against the baseline times. Like overall Northern Corridor time reductions, these are confirmed by respondents ranging from internal TMEA sources to disinterested users of the border posts for transit of goods. The Single Customs Territory rules that facilitate transshipment for landlocked countries is cited as a specific time savings by the private sector respondents with whom the evaluation has spoken.

Key SO1 strategic outcome indicators for Strategy 1 showed unclear results, though TMEA’s Results Meter is more positive. Transport times data in the RF are unclear and the methodologies used to calculate, capture and report are weak, as described in the 2017 Annual Report. That the OSBPs have reduced crossing times well beyond targets is well-documented; and times for Mombasa Port and Dar Port customs clearance were cut significantly (though not reaching target in either case; recent requirements to scan the contents of all containers have also occasioned backsliding in Dar, and may do so as well with 100% verification requirements at Mombasa Port).

Initial performance evaluation data and the wealth of reports (internal, donor, and commissioned evaluations), the evaluation team touched on the following discussion points in considering the sample for this SO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. For which components (or results chains) do TMEA claim results, and where (regional or national level(s))? As a condition for this criterion, we would also want to see results chains where activities, outputs and outcomes were largely successfully implemented.</td>
<td>Mombasa Port and OSBPs, at national levels and again across the Northern Corridor (regional). Results chains were largely successfully implemented, keeping in mind that TMEA had to adapt deftly in light of political will for port reform. Dar Port has struggled with changes in port authorities and priorities, and as a result the ongoing work is currently stalled. Results appear less robust along the Central Corridor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Was the (claimed) maturity and potential scale of the impact sufficient to be detected by the evaluation?</td>
<td>Mombasa Port and OSBP interventions (aligned, it must be said, with the Single Customs Territory and ICT for Trade components) have the potential for major impact, along with nuances that may provide lessons learnt for this and further trade-related interventions in future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Does the results chain warrant investigation, in terms of scale? Components with materialized, detectable impacts that relate only to a small fraction of the</td>
<td>Given the pre-eminence of Mombasa Port for the Northern Corridor and Dar Port for the Central Corridor, either would provide detectable, material impacts for intraregional trade, as well as for Rest-of-the-World import/export to landlocked countries in the EAC. The OSBPs are part of the overarching results chain and – as with ICT for Trade and the SCT – TMEA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The scope of the issue might be disqualified here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Are data likely to be accessible, both within and outside TMEA, to substantiate the contribution claim?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data quality is mixed within TMEA – the Results Framework and Results Meter do not align, for example. Some indicators and some indicator data have been brought into question in repeated Annual Reviews. However, there is quite a lot of granular TMEA data (e.g., through the Results Meter) that can be reviewed node-by-node. Overarching figures can also be compared to some external data, e.g. Corridor observatory data, Maersk data on regional transhipment, and end users’ experiences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Which cases will best answer each of the three SO-related DEQs?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To answer SO1, the evaluation must look across a corridor, and the Northern Corridor makes the most sense because of its greater time reductions and larger number of nodes, as well as because the work has not been interrupted for political reasons (or at least resumed despite political interruptions).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evaluation team therefore proposes to cover Mombasa Port and the related OSBPs in a Northern Corridor contribution tracing (CT) case study, focused on projects with direct links to claims of time and cost reductions. To be clear, the Port and the corridor OSBPs would be first examined in separate CT cases but then examined as a corridor, given the logic of intervening holistically and synergistically along the corridor. It will likely not be possible to fully separate the effects of the ICT for Trade and SCT efforts from SO1, as both were necessary for the physical infrastructure to perform in ways that reduced corridor times. A coloured box indicates selection in the following table.

Table 4: Proposed sample, SO1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO1: Reduced corridor times; increased corridor volumes</strong> (through improved transport laws and infrastructure)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Mombasa Port</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Dar Port</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 OSBPs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3.3 Selection: SO2 (increased ease of trading across borders)

Strategic Objective 2 represented the second highest amount of spending among the three SOs, with approximately 45% of TMEA’s overall budget. Programming included four main streams, with the following key outcomes discussed by respondents:

2.1 Promoting **regional trade integration** (through the East African Community (EAC) Secretariat at regional level, and the Ministries for the EAC at national levels). In S1, TMEA worked towards regional integration in part through embedded projects in the EAC Secretariat. Each of the SO2 components and their projects were supported by this regional engagement, in terms of policy, guidance and implementation. TMEA country programmes worked directly with National Ministries and Directorates to domesticate these EAC policies in each country.

Two indicators in the Results Framework (RF) are tied to this outcome. The first, “Increase in the number of Common Market Protocol and Customs Union commitments (related to trade in goods and TMEA funded) annually implemented”, is said in the last Strategy 1 RF to have implemented 37% of these outstanding commitments over the life of the project. The second indicator refers to an increase in the percentage of volume of selected goods that are cleared under the SCT for all EAC Partner States. For this indicator, the TMEA RF cites...
100% of the selected goods being cleared since the SCT was begun. The 2017 AR gives TMEA a score of 86% outcome achievement rate for this component. The qualifier “select goods” is unclear in the RF, making it hard to judge the strength of this high performance, relative to the scope of good clearance.

The TMEA TOC characterises the projects under this Programme Intermediate Outcome as “enabling” rather than as “direct” projects. The component is therefore not as apt for being a CT case study, though the substance of work with the EAC and its national partner ministries – where successful – would have facilitated significant advances of the other components in SO2.

2.2 Building ICT for Trade systems, such as electronic single windows, upgrades and alignment of customs management systems, electronic cargo tracking, and information portals. The goals of this pathway are to meet the needs of the private sector and government bodies in terms of facilitating trade-related processes, on the one hand, and ensuring the availability of trade process information for users, on the other. The 2017 AR says component 2.2 has met 71% of its outcome targets. The first indicator is for a reduction in overall average customs clearance times, including inspections. Baselines, targets and progress are not clearly recorded for this indicator, which is subdivided by country and by channels within customs’ systems. Another indicator was removed on the recommendation of the 2016 AR, and the third, on reduction in escorting risky consignments, is said to have been 100% achieved.

Initial interview responses on improvements to customs and other systems are mixed; government respondents have lauded the systemic changes particularly with single window efforts and the Authorised Economic Operators programmes in three countries. They cite impressive reductions in time to process permits and to process Customs clearance. At the same time there were multiple reports of systems going down or having other problems on a not infrequent basis, which limited the impact of changes. Users’ experience appears to have varied (differently for different systems, in different countries, and for different types of use) from the average times cited by TMEA and government partners.

Kenya Country Programme reports particular gains in Outcome 2.2, despite having nothing to report against RF targets during the S1 period. Still, limited interviews to date do suggest useful change, related to some sectors more than others. Tanzania’s indicators are similarly underperforming, though some respondents in initial interviews also reported gains in single window operations. Uganda created its own set of nine indicators which show significant time reductions (from at least 9 days to around 3 per process in seven agencies) but do not respond to the stated question of time reductions (in the RF). By the final reporting period, nearly 28,000 consignments were under electronic seal in Uganda, compared to a target of 19,000. The reduction in transit time from Busia or Malaba to Ugandan exit borders was reported to be 81%. The 2017 AR gives Uganda a score of 88% on its RF achievements for this component. Rwanda reports an approximate reduction of 50% in export and import clearance times, including inspections, in two of three channels; the last channel was reported to be a focus of attention for S2.

2.3 Eliminating NTBs: setting up national monitoring committees that coordinated with the EAC-level NTBs body under the demands of the NTBs Act. TMEA’s support to this work has been particularly dedicated in Tanzania, according to respondents’ reports (both TMEA and other sources). Overall, TMEA cites 116 NTBs eliminated in their end-of-project RF; this, however, is not the way the indicator was designed. “High-priority” NTBs are not clearly defined in the RF nor divided by the “total number of High Priority NTBs still reported as outstanding.” The 2017 AR gives TMEA a 50% score on this indicator.

Rwanda reports a cumulative total of 40 NTBs eliminated; Tanzania reports 65 but clarifies that the criteria for prioritisation of NTBs have not been established. In Uganda, 92% (178
out of the total 193) of total cumulative NTBs reported were resolved, well above target. Kenya reported 6 NTBs resolved at end of project. Rwanda and Uganda scored 100% on this indicator in the 2017 AR; Tanzania’s indicator was judged not to be assessable and Kenya received a 0% score.

2.4 The **effective regional standards** pathway has the S1 goal of harmonization of agricultural and industrial standards for a set of the top twenty products recommended by the East Africa Business Council. The regional TMEA standards team works with the East Africa Standards Committee at the EAC on harmonization of standards, with private sector at national and regional levels, and with national standards bureaux. TMEA report reductions from 10 days to one half-day for gaining clearance. The target number of product standards technically harmonised at regional level was not likely to be reached though significant numbers of products were harmonised. Countries were on track to meet targets for the additional number of tests performed by their bureaux of standards. More SMEs were certified than the target figures, and select goods’ average time to test and issue relevant certificates surpassed TMEA targets. No progress was reported against the indicator for the number of Mutual Recognition Agreements (regional and bilateral) to be agreed and implemented.

Looking at the initial information from the Performance Evaluation data collection as well as the wealth of reports (internal, donor, and commissioned evaluations), the evaluation team touched on the following discussion points in considering the sample for this SO.

### Table 5: Discussion of SO2 and the CT criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. For which components (or results chains) do TMEA claim results, and where (regional or national level(s))? As a condition for this criterion, we would also want to see results chains where activities, outputs and outcomes were largely successfully implemented.</td>
<td>Outcome-level results are reported for ICT for Trade, NTBs, and Standards components. KCP respondents have emphasized (in addition to the SO1 projects) ICT for Trade gains; RCP has had enthusiastic and dedicated government partners for Standards and ICT for Trade; Tanzania’s work in NTBs was reported to be quite strong by TMEA and private sector partners. UCP had several strong areas (as evidenced by its overall 2017 AR outputs achievement score of 88%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Was the (claimed) maturity and potential scale of the impact sufficient to be detected by the evaluation?</td>
<td>SO2 interventions in ICT for Trade and Standards prioritise products and agencies from among those involved in trade processes. When successful, the process upgrades have strong effects in terms of time reductions in clearances and permits, as well as testing. In the selected country programmes, online portals, testing regimes and certifications, and reduced time for various processes should be easily detectable, given the magnitudes reported in the RF and early interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Does the results chain warrant investigation, in terms of scale? Components with materialized, detectable impacts that relate only to a small fraction of the scope of the issue might be disqualified here.</td>
<td>SO2 interventions in ICT for Trade and Standards prioritise products and agencies, from among many agencies and processes within agencies. The selection process is geared to have strong effects in terms of time reductions in clearances, permits and testing for important value chains. This work thereby signifies an attention to scope. The work on NTBs have that characteristic as well, given the stated attention to high-priority NTBs noted in the RF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Are data likely to be accessible, both within and outside TMEA, to substantiate the contribution claim?</td>
<td>Data for ICT for Trade and testing/standards outcomes are likely to be available from government agencies as well as TMEA. NTBs data will come from the Time-Bound Programme (EAC) as well as TMEA. This bodes well for a well-rounded look at overall outcomes. EAC data on standards harmonization outcomes is strong, but verification of countries’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The evaluation team proposes to include CT case studies from among the three “direct” components: ICT for Trade, Effective NTB Mechanisms, and Effective EAC Trading Standards. Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya would each be included in two case studies, and Uganda in three. The case studies would take each country signalled in the grid below into consideration when weighing the outcome, while also looking at the overall outcome and those countries’ contributions to that overall outcome.

Where multiple projects were undertaken in a given component, particularly ICT for Trade working on various activities, a further sub-sample of projects with the greatest contribution to results will be proposed. This would avoid stretching the evaluation team too thin.

The proposed sample for SO2 is shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SO2: Increased ease of trading across borders, through:</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Strengthen EAC regional trade integration</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Effective trade systems, agencies and procedures (ICT4Trade)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Effective NTB mechanisms</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Effective EAC trading standards</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3.4 Selection: SO3

SO3 on Improved Business Competitiveness had the smallest budget among the SOs, of about 13% of overall spend. Two components were “enabling” and two “direct”; of the latter, one component began quite late in Strategy 1. However, the SO also provides the most important programmatic attention to inclusivity, with its efforts to support women traders, small and medium sized entrepreneurs, civil society, and private sector organisations. Though these interventions were less costly than the other SOs, TMEA paid considerable attention to them.

3.1.1 The Private sector- and civil society-led policy formulation (PSO/CSO) component involved in-depth technical assistance for industry associations, chambers of commerce, apex bodies (i.e., associations of associations), smallholder cooperatives and CSOs that support them, and civil society organisations. The TMEA RF reports 89 regional level policies, 45 of which were tax proposals that were accepted by EAC Partner States. KCP reported a cumulative total of 99 policy recommendations adopted, Rwanda reported 43,
Burundi 21, and Uganda 11. A second indicator on the number of these policies that reflected gender-related efforts resulted in 3 such policies. The numbers of policies serve as good output indicators but less well as outcome indicators, owing largely to the types of projects. Such “enabling” projects that were sampled by the evaluation team in the interim evaluation report on SO2 and SO3 indicate that the activities left installed capacity with the PSOs and CSOs with whom TMEA worked.

The team leading this component was called upon in some instances to use advocacy and dialogue to facilitate the outcomes of SO1 and SO2. In the case of Mombasa Port, for example, advocacy work with the Dockworkers’ Union was seen as critical for advancing the workplan. The extent to which 3.1.1 supported other SOs will be explored in the interviews that provide a response to HEQ5, particularly in terms of synergies (DEQ5.8), coherence (DEQ5.7), and lessons learned around the theory of change (DEQ5.1).

Work in component 3.1.2, Improved processes for traders, especially women, was designed to support informal cross-border traders. Women make up the majority of this group, across East African economies. TMEA worked with partners to create and install gender-sensitive policy frameworks for trade, particularly but not exclusively at border posts, and to train women cross border traders and entrepreneurs. Training WCBTs brings women traders into the formal system, improves their security, and enables them to demand the rights they have as citizens and as entrepreneurs. The policy frameworks sub-pathway relies on government engagement to put better policies in place and see that they are enforced. Average border crossing time for these users at five borders was reported to have dropped to 30 minutes or less, from a baseline average of 120 minutes. Only Tanzania and Burundi report not having achieved this goal. An indicator on the number of women traders facilitated to trade formally across borders bears mixed data, with some countries reporting the number of trained women without specifying whether formality patterns have changed. In all, however, many more women and cooperatives were trained than were targeted. Only South Sudan measured increase in knowledge per se, but a regional TMEA study recorded over 100% increase in cross border revenue among respondents (though a wider income study was underway when the RF was finalised; results are still expected from TMEA). The 2017 AR scores this component 85% achieved in terms of indicators.

The evaluation team proposes not to cover this component in the CT case studies. First, TMEA deems this component “enabling”, rather than “direct”, which is reflected in the indicators listed above: most of these are stronger as outputs than as outcomes. Where indicators do attempt to measure outcomes, as in the case of change in income, data are incomplete. The work accomplished, while clearly vital and likely quite successful, appears not to be of a scale or maturity level in terms of broader, at-scale goals including stable and national government frameworks, sustainability and continuity.

Further, the Poverty and Gender Impact Study (PGIS) will look in-depth at the Women and Trade activities in several countries, using extensive site visits, focus groups, interviews and participatory evaluation methods. This is far more, and more in-depth, attention than the Performance Evaluation can devote to the issues. By reserving the close study of these cases for the PGIS, and excluding it from CT case studies, the evaluation can focus its efforts across the theory of change without duplication of effort.

3.2 Export capability component work varied by country according to opportunities determined by country programmes. This component began later in the life of TMEA, rolling out projects in 2016. The projects have shown promise but have not had as much time as other projects to reach outcome goals. This category includes activities categorised as 3.2.1 Improved quality and standards of goods and services, and 3.2.2 Increased trade in services. Projects are generally smaller than in the other SOs, in terms of scope and scale as well as cost.
TMEA’s activities began in landlocked countries – Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. Since TMEA’s mandate is broader and more systemic than “traditional” value chain projects, some observers were uncertain this component was appropriate. However, in thinking of how to enhance the business environment for export, TMEA tried to conceptualise these projects differently, such as by facilitating specialised certifications, establishing links all the way along the value chain to gourmet markets (for coffee, for example), and supporting export-ready cooperatives and farmers to take the next step. They also emphasised the poverty, gender, jobs and economic empowerment aspects of the work, in order to ensure its relevance to the TMEA mandate.

A coffee project in Burundi and Rwanda on standards and access to markets was on track to achieve 10-15% increases in volume and value of coffee sales. Another in Uganda was awaiting impact data for projects regarding maize and sesame standards that had been promulgated through the EAC standards work in SO2.

Another link is to the Strategy 2 focus on trade logistics hubs: the export capability activities have informed the creation of these hubs, which are synergistic in nature.

Activities in component 3.3 Effective and innovative logistics services were designed to enhance business competitiveness by supporting transporters, freight forwarders and others in aligning their positions to form a coherent logistics advocacy group and in strengthening their associations and their industry with capacity building and increasing the participation of women. The East African Freight Forwarders Association was one key target, with their national partners. Respondents interviewed during the first evaluation visits to Uganda and Rwanda report having created strong logistics platforms in each country, while continuing to work on their own sustainability.

Corporate results reported in the RF show a small number of trainees, a short list of innovations supported through a challenge fund, and significant efforts in industry advocacy. However, the RF also notes the component was suspended “due to management concerns,” which in interviews were said to be related to a corruption scandal in one of the organisations charged with carrying out training. The outcomes in the RF were therefore not achieved, and therefore this component – while promising and with a strong redesign for S2 – doesn’t meet the criteria for a CT case study.

**Table 7: Discussion of SO3 and the CT criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. For which components (or results chains) do TMEA claim results, and where (regional or national level(s))? As a condition for this criterion, we would also want to see results chains where activities, outputs and outcomes were largely successfully implemented.</td>
<td>Indicators for 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 are primarily at the output level; one indicator for increased annual income reported by women traders has only preliminary information. 3.2 on Export capability has indicators of increased revenue, reduction in rejection of cargo, and entities implementing trading standards or accessing new markets. These indicators better express outcomes that go beyond the results of TMEA’s direct interventions. Component 3.3 was suspended and no outcome data are provided in the RF. We therefore exclude 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Was the (claimed) maturity and potential scale of the impact sufficient to be detected by the evaluation?</td>
<td>Having ruled out 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.3 above, the evaluation is left with 3.2 from among all of SO3. The work in the Export capability component began quite late in Strategy 1, and so its activities may lack the “maturity” sought. However, data are reported against outcome indicators in the RF for this component, and where these exist, the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The evaluation team believes it possible to look at this case critically in the context of a late start.

3. Does the results chain warrant investigation, in terms of scale? Components with materialized, detectable impacts that relate only to a small fraction of the scope of the issue might be disqualified here.

Export capability is a somewhat contentious component among TMEA’s donors, given possible overlap with other donor programming in value chains. Looking at this results chain with those criticisms in mind, the evaluation team feels we can interrogate the notion that TMEA’s work in value chains can be differentiated based on a) the need to improve the business environment across export sectors in order to increase entrance into export markets, including for small and women-owned businesses, and/or b) removing obstacles to export access that have a systemic character, in which there may be scaled or scaleable benefits.

4. Are data likely to be accessible, both within and outside TMEA, to substantiate the contribution claim?

There are data within TMEA on the Export capability interventions; there may be some available as well from within supported cooperatives and value chains. The evaluation team would include visits to some supported projects to supplement this information, particularly in the case of indicators on how entities are now using new standards and accessing new markets, and on job creation figures.

5. Which cases will best answer each of the three SO-related DEQs?

Export capability is the only one of the four SO3 components to meet – at least somewhat – the criteria for CT case studies. Achievement of outcomes is therefore going to be difficult to assess for SO3 in any case; the evaluation team believe this component provides the best opportunity to do so.

Given that 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 are enabling projects and their indicators are chiefly at output level rather than outcome; and that 3.3 did not reach its outcomes, 3.2 Export capability becomes the best option for representing potential impacts for SO3. Activities under this component took place in three countries, Kenya and Rwanda of which appear in initial conversations to be the strongest. Because of the breadth of small, disparate activities, the evaluation team will propose a subselection of these projects in the countries selected, based on the degree to which the projects contribute to RF-reported outcomes.

Table 8: Proposed sample, SO3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SO3: Enhanced business environment for trade; improved export capability; and efficient trade logistics services</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Private sector-/civil society-led policy formulation (advocacy)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 Improved processes for traders, esp. women</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.2 Export capability</strong>&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Effective and innovative logistics services</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>3</sup> Pathway “3.2: Export capability” is a portmanteau of the three pathways originally planned in this section of the theory of change. The original pathways do not constitute significant efforts singly, because these areas received lesser, and later attention in programming. Combined, however, they represent a set of export capability efforts.
2 Overall proposed sample

The summed proposed sample is shown in the table below, indicated by shaded boxes.

Table 9: Proposed sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO1: Reduced corridor times; increased corridor volumes</strong> (through improved transport laws and infrastructure)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Mombasa Port</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Dar Port</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 OSBPs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO2: Increased ease of trading across borders, through:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Strengthen EAC regional trade integration</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Effective trade systems, agencies and procedures (ICT4Trade)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Effective NTB mechanisms</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Effective EAC trading standards</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SO3: Enhanced business environment for trade; improved export capability; and efficient trade logistics services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Private sector-/civil society-led policy formulation (advocacy)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 Improved processes for traders, esp. women</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Export capability5</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Effective and innovative logistics services</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 Enabling project sets are written in grey font, while those of direct projects are in black. An X indicates that there were activities for a given country under the appropriate column; when the X is bold, the component is noteworthy in that country. Other country selections (in coloured shading) are somewhat more interchangeable; that is, there is no particular reason to select one country over another between, for example, Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda under 2.3 Effective NTB mechanisms. Tanzania’s case, however, is stronger and should be retained.

5 Pathway “3.2: Export capability” is a portmanteau of the three pathways originally planned in this section of the theory of change. The original pathways do not constitute significant efforts singly, because these areas received lesser, and later attention in programming. Combined, however, they represent a set of export capability efforts.
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Annex I: Interview Guides
INTRODUCTION:


1. Please tell me about your experience with the programme/project.

2. What, in your opinion, were the most useful aspects of the programme/project? [Probe on specific trainings, topics, or supports provided.] Why were these most useful?

3. How have you been able to use what you learned in the programme/project? [Probe on specific examples for change stories. With exporters, probe on any changes that reduced barriers specific to exporting.]
   
   a. **DEQ5.1b** Have you (or your company or industry) increased your East African or other external trade in the last decade? PROBE Why or why not, multiple factors, time/cost/volume, permit processes)

   b. **HEQ2** Have you experienced any changes in your access to markets or ability to trade across borders, over the last decade or so? (PROBE concrete outcomes: times, volumes, cost, and evidence that supports each)

4. How would you describe the impact of the programme/project on your trading (or livelihood) activities? [Probe for specific changes in revenue/income, quality of products/services, trade/production volume, trade time, trade costs, quality of experience at border posts, etc.]

5. **DEQ5.4a, HEQ2** Are there other factors that you think caused these changes? (PROBE for political economy if not mentioned)

6. **DEQ2.4a** What outcomes/results were unexpected? Who was affected? (PROBE: positive or negative)
RELEVANCE

7. **HEQ2** Do you have any challenges or obstacles that keep you from exporting, or from exporting more? (PROBE and enter the answer appropriately below – do not read categories.)
   a. Infrastructure related?
   b. Related to permits, certification, or other national or regional trade regulations or standards?
   c. Problems related to the business environment?
   d. Other? (Examples might include difficulties importing capital equipment or raw materials/intermediate goods; qualified staff)

8. Based on the experience you have had since participating in the programme/project, is there anything in the programme/project you would change or anything you would add to make it stronger for future participants? [Probe on specific topics, activities, supports.]

9. **DEQ5.13, 5.5** Are there any other donor, government or private sector initiatives that support you (your company or industry) in the same area? If so, who are they? Have they helped you (or your company/industry), and if so, how?

SUSTAINABILITY

10. **DEQ5.17** [Referring to any possibly programme/project related changes captured in the first questions] do you think those changes are likely to be sustained? Why or why not?

CLOSING

11. **DEQ5.1i, 5.6b, 2.4b** Is there anything you’d like to relate about your experiences in this programme/project that we’ve not asked about?
INTRODUCTION:
Independent evaluation, for DFID, looking at STRATEGY 1 (2010 to mid-2017).
Confidentiality.

1. **CSC1** Please tell us a little about your organization – what are your goals?

2. **CSC2** How many members or beneficiaries do you serve? What is the ratio of men to women?

3. **CSC3** Is there a women’s focus to your activities?

4. **Please tell me about your history with Trademark.**

5. **DEQ5.1b** Tell me the headlines: what outcomes did you and TMEA accomplish together in S1? (Let them tell the story, but emphasise briefly, headlines, concisely… whatever it takes)

6. **HEQ2a** Can you choose one among those which feels like the most concrete and important outcome? (PROBE concrete outcomes: times, volumes, cost, and evidence that supports them)

**INTERVIEWER: PLEASE TICK STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO WHICH THIS OUTCOME CONTRIBUTES**
HEQ2.1______To SO1 reducing corridor times and/or increasing corridor volumes?
HEQ2.2______To SO2 increasing ease of trading across borders?
HEQ2.3______To SO3 improving business competitiveness?

7. **DEQ2.4a** What outcomes were unexpected? Who was affected? (PROBE: positive or negative)

**THEORY OF CHANGE, STRATEGY, RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

8. **DEQ5.6a** Going back to that main outcome, why did it work? What factors made it work?

9. **DEQ5.6a** What were inhibitors or obstacles?
10. **DEQ5.7b** Was your organisation involved with TMEA in any other country or countries?

11. **DEQ5.1l** Did your collaboration with TMEA go according to plan? Please explain.

12. **DEQ 5.6d** What would you change in your work with Trademark, knowing what you know now?

**RELEVANCE**

13. **DEQ5.5c** What does your organisation do to promote regional trade development and integration, if anything?

14. **DEQ5.5d** How did Trademark’s work align or not with your work?

15. **DEQ5.4a** Did any changes (2010-2017) in the political economy affect your outcomes with TMEA? If so, how? (Political economy: changes in government or interactions between political and economic processes and interests in a society)

**COORDERANCE AND COORDINATION**

16. **DEQ5.8** Were there any ways your work with TMEA and other TMEA or outside actors achieved synergies (i.e., achieved more together than you might have separately)?

17. **DEQ5.10, 5.11** Did TMEA governance or donor issues help or hinder your achievements?

18. **DEQ5.12c** Did Trademark align with government systems and agencies? If so, did this affect your work with them, or your success? Why or why not?

19. **DEQ5.13a, 5.5a** Have you been engaged with any other donors or other initiatives on trade issues in your country? If so, what was your engagement?

**SUSTAINABILITY**

20. **DEQ5.17** Are any S1 benefits likely to be sustained? Why or why not?

21. **DEQ5.20b** To what degree will you take lessons learnt from the collaboration with TMEA into account in the future?

**CLOSING**

22. **DEQ5.1i, 5.6b, 2.4b** Is there anything you’d like to relate about your experiences in S1 that we’ve not asked about?
INTRODUCTION:


1. Please tell me about your history with Trademark.

2. DEQ5.1b Tell me the headlines: what outcomes did your team has accomplish as part of S1? (Let them tell the story, but emphasise briefly, headlines, concisely… whatever it takes)

3. HEQ2a Can you choose one among those which feels like the most concrete and important outcome? (PROBE concrete outcomes: times, volumes, cost, and evidence that supports them)

4. HEQ2b What were the steps?

5. HEQ2c What evidence supports the outcome having happened?

6. HEQ2d What evidence supports Trademark’s responsibility for the outcome?

INTERVIEWER: PLEASE TICK STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO WHICH THIS OUTCOME CONTRIBUTES

HEQ2.1 To SO1 reducing corridor times and/or increasing corridor volumes?
HEQ2.2 To SO2 increasing ease of trading across borders?
HEQ2.3 To SO3 improving business competitiveness?

7. DEQ2.4a What outcomes were unexpected? Who was affected? (PROBE: positive or negative)

THEORY OF CHANGE, RESULTS FRAMEWORK

8. DEQ5.6a Going back to that main outcome, why did it work? What factors made it work?

9. DEQ5.6a What were inhibitors or obstacles?

10. DEQ5.1c Were you involved in the design or adaptation of your component? (PROBE process)
11. **DEQ5.1h** Did this result in a document? If so, did you use it? When?

12. **DEQ5.1j** Did any early assumptions not come about? What were they and what were the effects?

13. **DEQ5.1d** How did the S1 Results Framework (RF) affect your component?

14. **DEQ5.1e** Did you have any problems meeting the data needs called for by the RF?

15. **DEQ5.1f** How could they be more helpful in the future?

16. **DEQ5.1k** How would you change how you worked on your component, knowing what you know now?

**Relevance**

17. **DEQ5.4a** What were COUNTRY’s policies and priorities for your component? [Probe component’s alignment with those policies/priorities and the systems they used.]

18. **DEQ5.4b** Did any changes (2010-2017) in the political economy affect your outcomes with TMEA? If so, how? (Changes in government or interactions between political and economic processes and interests in a society) (Seek ways to probe political issues, perhaps a 2nd meeting)?

**Coherence and Coordination in Implementation**

19. Please tell me briefly how you coordinate with all the other actors? [PROBE for EAC (DEQ5.3), TMEA corporate (DEQ5.7), government, donors (DEQ5.11); PROBE challenges, ways to improve, quality of relationships]

20. **DEQ5.8** Were there ways your component and other components or TMEA actors achieved synergies with your work (i.e., achieved more together than you might have separately)?

21. **DEQ5.9** Did the non-profit working model affect your work or ability to reach outcomes?

22. **DEQ5.10** Did the TMEA governance arrangements affect your work? If so, how?

23. **DEQ5.13a, 5.5** What other initiatives (donor, private, government) work in your component area?

24. **DEQ5.13b** Did coordination among these actors improve, worsen, stay the same? If improved, was TMEA involved in coordination?
25. *DEQ5.14* Which approaches have most helped you work with African regional institutions? Why? [PROBE EAC, others RECs, corridor commission…]

SUSTAINABILITY

26. *DEQ5.17* Are any S1 benefits likely to be sustained? Why or why not?

27. *DEQ5.20b* Will the stakeholders take TMEA lessons learnt into account? Can you give us one concrete example about how?

28. CLOSING: *DEQ5.1i, 5.6b, 2.4b* Is there anything you’d like to relate about your experiences that we’ve not asked about?
### INTRODUCTION:


1. **Please tell me about your work in trade and trade infrastructure in the Northern corridor.** (PROBE about roads, as well as any work at PORT, OSBP, or on NTBs, ICT for Trade, Standards or with the EAC)

2. **What kinds of data do you use to show whether your efforts have had the desired outcomes?** (PROBE for data on trade times, costs and volumes)
   
   a. Are you confident with data quality? Why or why not?

   b. Is it possible to share your reports and data, for the purposes of the evaluation?

3. **What kinds of coordination have you had with Trademark between 2010 and 2017, if any?**

4. **What is your opinion of Trademark’s role in trade and trade infrastructure in the region?**

   a. Do you think Trademark has had positive impacts? If so, what were they? Do you see them as sustainable?

   b. What is your opinion of how they align with other donors, with the EAC, and with the governments of the region?

   c. What is your opinion of the strengths and weaknesses of Trademark?

5. **DEQ2.4a Has collaborating or coordinating with Trademark resulted in any synergies?**

6. **DEQ5.12a, 5.4a Would you say that this government’s priorities for regional trade development have changed since 2010? If so, what were the changes and how has your agency dealt with those changes?**
7. **DEQ5.4b** Did any changes (2010-2017) in the political economy affect your outcomes? How? (Political economy: changes in government or interactions between political and economic interests in a society)

8. **DEQ5.13b** Did coordination among these actors improve, worsen, stay the same? If improved, was TMEA involved in coordination?

9. **DEQ5.14** What approaches did TMEA use to work with regional institutions in Africa, and which are most successful? Why?

10. **CLOSING:** **DEQ5.1i, 5.6b, 2.4b** Is there anything you’d like to relate about your experience with TMEA in Strategy 1 that we’ve not asked about?
INTRODUCTION:


1. **Please tell me about your history with Trademark.**

2. **DEQ5.1b** What were the main TMEA outcomes or accomplishments as part of S1? (Emphasise brevity, headlines, conciseness)

3. **HEQ2a** Can you choose one among those which feels like the most concrete and important outcome? (PROBE concrete outcomes: times, volumes, cost, and evidence that supports them)

INTREVIWER: PLEASE TICK STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO WHICH THIS OUTCOME CONTRIBUTES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>HEQ2.1</th>
<th>To SO1 reducing corridor times and/or increasing corridor volumes?</th>
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<td>HEQ2.2</td>
<td>To SO2 increasing ease of trading across borders?</td>
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<td>HEQ2.3</td>
<td>To SO3 improving business competitiveness?</td>
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4. **DEQ2.4a** What outcomes were unexpected? Who was affected? (PROBE: positive or negative)

THEORY OF CHANGE, STRATEGY, RESULTS FRAMEWORK: I recognize those achievements and want to know what factors contributed to those successes.

5. **DEQ5.6a** Going back to that main outcome, why did it work? What factors made it work?

6. **DEQ5.6a** What were inhibitors or obstacles?

7. **DEQ5.1c** To what extent did TMEA work from a plan, like a strategy or theory of change? (PROBE actors/process, and strength of the causal logic)

8. **DFID ONLY DEQ5.1d** How well did the S1 Results Framework (RF) work for keeping tabs on TMEA’s progress? (PROBE for how the evidence did/did not help TMEA tell their story, and how assumptions around political economy were/were not realised)
RELEVANCE

9. **DEQ5.12a, 5.4a** What are COUNTRY government’s priorities in terms of regional trade development? How did these change over the course of S1? (PROBE for effects on TMEA)

10. **DEQ5.3** Do you think TMEA supported EAC regional or country trade development priorities? Why or why not?

11. **DEQ5.12b** Did TMEA activities align with COUNTRY trade priorities? (PROBE for improvement)

12. **DEQ5.12c** Did TMEA align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership and impact? (PROBE for ways to improve.)

13. **DEQ5.4b** Did any changes (2010-2017) in the political economy affect your outcomes? How? (Political economy: changes in government or interactions between political and economic interests in a society)

COHERENCE AND COORDINATION IN IMPLEMENTATION

14. **How did TMEA coordinate with other actors?** [PROBE for EAC (DEQ5.3), TMEA corporate (DEQ5.7), government, donors (DEQ5.11); PROBE challenges, ways to improve, quality of relationships]

15. **DEQ5.8** Were there ways TMEA achieved synergies with their work (i.e., achieved more together than you might have separately)? (PROBE how this could be improved)

16. **DEQ5.9** Did the non-profit working model affect TMEA’s work or ability to reach outcomes?

17. **DEQ5.10** Did the TMEA governance arrangements affect their work? If so, how?

18. **DEQ5.11** Was the donor operational model appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? (PROBE strengths and weaknesses)

19. **DEQ5.13a, 5.5a** Thinking about other initiatives that support trade here, whether from government, other donors, or elsewhere, were TMEA’s focus and activities consistent with and additional to those other initiatives?

20. **DEQ5.13b** Did coordination among these actors improve, worsen, stay the same? If improved, was TMEA involved in coordination?

21. **DEQ5.14** What approaches did TMEA use to work with regional institutions in Africa, and which are most successful? Why?
SUSTAINABILITY

22. **DEQ5.17** Are any S1 benefits likely to be sustained? Why or why not?

23. **DFID ONLY DEQ5.20a** Do stakeholders continue to engage with TMEA after S1 funding ended? Can you give a concrete example?

24. **DFID ONLY DEQ5.20b** Will S1 stakeholders take TMEA lessons learnt into account? Can you give us a concrete example about how?

25. **CLOSING: DEQ5.1i, 5.6b, 2.4b** Is there anything you’d like to relate about your experience with TMEA in S1 that we’ve not asked about?
INTRODUCTION:

1. Please tell me about your history with Trademark.

2. DEQ5.1b Tell me the headlines: what outcomes did you and TMEA accomplish together in S1? (Let them tell the story, but emphasise briefly, headlines, concisely… whatever it takes)

3. HEQ2a Can you choose one among those which feels like the most concrete and important outcome? (PROBE concrete outcomes: times, volumes, cost, and evidence that supports them)

INTERVIEWER: PLEASE TICK STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO WHICH THIS OUTCOME CONtributes
HEQ2.1______To SO1 reducing corridor times and/or increasing corridor volumes?
HEQ2.2______To SO2 increasing ease of trading across borders?
HEQ2.3______To SO3 improving business competitiveness?

4. DEQ2.4a What outcomes were unexpected? Who was affected? (PROBE: positive or negative)

THEORY OF CHANGE, STRATEGY, RESULTS FRAMEWORK
5. DEQ5.6a Going back to that main outcome, why did it work? What factors made it work?

6. DEQ5.6a What were inhibitors or obstacles?

7. DEQ5.1l Did your collaboration with TMEA go according to plan? Please explain.

RELEVANCE
8. DEQ5.3b In what ways did your work with TMEA align or not with the goals of your agency?
9. **DEQ5.4a** Did any changes (2010-2017) in the political economy affect your outcomes with TMEA? If so, how? (Political economy: changes in government or interactions between political and economic processes and interests in a society)

**COHERENCE AND COORDINATION**

10. **DEQ5.8** Were there ways your component and other components or TMEA actors achieved synergies with your work (i.e., achieved more together than you might have separately)?

11. **DEQ5.10, 5.11** Did TMEA governance or donors affect your achievements, and if so, how?

12. **DEQ5.12d** How did TMEA work with your agency? (PROBE for ways to improve, if any.)

13. **DEQ5.13a, 5.5a** What other initiatives (donor or private sector) worked in your sector in this country?

14. **DEQ5.13b** Did coordination with other initiatives improve, worsen, stay the same?

**SUSTAINABILITY**

15. **DEQ5.17** Are S1 benefits likely to be sustained? Why or why not?

16. **DEQ5.20b** To what degree will you take lessons learnt from the collaboration with TMEA into account in the future?

**CLOSING**

17. **DEQ5.1i, 5.6b, 2.4b** Is there anything you’d like to relate about your experiences in S1 that we’ve not asked about?
INTRODUCTION:

1. Please tell me about your history with Trademark.

2. **DEQ5.1a In S1, which components did this country office work on?** PROBE PIOs.

3. **DEQ5.1b Tell me the headlines: what outcomes did your team has accomplish as part of S1?** (Let them tell the story, but emphasise briefly, headlines, concisely… whatever it takes)

4. **HEQ2a Can you choose one among those which feels like the most concrete and important outcome?** (PROBE concrete outcomes: times, volumes, cost, and evidence that supports them)

INTERVIEWER: PLEASE TICK STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO WHICH THIS OUTCOME CONTRIBUTES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ2.1</th>
<th>To SO1 reducing corridor times and/or increasing corridor volumes?</th>
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<tr>
<td>HEQ2.2</td>
<td>To SO2 increasing ease of trading across borders?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEQ2.3</td>
<td>To SO3 improving business competitiveness?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **DEQ2.4a What outcomes were unexpected? Who was affected?** (PROBE: positive or negative)

THEORY OF CHANGE, STRATEGY, RESULTS FRAMEWORK: I recognize those achievements and want to know what factors contributed to those successes.

6. **DEQ5.6a Going back to that main outcome, why did it work? What factors made it work?**

7. **DEQ5.6a What were inhibitors or obstacles?**

8. **DEQ5.1c How were your strategy and/or theory of change designed?** (PROBE actors/process)
9. **DEQ5.1d** How did the S1 Results Framework (RF) affect your programming? (PROBE as necessary for relevance, ease of use, usefulness, positive/negative)

10. **DEQ5.1e** Did you have any problems meeting the data needs called for by the RF?

11. **DEQ5.1f** How could the RF be more helpful in the future?

**RELEVANCE**

12. **DEQ5.12a, 5.4a** What are the government’s priorities in terms of regional trade development? How did these change over the course of S1?

13. **DEQ5.12b** Tell us how you aligned activities with the government’s own trade priorities. What could have been improved?

14. **DEQ5.4b** Did any changes (2010-2017) in the political economy affect your outcomes? How? (Political economy: changes in government or interactions between political and economic interests in a society) (Seek opportunities to probe on political issues, perhaps in a 2nd meeting)?

**COHERENCE AND COORDINATION IN IMPLEMENTATION**

15. Please tell me briefly how you coordinate with all the other actors? [PROBE for EAC (DEQ5.3), TMEA corporate (DEQ5.7), government, donors (DEQ5.11); PROBE challenges, ways to improve, quality of relationships]

16. **DEQ5.8** Were there ways your component and other components or TMEA actors achieved synergies with your work (i.e., achieved more together than you might have separately)?

17. **DEQ5.9** Did the non-profit working model affect your work or ability to reach outcomes?

18. **DEQ5.10** Did the TMEA governance arrangements affect your work? If so, how?

19. **DEQ5.13a, 5.5a** What other initiatives support trade here? (PROBE for government, donors, CSO, private sector or other initiatives.)

20. **DEQ5.13b** Did coordination among these actors improve, worsen, stay the same? If improved, was TMEA involved in coordination?

21. **DEQ5.14** What approaches has your team used to work with regional institutions in Africa, and which are most successful? Why?
SUSTAINABILITY

22. **DEQ5.17** *Are any S1 benefits likely to be sustained? Why or why not?*

23. **DEQ5.20a** *From a management perspective, describe stakeholder engagement with TMEA in S1 and since.* *(Stakeholders: recipients) (PROBE government partners, business/industry, CSOs)*

24. **DEQ5.20b** *Will the stakeholders take TMEA lessons learnt into account? Can you give us a concrete example about how?*

25. **CLOSING: DEQ5.1i, 5.6b, 2.4b** *Is there anything you’d like to relate about your experiences in S1 that we’ve not asked about?*
PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVE - EXTERNAL

INTRODUCTION:

1. **Please tell me about your history with Trademark, if any, or what you know about them.**

Gateway of cocaine into Europe

$200m-$400m cost in the last year, double cost to importers last year and this year, times doubled with full inspection, reaction to negative public naming and shaming of colleagues.

2. **DEQ5.1b Tell me how East African and other external trade is important for your work.** (PROBE import, export, transit, and their route/means of transport)

3. **DEQ5.1b Has your company [or industry] increased its East African or other external trade in the last ten years?** (PROBE Why or why not, multiple factors, time/cost/volume, permit processes)

4. **HEQ2 Have you experienced any changes in your access to markets or ability to trade across borders, over the last ten years or so?** (PROBE concrete outcomes: times, volumes, cost, and evidence that supports each)

5. **HEQ2 To your knowledge, have any such changes [in access to markets?] been influenced by:**
   a. Changes in infrastructure at ports, borders, rail or other?
   b. Changes in export permit procedures, standards or other national or regional trade regulations/ processes you must follow?
   c. Changes in transport security, or other issues like transit cargo being illegally unloaded before they reach customs clearance, to avoid paying customs duty?
   d. Changes in the business environment? (examples might include: satellite tracking of shipments, truck scanners, professional trucking operations (reliability of truckers and their vehicles),
border crossing procedures, trade finance, packaging, un/loading, transshipment, corruption…)

9 **Other changes?** [Probe: what were they?]

6. **DEQ5.4a, HEQ2** What do you think caused these changes? (PROBE for political economy if not mentioned)

**INTERVIEWER:** PLEASE TICK STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO WHICH THIS RESPONDENT ATTRIBUTES CHANGE, IF ANY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEQ2.1</th>
<th>To SO1 reducing corridor times and/or increasing corridor volumes?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEQ2.2</td>
<td>To SO2 increasing ease of trading across borders?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEQ2.3</td>
<td>To SO3 improving business competitiveness?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RELEVANCE**

7. **HEQ2** Do you have any challenges or obstacles that keep you from exporting, or from exporting more? (PROBE and enter the answer appropriately below – do not read categories.)

   a. **Infrastructure rated?**

   b. **Related to permits, certification, or other national or regional trade regulations or standards?**

   c. **Problems related to the business environment?**

   d. **Other?** *(Examples might include difficulties importing capital equipment or raw materials/intermediate goods; qualified staff)*

8. **DEQ5.5d** Does your company/industry promote regional trade development and integration? If so, how?

9. **DEQ5.13, 5.5** Do you know of donor, government or private sector initiatives that work on trade? If so, what are they? Have they helped your company/industry, and if so, how?

**SUSTAINABILITY**

10. **DEQ5.17** [Referring to any possibly TMEA-related changes captured in the first questions] *do you think those changes are likely to be sustained? Why or why not?*

**CLOSING**

11. **DEQ5.1i, 5.6b, 2.4b** Is there anything you’d like to relate about your experiences in trade that we’ve not asked about?
INTRODUCTION:
Independent evaluation, for DFID, looking at STRATEGY 1 (2010 to mid-2017).
Confidentiality.

1. Please tell me about your history with Trademark.

2. **DEQ5.1b** Tell me the headlines: what outcomes did you and TMEA accomplish together in S1? (Let them tell the story, but emphasise briefly, headlines, concisely… whatever it takes)

3. **HEQ2a** Can you choose one among those which feels like the most concrete and important outcome? (PROBE concrete outcomes: times, volumes, cost, and evidence that supports them)

INTERVIEWER: PLEASE TICK STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO WHICH THIS OUTCOME CONTRIBUTES

- HEQ2.1 To SO1 reducing corridor times and/or increasing corridor volumes?
- HEQ2.2 To SO2 increasing ease of trading across borders?
- HEQ2.3 To SO3 improving business competitiveness?

4. **DEQ2.4a** What outcomes were unexpected? Who was affected? (PROBE: positive or negative)

THEORY OF CHANGE, STRATEGY, RESULTS FRAMEWORK

5. **DEQ5.6a** Going back to that main outcome, why did it work? What factors made it work?

6. **DEQ5.6a** What were inhibitors or obstacles?

7. **DEQ5.1l** Did your collaboration with TMEA go according to plan? Please explain.

8. **DEQ 5.6d** What would you change in your work with Trademark, knowing what you know now?
RELEVANCE

9. **DEQ5.5d** How does your industry promote regional trade development and integration?

10. **DEQ5.5e** How did Trademark’s work align or not with your work?

11. **DEQ5.12c** Did TMEA align with government systems and agencies? If so, did this affect your work with them, or your success? Why or why not?

12. **DEQ5.4a** Did any changes (2010-2017) in the political economy affect your outcomes with TMEA? If so, how? (Political economy: changes in government or interactions between political and economic processes and interests in a society)

COHERENCE AND COORDINATION

13. **DEQ5.8** Were there any ways your work and other TMEA or government actors achieved synergies (i.e., achieved more together than you might have separately)?

14. **DEQ5.9** TMEA operated as a non-profit. Did this affect your work or ability to achieve outcomes?

15. **DEQ5.10, 5.11** Did TMEA governance or donors affect your achievements?

16. **DEQ5.13a, 5.5a** What other donor, government or private sector initiatives work on trade?

17. **DEQ5.13c** What engagement have you had with those other projects and programmes, if any?

SUSTAINABILITY

18. **DEQ5.17** Are any S1 benefits likely to be sustained? Why or why not?

19. **DEQ5.20b** To what degree will you take lessons learnt from the collaboration with TMEA into account in the future?

CLOSING

20. **DEQ5.1i, 5.6b, 2.4b** Is there anything you’d like to relate about your experiences in S1 that we’ve not asked about?
### CASE:

#### Narrative Summary:

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<td></td>
<td>Evidence that outputs were caused by TMEA Activities</td>
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<td>Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is True</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is Not True</td>
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<td>Belief in Claim after Seeing Evidence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Evidence that TMEA interventions contributed to outcomes</td>
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<td>Belief in Claim after Seeing Evidence</td>
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<td>Evidence that TMEA interventions contributed to impacts</td>
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<td>Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is NOT true</td>
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<td>Belief in Claim after Seeing Evidence</td>
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## CASE:

Reference Table for Calculating Beliefs after seeing evidence

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Likely</td>
<td>VL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>About as likely as not</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>UL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely</td>
<td>VUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionally Unlikely</td>
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1 The purpose of this annex

This annex looks at TMEA’s programmatic components individually and answers the DEQs by component, also called Programme Intermediate Outcomes (PIOs). More detailed evidence is presented here for each of these components from the countries visited and the range of actors interviewed, and sites observed. While not all of this would fit into the main body of the report, this annex allows for the discussion and analysis of the data on a component-by-component level, and allows a more visible role for the range of evidence and perspectives. Key findings from this annex are captured in the main body of the report.

The evaluation and this annex were built around the following understanding of the TMEA Theory of Change (ToC), which emerges from their Results Framework (RF) and its concrete (if incomplete) alignment of projects, leading to outputs, to outcomes, and to impacts. Within three Strategic Objectives (in green), S1 worked on the PIOs (blue boxes) specified below. Programme Outputs (in yellow) represent clusters of projects conducted in country programmes and from regional level. The PIOs form the structure of the annex, with two adjustments. First, PIO1.1 on improving transport laws and infrastructure, was broken down into the three main sub-categories of projects – Mombasa and Dar Ports, and the OSBPs. Second, the SO3 activities in export capability (3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 in the diagram) were bundled into one PIO because these were smaller clusters of work.

Figure 1: Implicit ToC from the RF
2 SO1 PIO 1.1 Mombasa Port

2.1 Summary

TMEA’s Mombasa Port interventions comprise some of the most visible and important activities under S1. In addition to the obvious measure of programme expenditure (which was more than for most other PIOs), efficient port operations and sufficient port capacity are critical for the Northern Corridor, to bring about decreased time and cost of trade to the benefit of the private sector and citizens of the region. Improving port functioning was always a primary objective of TMEA for this reason, in strong alignment with the regional trade integration goals of the EAC and those of the Government of Kenya (GoK).

Theories of change (ToCs) were not yet well-embedded in development partner protocol when TMEA began, but they did become so over the life of S1. TMEA was asked to produce a ToC about their overall programme and about projects, and for this PIO – as such a critical set of interventions – a results chain was prepared to accompany the activities, already in progress. As the PE reported in the main body of the report, this was not followed with an iterative ToC process as conceived of by the donor community today.

Still there is much evidence of strategic thinking by TMEA around the port activities, some in the form of narrative documents and some in its attempts to work through the question of attribution, first in the logic of TMEA’s Results Meter, and again in an attempt at calculating the relative values of different port investments. Assumptions listed in the programme RF are quite general, and no systematic documentation was found that these were tested. However, assumptions about political economy were clearly part of TMEA’s ongoing discussions about how best to resolve issues that arose.

Relevance of port improvements remained strong through the life of S1, but are tested at the time of writing by the advent of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), which has taken a large proportion of clearance work formerly carried out at the port to an inland container depot. Coherence of TMEA investments was strong through S1, including in its challenging efforts to establish a strong network among port actors and Northern Corridor agencies with the Mombasa Port Charter (MPC). While the sustainability of physical works is likely, the degree to which the SGR has changed revenue structure has affected incentives, and additional political economy events have also deeply affected some of TMEA’s most important gains in time reductions.

In terms of effectiveness, the work at the port shows strong evidence of the value of TMEA’s investments in increasing capacity and efficiency, and in reducing times for trade through the port. Cost reductions have been more difficult to ascertain and to substantiate. At the impact level, trade has increased, though intra-EAC trade has not, but in neither case can the port interventions be substantiated at this time. It is hoped that the TGIS will provide more insight into the latter.

2.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

2.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

The verification of causal links and assumptions underpinning the Mombasa Port component was not documented, though TMEA teams did have some data pointing towards some of the assumptions and links. Primarily, data were used more to show reductions in time and cost, which were evident in port data following successful implementation of their PIO activities.

TMEA’s port components come under SO1: “Increased physical access to markets”. In its first corporate strategy plan for the period 2010–2016, TMEA summarised its overall ToC as follows: ‘If trade costs are reduced in East Africa, businesses will become more competitive; which will lead to increased trade; which will contribute towards increasing economic growth; which will contribute toward reducing poverty in the region.’ At this stage, ToCs were not widely used and TMEA did not develop a visual ToC representing SO1 until later; when they did, it represented necessary types of interventions based on three categories: improving capacity, improving efficiency, and ‘reduced port regulatory and administrative costs’, rather than planned TMEA activities per se.

The TMEA vision for SO1 worked at the level of the Northern and Central Corridors, rather than Mombasa Port alone. This meant that SO1 also included work at Dar Port (see Chapter 2) and at OBSPs (see Chapter 3). The evaluation team has divided these three sets of activities into Programme Intermediate Outcomes (PIOs) 1.1, 1.2.
Figure 2: Re-created ToC for PIO 1.1 Mombasa Port

The range of activities conducted at Mombasa Port are shown in orange, with outputs in blue. Legal and regulatory reform of port jurisdiction and operations and port reform dialogue (resulting in the Mombasa Port Charter – MPC) on operations and logistics were activities aimed at increasing the organisational efficiency of the port. The productivity capacity building was conducted to complement this. Thus, staff who knew their jobs would work within interconnected, co-operative organisational structures that performed tailored tasks within an appropriate legal framework. TMEA commissioned logistical and commercial studies to guide implementation and to catalyse works to repair identified gaps, to reinforce the enhanced efficiency of the port as a systemic whole. Some outputs materialised as per the plans, while others, such as port reform, were more difficult to bring about for reasons of political economy.

Grant-aided civil works relieved bottlenecks to open berthing space, container-stacking space and roadways that increased port capacity. Clogged container stacking space at a berth led to delays for vessels, so TMEA improved the container yard to provide a greater buffer while in/outflows of cargo would take place by road and rail. TMEA also eased congested roads that had bottlenecks preventing smooth in- and out-flow of cargo at the port. In the case of berths, an early needs assessment identified significant decay of Berths 11-14, which limited space for port services. As works of that size were outside TMEA budget and mandate, and since such works are sometimes undertaken without sufficient prior technical study, they financed such work that could underpin others’ investment.

Several important assumptions can be inferred, as shown in the diagram, though these conditions were un- or underspecified in TMEA documentation for this and most of the other components in the S1 ToC. Political economy, security, foreign exchange, and governance conditions must be in place, at a minimum. The ToC assumes that transporters will pass cost reductions on to consumers, through efficient market operations, and that it will induce additional trade (that is, the demand curve must be elastic for imports and the supply curve must be elastic for exports) so that East African consumers benefit from lower-priced imports and East African

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1 Please see also OPM: Ian Scott, Philip Lacey, Peter Omondi, Godfred Shuma, Thomas Otter, David Smith, Alex Hurrell and Saltanat Rasulova. Strategic Objective 1. Deliverable 2C: Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation And Deliverable 3A: Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects. December 2018
producers benefit from higher-priced tradeable goods. There must also be sufficient resources to maintain new technologies and ensure ongoing capacity building for staff, even after TMEA’s funding ends.

The basic structures of the 2014 ToC are correct, though it does not indicate the strength or mechanism of causal flows from one level to another. However, two causal links did not hold, and one remains unclear.

1. ‘Legal and regulatory reform’ faltered because of its incompatibility with the prerogatives of the Minister of Transport and with devolution of power to county level. In the longer run (beyond S1), the absence of the legal and regulatory reform will limit improved port efficiency because KPA will remain a port regulator whereas best practice is for it to assume a landlord role, overseeing private sector contractors that run port operations. However, TMEA’s port-reform dialogue, culminating in the adoption of a presidentially endorsed MPC, a port community commitment to facilitate trade through pursuit of monitored targets, worked well within S1 without the legal changes envisaged.

2. TMEA succeeded in attracting the attention of a consortium of donors to implement one of its identified port needs – the rehabilitation of berths 11-14.

3. TMEA was not able to substantiate the higher-level causal links: from reduced port delays to lower port costs and from lower port costs to greater trade.

On the other hand, TMEA’s ToC did not capture other benefits that TMEA was able to gain in S1. In a political vacuum about an overarching and commercially viable strategy for the SGR as it neared completion, TMEA commissioned a report on the technical and commercial options for integrating SGR into the corridor linking Mombasa Port to Nairobi. Building on the port community and links to other key actors, it built consensus for government SGR policy around the report’s findings. Rather than just facilitate the integration of SGR into port operations, through this initiative TMEA achieved a coordinated plan for road and rail along the entire Mombasa-Nairobi corridor. TMEA had not anticipated a need for the report (or its benefits) in the early period of S1, but the opportunistic approach bore fruit (though the GoK has not taken much of TMEA’s counsel on board).

As part of TMEA’s rehabilitation of container storage space, it was able to leverage KPA’s purchase of cranes to make container handling more efficient in that space. Together, the two investments increased port capacity in a way that neither would have done alone and in a way unforeseen by the ToC. Indeed, TMEA does not explicitly assume any benefits due to synergies in its ToC.

The expanded Port Reitz road (in concert with Kenya National Highways Authority – KeNHA), justified in terms of decongesting port access, also created a fast link Mombasa’s Moi international airport, resulting in time savings, facilitating tourism growth, enhancing property values along expanded roads, reducing the incidence of water borne diseases due to improved storm-water drainage, and reducing vehicular emissions due faster average traffic speeds. TMEA staff also reported that their work at the port and roads leveraged additional DFID funds to support Mombasa West roads and the purchase of eco-hoppers.

The assumptions inferred above regarding a stable political climate have not entirely held. Following the Brexit referendum, the UK budget contribution to TMEA lost some of its value. The GoK proved unamenable to some port reforms, in particular that of a change to landlord port operations, which international best practice strongly suggests would improve efficiencies. TMEA works at the port did reduce congestion of trucks and improve container stacking and management, but with the advent of the SGR, the port is processing far fewer containers while the bulk are loaded onto the railway and taken to the Embakasi inland container depot, which is now working over capacity and causing delays there instead of at the port.

Despite garnering support from other donors to finance the rehabilitation of berths 11-14, the Government’s hesitation to enter into the loan agreement and begin the work undermines the assumption that government would value the outcomes sufficiently to support them. The faltering of the legal reform initiative was partly due to the impact of the Government’s devolution of power to the county level, a political change that brought unforeseen difficulties. A scandal related to the disqualification of all but one bidder for a concession for a JICA-funded deep-water container terminal resulted in the complete removal of the board and most of KPA’s senior management. The change of personnel, and the ensuing loss of confidence, compromised momentum for important changes, such as labour reform.

The assumption that the efficient markets would lead to truckers and shippers passing on a large proportion of the profits that they make from lower port-related costs to producers and consumers gives some indication of having held. Changes in efficiency to which TMEA has contributed may therefore result in most of the benefits

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2 Eberhard-Ruiz & Calabrese find that the cost of importing a container via Mombasa with onward dispatch to Kampala fell by over 30% from 2013 to 2016 a period during which total operating costs for a truck fell by 26%. Truckers profits remained roughly constant over this period.
flowing to shippers. The extent to which shippers pass on these benefits to producers and consumers, directly or indirectly, is not known, may vary by sector, and largely falls outside the ToR of the current study. However, the PGIS will examine price changes at household level through qualitative and quantitative means, with the intent of checking this assumption.

TMEA’s relevance remains, in that many of the issues identified in the original DFID Business Case continue to exist. TMEA’s S1 represented a well-thought out, considered approach to address many of those issues, which was faced with numerous contextual challenges but did achieve improvements in efficiency and capacity at the port. At the same time, TMEA’s ToC does not demonstrate linkages from its outputs to higher causal levels.

During S1, TMEA was able to causally link its port activities to outputs which, in turn, are likely to have played a part in bringing about planned outcomes. It seems clear that the programme’s hard investments and soft training and studies led to increases in port capacity and port efficiency (outputs), improving times through the port by the end of S1, and this was borne out in evaluation interviews with external private sector port users. However, since the end of S1, events have in important ways superseded the results in time reductions TMEA supported: the SGR’s opening has affected how much volume is actually processed at the port; the inland container depot is operating well over capacity; and the GoK has imposed a requirement for 100% verification at the port. These have all affected times precipitously.

It is difficult to imagine that the extra capacity and efficiency did not benefit the continuing trend of increased port imports since 2006 of 1.2 million tonnes annually. However, TMEA has not convincingly established the causal link from their contribution to port improvements to higher volumes or values of trade.

Alternative explanations for higher levels of trade are that Dar es Salaam Port may have improved less than Mombasa Port over the same time period, steering shippers towards Mombasa Port; lower fuel costs or more professional trucking may have lowered the cost of road transport; or increased OSBP efficiencies (rather than improved port throughput) may have reduced costs.

TMEA did not verify these assumptions during S1, but is planning some work in S2 to better measure the corridor and gather data that will populate its Impact Model, which builds on the previous work with the Results Meter. Some combination of econometric and interview-based evidence integrated into RF would give feedback on ToC that could allow better mid-course corrections to resources allocated to a mix of activities and/or to elements within an activity.

Government agencies in the port make available data for port dwell times for imports of two types: ‘containerised imports’ and ‘all imports.’ The Northern Corridor observatory includes these on its website on a monthly basis, but apparently the agencies do not provide the corresponding statistics for export dwell times to the observatory. This means that there are no findings about East African export causality through Mombasa Port, limiting the verification of the ToC in this direction.

2.2.2 **DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?**

EAC’s top priorities include enhancing intra-EAC trade and deepening integration in its medium-term policy framework, through SCT consolidation to cover all imports and intra-EAC traded goods, infrastructure development in the region, boosting free movement of all factors of production, and skills development, technological advancement and innovation to stimulate economic development. TMEA’s SO1 addresses all of these by working to lower the infrastructural and complementary administrative costs of importing and exporting to the rest of the world and of trading across borders. The limit to TMEA’s support lies in its focus on the northern and central corridors, which is to be expected, given the efficiency of concentrating resources on limited routes that link together major population centres. It neglects off-corridor integration. The table below shows TMEA activities aligned with the EAC’s stated regional trade development priorities.
Table 1: EAC regional trade development priorities, and related Mombasa Port projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAC Regional Trade Development Priorities</th>
<th>Related TMEA activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customs Union and the Single Customs Territory</strong>&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>• Supporting national Customs Management Systems by facilitating the one-stop office at Mombasa port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ‘Interconnectivity of customs systems to facilitate seamless flow of information between customs stations and a payment system to manage transfers of revenues between EAC Partner States’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure:</strong> Coordinating, harmonising, and complementing transport and communications policies; improving and expanding the existing transport and communication links; and establishing new ones.</td>
<td>• Infrastructure work at Dar and Mombasa Ports to reduce trade costs, ensure efficient import and export, and improve environmental compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support to multi-modal transport in SGR process</td>
<td>• Support to multi-modal transport in SGR process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industrialisation, SME development, investment promotion &amp; private sector development</strong></td>
<td>• Reducing import/export times and costs to make EA exports (and EA companies) more competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improving the competitiveness of the industrial sector to enhance the expansion of trade [...]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ assembly from EAC website and a range of evaluation interviews and data

2.2.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

TMEA collaborated very closely with partners and employed its relationships and its well-connected local staff in considering political economy challenges throughout programming. There is no documentation of their thinking on contentious political topics, according to the team, in order to maintain the political neutrality, they had cultivated as part of the process to work with governments. There was a fear that TMEA documenting its political economy analyses put them at risk that such documents would fall into partners’ hands, which would hurt their relationships. They did, however, take advantage of existing political economy analyses, such as those done by Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and others around port issues and reform proposals.

As described above, a number of important changes in the political economy affected the Mombasa Port component during and after S1. The GoK proved unamenable to some port reforms, in particular that of a change to landlord port operations, which international best practice strongly suggests would improve efficiencies. TMEA works at the port did reduce congestion of trucks and improve container stacking and management, but with the advent of the SGR the port is processing far fewer containers while the bulk is loaded onto the railway and taken to the Embakasi inland container depot, which is now working over capacity and causing delays there instead of at the port. A port authority respondent said the SGR had ‘upset our business’ at the port. The operations and decision-making around the SGR are highly political, in part because of the significant debt the GoK must repay to China for its construction.

The faltering of the legal reform initiative was partly due to the impact of the Government’s devolution of power to the county level, a political change that brought unforeseen difficulties. A scandal related to the disqualification of all but one bidder for a concession for a JICA-funded deep-water container terminal resulted in the complete removal of the board and most of KPA’s senior management. The change of personnel and the ensuing loss of confidence compromised momentum for important changes, such as labour reform.

TMEA facilitated the offer of a loan for the rehabilitation of berths 11-14 by EIB and AFD agreed to KPA. However, SGR and government changes especially of KPA’s acting managing director led the president to stop all new projects starting. This had a direct effect on the rehabilitation work. The lenders are no longer sure whether KPA wants the loan. At the time of writing, this had not deterred EIB proceeding with the project, should the GoK come on board.

As with many development programmes, high-level personnel changes for political reasons can change priorities or delay outcomes. This happened with the MPC. The sudden loss of a permanent secretary with knowledge and diligence about the charter slowed down its progress. More generally, business slowed down during political tensions prior to the Kenyan elections in 2017, as traders became very sensitive to the possibility of insecurity or violence.

Some activities were immune to political changes. For instance, the Reitz Road project was unaffected by political turmoil because government and its agencies classified the work as top priority and of vital importance.

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<sup>2</sup> https://www.eac.int/customs-union
Annex J: PIOs

to the country. TMEA had also identified specific individuals who acted as its champions, most of whom were not affected by political economy changes.

2.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

Mombasa Port partners, including KPA, report that TMEA’s modus operandi was marked by relationship-building and a demand-driven approach to planning. A corporate KPA respondent said that agency ‘spearheaded TMEA activities and investments’; another KPA lead reported that TMEA’s goals and KPA goals were parallel: ‘facilitate trade, improve efficiency. If our goals were not similar, TMEA would not be here.’ In large part, the TMEA investments were reported to be complementary.

TMEA’s SGR study, the validation workshop, and the planning process that developed from these, allowed TMEA to influence the restructuring of the Kenyan government’s plans for the port, SGR, trucking, logistics, warehousing, and customs clearance along the Mombasa-Nairobi corridor. This process put the various elements into a comprehensive plan and gave them cohesiveness.

Civil works around the port was conducted in concert with Kenya National Highways Authority (KeNHA) who reported a very good working relationship that had substantially benefited the roads system of Mombasa as a result. Ongoing plans were in the works to build on those gains: it was reported that Mombasa Port was planning to improve an additional stretch between Changamwe roundabout and gate 18, which suffered from gridlock and trucks parked on the road. TMEA had offered to make funds available, and KPA reported they would do so as well. KeNHA and TMEA will also partner to connect Magongo Road with the Nairobi bypass as part of S2.

Private sector representatives are present at the port as well, and interested in outcomes like those that TMEA’s S1 worked toward. Shippers are allied in a Shippers Council of East Africa, and there are umbrella bodies for manufacturing, horticulture, cement, coffee, tea, steel, grain sectors, petroleum, and cotton, some of the largest movers of cargo in the region. At the same time, major logistics firms and their representative bodies are important actors. The Maersk line works on improving data capture and along the corridors, and apex bodies for manufacturing and other sectors were some of TMEA’s private sector partners that were supported in advocacy and policy formulation. No major initiatives were seen, but TMEA’s work was in line with these efforts to improve both M&E and private sector participation in dialogues on of trade policy.

2.3 Coherence and coordination

2.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

TMEA’s modus operandi is an important reason for the successes it has enjoyed. The programme is well respected by its partners and takes steps to maintain that trust, visiting sites and holding meetings in person more than other donors, and troubleshooting and finding solutions where necessary. One TMEA donor noted that TMEA catalysed KPA to do more work than anticipated. TMEA started its port investments with relatively small investments to widen roads and create container-stacking spaces. This enabled it to foster relations, establish the range of options open to it, and refine its ToC before taking on larger projects.

TMEA made a series of environmentally friendly ‘green port’ investments. These relatively low-cost investments had good results, such as increased dock-workers’ health and safety and greening the port, while countering the threat of landslides onto container-stacking space, generating cheaper electricity, and lowering the cost of bulk loading of clinker.

Overall, donors and implementing partners felt that TMEA’s approach to improving the efficiency and increasing the capacity of Mombasa Port was good. They felt that the major strengths of TMEA’s working model resided in its staff’s competence and political connectedness, as well as the programme’s flexible, proactive, collaborative, and efficient approach. ‘We’re very satisfied with the work they do, our money is well spent there.’

Strengths:

1. Flexibility: Donors and implementing partners also praised TMEA’s flexibility and resourcefulness. Seen in another way, this is a willingness to deviate from RF when a superior pathway presents itself. Two examples: (1) TMEA’s efforts to facilitate a reasoned approach to how Kenya would integrate SGR into
existing transport & logistics, (2) the avoidance of delays in the construction of Reitz road through early monthly payments to the contractor at a time when the Kenyan government (co-financier) had cash-flow problems due to reimbursements to those displaced by the road. Observers felt that TMEA’s being based in East Africa and not having to answer to the politics and bureaucracy of a distant paymaster played a big part in this approach.

2. **Problem solving:** A Kenyan government agency commented favourably on a package of support that TMEA had provided, which not only provided on-the-ground support to follow up implementation, but also ensured that it used consultants who understood local issues to do so. It compared this approach to an international lender with which it had partnered that only provided implementation funds without follow-up.

3. **Collaboration:** TMEA collaborated closely with implementing partners in projects, from inception to implementation. Its working style involved spending time to build partnerships to include representation from all stakeholders was successful. Several interviewees cited TMEA’s inclusive work underpinning the MPC as a good example. KPA agents saw the high-proportion of their time that TMEA staff spent at Mombasa Port as a positive factor for project success, enabling information gathering, ease of coordination and one-on-one discussions.

4. **Connectedness:** TMEA staff were well networked in the areas in which they worked, both at high political levels and to technical staff. For interpretation of important changes, one donor said: ‘We can always get fast replies on political issues that come up.’ Equally, they could understand the minutiae of port business, sometimes because they were former employees of KPA. TMEA converted the credibility and trust resulting from these positive factors, along with a consensus in favour of regional integration, into backing from the Government and political engagement. The same attributes brought donors together, making coordination easier. However, the political will on the part of government was not comprehensive and, when it was lacking, this was an important constraining factor to advancing trade facilitation. A central factor was vested interests in the port, which is a lucrative asset for many people.

5. **Qualified, dedicated staff:** Government agencies found TMEA personnel to be experienced, professional and committed. The programme built on specialised trade-facilitation expertise. KPA felt they could call TMEA staff on a wide range of topics and expect to get cogent answers: ‘We have many other donors, but I’d struggle to point out a person that would be a reference point in most of those. With TMEA you know who to go through, and for what. They’re determined to get necessary information from all levels of government.’

6. **Procurement:** It was a revelation for KPA officials to see the TMEA’s open and efficient TMEA procurement: ‘Everyone can see the process on PowerPoint. In comparison, government procurement procedures are opaque and non-consultative.’ However, this was not always the case: KPA found some TMEA procurement processes onerous, and queried why KPA had to follow TMEA’s procurement standards in cases where KPA was funding two-thirds of a project and TMEA was funding only about one-third. At least some KPA officials found this arrangement difficult to accept: ‘They have to come and learn about our procurement. They should come and do a strategic plan, then pick things they can support 100%. We end up accommodating them.’

7. **Professionalism:** TMEA systems were effective, mixing commitment, organisation, discipline, and due diligence in order to get value for money for its partners. TMEA communicated clearly in meetings. ‘From initial stages to project delivery, TMEA has a positive, strict way of monitoring, and giving feedback to institutions, not individuals.’ It ensured that its consultants submitted good studies and followed up to convert them into activities.

**Weaknesses:**

1. **KPA implementation capacity:** Even when the will was there, civil-service capacity to contribute to implementation was sometimes lacking. From the donor perspective, the lack of capacity meant not having a detailed proficiency in the relevant information. From the KPA-management perspective, it meant a prevailing attitude of not rushing, not being responsible or accountable, rendering the port uncompetitive. It took the form of inefficient administrative procedures and not having an engineer on site in the port, which could mean an inability to implement more than about half of the recommendations from TMEA studies. This was exacerbated by staff turnover with the consequent loss of historical knowledge. This was problematic when the agency had not systematically designated a backup liaison person.

2. **TMEA’s budget management:** KPA omitted to include an engineering simulation for a berth strengthening. The simulation was important for the design, because otherwise big vessels were not going to be able to dock at the remodelled berths. TMEA refused to pay for it, which surprised and disappointed KPA, which felt that there ought to have been some tolerance in the budget for such
contingencies. Also, the TMEA payment process involved more approvals than KPA was used to and sometimes contractors were not paid for more than a month because certain officers were not present to approve payments.

3. **TMEA’s tutelage**: One donor noted that TMEA’s handholding of KPA was quite strong; TMEA staff did not let KPA officials directly answer questions about their institutional operations. The donor believed that TMEA’s role should be to facilitate their counterparts to master their own briefs. However, it is not clear if this behaviour was a constraining factor in S1 or if it is merely a potential constraint for future implementation.

### 2.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

One donor responded that it was self-evident that TMEA had to coordinate between national and regional levels. However, most interviewees did not respond directly to this question, assuming that support to the development of Mombasa Port meant support at regional level too.

National-regional coordination for these projects benefited from the fact that Kenya Country Programme and TMEA HQ were located in the same building, and the size of the Mombasa Port project investments ensured close and constant attention from infrastructure team leadership, specialists contracted to work on given aspects, and country programming overall.

### 2.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

The Mombasa Port projects were a keystone part of the explicit goal of improving corridor times and costs, including virtually all undertakings in the other SOs. Specifically, the port work along with OSBPs, ICT for Trade, NTBs and Standards work all contributed to regional integration goals aligned with those of the EAC. Advocacy team members from HQ were brought in to support port outcomes in negotiations with the Dockworkers’ Union when their concerns threatened to limit overall gains. The Port Resilience projects aimed to improve port performance on issues around regional trade impacts on local environmental conditions.

Most interviewees considered that TMEA allowed KPA to attain project success through not only financing projects but also providing additional support in the form of M&E, studies and/or training. Without these additional tailored inputs, KPA’s rate of success would have been lower.

Reitz Road civil works were co-financed by both TMEA and KeNHA in whose interest the need to undertake the works increased the efficiency of port operations. Compensating those who lost land because of the construction cost more than GoK had anticipated, creating a cash crunch for construction, but TMEA was able to partially offset this by making its share of payment early. If TMEA and GoK had not been co-financing these works, construction delays could have resulted.

Gender considerations were also part of port project planning, with a gender mainstreaming strategy that focused on increasing the number of women at different levels of port management and in other roles at the port. Given interest in improving in similar ways among the logistics industry through TMEA’s PIO 3.3, this might be improved by creating a related implementation plan based on that PIO’s research on gender in the industry.

Supporting the Northern Corridor observatory is an example of synergistic planning and implementation. Data, such as those gathered and disseminated by this observatory, were not only necessary for TMEA but for the sector at large. TMEA’s work with this regional international organisation consisted of significant capacity building as well, by embedding technical staff. This and the resulting status as a data clearinghouse has raised the organisation’s profile and the dearth of trade data has diminished as a result.

### 2.3.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high-quality and timely outputs?

One donor stated that the governance structure was working quite well with government and other donors. In addition, the NOC has representatives from all relevant stakeholders. A second donor was positive specifically about NOC meetings that allowed him to follow what was going on and what other donors were saying and doing.
A third donor said that the TMEA governance arrangements strengthen the organisation and the programme itself, allowing donors to better discuss TMEA activities in the context of their specific development visions and objectives. Donors did sit on TMEA’s Board and, in that capacity, had constant dialogue with management but it was an improvement that a separate Council had been created for donors. Some differences had arisen as donors put more pressure on TMEA and the Board ‘might not always have understood the donor perspective’ but iterative discussion has ‘has kept us on the same page.’

For a fourth donor, the governance model was positive, as it created more engagement by local beneficiaries and had had better access to its clients and was able to seek better results through the networks of influential NOC members.

A government agency explained that TMEA’s governance did not compromise the agency’s achievements. On the contrary, TMEA’s experts working with the agency did a commendable job. They were effective in their participation at all consultative forums set up to enhance implementation of project activities. Further, senior TMEA officials were always available to attend events with key stakeholders in related private sector industry. Attending such meetings was very important for the TMEA team to ensure that programme activities were effectively and efficiently targeted and implemented.

A second government agency appreciated the importance of donors’ port visits but was grateful that, apart from taking visiting delegations on tours, TMEA absorbed donor interests and kept the agency from having to deal with each of them directly. In a similar vein, a contractor for a TMEA port project expressed gratitude that TMEA shielded the government agency from some constraining conditionalities common with donor-funded projects.

A representative of a business membership organisation, who sat on Kenya’s NOC, explained that, as a NOC member, he asks questions about the progress of projects. He noted that TMEA had had to put in place more structures to secure the investments made with donor’s taxpayers’ money. ‘The more TMEA works with government agencies the more checks and balances they have to have.’ The private sector is already a ‘cost reducer’ but government, according to this respondent, was a more complicated partner.

2.3.5  DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

One donor representative affirmed that the operational model at donor level was appropriate and efficient: ‘We brief our Deputy Ambassador so he’s ready for the quarterly Council meetings. They meet in various places in the region… [T]hey go out and see projects, talk with people, and have a networking session to get to know each other better. That is also a big advantage… From our side, we also make sure what TMEA is doing complements what else we’re doing.’ A second donor representative was hopeful that the current model should continue, and argued for TMEA’s sustainable, long-term structure.

Some donors participated in the Trade and Private Sector Donor Working Group, and found it to be a useful forum for donor coordination. ‘The work on the port sits in both trade and in infrastructure, because the issues are cross-cutting. The transport sector donors tend towards working on roads. A Port Community Donor Group fizzled. But DFID, JICA and AfDB have always been in communication, and all have participated openly.’ The respondent reported the TMEA approach ensured operational effectiveness and efficiency:

The Board meets on a quarterly basis with recommendations feeding into the Council’s six-monthly meetings. TMEA management presents papers to the board on pertinent operational and strategic programme issues mostly emanating from NOCs. There is a need to align these structures so as to avoid situations where issues were being discussed when the board had already met, thus missing the requisite window of approvals. A “virtual” working model was now working, addressing all the relevant issues with the requisite promptness without having to wait for face-to-face meetings.

A smaller donor noted that the added value had been that TMEA donors come together and bring funds to a shared enterprise: ‘Yes, DFID is biggest, but when we work at the Council, we work equally. We have the same power in decision-making, in principle.’

As mentioned above with regard to the appropriateness of governance arrangements, TMEA partners tended to appreciate the donor operational model as well. Multiple donors meant that TMEA’s focus was less tied to one or
another political agenda, and that funding was concentrated, which acted to coordinate development partners and to amplify their impact.

### 2.3.6 DEQ5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

Most respondents from the GoK reported that TMEA was aligned with Kenyan national goals. For instance, the contractor’s representative for the Reitz-road dual carriageway to the new container terminal affirmed that TMEA’s activity was supportive of KeNHA goals since its mandate is to construct and improve truck roads in Kenya. A KMA official emphasised that the TMEA mandate is in trade facilitation, which is also the major role of KMA. Similarly, a KPA official stated: ‘The plan of KPA is to provide and facilitate trade. And if you check the goal of TMEA it’s more or less the same.’ These sentiments speak to the Paris Declaration principles about alignment with local systems and country ownership.

The financing agreement between TMEA and GoK for Reitz road prescribed an implementation ‘framework of guidance’, which included regular structured consultations at different levels, including weekly and steering-committee meetings that TMEA attended without fail. Posting a supervisory engineer at the site helped considerably in solving issues that might have arisen. This type of arrangement between TMEA and GoK was common in port projects, as discussed in the response to DEQ5.6 on the strengths of the working model in terms of TMEA presence and connectedness. Working like this also reflects the mutual accountability called for in the Paris Declaration.

One donor representative had formed the impression that there was close alignment with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership and for impact: ‘When you talk with the authorities here… about TMEA, you don’t hear any critical voices about it, they’re very appreciative. TMEA is also more and more appreciated among the business community.’ The contractor’s representative for a port activity emphasised that TMEA had given grant financing while other donors would generally have offered loans to be repaid with interest. Better, TMEA provided hands-on collaboration during the entire implementation process, which was very beneficial and greatly appreciated.

Another donor noted that, during S1, TMEA worked very closely with, and provided technical assistance to, the Ministry of Trade, which culminated in the development of the National Export Development Strategy, currently at the implementation stage. Further, TMEA support to various other ministries and institutions align with county systems and agencies e.g. support to KEBS, KPA, KENHA. Donors and government partners reported that TMEA’s approach was more straightforward than that of other programmes, because the local authorities had the responsibility to implement. Both the knowledge transfer and the logistics/infrastructure were part of what the governments managed, again reflecting country ownership and mutual accountability as in the Paris Declaration Principles.

Another government agency respondent confirmed that ownership, explaining that it appreciated TMEA’s staff members having been available in Mombasa Port because of the ease of coordination that resulted and the one-on-one discussions that ensued for first-hand decision-making. On the other hand, TMEA was reported to have been rigid when it came to planning budgets, with no room for contingencies, and providing at times only partial funding but requiring full bureaucratic internal approvals processes.

According to a fourth donor, TMEA hired good consultants and local technical staff; and it had an effective network. The MPC was very challenging to implement, but TMEA managed to link up people at technical and political levels because it was well connected politically. By supporting both infrastructure and softer side interventions, TMEA were able to do bring together the various partners operating across port functions.

### 2.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

Other development programmes working on port issues include the World Bank (WB) with port productivity investments, JICA in its work at the port on container terminal space, the People’s Republic of China in its development of the SGR, Agence Française de Developpement and the EU through the European Investment Bank in major port improvements.
Donor representatives – including donors not part of TMEA – said they believed that the focus and activities of the work at the port were consistent with and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region. Another echoed that perspective, pointing out that TMEA is unique because of its scale and its approach, while working in-line with shared overall sectoral goals.

One donor asserted that, as Aid for Trade has become a more important part of donors’ portfolios, coordination in this area has become key to effectiveness. The development-agency mindset has changed: the private sector has become seen as the driver for change and development. In that context, one said that TMEA gets respect for its work and he was sure that other organisations would like to keep better informed about what TMEA are doing as part of improved coordination.

Another donor pointed out that there had been significant donor collaboration at Mombasa Port, with collective longer-term thinking focused on Mombasa West among government and partners: TMEA, KPA, AfDB. DFID had funded up to the Changamwe roundabout, which AfDB was funding with the Government at the time of this writing. That work will bring about significant decongestion when complete.

JICA also continues with second phase of its container terminal ("Kipevu 2"). The combination of interventions should help to manage the flow, which was reported to be currently 6,000 trucks per day.

Funding infrastructure is collaborative, putting donors in the position of being able to ask government to complement that investment. For instance, if a donor offers to rehabilitate container-stacking yards, it can reasonably ask KPA to invest in, say, cranes, which happened in S1. During S1, KPA also expanded on TMEA’s green-port solar work.

A KPA representative was particularly happy with working with TMEA: ‘If you compare JICA and TMEA, TMEA has done a lot, while JICA has given us a loan at 0.01%. But the difference is that JICA and Japan get enormous benefit from that project. TMEA do not get any benefit like that. JICA benefit enormously, bringing expats and equipment from their country. With TMEA, it is that old link with the British. It is much more sincere, while the others bring benefit but then take it back home with them. They are more capitalistic. With TMEA we feel attached.’

Reports were mixed about whether TMEA had taken on a coordination role for the sector, though their presence as a major actor was not questioned. One donor representative noted that TMEA had built up its specialised expertise and leadership in trade facilitation. ‘They have the ability to bring donors together, thus making coordination easier, and have earned governments’ trust.’ Certainly, TMEA’s role in coordinating actors at Mombasa Port to rally around the MPC is an important example of its ability to convene among Kenyan government institutions.

The Infrastructure Working Group mentioned above convenes major donors in the sector, and JICA reported close contact with TMEA around port activities. At the outset of OSBP work, TMEA and the WB collaborated closely regarding the border sites that the latter’s EAFFTP was passing on to TMEA. However, WB respondents for the evaluation reported less interaction in recent years, and a desire to be in more regular contact.

Another donor noted that they had not yet put funds into the common pool but may do so where there a common strategy considered the capacity of the partner institutions to manage the funds. Donors are also strongly concerned about the quality of M&E, which must be solid to make the programme more efficient for longer-term engagement. The MPC has an M&E platform that it is hoped will show results during S2.

**2.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?**

TMEA’s work with the Northern Corridor observatory to improve trade data collection and dissemination was not only necessary for TMEA but for the sector at large. TMEA’s work with this regional international organisation consisted of significant capacity building as well, by embedding technical staff. This and the resulting status as a data clearinghouse has raised the organisation’s profile and the dearth of trade data has diminished as a result.

TMEA’s interactions with the EAC were not cited in respondent interviews on this component, but the alignment of Port work with overall EAC goals for trade is in evidence.
2.4 Sustainability

2.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

Infrastructure has to be owned by a government entity e.g. KPA, KeNHA, so that each owner has responsibility for maintenance and repairs. Each contract for building or rehabilitation of infrastructure should spell this out. Capacity building engagement has focused on both human and institutional capacity adopting a whole-of-government approach. This would be able to sustain these capacities within the various institutions e.g. Ministry of Trade.

TMEA’s engagement of local staff who have good access to partners and who are motivated to do things for posterity also works well for sustainability of benefits. The HR technical skills are also transferable across Africa.

The investments in infrastructure and the training and reforms to operations seem unlikely to be undone. Rehabilitated berths are likely to last for 30 years; incentives for government agencies (particularly KPA) to use and benefit from skills resulting from training and changed institutional incentives for increased port throughput are substantial. However, though these incentives have already had noticeable outputs, on their own they may prove insufficient to ensure increased port throughput in the longer term. And TMEA’s inability to work with government to support the successful passage of port reform law seems destined to constrain port performance non-negligibly in the future.

Donor representatives believe that the sustainability risk for the investment in the port is not very high because wharves do not require much maintenance, compared to roads. KPA estimates that ‘major maintenance will be necessary in 2045. In addition, complementary technological systems built and staff planning and management, including the use of KPIs, will remain.’ However, KPA management needs reform for it to be effective and, perhaps a more challenging task, KPA unionised labour needs a new incentive structure to make it more efficient. Dedicated maintenance budgets for each enshrined in law are important for the post-TMEA period.

Mombasa Port is important to Kenya at the presidential level and the organisation structures supported by M&E in the framework of the MPC appear to be vibrant and self-sustaining (though not yet M&E itself through NCTTCA, which needs help to assess the market for, and then develop, value-added services based on its raw data). The benefits of the Reitz Road work will be sustained as they are aligned to government strategic plans, as well as those of the agencies, as they fall within their core mandates.

Revenue authorities in each country are delighted by the enhanced revenue collection at OSBPs, with every incentive to maintain and repair the infrastructure and to update and improve the skills of agents based there. At Mombasa Port, however, revenues have fallen with the advent of the SGR. Incentives might then be to maintain what revenues they have, rather than to reap greater revenues. However, scandals have deeply affected port operations – some involving counterfeits, others around luxury goods – as well by the new Anti-Counterfeit Authority’s insistence on 100% verification. At the same time, inspections are a revenue source and a greater incentive at present may be to maintain higher-revenue, multi-agency inspection tasks than to rationalise these, as TMEA and the private sector would advocate.

A government agency respondent noted that the revised MPC discusses its own sustainability: all signatories are to fund the revised MPC to sustain its operations, including outputs and outcomes, without relying fully on TMEA and other donors. The MPC community is reported to have reviewed recruitment of M&E staff, and provided budget for annual meetings and sending teams to follow up the reports. KMA’s commercial shipping department reports having started working on the promotion of investments and implementation of Blue Economy Conference recommendations.

2.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

TMEA’s professionalism and transparency had a demonstration effect on KPA officials who saw alternatives to their traditional approach within the Kenyan civil service. The net effect has been an increase in KPA’s ability to accommodate further change in the future, to plan and execute projects better, and to insist on professionalism from partners.
A similar dynamic seems to hold among the higher echelons at Mombasa Port, due to having worked directly with TMEA staff. A KPA official described how his collages who had worked with TMEA adopted its more focused, determined and technologically innovative work ethic and that this approach spilled over gradually to those who had not worked with TMEA. He could not conceive that, once having experienced this way of working, his colleagues would revert to the more lackadaisical and opaque way of working that they had had before.

A Reitz road contractor enthused about the close collaboration between TMEA, government and his company, which led to effective infrastructure project delivery. He particularly appreciated TMEA’s liberal approach to tendering without many conditionalities (in comparison to other funders), the flexibility in the timing of TMEA’s monthly payments in order that cash-flow problems would not constrain the contractor’s progress, and its attention to value for money. However, he did not suggest that he would necessarily be in a position to apply any of these improvements in future work.

A KPA representative said that he found little from which to learn among TMEA’s contributions because TMEA was very much involved in major decision-making about securing funds and overall logistics, as well as ensuring that port projects meet donor requirements and provide value for money. However, TMEA was not involved in engineering or the technical aspects (although it did engage experts to come and cross-check on standards).

A private sector apex body said it would take account of the best practices in its future programmes either on its own or in future donor-funded projects, if allowed to do so. As with some private sector partners under the PIO3.1.1 on advocacy, this organisation did not feel TMEA’s process was demand-driven in their case (please see Chapter 8). The leader of the organisation said it would make more long-term sense for TMEA to create sustainable institutions, rather than to ensure short-term compliance with donor precepts.

One donor raised the possibility of risk due to TMEA’s rapid expansion, leading to the unravelling of the organisation, making it inefficient and ineffective. The depth of engagement would not be as solid as is currently the case. TMEA might also lose its flexibility: the bigger they grow, the donor warned, the more inflexible they may become as an organisation.

### 2.5 DEQ2.1 Effectiveness: Contribution Tracing

**HEQ2: To what extent has TMEA been effective in achieving expected intermediate outcomes and to what extent has TMEA programme been effective in contributing to achieving programme strategic outcomes? Did the programme bring about any unintended outcomes?**

#### 2.5.1 DEQ2.1 To what extent has TMEA contributed to reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes?

According to OPM’s Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBPs,⁴ work plans and outputs were implemented at both ports and OSBPs (including IBM work) with minor project delays and some cost variations but not at a level critical to the overall projects. Project management and controls were deemed to be reasonable. Civil works at ports generally progressed satisfactorily in both ports, with some delays but project execution improved with better guidance and systems supported by TMEA. TMEA relationships and investments in capacity building were generally positive and appreciated. Cross-border time comparisons showed that efficiency had improved considerably from 2011 to 2016 with a notable reduction in the average crossing time from Kenya to Uganda from 14 to 3 hours. There were (and are) major questions on the potential effectiveness of the Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP, but regarding Malaba, where time and costs have temporarily increased due to ongoing construction, they are work on the World Bank left the project prematurely, time and trade costs are expected to decrease importantly as a result of the OSBP.

That report concluded that the improvements to civil works could be expected to contribute to efficiency gains (and reduced costs) and that the key measure of effectiveness of the TMEA activities contributing towards improved port infrastructure on the pathway to a reduction in trade costs has been achieved. The critical shortfall at ports related to reform and modernisation which was a key assumption in the TMEA results framework. The transition to landlord port models in the key container segment did not happen at ports related to reform and modernisation which was a key assumption in the TMEA results framework. The improvement in time and trade costs are expected to decrease importantly as a result of the OSBP.

Across all countries and at the corporate level, respondents report time reductions. These reductions come from individual projects and from components across the TMEA ToC. SO1 work at ports reduced dwell and truck turnaround time, and OSBPs and the RECTS kept cargo moving along the corridors. In SO2, permit processing

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⁴ OPM: Ian Scott, Philip Lacey, Peter Omondi, Godfred Shuma, Thomas Otter, David Smith, Alex Hurrell and Saltanat Rasulova. Strategic Objective 1. Deliverable 2C: Effectiveness and outcome-level evaluation And Deliverable 3A: Consolidated Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP projects. December 2018
at supported agencies was reduced and customs management systems ensured paperwork was available throughout transport; standards inspections times decreased with faster processing and harmonised standards.

The PE heard about these outcomes not only from TMEA and its partners, but also from external private sector firms using the infrastructure and ICT for Trade, standards, and other improved systems. TMEA also commissioned evaluations of many of its projects, components, and countries; results from those studies concur that TMEA met most of its planned S1 outcomes. The degree to which TMEA contributed to corridor volumes, however, is not substantiated in the data.

2.5.2 Contribution case study: PIO 1.1 Mombasa Port

The goal of PIO 1.1 was to increase the efficiency and capacity of Mombasa Port. Increased efficiency and capacity of the port results was believed to result in faster trade and lower costs, making trade more profitable and, according to the logic chain, increasing trade volumes. TMEA intended to increased capacity with increased and better use of space for container stacking, rehabilitating berths to manage larger vessels, faster cargo transfer between vessels and trucks, and less congested port access for trucks. They intended to increase efficiency through institutional reform, better collaboration between agencies and faster clearance procedures.

The contribution claim that forms the focus for the evaluation under this component is:

TMEA contributed to efficiency and capacity gains at the port which helped to reduce average time to import and export goods through Mombasa Port, (to ultimately make trade more profitable and increase trade volumes) through a combination of hard infrastructure projects and institutional and soft infrastructure work.

To boost port capacity (through hard infrastructure), this PIO started with a set of relatively small civil works, increasing scale later. For port projects too large for TMEA to fund, the PIO team commissioned detailed studies to pave the way for others with greater funding to participate. To enhance efficiency (through soft infrastructure), a port charter fostered co-operation among port actors to attain a set of agreed targets, training provided needed skills, a one-stop centre sped up customs clearance and an ‘observatory’ collated port data online to provide feedback on how well targets were being met.

TMEA’s projects that contributed to this outcome included:

Hard infrastructure

- Concreting of two container storage areas and small road construction/gate widening
- Major road construction to the container terminal with improved new gate access
- ‘Green port’ investments boosting capacity, as well as serving environmental goals
- Detailed feasibility studies designed to encourage other donors to fund extensive upgrades to a set of derelict berths (including cranes and other equipment)
- Strategy document for investment and logistics for integration of the new standard-gauge railway into port logistics and Nairobi’s inland container terminals

Institutional and soft infrastructure work

- Port charter: collaborative forum for port actors and Northern Corridor agencies to agree on targets for improvements
- Capacity building: complementing the charter as part of a port-improvement plan
- One-stop centre to speed up customs clearance, particularly of imported cargo
- M&E on port charter targets done by the Northern Corridor observatory

More information on each of these can be found throughout this chapter covering the entire PIO 1.1, and in Annex N in the CT Case Study data tables (with additional narrative on the projects, as well as specific data and sources).

Documents from TMEA provide robust evidence that supports the successful delivery of these activities; these include contracts for the civil works, the detailed infrastructure studies, and the green-port investments; the agreement with the Northern Corridor observatory; and e-mails and minutes of meetings indicating capacity-building completion. In addition, the PE team corroborated many of these and other facts in interviews with partners and three site visits.

Some of the six outputs were related to hard infrastructure: more, and improved, container stacking and organisation; increased capacity to handle trucks through road widening and gate expansion; clean technologies.
improvements installed; resilient infrastructure and equipment delivered; feasibility studies/designs facilitated and shared. Others were ‘soft’: garnering commitment and regular collaboration of key institutions (including action planning) in accordance with the Mombasa Port Charter (MPC); upgraded staff capacity; improved port efficiency based on recommendations for removing bottlenecks due to dockworker gang sizes; KPA prioritising identified training needs and performing training; and a one-stop centre promptly resolving customs problems.

Site visits to the port, and examination of Google Earth images before and after S1, confirmed the first two hard infrastructural outputs. Documentary evidence confirmed the production of the feasibility studies for berth rehabilitation and a strategy document for the development of a modern rail-freight corridor for an efficient, low-cost freight logistics chain between Mombasa Port and Nairobi. For soft outputs, meeting minutes and recommendations established the existence and operations of the MPC; a time-and-motion study for port productivity and other evidence confirmed improved staff capacity and consequent improved port efficiency; details of resolution of customs issues showed the one-stop centre at work. Interviews with partners regarding various aspects of these outputs corroborate. A project to institute legal reform of the port’s status was less successful, as reported in the OPM formative evaluation, due to difficulties encountered with ministerial prerogatives and new county rights after the devolution of power. A fourth soft output was verifiable online: the Northern Corridor observatory’s data collection, management, and dissemination; and creation of the maritime, port and corridor indicators for MPC M&E. No other donors participated in the production of these outputs.

Overall, the evidence at output level supported a probability level of ‘Virtually Certain’ that the outputs materialised, after reviewing the evidence, on three key (bolded) outputs as shown in Table 2 below. These three had direct effects on the key outcome claim, per the re-created ToC, and the evaluators were also ‘Virtually Certain’ that TMEA’s contribution was central to their realisation, based on the evidence collected. The collaboration goal is noted to be ‘incipient’ (at the end of S1) as this highly political work has taken up a longer time frame to see the results of the Charter’s inception and planning.

Table 2: CT Case Study: Mombasa Port

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More, and improved, container stacking and organisation –</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: pre/post photos, Google Earth imagery from 2010 &amp; 2017; OPM Formative Evaluation and PE site visits and interviews</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: extensive TMEA reports on yards, White House roundabout, gate 10 approach road. Site visit, interviews with KPA, KenHA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased capacity for vehicle and cargo traffic</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: triangulated interviews from different stakeholder groups: private sector users, partners, TMEA, NCTTCA staff</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: TMEA and Observatory data on reduced time to import; site visit; confirmation from shippers and logistics firms interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility studies/designs facilitated and shared</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: Donor conference between Ministry of Trade and TMEA documentation; KPA interviews; Validation meeting of SGR report</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: EIB/AfD confirmation of TMEA role TMEA’s SGR support with Permanent Secretary reference letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration/integration and planning between key institutions</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> but incipient Evidence: MPC and annexes; KPA &amp; GoK MOUs; MPCC reports; Results Framework for MPCC and validation meeting minutes; interviews show PSO/CSO engagement</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: Extensive documentation on Mombasa Port Charter work, including photographed public signing. Mombasa Port Charter M&amp;E plan, annexes, branding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved staff capacity, improved port efficiency</td>
<td><strong>Very likely</strong> Evidence: Productivity Improvement Programme baseline and other reports</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: Relevant reports commissioned by TMEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Corridor observatory data collected, shared</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: NCTTCA data; interviews with the partner and Charter members</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: NCTTCA close-out report, and confirmation from evaluation interviews</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In the process of re-creating the ToC for the Mombasa Port work (please see the response to DEQ5.1 in this chapter), the evaluation team identified critical outputs that would, if successful, generate the key outcome. Time for import\(^5\) has three sub-components: The time before customs processing, in which cargo arrives and is

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\(^5\) Time for export, as explained in the coming paragraphs, is not routinely monitored or reported at this level of detail.
registered; customs processing through the One-Stop Centre; and the time to depart the port after clearance. TMEA outputs on container capacity and efficiency would support faster registration of landed cargo; TMEA projects to integrate and improve collaboration would support faster customs processing; and the civil works supported truck turnaround time, which is a key part of the departure sub-component of time. These three outputs are in **bold** in the table above, and the evaluation found strong evidence that these outputs materialised and that it was TMEA that caused them.

Three **outcomes** were considered in the case study. The TMEA RF shows two related outcomes – average time to import/export goods through the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam (disaggregated by type of cargo) and average reduction in transit time from Mombasa to Malaba and Busia (e.g. Northern and Central Corridors). The first directly relates to port interventions and therefore fits into the CT case study, while the second is affected strongly by factors outside the port, and is better conceived as a “Northern Corridor outcome” rather than strictly speaking a port projects outcome. That indicator is examined in looking at the Northern Corridor as a whole in the SO1 effectiveness section of the main body of the text.

TMEA staff interviews suggested two additional outcomes coming from their investments at Mombasa Port. The full list, then, was:

1. Average time to import/export goods through the port of Mombasa (by type of cargo)
2. Donors/lenders come on board to expand berths per the feasibility studies

The first indicator, average port import/export time, includes the time for three separate processes for imported cargo: registration of landed cargo and a wait before customs processing, customs processing, and a wait before the cargo leaves the port. The Northern Corridor observatory maintains an online database that includes the duration of import times in the port after unloading from the vessel, measured in two ways: for containers (from KPA) and for all freight (from KRA). The two profiles show similar trends over the 2009-2018 period. Noticeable for both is a period of increased import time from 2010 (120 hours) to 2012 (200 hours), followed by a 2012-14 drop to 100 hours, or 4.13 days, which is sustained thereafter.

This was against a target of 2.3 days in the TMEA RF, which would have been equal to a 72% reduction time since the 2012 average, a year which coincided with the start of many TMEA activities at the port. For time to export, TMEA reported a reduction of about 50%, from 15.4 to 7.3 days over the life of S1 from NCTTCA data; however, detailed data of export time were not collected by NCTTCA. Exports comprise less than 15% of port throughput and are slated to be included in Observatory data during S2. The TMEA RF lists no target for export time, and the PE can confirm only the reduction in import time, which is substantial but less than targeted.

Outcomes 2 & 3 result from the commissioning of detailed reports that have proven successful at attracting commitment that should lead to reductions in corridor times in the future. Donors/lenders agreeing to fund rehabilitation of berths 11-14 in light of the feasibility studies will increase port throughput and lead to lower costs (though this still needs government approval to begin). Similarly, government’s adoption of TMEA’s proposed process for managing flows of goods by fast rail from Mombasa to Nairobi (or onward shipment by road or rail), in parallel to continued shipments leaving the port by road, will decongest the port and the road and lead to faster average land-shipment times. Evidence of outcomes 2 & 3 takes the form of interviews with donors and a letter from the PS of the Ministry of Industry, Trade & Cooperatives to KPA, KRA, KeNHA and others.

That outcomes 2 & 3 are intermediary to project completion is a consequence of TMEA’s strategy of conceptualising and designing large-scale projects and persuading others to implement them, referred to in their project documentation as ‘catalytic’ work. Their successful completion was not, however, necessary to generate the key outcome claim of reduced average time to import and export, and so are considered ancillary for the case study (though discussed in more detail earlier in this PIO chapter).

TMEA’s coordinated initiatives at the port were designed to work together to help reduce time to import in reducing congestion and increasing capacity in hard infrastructure projects; however, other outcomes in terms of efficiency gains through productivity improvement are harder to track through the logic chain, in part because soft infrastructure initiatives were often ‘catalytic’ in that KPA and other actors took TMEA recommendations on board, such as in the productivity improvement capacity building, but full implementation of the recommendations was not completed in S1. The MPCC was an important achievement for TMEA as well, but there were similarly long-time horizons on the actual gains to productivity from the coordinated work of these political actors, such as facilitating quick responses to consignments brought to the One-Stop Centre. Evaluation interviews and document review confirmed the ongoing nature of these activities, as well as the Observatory efforts to capture and utilise related data.
There were significant other donor and government initiatives at the port. TMEA estimated that they contributed 20% of the overall time reduction; the OPM TGIS estimates 10%, but in both cases the figures reflect that significant additional work was undertaken, which also affected time to import and export.6 The combined effect of the interventions as a cluster supported TMEA’s outcome claim of the S1 time reductions to import (but not to export), as confirmed when the time data are examined by sub-component. Faster registration of landed cargo was supported by increased container capacity and efficient handling. The One-Stop Centre enhancements led to shorter cargo release, and the shorter wait before cargo left the port included faster truck turnaround time. At the same time, reductions in actual Customs processing time were minimal, and Customs processing was always only a fraction of the other two sub-components of time to import (e.g., measured in hours, rather than days, at five hours in 2010, down to 1.74 hours in 2017). Of the three sub-components, the greatest differences over the life of S1 were seen in pre-customs processing time, and secondarily, in post-release time which is not much lower than the best times prior to 2011, but very consistently at that ‘best time’ level of around 40 hours.

It is possible, but not documented, that export times would have reduced for the same reasons as did import times, and in similar proportions, given the need to complete most of the same processes but in reverse order. The evidence supporting this coordinated set of targeted initiatives confirms that TMEA initiatives were central to realising the key outcome claim, for imports, and that TMEA’s key output claim is ‘Virtually Certain’.

In conclusion, the evidence is very strong that TMEA’s contribution claim to reduced time to import is true, at between 10-20% of the overall time reduction. The probative value of the collected evidence is that this 10-20% contribution to the time reductions is virtually certain, determined through the triangulation of evaluation interviews and data on times and on TMEA and other donor and government work at the port. Other donors’ and government projects, quantified in the TGIS, support this conclusion. Due to limited evidence, the part of the contribution claim that refers to exports cannot be confirmed or disproved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Import times reduced by 51% in S1 | Virtually certain NCTTCA’s observatory online updates of the three port processes accelerated for all import cargo and an update of one undifferentiated port-processing variable for containers.  
- Evaluation interviews with donors, shippers, logistics firms.  
- KPA Annual Bulletins of Statistics on port performance – throughput, ship turnaround  
- Target was 72% reduction to 2.3 days | Virtually certain TMEA expenditures on projects across port operations to improve capacity and efficiency. JICA second container terminal came online too late to have affected these measures, though the presence of the terminal will have affected times since the end of S1, as has the advent of the SGR. WB interventions on capacity building were also underway during S1. KPA and inspections agencies interviews confirmed the importance of TMEA investments, but other projects contributed. |
| Export times reduced by 50% in S1 | As Likely As Not Limited NCTTCA data on exports. TMEA RF cites approximately 50% reduction in time to export through the Port, based on NCTTCA data, from 15.4 to 7.3 days. | As Likely As Not TMEA expenditures on port capacity and efficiency would also have affected export handling, but the data are not present to support this. |

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6 The TMEA figure of 20% contribution comes from the S1 Results Meter, where 20% of the time reduction was calculated as part of TMEA’s reported 15.3% time reduction across the Northern Corridor. The 10% figure is discussed in the forthcoming TGIS which compared investment dollars from government and other donor sources, finding that TMEA’s contribution amounted to 10%. Time reduction and investment amount are not necessarily the same; however, an estimate of between 10 and 20% of the time reduction being attributable to TMEA is justified.
3 SO1 PIO 1.2 Dar es Salaam Port

TMEA’s S1 work at Dar es Salaam Port started slowly in 2011, until it integrated itself into a large WB initiative where it had an appropriate role in commissioning studies for the WB (and government) to use to develop infrastructure and studies on port efficiency, and in undertaking small construction works. This period lasted for about two years until, after the presidential election in 2015, a new regime inimical to private-sector operation of the port assumed leadership.

The TMEA ToC identified improving capacity and efficiency as goals for infrastructure projects like those conducted at Mombasa Port, as well as ‘reduced port regulatory and administrative costs’—rather than showing the projects to be carried out. While the work at Mombasa Port opportunistically flourished and found synergistic connections, in Dar es Salaam political conditions prevailed against full implementation.

The SO1 Dar es Salaam Port component fell short of its potential partly because it took time to find a collaborative niche within the framework of a WB project that had the heft to largely reconstruct the port after 40 years of neglect. But the other reason was the change of administration following the Tanzanian presidential election of 2015. The president wanted Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) to manage port operations, whereas the WB and TMEA subscribed to the prevailing philosophy that while governments own and oversee port operations, private operating companies should manage ports. Government cited previous concessions in Tanzania as examples that such systems were not to their benefit, and work on institutional reform had to take a back seat.

The president’s decision to inspect all imported cargo in response to rampant smuggling set back the port as a whole—throughput fell—and TMEA’s outcomes as well. TMEA set up a successful project implementation team to oversee WB and TMEA projects and conducted a series of useful studies, but otherwise its output largely consisted of a few public works and some procurement on the port’s behalf. Throughout the implementation of this PIO, the TMEA team promoted transparency and the exchange of ideas and continued to engage TPA.

Still, transit costs have come down in the Central Corridor during S1, for five destinations (Kigali, Bujumbura, Kampala, Bukavu and Goma),7 according to the TMEA-supported Central Corridor observatory data; the observatory go on to estimate that transport costs are equal to 40-50% of final product costs, still much higher than international norms. TPA reported 9.94 days dwell time for local containers in 2013, reduced to 5.58 in 2017; transit container dwell time dropped during the five years measured but in 2017 was the same as in 2013. Trade has grown marginally in the same time period.

3.1 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

3.1.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

TMEA’s SO1 Dar Port component eventually found a role within the ambitious Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Improvement Project (DMGIP), designed to achieve a 2009 port masterplan that proposed a set of activities to respond to forecast port throughput. There had been little investment in the port since 1977, with the exception of a 2000 investment by the Tanzania International Container Service (TICTS) to convert berths 8-11 for container handling. The WB sponsored DMGIP, and along with TMEA and DFID, signed an MOU in September 2014. ‘A WB loan together with a DFID grant of £30 million within a ceiling of US$600 million together with collateral finance from TPA produces a total of US$750 million of funding intended to finance the physical development of the berth reconstruction and dredging and associated items.’8

The WB managed the larger tranche of funding for major DMGIP project work, including intended investments as follows: reconstruction of berths 1-7, dredging a deeper entrance channel to the harbour, constructing a RoRo berth, demolishing and relocating old transit sheds to improve port layout, improving bulk handling with conveyor systems, road improvements, and provision of scanners to speed up customs inspection. TMEA’s role took the form of soft projects to prepare for the infrastructure works. In anticipation of the conversion of the MoU into a

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8 This text draws on that of OPM’s Consolidated formative evaluation of ports and OSBP projects, from which several quotes in this section are drawn.
formal loan agreement, between 2014 and 2016, the TMEA-funded project implementation team (PIT) set about conducting studies to improve productivity and a mix of minor roadworks and gate access improvements.

The TMEA-supported PIT team established an open discussion environment, supporting transparency and the inclusion of different stakeholders’ viewpoints. Despite TMEA staff having used its well-honed negotiation skills to deliver some important outcomes, gradually they became weaker in the PIT meetings. Eventually TPA put in place a rule that funders could not attend PIT meetings and TMEA lost that avenue for influence.

Poor management at TPA resulted in numerous changes of high-level officials and personnel, culminating in 2016 in a ‘thorough-going purge at the instigation of the [new] President’ following allegations of corruption and fraud. The shock of the personnel change led to ‘a reluctance to take decisions and responsibility at all levels and a new cadre introduced at the top level who have little experience of ports.’ Implementing a $600-million project in this context was ‘a major challenge’.

The new president (elected in 2015) consistently resisted a landlord port-management model, whereby the government invests and the private sector manages, preferring that TPA would continue to manage all but the existing TICTS berths, with the concession that TPA would manage them as profit centres, possibly as joint ventures. In addition, ‘failure on the part of the TPA, which has arisen, in part, from corrupt practices in the past, has led to the imposition of a strict TRA Customs inspection regime that has increased costs dramatically.’ Port throughput fell.

TMEA staff reported they felt the need to deliver on what they could – infrastructure and productivity improvements – to help build the Government’s confidence in partnering with TMEA. By the end of S1 in late 2017, TMEA had achieved: contractual commitment to support DMGIP, a set of feasibility studies, a series of minor civil works for improving port layout, procurement of scanners for containers (and other goods), and business case studies, and setting up an effective project implementation team. At the same time, the WB loan agreement had still not been signed. Institutional reform was not moving forward, and government became less, rather than more, co-operative.

These frustrating circumstances were not alleviated by the well-connected Tanzanian who chaired TMEA’s Board at the time, despite his concentrated efforts. Tanzania Country Programme (TCP) was forbearing during these challenges. A private sector observer felt: ‘[TMEA] could have been tougher. How much perseverance they had! The need to disburse funds eventually meant that the WB ‘gave in… stepping back from its own initial ideals (i.e. landlord model, concessionary agreement) …’ TMEA adjusted plans to accommodate what was possible, though documentation of that strategic thinking process was not seen. A new PAR was produced in 2014 to ‘cater for planned activities under the revised TMEA Dar Port Programme…. The planned activities incorporate the GoT [Government of Tanzania] Big Results Now (BRN) programme requirements.’ The new PAR referenced growing demand in sectors the port serviced and the growth as well of congestion. The landlord port concept was still an important part of planning at that point, as the PAR reports the recent conduct of training for such operations, a study visit for the TPA Board to Durban, and planning for labour-related negotiations around the issue.

One staffer, who had been present for much of the S1 challenges, expressed concern that negative statements like those in the Formative Evaluation report could further stall progress if made public, perhaps helping to explain why an iterative and frank ToC process like that in common use in other development programming was not availed here. Such a process would have required identifying, examining, and tracking specific assumptions around political economy issues such as political will for reform, which might well have made their government partners uncomfortable, particularly if these documents were public in any way. However, with the end of the prior presidency and the resulting abandonment of BRN, at the very least another PAR might have been useful to retool expectations. The PAR does not delve deeply into the assumptions behind the project, in particular those around political will and governance, but the risk matrix does note the risk as ‘high’ that the BRN was ‘perceived as an initiative of the current Head of State’, and proposes to work on a Port Community Charter in order to have an alternative reform framework widely backed by stakeholders.

TMEA’s partnership with the Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency (CCTTFA) represented a strong effort to capture important data about port and transit times and costs (on imports only), to make these data available online, and to conduct analyses that would support troubleshooting the flow of trade on the Corridor. The resources committed to these data and analyses, as in the case of Mombasa Port, show intention to track key port and corridor performance indicators, if not also tracking the assumptions or risks underlying their work plan.

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Figure 2 above reflects the evaluation team’s re-created ToC for the work at Dar Port. While there are similarities with the work at Mombasa Port, this ToC is distinctive in that it must be read within the context of the overarching USD $750m WB-GoT efforts to improve the Port, for which TMEA’s portion is a small fraction. In the final PAR created for the project, building trust through successful and collaborative work was seen as vital for eventual GoT willingness to conduct port reforms of the type proposed by TMEA, the WB, and international best practices. The assumptions around GoT co-operation towards these goals did not hold; the WB was very late in signing its agreement with GoT and only when their goals for reform were changed.

However, achieving the ToC aims is largely thwarted after the output stage. TMEA reported some gains in reduced import and export times (from 16 to 11.6 days for imports over the life of S1, and for exports from 14.6 to 6.8 days), with reduced average dwell time figures from the Central Corridor Observatory showing a decrease from 11.3 to 9.6 days.\(^\text{10}\) It should be noted, however, that the Results Meter documents TMEA’s assertion that only 10% of changes at that port should be attributed to TMEA, given the other government and donor activities ongoing – meaning less than half a day’s savings for imports, less than a day for exports, and about a third of a day with respect to dwell time.\(^\text{11}\) The Central Corridor Observatory shows slowly but steadily increasing metric tonnes of cargo throughput through 2017, but does not report values of these imports and exports. International data put the values on a steep decline: the WB’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) reports that imports dropped from a high just under US $15b in 2015 to just over half that in 2016 and 2017; TradeMap.org (from the International Trade Centre) shows a small rebound (to $8.5b) in 2018 data.\(^\text{12}\) Exports peaked in 2015 at US $5.8b and have since dropped to about US $3.8b, according to TradeMap.

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\(^\text{11}\) Revenue authority release time has increased, according to the Observatory dataset, from 50.1 to 64.6 hours on average, between 2015 and 2017. Truck turnaround time has decreased somewhat, but it still takes more than twice as long for TPA to release a shipment than it does for the concessionaire to do so.

TMEA respondents make the case that the reform agenda does not represent the only way forward for the port to be productive and efficient; however, the latest PAR does indicate that the project goals continued to put forward that same agenda. There are undoubtedly additional factors, aside from the question of a landlord port model, that deeply affect trade outcomes, such as uncertainty around inspections and quality infrastructure. One Kigali transporter noted that their clients most often chose Mombasa Port for the relative certainty around processes, costs, and time. The lack of political will is not solely around port reforms, as is demonstrated by the GoT’s unwillingness to sign a MoU with TMEA so far in S2. Each aspect of port delays that relates to government compliance would need to be addressed in a stronger ToC for S2.

Though in hindsight we can see that the GoT did not eventually adopt TMEA proposals for change, and in fact the relationship has worsened since the end of the first MoU, a TMEA respondent reports that, at the time, it was difficult to see how entrenched the problems were. Several staff reported how they worked on a principle of doing what was possible, in order to build trust with government. They eventually scaled down the programme, and virtually closed it, as they were unable to get a renewed MoU after significant effort.

Overall, the PE did not find evidence of a robust and evidence-based verification of the causal links in the Dar Port interventions, nor a documented process for considering the degree to which assumptions have borne out as S1 progressed. The re-created ToC shows a breakdown in the causal links where political economy takes over, after outputs are realised, where greater collaboration from the GoT would be required to institute reforms, and to use best practices for efficiency, such as risk-based inspections. Given the important impacts from the SGR on Mombasa Port, and the progress on SGR in Tanzania to date, as well as warming bilateral relations with Rwanda, these will surely already have affected planning in S2 as well, and would also require close attention in a revamped ToC.

3.1.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

TCP staff reported that GoT priorities for transport improvements reflected the current president’s former long-term role as Minister of Works, which for the president had even more resonance in terms of national infrastructure development than as part of the region-wide EAC priorities. Still, regional integration could build from those infrastructure improvements and on the shared gains at OSBPs, for example, where the president had praised efforts. According to the TCP staffer, ‘the assessment of “what we are good at and what should be exploited to gain from being a member of the EAC,” you can’t see clearly that strategy.’

At the same time, TMEA was able to support the EAC Ministry on a range of projects, though not distinctly related to the port. Whether regional integration was a priority or not, TMEA was able to build capacity and interest that appears to continue in relation to the proposed Continental Free Trade Agreement. Efforts with a logistics platform have resulted in advocacy efforts around reducing port charges make transportation more cost-effective.

A private sector effort in Tanzania appeared to have gained traction through evidence-based research on freight, logistics and competitiveness at the port. The association respondent reported that they had been able to resolve issues at the port related to logistics costs. The observatory project also facilitated reviewing data for the entire corridor, rather than focusing on national gains.

Table 3 summarises the ways in which TMEA work supported EAC Regional trade development priorities. Support takes place in three ways: through support for the customs union, infrastructure to reduce trade times and costs, trade, and trade to increase the competitive of industry in all EAC countries.

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Table 4: EAC regional trade development priorities, and related Dar es Salaam Port projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAC Regional Trade Development Priorities</th>
<th>Related TMEA activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure: Coordinating, harmonising, and complementing transport and communications policies; improving and expanding the existing transport and communication links; and establishing new ones.</td>
<td>• Infrastructure work at Dar and Mombasa Ports to reduce trade costs, ensure efficient import and export, and improve environmental compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support to multi-modal transport in SGR process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialisation, SME development, investment promotion &amp; private sector development</td>
<td>• Reducing import/export times and costs to make EA exports (and EA companies) more competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improving the competitiveness of the industrial sector to enhance the expansion of trade [...]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ assembly from EAC website and a range of evaluation interviews and data

3.1.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

The election of a new president in 2015 significantly changed TMEA’s port development work in Dar es Salaam. The new president did not share his predecessor’s approach. He wanted TPA to run operations in the port, rather than have it become a landlord overseeing private sector operators. His insistence slowed down a range of port improvements linked to solving this basis issue.

The president stamped on corruption, for which people gave him credit but, in so doing, he created inefficiencies through his insistence on 100% inspection of cargo (to detect smuggling), which noticeably slowed port throughput. Since the close of S1, inland container depots are closed to transit cargo as well, which is the bulk of imports, forcing all that clearance through the port and slowing clearance times, according to private sector respondents. Others reported that local purchasing power has dropped, and many goods are no longer available for consumers (contrasted with stable imports of raw materials). They asserted that these factors led to a fall in shippers using Dar es Salaam Port.

These did not affect the relevance of TMEA’s interventions, but added to their challenges in achieving outcome-level results. Some private sector respondents (including Rwandan and Tanzanian) reported that their clients chose a different port rather than face the uncertainties of importing through Dar Port: ‘We often get new customs/export charges with no public notice and have to tell our clients this and the pass the additional cost on to them and then the clients go to other ports’, said one. The president’s 100% inspection regime slowed down port throughput, which did not please the private sector in the short run in terms of port clearance times, though anti-corruption and anti-counterfeiting rationale did resonate with respondents. Adding VAT to transit shipments caused a decrease in the use of the port, which resulted in a small increase in efficiency according to port observers, but only because throughput was reduced. The VAT issue was resolved but one logistics platform respondent noted that it was taking longer to get that business back than it took to lose it.

3.1.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

The TMEA interventions were consistent with the policies of the president in place until 2015, and evaluation interviews show that the private sector was in favour of the measures. The new president’s policies in terms of improving trade corridor performance made a good fit thought TMEA’s goals regarding port reform were not aligned, and TMEA changed tack to accommodate.

Aside from port reform, several of TMEA’s efforts were recognised by the private sector as successful from 2010 to 2017: ‘quick wins’ around creating space for cargo and trucks to move within the port, an online cargo management system, faster permit times and clearances; the latter, however, has declined since then ‘due to inefficiencies’ according to private sector respondents. An effort to improve ongoing communication among port community members is still a work in progress, but the gains to date were reported by the private sector as valuable: ‘The Port Improvement Committee used to meet every three months, now it is every two. They used to make decisions right there, but it’s not so easy right now.’
3.2 Coherence and coordination

3.2.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

TMEA staff won respect among port officials, even among those from the post-2015 regime but trust was harder to win when, in that era, decisions about port reform were more politicised. The continuity of TMEA’s presence in the port and their ‘permanent coordination’, as one observer phrased it, helped quite a lot in making their work successful. ‘There was nothing negative about TMEA’s work.’

On the other hand, TMEA might have been well advised to retreat and allocate its resources, perseverance, and problem-solving skills elsewhere, at least in the short-to-medium term. TMEA did scale back its port activities to an uncontentious core, which is a strength given the environment, but the ongoing question of the unsigned MoU has restricted further goals from proceeding at all. A donor respondent noted, ‘TMEA Tanzania’s good work in so many other areas has been overshadowed by the troubled work on the port. It takes away from their numerous soft-side achievements.’

Despite the lack of progress in major policy areas, there is evidence that TMEA still got credit from most observers for a reasonable perspective and for promoting open dialogue, which will be remembered to TMEA’s credit in the long run.

3.2.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

TMEA SO1 regional staff were supportive and trusting of Tanzanian national staff working on Dar es Salaam Port development in the early S1 days before DMGIP took off, in the more propitious 2014-15 period, and in the more politicised and less productive post-2015 years. Problems that arose led to discussion, after which they were delegated from regional to national level for solution. There were cases cited in which Nairobi-based consultants or donor opinions were felt to have carried too much weight in decision-making, according to TMEA staff, but the problem was reported to have ‘since been overcome.’

3.2.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

The plan for the port was an integral and central part of the plan to improve corridor times and costs. Work at the port on improving efficiency involved close collaboration on a cargo management system and single windows with the ICT for Trade team, interfacing with the Standards PIO on inspection times and clearances, and working with the revenue authority on customs. This also meant lining up systems so that imported transit consignments could move swiftly through OSBPs upon their completion. Also, working with the Government to implement 24-hour operations involved working with the SO3 team on the business environment; TMEA staff reported that there were significant cost implications for the private sector of this government decision.

Work in the TCP office is stimulating; there is a lot of interaction in staff meetings, informal discussions, and strong sectoral knowledge among the team. For instance, discussions of the logistics platform may not be principally port-related but because these discussions address transport, SO1 staff reviewed consultants and attended platform meetings. Similarly, SO1 staff were involved in the ICT 4 Trade issues of clearance at the port and tracking of cargo along the corridor, which benefits TMEA in the wider sense: if TMEA develops a good tracking system, it is going to work better in the field, including – for example – improving M&E.

3.2.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

TMEA staff reported that interactions with the different donor staff, particularly from DFID, overseeing the programme was useful. Some staff were strategic; others’ strengths lay in implementation; and others could bring the WB into closer collaboration. NOCs were well-attended and proved useful in clearing bottlenecks because of the strong connections of some members; having a Tanzanian head the overall TMEA Board was seen as a boon in some respects. One TMEA staffer said that the governance was not a problem: getting the
technical proposition and funding right, to ensure VfM, was where it was trickier, particularly in an uncertain political environment.

Some government, private sector and civil society partners reported that they were generally pleased with TMEA governance because they found it to be collegial, professional, and transparent. Others simply said the governance arrangements had not affected them, and were not problematic, apart from infrequently mentioned concerns about approval delays, and a preference for funding decisions to be taken at country level rather than in Nairobi. These positive experiences boded well for delivery of outputs from many projects, though outcome-level gains have been harder to achieve, and to sustain.

3.2.5 **DEQ5.11** Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

During the early Big Results Now period [pre-2016], TMEA Tanzania had weekly meetings with DFID to share status reports, often with Washington on the phone, and at other times with DFID, WB, and government. These meetings were able to resolve a lot of things and help in various aspects. TMEA staff found them rewarding. Now such meetings are less frequent. Donors were supportive of TMEA’s efforts but frustrated around the MoU issue that had stopped S2 port progress. As yet they had not been able to help TMEA get more traction for these proposed interventions.

3.2.6 **DEQ5.12** Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

TMEA’s demand-driven, relationship-building model helped them successfully align with government systems and agencies around port development early in S1, with numerous ‘quick wins’ and achievements that were praised by private sector and government partners alike. ‘TPA had a plan and TMEA funded projects under that plan,’ according to an active partner, and then had to adjust as each of four new CEOs joined TPA over the course of S1. Alignment was elusive after the new president took the helm, and has stalled in S2 as a result.

This is through no fault of TMEA, but rather represents the wishes of the current administration. Given the lack of a MoU, the signals from government on future prospects seem dim and strengthening alignment may mean taking TMEA’s resources elsewhere.

Competition may help to correct deviations from efficient port operations, though corrections can be slow to materialise. And within the TMEA context, there is no interest in pitting the Central and Northern Corridors against one another. TMEA staff report that they want to ‘make both these corridors efficient so that people – especially in landlocked countries – have the same basis for making their choice.’ Nevertheless, in the current climate that appears to be impossible to undertake.

3.2.7 **DEQ5.13** Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

The WB is the biggest co-operator. Between the pair, the WB and TMEA cover most elements of the port activities to be done. In contrast, JICA was reported to have made some inroads but then to have proposed a Japanese company to run the port, which did not get any traction in the current climate. An outside observer reported that the EU also attempted to gain footing with public-private partnership proposals that did not move forward. The WB has ‘lowered its own standards’, according to one port observer, and agreed not to push for port reform, in exchange for promises to turn port functions into profit centres.

TMEA and the WB worked in a complementary fashion on the DMGIP – ‘it was one programme, divided into two institutions’, according to one staffer. Coordination was therefore stronger, given that TMEA itself brought multiple donors to the table with the WB. However, as the lead donor, the WB had a leading role, according to respondents, which meant that their traditional way of bringing projects – less demand-driven, more ‘imposed’ – was seen at times to have affected the relationship with the government. In addition, the WB’s involvement with past concessions in which the Government felt poorly compensated meant that trust had to be rebuilt. Apparently, to some extent, it has been, as the WB’s current project is financing port projects of over US$340m. TMEA’s mediation and influence are considered to have been essential for moving this project to its current stage.
Other donors had tangentially related investments, such as WB and JICA at OSBPs, the EU on the one-stop inspection stations, and Belgium’s work on rail; however, in terms of the port, no other donors were found to be involved.

3.2.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

TMEA’s work with the Central Corridor observatory to improve trade data collection and dissemination was well-considered and very useful for TMEA and for the sector at large, though a TMEA respondent noted how challenging it was to get accurate and timely trade data in Tanzania overall. TMEA’s work with this regional international organisation consisted of significant capacity building as well, by embedding technical staff. One respondent there said it was the continuous engagement with stakeholders that had made the project successful. This and their resulting visibility as a data clearinghouse has raised the organisation’s profile and the dearth of trade data has diminished as a result.

TMEA’s interactions with the EAC were not cited in respondent interviews on this component, but the alignment of Port work with overall EAC goals for trade is in evidence.

3.3 Sustainability

3.3.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

The physical assets, such as the port roads, will remain and the dredging study will be used. The fate of the port's institutional transformation, its increased productivity and the implementation of the action plan are less sure in the short-to-medium term. Competition and input from the private sector will help sustainability. TPA looks both at their own operations and at those of TICTS, and they do try to compete. Better berths get more vessels. Changes in personnel (e.g. four different CEOs at TPA since 2014) make institutional stability look more challenging, as does the president’s detailed involvement.

Improvement of port productivity entails changing processes and technology (from manual to electronic), which requires a change of both attitude and way of working, as well as training and even altering the mindsets of people who would not otherwise change to new working norms. Changing people one-by-one contributes to reforms. Manuals and training can contribute too if they are used the way they were intended. Some of the electronic processes will be sustainable, and the unanimous appreciation from the private sector will act as an incentive to broaden the scope of single window services for the port.

Knowledge developed in Dar es Salaam is also being used now for furthering port projects. All the studies and technical studies (i.e. productivity and dredging studies) are being used. TMEA developed a wealth of relevant knowledge products. For example, they quantified crane loads and productivity studies were particularly useful. These studies were mostly finalised in 2017, to be further used in future work, including the WB projects referenced above.

TPA was pushed by the WB to develop short-term and long-term action plans in line with the recommendations and findings of the green port study and productivity improvement study. Projects themselves are sustainable. The knowledge about how to plan the port activities for the next 60 years is there.

3.3.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

The main partners for increasing port capacity and efficiency were TMEA, DFID, the WB, and the GoT, which held weekly meetings at the start, but the frequency reduced as S1 implementation proceeded. It appears, however, that frequency is picking up again, according to logistics platform respondents. The value of dialogue was a lesson mentioned by several partners at the port, which bodes well for a port community charter. Where TMEA were welcomed, their flexibility, primarily demand-driven model, and professionalism were appreciated.

Capacity building and a sense of ownership were reported to be very strong by observatory respondents. They had also been able to automate some functions, reducing overhead, to make best use of member state funding. A contractor at the port stated that, at a personal level, he has learned more procurement knowledge and taken part in evaluations. He will take some of these lessons forward and thinks it is the same for his colleagues.
4 SO1 PIO 1.3 One Stop Border Posts

4.1 Summary

TMEA’s S1 efforts at border posts built on the work of the WB’s East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Program (EATTFFP) and, alongside PIOs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, worked to achieve important gains in the path to regional integration of the roads network. Over the course of S1, the team built up a more sophisticated understanding but one that did not find its way into a formal revised ToC. The RF served well as a guide to allocating resources in activities but not as a flexible tool for exploring assumptions or causal links. Lack of all the data needed to test their outcome performance required the creation of the Results Meter, which was a first step towards S2 efforts to track time and cost reductions with the Impact Model.

The OSBP work remains relevant when seen as a steppingstone to the full implementation of the Single Customs Territory (SCT). The OSBPs, when functioning well, support intra-EAC trade, complement other related activities undertaken by the Government and the private sector, and have come through S1 largely unscathed by changes in the political economy.

The OSBP programme is coherent in that its strengths significantly outweigh its weaknesses. Its interaction with regional organisations, donors, country systems and agencies, and the private sector are all functional and supportive. Its governance arrangements allow it to function efficiently and its operations generate synergies.

The sustainability of the OSBPs seems assured, fundamentally because they provide significant benefits to traders and truckers, while raising government revenue, thus providing an incentive for government to maintain the infrastructure and continue to train and supply agents working there.

4.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

4.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

The verification of causal links and assumptions underpinning OSBP design was not documented, though TMEA teams did have some data pointing towards some of the assumptions and links. Primarily data were used more to show reductions in time and cost, which were evident in most border posts after these came online. A re-created ToC highlights weaknesses in work related to gender at the OSBPs, and in terms of data that would make the case for the gains realised at border posts, differentiate the border post outcomes, and show TMEA contribution more clearly.

TMEA’s activities with OSBPs pre-date the ToC, but were part of early strategy documents and were long assumed to be key nodes for reducing time and costs of trade. Regional forecasts at about the time TMEA began predicted both great increases in trade flows and dire weaknesses in the corridor networks; chief among these weaknesses were the delays experienced by traders in getting goods across borders. TMEA conceived of the work with the OSBPs as closely linked with their efforts with the EAC, as a regional enterprise. In strategy documents, TMEA staff documented their holistic viewpoint about the enterprise of improving trade and transport through supporting OSBPs, citing traders’ lack of access to trading information; lack of adequate data on transport times and costs; Customs’ bonds; standards and inspections, and other issues TMEA programmed to address.15,16 Later the TMEA ToC included the OSBPs among the infrastructure undertakings needed to expand capacity and efficiency of trade and transport in the region.

The PE team reviewed an early results chain for one border post (Taveta/Holili) that offers a detailed diagram of the main activities for the border post, with activities leading to discrete outputs. Moving to the outcome level, the diagram is less clear. Most of the other border posts would have a similar design, though some infrastructure details differed from site to site, where in one the traffic flow had to be re-routed, while in another, parking for vehicles under inspection had to be constructed, for example. The soft-side activities were planned to be roughly the same, as detailed in the Contribution Tracing Case Studies later in this chapter: interagency collaboration within countries, and then between them; a bilateral agreement to allow for Customs from one country to operate in the new facility of its neighbour; establishment of oversight committees; IBM process flows and interconnectivity; and the like.

The strategy documents referenced above document the way the OSBPs were envisioned to contribute to intra-EAC and international trade, in an ideal world. The results chain for Taveta/Holili shows a basic rendition of one or more inputs leading in a linear way to an output which leads on to an outcome, and so on across the activities, without representation of either less than ideal conditions, for the way these inputs and outputs fit into their context, for the different outcomes at different borders, for any assumptions that must be met, or for how the activities might support or negate each other. The TMEA documents do not show the team’s consideration and planning as part of a strategic process that considered the causal packages necessary to achieve the projects’ shared aims, or the assumptions that underlie their thinking. That is not to say such processes did not take place, either at the beginning of programming or throughout its duration; the process resulting in the TMEA Results Chain shows significant effort towards understanding the underlying processes TMEA teams felt would lead to the time and cost reductions they sought. And, as has been noted in the main body of the report, the idea of a ToC and attendant iterative processes had not yet taken hold in the international development community when TMEA started.

The Taveta-Holili results chain, shown below, has admirable detail but upon close inspection the logic of building from activities through outputs and, especially, to the outcome level is weaker.

**Figure 4: TMEA Results Chain for Taveta-Holili OSBP**

One example of a weakness in the way the results chain is made can be seen around incorporating improved attention to gender into border processes. One activity cell cites ‘Gender action plan developed. Training on gender conducted for border agencies.’ Then, one output cell reads, ‘Gender action plan for border agencies implemented.’ This is paired with two similar cells around a Cross-Border Charter, which codifies expectations for behaviour from border officials towards people who cross the border, including traders. These positive efforts are not related directly to macro-indicators of trade, but rather to the inclusiveness TMEA would like to see in the operations of the border posts they have supported. But those expectations about behaviours do not then appear in EAC manuals, regulations, or training materials. TMEA trainings do include those topics, but if the countries and EAC are to continue to implement the gender action plan, there would at a minimum need to be some efforts directed towards ensuring that in the ToC.

Also missing in this example is how to deal with gender not being a priority issue. As this was a pattern when TMEA worked to mainstream gender in S1, facing this issue squarely – with advocacy efforts, indicators about border official response, and follow-up – is necessary, and requires more detailed treatment in the ToC. Assumptions around gender are easily missed between cultures, as a rule, and in this case the result is not favourable for gender being part of training and procedures in the long-term.

The evaluation team re-created a ToC at the component level for the range of OSBPs and used that logic to identify some of the important gaps in the results chain process in which TMEA engaged.
The TMEA RF lists some assumptions around other potential challenges along the route to reduced time and cost. For infrastructure work in general, the RF lists the following assumptions:

1. Cooperation between respective governments and adherence to bilateral and EAC agreements is assured
2. National governments willing to undertake trade facilitation reforms
3. Willingness to eliminate protectionist measures to trade and logistics on behalf of governments
4. Ability of freight and logistic companies to pay charges, duties, and taxes
5. Transport corridor and customs improvements lead to lower costs
6. Border officials are willing to support gender interventions and apply skills learned

The TMEA work with the EAC collected some data on Partner States’ compliance with commitments; these may have been used as guideposts to the first three assumptions listed here. In the logistics sector TMEA was working with firms and apex bodies on a logistics platform so there would have been some team understanding of the way charges were affecting those actors, but the degree to which any cost savings might have been captured before reaching the consumer in better prices, particularly poor households, was not monitored – and this is not listed as an assumption in the RF, but the evaluation team included it in our re-created version. Border officials’ application of skills around treatment of women and others at borders appear to have been anecdotally confirmed, according to the broad RF statement that ‘100% of planned gender activities have been implemented at the 10 completed target OSBPs’, though this does not fully answer the indicator that reads ‘% of targeted borders that incorporate gender sensitive activities in tandem with statutory IBM activities’ – that is, TMEA have carried out the activities and met the output of putting gender issues on the table, but have not satisfactorily assured that statutory IBM activities have incorporated gender sensitivity.

The TMEA ToC process was linear and suffered from a silo effect in the documentation provided at corporate level, though it was clear that all staff recognised that components overlapped and reinforced one another. Our re-created ToC reflects that silo effect, because the ways in which co-operation and reinforcement occurred were ad hoc, in that the decisions about them were not documented. In the re-created ToC above, for example,
there is no attention to how the decrease in the number or duration of quality inspections would also have an effect on the time spent at a OSBP – but the reduction in time brought about by the Standards component is part of the overall time reduction at border posts. It is also not explicit in the ToC who will train standards bureau staff, either at the onset of the IBM system or in an ongoing fashion – training within the OSBP results chain is for customs officials. New standards testing equipment and on-site testing protocols, however, are necessary to maximise this time reduction benefit at the OSBP.

An important set of changes came from TMEA’s support to the SCT, which were not modelled in the TMEA ToC. The Customs management reforms established a destination model for cargo clearance that reduced the number of documents (from three to one) and inspections necessary at borders along the Northern Corridor. This had the effect of reducing demands on Customs teams at borders and allowing them to focus on risky cargo. Rwanda and Uganda deployed staff to the ports to receive and process cargo, which saved time as well.

The regional Authorised Economic Operators (AEO) programme, by which firms that apply and are audited and approved to allow expedited processing, would speed up average times as well, but this is not contemplated in the results chain. At the same time, the work on women and trade at border posts may actually introduce an effect that slows down average crossing times, but that work is also not considered or represented in the results chain. TMEA has committed to a ToC process in S2 that would better represent these feedback loops and mitigating factors across components.

User satisfaction was surveyed as part of the Time and Traffic Surveys commissioned by TMEA. In most OSBPs these surveys showed improved satisfaction with the advent of the fully functioning OSBPs, but at one of the busiest and in other respects more successful OSBPs, Busia, satisfaction levels were much lower, particularly on the Kenya side. When asked about satisfaction around particular elements, those found to be most negative were parking, facilities for the disabled, separation of goods and passenger traffic, warehouse facilities, and cleanliness – this, despite also reporting ‘time savings and smoother traffic flows’, according to the report. Border officials were also surveyed and reported an average level of satisfaction of 18%, with a significant list of specific concerns recorded. The survey was not repeated, however, so the measurement is only of the experiences of users as at June 2016, called the ‘impact survey’ in the report. On the Uganda side, impressions were better at an average of 50% satisfaction, but still far below the satisfaction levels at the other border posts surveyed. User satisfaction is not the only measure of OSBP outcomes, but it appears to be unexplored in documentation about OSBP design. The assumption that users would be satisfied mostly – but not always – held.

There were some variations in how this process played out by country. In Rwanda, staff reported conducting detailed planning along various dimensions from the start, thus avoiding any need for adaptation of the original ToC. Small adaptations were not documented, they said, because early assumptions were met. They had anticipated, for example, that capacity of the relevant agencies needed building. While they had not anticipated adding disability access, a mother’s room, and a changing room, they added those without changing their results chain.

A donor felt that TMEA was not strong in using its RF for keeping tabs on progress, but reported they had ‘learned over time’. Rwanda Country Programme (RCP) staff said they used their RF as a guide to remind them of the outcomes they had to meet or surpass and focused on the outputs that would lead to these. In the short run, quarterly project reporting demanded periodic attention to where they were in the path to desired outcomes. The Tanzania Country Programme (TCP) staff reported much the same: lists of OSBP outputs and indicators helped staff tracking the project with benchmarks against which to write quarterly reports. The work they described corresponded to project outputs, rather than a component-level set of goals. Kenya Country Programme (KCP) staff explained that the overarching ToC borrowed transport parameters from WB diagnostic reports and academic trade-policy studies estimating impacts on exports of transaction costs from, for example, border-crossing times from landlocked countries. They also drew on the weighted inputs to the WB’s ‘cost of doing business’ index.

KCP staff further described explaining their strategy to partners in RF terms and presenting proposed projects. They used partner feedback to identify omissions and the best approaches to use, streamlining the basic ideas as they proceeded. Ultimately, there was a balance between the implementing partners’ refined preferences and those of the development partners who would provide finance. However, some projects had already started before this process began. Moreover, the ToC changed over the years, as regional integration plans and appetite evolved, as conceptual changes brought about distinctions such as that between direct and enabling projects, and as efforts were made to build a portfolio of more mutually complementary projects. At the same time, a results perspective fostered an analysis of causality and indicators improved to allow assessment of how outputs led to outcomes. Having identified its data needs, the Kenyan office found that the data-collection skills

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of its implementing government and private sector partners were weak. They had to train them and develop tools for data collectors. For example, they had to review the capacity of organisations such as the corridor observatory host and help them improve, often relying a lot on outside consultants.

Rwanda’s team found they reassessed the RF when they began S2 planning, including simplifying and condensing it. The S2 planning process drew on these S1 lessons, and it may be this period of reflection led to their statement that the results framework should be a living document and that it should be reviewed regularly, but it seems they did not do so during S1. In contrast, another country office respondent who had overseen the development of Malaba and Busia OSBPs by ‘following the RF document’ during S1 felt the RF simply was not helpful.

**Data**

Having the right data at the right time to show reductions in time and cost of trade has been an evolving challenge for TMEA. The complexity of the Results Meter shows concerted effort to capture the details of when and how much time and cost were saved, as a result of each SO1 and SO2 component. While partner revenue authorities shared important data that documented crossing times, TMEA is currently planning for a comprehensive system to capture differentiated times automatically through borders, because national and TMEA systems to capture those data (including the corridor observatories, described below) were insufficient.

The Time and Traffic Surveys were designed to show the dramatic changes in border crossing times from baseline, to the time at handover to government, and again about three to six months after that handover. While this was accomplished, the methods used to capture the changes left the findings open to question. The studies contained no detail to explain the extent to which any increase in traffic consisted of the same trucks enjoying faster clearances with less hassle (including corruption), trucks switching to OSBP from other border posts for the same reason, or a natural increase in traffic if and when the East African economy grew. The method of studying a given week, rather than ensuring that new systems could provide consistent real-time data, left the studies open to critique regarding exogenous or idiosyncratic factors that affected the given weeks of study. No systematic, regular tracking of traders’ cargo volumes, along with their reasons for any changes, took place (either as a rigorous study or a regular series of focus groups). Even the descriptive statistics in the commissioned study contained arithmetic errors and were based on a small, seasonally variable sample that was also affected by exogenous events: a truckers’ strike, for example, made traffic in one baseline unnaturally low.

While these issues were mentioned in the consultants’ reports, the results are still reported in the RF as if they are unquestionably valid. That these errors and issues were still present in 2019 despite review by various sources indicates either scant attention or the inability to detect the errors. One revenue authority also provided detailed data on a sample of trucks crossing each OSBP regularly that contradict the findings at one OSBP in both times and volumes.

Another analytical weakness has been the lack of a methodology to show how much the outcome of faster border-crossing has led to the impact of greater trade. One donor stated that that attribution and contribution was not strong for TMEA in S1, with an over-reliance on anecdote rather than hard evidence. EAC Trade Reports, supported by TMEA, were not available in time for use with the RF, coming out over a year after the annual RF requirements. Worse, the EAC data are of a different quality, and regularly differ from the data published by Comtrade and the WB, which affected the degree to which they were accepted as accurate. The reports have not been posted since 2017 on the EAC website.

**Observatory data**

TMEA also supported two corridor transport observatories, one for the Northern Corridor (based in Mombasa) and one for the Central Corridor (in Dar es Salaam). Given that TMEA focuses on the corridors, it would be appropriate for the observatories that collect data on indicators of corridor efficiency would include all the elements along the corridor. In its periodic (not monthly) surveys of trucking costs between important northern-corridor cities, the Northern Corridor observatory team collects cost data for transport from city to city so that, when added together, the sums directly give the cost of other routes. However, journey times are more problematic, as they include port times, trucking times and border crossing times. The monthly data on the times

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17 Busier periods and slower periods of the year are not necessarily comparable, especially where agricultural products are an important part of the mix of traded goods

18 The earlier OPM evaluation team had access to some, though not all, of these endline studies and their analyses. However, the first line of audit of these reports ought to have been TMEA’s M&E function, including at the contractors’ inception phase when the design had critical weaknesses; followed by DFID oversight, and the quality assurance function in DFID Annual Reviews, none of whom caught the problems or, if they did, did not attempt to correct them.
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taken for trucks to cover Northern Corridor segments exclude the border crossing times, which are the segment of most interest to OSBPs. The observatory gathers time data for trucking segments to each side of the following border-crossing points but not the transit time (queuing & processing) across the border itself: Malaba and Busia (both Kenya-Uganda), Gatuna-Katuna (Uganda-Rwanda) and Akanyaru-Kanyaru Haut (Rwanda-Burundi). Of these, Malaba and Busia are TMEA-facilitated OSBPs. (Akanyaru-Kanyaru Haut is an AfDB-funded OSBP; the WB started to convert Gatuna-Katuna to OSBP but did not achieve its goal. It would be of interest to compare their transit times to the two TMEA-facilitated OSBPs, using a common methodology.) Further, on the Uganda-Rwanda border, the observatory tracks times to and from Gatuna-Katuna, which makes sense because it is the most frequented border crossing. However, TMEA has constructed its OSBP at the Kagitumba-Mirama Hills crossing, not Gatuna-Katuna.

Interconnected customs information systems should allow the collection of accurate data of the time of arrival/clearance of any given shipment in Mombasa and the time of its arrival/clearance at the final destination point, as well as at each border passage in between.

However, the observatory does not use these data. Further satellite-tracking data of trucks en-route should give additional information of times of passing each location along the route, stationary periods, etc., which, with the permission of the satellite-tracking company/authority could yield ‘big data’ that would reveal many more details of corridor trucking. For instance, at what point does it become economically worthwhile to employ a second driver in order to prevent a truck being stationary while the driver sleeps? As constraints to East Africa’s corridors become fewer and fewer, there is a greater incentive on the part of truckers to maximise the hours they spend hauling freight, rather than stationary.19

Reduction in transport costs could be improved in terms of data quality. As the total cost to the shipper is the explicit monetary cost plus the implicit cost of immobilised capital, both elements can be combined to compute a total cost for each intercity segment of the corridor, on a daily basis if desired.

Results meter

In 2014, TMEA built a quantitative performance indicator – the Results Meter – to estimate its progress towards a goal of a 15% overall time reduction from all projects on the corridors. Relative to a baseline of times for each East African corridor segment, the Results Meter compares progress in reducing the mean of times along each corridor in both directions (weighted by trade flows). Data come from ports, the Northern Corridor observatory and the WB’s ‘Trading across borders.’ Time lost due to delays has two hidden costs due to immobilised capital and holding additional stock, the sum of which provides an estimate of the associated cost: TMEA values its performance in terms of the monetary value of time savings it can claim. But identifying which part of any time savings accrues to TMEA due to the aggregate of its projects is difficult, all the more so for any individual project. A bias may arise from the omission of some positive and some negative project effects that remain unattributed.

Further, some TMEA projects explicitly boost trade for less efficient traders (e.g. small-scale women traders, or export-ready Small and Medium Enterprises, or SMEs), which would in theory increase average trading times. The Results Meter is best for measuring the impact of SO1 interventions, the time savings of which are often more obvious than those of SO2, and particularly of SO3. The model measures progress towards programme goals but generally does not allow strong causal inferences about the impact of the sum of TMEA projects on the overall time reduction at any point in time. Attribution is difficult with so many other influences on corridor times, including initiatives by governments, donors and the private sector that may occur on a similar scale to TMEA influences. Thus, the Results Meter plays a useful but limited role and requires complementary studies that either gather data more suited to analysis that will identify stronger associations between specific project results and time reductions and/or will interview traders about the impact of such projects on their commercial behaviour. One such study was recently drafted by the KCP with respect to effects on British companies doing business in the region; however, the design of that study was targeted differently.

Outcomes not foreseen in ToC

ToCs dwell narrowly on accelerated border-crossing and neglected a range of positive outcomes which become clear where OSBP operations work well, as at Busia, where SO1 staff noted higher morale for agency staff, greater revenue for revenue authorities, a greater private-sector sense ownership of border-crossing affairs, an evolution of

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19 USAID, with its Corridor Performance Monitoring System, using satellite data, shows significant stationary time on Northern and Central Corridor routes from 2017-2019.

20 SO2 time savings in reduced inspection times or testing times due to work with standards bureaux is one example; this is captured as an undifferentiated part of the whole-time savings at OSBPs. Similarly, time reductions from eliminating NTBs should be caught in measuring the segments of corridor transit time – but that does not specify how much of any time savings is from eliminating the NTB(s) on a given segment. Moreover, the Results Meter tracked ‘nodes’ – ports and OSBPs – and left out the time in between, given the concentration of some of their activities at those nodes. In this way, any time savings from NTBs would not have been included, unless an eliminated NTB had been occurring within a border post or port.
traders towards a more formal-sector professionalism, and local commercial development and population growth. Similarly, OSBP success brought with it negative outcomes: the unemployment of former customs-brokers whose jobs disappeared due to the ease of traders’ direct electronic submission of documentation to border agencies and the loss of manual labouring jobs because of less unloading/reloading of trucks for inspection. In addition, at Kagitumba-Mirama Hills, to which GoR had seconded more staff in anticipation of greater trade that did not immediately materialise, these staff were bored, and revenue did not significantly increase.

TMEA Tanzania focused on a different range of OSBP ToC assumptions that were not borne out: the Zambian and Tanzanian governments disagreeing for 1.5 years about who should play the construction-oversight role (at which point TMEA gave them an ultimatum and they backed off); contractors delaying in obtaining environmental and social approval (needed to get a building license); and provision of materials delayed by VAT exemption issues. The construction time of one year was too ambitious; it was increased to 18 months. (TMEA Tanzania staff now feel that 18-36 months is appropriate.)

S1 was TMEA’s learning period for ToC and RF use. It seems that most staff now accept that RF should be simplified and be easily understood internally and externally and that, though it is important to invest resources to make the initial version a serviceable document, it should allow for improvements and necessary changes during implementation. The ToC process for S2 has also been more in-depth, with more attention to the reinforcing nature of interventions and the logic chains behind them. However, it will continue to be important to revisit the ToC and ensure this process looks closely at the component level, not just projects and the overarching vision.

### 4.2.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

1. EAC has an infrastructure pillar for ‘coordinating, harmonising and complementing transport and communications policies; improving and expanding the existing transport and communication links; and establishing new ones.’ OSBP development and information systems integration fall under this heading.

2. Another EAC pillar supports ‘industrialisation, SME development, investment promotion & private sector development.’ OSBP contributes to this pillar by reducing import/export times and costs to make EA exports (and EA companies) more competitive.

3. A third pillar promotes women, community development and civil society. TMEA has designed OSBPs to have female representation in joint border committees and to be foci for training women to export according to the simplified trade regime, which allows them to import limited quantities of goods into EAC countries duty-free.

4. A fourth pillar supports the EAC customs union and the single customs territory, including interconnectivity of customs systems to facilitate a seamless flow of information between customs stations. OSBP contributes to this pillar by supporting IBM and the collection and dissemination of data through the corridor transport observatories.

Under S1, Rwandan staff were working more at bilateral level (i.e. with Uganda for OSBP) and along the way they realised that there were advantages of being seen as pursuing regional goals, particularly under the infrastructure and industrialisation pillars: ‘We’ve already changed this: we now work through the EAC Secretariat. For example, when work on earlier OSBPs was in progress, we worked at the same time with the EAC Secretariat to produce regional documents, plans and standards. Working in this way unblocks lots of potential constraints because the project is seen as regional rather than as part of a national or individual agenda.’

### 4.2.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

The ratification of the EAC OSBP Act by Partner States took about two years, which was quicker than TMEA or the Secretariat had expected. ‘The push came from the countries’ themselves, according to one respondent.

In Rwanda, TMEA noted no political changes affecting project outcomes. ‘It was a calm period. Any changes were positive and measured, both regionally and nationally.’

In Uganda, there were cabinet changes, as well as civil-service changes at the level of director and above. These personnel changes led, in turn, to some changes in government priorities and focus. In particular, the new minister changed focus to other government projects, which slowed some of the activities such as the construction of some access roads. Also, in Uganda, some politicians took umbrage at the construction of OSBP staff houses being built in Uganda and not in Kenya.
In South Sudan, respondents were frustrated by the closure of the Juba office and the resulting delays with the OSBP construction. They felt that a local staff member should be a priority hire, so that at least one person would be working with agencies and undertaking necessary steps to move the project forward in the halls of government offices.

In Kenya, delays to project activities stemmed from extended politicking and electioneering processes for elections, ad hoc changes in government, and the introduction of devolution (which required an increased budget to cater for the devolved government system).

In Tanzania, OSBPs were reported to have increased the visibility of TMEA Tanzania. OSBPs were a top priority of the Government in power when TMEA started. The change of president following the 2015 elections resulted in significant changes. Among these was a delay in granting tax exemptions for inputs to one-stop inspection stations (OSIS) on the Central Corridor, but this did not apply to OSBPs. In 2017, investment in the port and in OSIS stalled, but not investment in OSBPs, which are popular: people want to visit OSBPs. One EAC ministry respondent has reported that staff from the two countries do not work together at the Holili/Taveta border; while this was not noted in a PGIS site visit, if true it would undermine the purpose of the OSBP on that route.

4.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

TMEA Rwanda’s support to Kagitumba OSBP sits alongside the construction of four other OSBPs in Rwanda, each supported by a different donor, with varying levels of success. The other S1 donors were:

- JICA, which financed the Rusomo OSBP with Tanzania, which is now operating
- AFDB, which financed the Nemba-Gasenyi with Burundi OSBP, which is now operating
- WB, which financed the Katuna-Gatuna OSBP with Uganda, which is only partially constructed because funds expired
- The Buffet Foundation, which financed the Rubavu-Goma OSBP with DRC, both sides of which have been built but that is not operational because insufficient prior awareness-raising has resulted in the two governments’ border agencies disagreeing about their bilateral agreement and there exists no catalyst to make things happen.

The Uganda Country Programme (UCP) worked directly with the East Africa Trade Hub to foster coordination among Uganda’s border agencies, with USAID/Compete to set up and operationalise cross-border committees and to harmonise border procedures in EAC, and with JICA (which funded OSBP in Rwanda and Tanzania) in training in OSBP procedures and the OSBP Sourcebook.

UCP also worked with the Ministry of Trade on its cross-border market between Busia and Majanji, with Uganda Export Promotion Board (UEPB), Ugandan National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) and Uganda National Roads Authority on the extension of Entebbe Airport; with the WB at Mpondwe and Malaba border posts on the East African Trade & Transport Facilitation Project. It contributed to the NTB policy component and to the regional electronic cargo tracking system (RECTS).

One area in which the TMEA OSBP work built on previous development work was the incorporation of cross-border women traders and gender action plans as part of soft infrastructure design. This is seen in TMEA’s RF in that each border post is to have a costed gender action plan under implementation. Also, in TMEA’s OSBP staff training materials, they include the Cross Border Charter, which demands transparent and non-harassing treatment at border posts and comes from a WB effort to improve behaviour of border officials at borders with respect to these traders and populations. However, it was also noted that EAC training materials for OSBP staff contained no such references or material; site visits also showed no attention to these issues except where women and men cross-border traders were organised and apt to demand their rights.

4.3 Coherence and coordination

4.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

Strengths:

1. TMEA is responsive and flexible in its implementation approach, and is receptive to national and regional priorities. This has enabled it to build fruitful partnerships and networks to deliver on its role.
2. Enabling EAC legislation (OSBP Act) facilitated the construction of the OSBPs and the use of integrated border management (IBM), as well as training. Aligning with this regional effort paid dividends.
3. Good relations between the countries and political will at high level are important.
4. Working with relevant and committed partners was important. In one country, once the Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration was appointed OSBP manager its staff took ownership and directed operations efficiently.
5. Strong commitment from all stakeholders and coordination of different stakeholders through joint border committees was important, as well as close and regular engagement with them. TMEA made efforts to develop stakeholder engagement from the start and to put the necessary legal instruments in place: a bilateral agreement, regulations, and OSBP standard operating procedures.

Weaknesses:

1. Roads may constrain OSBP effectiveness. If engineering works are not complete when operations start, an OSBP does not work as intended. In particular, after the Kagitumba-Mirama Hills opening, roads were in a bad condition for some time and road construction took place in an uncoordinated way. Initially road construction was incomplete on the Ugandan side; later, that TMEA-financed road construction had finished, but road widening started on the Rwandan side due to an independent initiative by the Rwanda government. At Busia, a single carriage road entering from the Uganda side is cited as a constraint, and works at the Malaba OSBP on roads – which actually began as a WB project, and for which TMEA ultimately secured extra resources to complete – were slower than expected.
2. An efficient OSBP may not yield benefits if it is poorly located. Since the opening of the Kagitumba-Mirama Hills OSBP, traffic levels have remained low because of the popularity of a competing route from Kampala to Kigali: ‘TMEA cannot force traders to use a given trucking route because a priority for us may not be one for traders.’
3. Silo thinking in government was at times a constraint. One Country Programme found that getting agencies to work together and internalise common goals was difficult. Implementing agency capacity levels vary, and at times needed resolution of capacity gaps before IBM systems would work.
4. Even once a bilateral agreement is in place, negotiations between multiple government agencies, some forward-looking and others not, presented problems at times, and one report says the Taveta and Holili sides are currently not working together on OSBP tasks like immigration and Customs.
5. Initial 12-month timelines for OSBP construction were unrealistic.
6. Another Country Programme had not anticipated the variation in the efficiency of construction firms due to their choices of equipment and machinery, planning and procurement procedures, and staffing.

4.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

SO1 was regionally run particularly on the soft side, during S1. Therefore, complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels was particularly important.

The leadership of the Kenya office outlined the set of general TMEA measures to ensure complementarity and coordination:

- structures (NOCs, Council and Board) and periodic meetings to review progress and address any emerging concerns: project implementation and steering-committee meetings, quarterly-progress reviews etc.
- TA support and capacity-building for coordination purposes, where necessary
- MoUs and project agreements to support the coordination process.

Rwanda staff confirmed a systematic interaction with TMEA corporate staff: ‘Within TMEA, we exchanged ideas, learnt and shared during S1. We met OSBP project managers in the region quarterly. We worked with the procurement and communications teams at regional level. We invited the communications team to quarterly meetings with OSBP managers, travelling with them to the border so that they could see the reality on the ground. The communications team could join the quarterly meetings to understand what had been done and share these achievements with the wider community.’
Similarly, the Tanzania SO1 line manager communicated closely with Nairobi office: whatever the team did was shared with the regional transport team. Collaboration with, and support from, the Nairobi team was excellent. ‘The OSBP IBM team was a special team. The kind of collaboration, the teamwork built by our managers, it was great. I could go to the stakeholders of my colleague in South Sudan and help him, and the same for us. This was to ensure the work flowed flawlessly.’

The success of OSBP work also depended on bilateral coordination and collaboration. Work took place at two levels: at each national level, TMEA worked through committees that included all stakeholders; at bilateral level, the process was similar. The Uganda and Rwanda offices had a joint OSBP design process, including joint inspections during which each country borrowed ideas from the other.

4.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

Synergies emerged within the TMEA offices. In various ways, TMEA staff in country offices achieved more collaborating than in isolation. SO1 and SO2 staff worked together with a holistic perspective on ICT needs as they related to IBM. Staff members’ common knowledge meant that one TMEA staff member could step in to give training in place of another. Their joint familiarity with the OSBP concept, on the one hand, and different perspectives due to different specialities, on the other, meant that joint inspections and management meetings resulted in different dimensions of the problem being brought to light to identify and solve problems quickly. OSBP Time and Traffic surveys coordinated by the results team through discussions with communications team, showed what had been done and the corresponding benefits, with pictures and statistics.

Kenya staff explained that the diversity of TMEA’s projects resulted in project design that addressed problems holistically. Their perspectives broadened and deepened due to interactions with revenue authorities; border communities, including informal and women traders; truckers and staff from Ministries of Transport; trade officials engaged in export strategy work; export-ready farmers; and bureaux of standards reducing testing times and increasing the efficiency of testing samples.

The Uganda and Rwanda SO1 teams coordinated with donors involved in setting up other OSBPs, e.g. JICA, to share experiences to avoid duplication of effort. When TMEA took over some WB OSBP projects it also incorporated some of its designs into the TMEA plan. Other donors with which TMEA staff worked and exchanged OSBP ideas were AfDB and EU. Having a NOC that was representative of partners and donors introduced synergies and reduced duplications of projects at donor and government level. Some work was done jointly. For example, training materials for EAC – e.g. regulations and the operational manual – were done jointly by TMEA and JICA; both donors worked on it for a final one single document for each instrument.

In a wider sense, when the OSBP model worked well it did so partially through synergies that generated better outcomes, through improved morale, greater efficiency, and monetary gain. Government agents were motivated to sustain the OSBP system because of the training they had received and being part of a technologically advanced and more efficient system. Their motivation also stemmed from better living quarters. The Kenyan National Chamber of Commerce and Industry stated that its trade facilitation work, including the work of its National Trade Facilitation Committee for the elimination of NTBs, was made more efficient by the existence of OSBP at key borders, particularly when combined with the training of cross-border traders (including women) under the TMEA funded Trade Facilitation Project, because of the cross-fertilisation between those involved in different dimensions. Traders’ incentive to make the OSBP system work was having been trained and asked for their feedback in border committee meetings, as well as by the faster, improved trading environment. This was especially true for women and vulnerable populations. Higher revenue for URA provided a feedback loop to sustain the system, which is important because URA is responsible for the upkeep of the infrastructure.

4.3.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

In principle, TMEA put in place transparent governance arrangements, with little effect on staff members’ work. Respondents reported that the matrix management and reporting lines were clear. An SO1 staff member might sit in the country office but report to the regional technical experts in the Nairobi regional office on the issues with regional focus (because OSBPs were managed regionally in S1). Otherwise reporting took place to the country director, and NOCs were apprised of progress quarterly. Reporting to the Board went via the country director; regional reporting went via the technical supervisor in Nairobi. However, the division of reporting nationally and regionally sometimes led to a lack of clear communication in meetings. It was possible for the regional technical director to lack context or information, resulting in confusion when the director met stakeholders. The Tanzania office was more sanguine about governance arrangements, which apparently had no impact on work. Similarly,
in Uganda: ‘It is normal to have governance structures, as long as they are supportive.’ In Kenya, staff were concerned about the impact of governance arrangements on delays encountered in approval processes for projects. Governance for the South Sudan Country Programme (SSCP) was currently located in Kampala, since the violence of 2016 forced the office to close. This has slowed work on all fronts, though numerous respondents report that agencies are able to continue work, with appropriate support.

4.3.5 DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

In Tanzania, the S1 donors were said to be present at every NOC. TMEA staff said they had regular interactions and staff took them to the OSBPs. It was also reported that donors also served as good mediators between TMEA and the government, though the relationship has changed since the new government took power in 2015.

Donor participation on NOCs at country level was appreciated as a key enabler, and allowed their inputs and concerns to be taken on board regularly. In Rwanda, no other donors participated in TMEA’s OSBPs, except in anti-NTBs and single-window work (discussed in the PIO for ICT for Trade, below). Each OSBP had a single donor, so the focus turned to harmonising inputs of all government agencies. No constraints from the operational model at donor level were mentioned with respect to the OSBPs.

4.3.6 DEQ5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

OSBP has been on the Rwandan government’s agenda since at least 2008 and SO1 staff were confident that government continued to want to promote this for reasons of trade facilitation (to help economic development through streamlined processes), regional integration, and support for small-scale cross-border traders.

The Kenya office emphasised that government priorities had remained the same: facilitating trade-driven growth (as a means of alleviating poverty, maintaining peace and security and guaranteeing sustainability of livelihoods, advancing Kenya’s national interests through innovative commercial diplomacy; and promoting joint economic development corridors for enhanced competitiveness). The strategy of the KCP was fully aligned with Kenya’s national Vision 2030 plan, government partner priorities, EAC regional integration efforts and donor priorities, and the President Kenyatta’s ‘Big Four Agenda’, according to extensive partner interviews. In addition, TMEA tried to both understand and align with private sector needs and priorities and, as a result, sought to support institutional strengthening among private sector industry groups and apex bodies. Separately, the Kenya office harmonised its financial year to match those of the Kenyan government and EAC, which improved planning and budgeting. When asked what could have been improved, staff answered: engagement at the county level, due to the then newly devolved county structures, because it was important to align TMEA strategy with theirs too and consult the county governments, especially those on the corridors and at the nodes.

The Ugandan SO1 team similarly observed that Ugandan government priorities were from the National Development Plan and did not change during the period; partners reported that TMEA priorities were aligned with these. Government wants better infrastructure such as roads and markets. OSBPs complemented the outcomes of good roads by facilitating movement of goods at border posts.

If there had been change in government priorities, OSBP committees and multi-stakeholder meetings, particularly NOC at country level, had members that included government representatives who would have communicated the change to TMEA. Committee members included works, roads, and transport ministries; revenue and immigration authorities; national bureaux of standards and other organs of quality infrastructure; ministries of agriculture, industry and trade; ministries of foreign and EAC affairs, as well as donors and the private sector. So, any change would have been factored into OSBP operations.

4.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of other development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

In Rwanda, TMEA took responsibility for Kagitumba within a system of donor support whereby WB, JICA, AfDB provided the infrastructure for other OSBPs and JICA and GoR operationalised them. Cooperation took place continuously but more at regional than national level.
Similarly, in other countries, different donors supported OSBPs according to expediency on the part of government and donor at the time, with donors exchanging information and coordinating on OSBP practicalities. TMEA Uganda noted that there had been good donor coordination.

To learn from each other’s experience, regional donors held quarterly regional OSBP meetings, organised in Nairobi by JICA and/or TMEA, attended by directors, covering different hard/soft aspects. These meetings still take place. They led to improvements in donor coordination, which had already been good.

During S1, donors saw TMEA as ‘a source of excellence’ according to one donor, so representatives visited TMEA OSBPs to see how things worked. Several donors reported visits to OSBPs to witness the operation of the investments.

There were some reports that donor coordination improved, led by DFID. Donors were often briefed before the NOC meetings, according to one donor respondent, so that the NOC would not be surprised by events. Collaborating with donors frequently was seen as helpful. External donors consulted for the evaluation were generally positive about TMEA’s role in the trade sector of the countries, particularly noting that they provided a regional viewpoint on OSBPs and IBM that connected with the support to the EAC.

4.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

EAC structured OSBP meetings at technical and other levels. TMEA had collaborated with them at different levels so, for example, TMEA/Arusha would bring revenue authorities together. This was a very helpful process, which kept partners up to date. With its offices near the EAC Secretariat in Arusha, TMEA worked with the Customs directorate to develop the OSBP manuals and procedures, with support from JICA. They have also begun a joint monitoring programme with a shared instrument. Working with the EAC provided an institutional home for the effort that aligned with the EAC’s goals for integration.

Collaborating with other regional economic communities was reported to be a useful approach on those occasions where TMEA began to extend its influence outside the original bloc. COMESA held meetings about the DRC’s procedures for a simplified trade regime, agreed by all member countries. The regime defined a shipment value below which no tax was due (or reduced tax rates applied). COMESA is not a structured umbrella, unlike EAC. However, the important thing is that DRC and Rwanda share regulations under COMESA.

4.4 Sustainability

4.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

TMEA Kenya asserted that it is a mere facilitator in most of the partnership projects with either the GoK or the private sector taking the lead and that this ensures ownership and sustainability overall. However, a donor representative in Kenya said he thought that TMEA makes governments lazy, in that funds they themselves might have spent on OSBPs go elsewhere. He asked if GoK would build more OSBPs with their own funds. ‘The impact was great, but what about going forward?’

TMEA teams made a hard/soft distinction for OSBP sustainability:

**Soft:**

- Traders liked OSBP and enjoy the benefits. The government would face resistance from private sector actors if they stopped the OSBP operations. Unless there are political problems, the operations should be sustainable because stakeholders were embracing OSBP. Traders, truckers, and truck drivers derive such benefits from it that they would not allow things returning to the status quo ante. Quick clearance saves money and creates a better working environment for both government and traders. However, OSBP losers such as clearing agents and manual labourers who have lost their jobs would disagree.

- TMEA worked with government agencies to ensure they integrated OSBP procedures into their work mandates. TMEA Kenya notes a ‘large staff turnover at [the] border’ and the need to at least have senior agents trained to retain institutional memory. The transfer of trained officials to other posts is disruptive but, in Rwanda, TMEA has addressed this problem by incorporating OSBP principles and SOPs into training so all officials have these skills. Organisation of this training started during S1 and continues in S2. Training materials and curricula exist. In Uganda, there will be training and retraining and sensitisation of staff through the EAC Secretariat to keep up the quality of services.
Hard:

- Partners perceive that OSBP reduces revenue that escapes from revenue authorities, so government should have an interest in maintaining the infrastructure to sustain this increased income. In addition, faster truck turnaround times increase the revenue for government – traders can do more trips now than they could prior to the OSBP. Government maintains the OSBP infrastructure through a centralised budget line, but the OSBPs are quite new so the time for big reinvestment has not yet come. During S1, TMEA followed up with the Rwandan government’s Estates Management office to ensure adequate reinvestment.

- Revenue authorities are the lead implementing agencies in three countries and should have maintenance budgets from their Ministries of Finance. Evaluation interviews with these partners confirm that their intentions are to maintain the facilities and IBM because of the benefits of OSBPs for their countries.

Construction and maintenance are costlier with the OSBP designs used by TMEA, but some respondents report that new infrastructure is not necessary for all OSBPs. Governments could apply OSBP reusing old border buildings, as at Cyanika OSBP (Rwanda-Uganda) for customs only: this has not provided all the benefits of a purpose-built OSBP that brings all agencies together, but some. An intermediate method may be to add new facilities to existing buildings and parking. It should be borne in mind that the goal in the longer run is to have no border, and thus no border posts, within the customs union: the current system should only be a staging post to that vision. To the extent that this vision becomes reality, it would be a mistake to invest too much in OSBPs that become redundant.

Tanzania staff felt that an important part of the OSBP training was about sustainability – maintenance of equipment and buildings, proper adherence to processes, guided by the need to reduce further the times to cross the border, ensure safety of cross-border traders and citizens, and protect the environment. It was reported that transfers and new officials still needed to be trained. If left for too long without tracking, they reported, it would be hard to maintain that sustainability.

4.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

Across OSBP projects the partners and stakeholders were deeply engaged through a committee structure at management and technical levels. Government partner respondents to the evaluation were clear in commending TMEA’s manner and consistency of engagement, TMEA’s demand-driven model, and the alignment of the OSBP work with national and regional priorities for trade integration.

During S1, TMEA Rwanda undertook a process review for all the border agencies to assess the performance of Kagitumba OSBP, to see how long crossings took and who did what. The validation of this assessment showed agencies where duplication and unnecessary procedures existed. The agencies adopted and implemented the study. They changed their processes and procedures accordingly. In future, they will use joint inspections to avoid other redundancies.

The Kenya office explained that the Kenyan OSBPs are strongly embedded inside the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), with clear commitment and leadership demonstrated both centrally and locally to the OSBPs. TMEA has tended to find its best successes through strong partnerships with local partner agencies and the importance of ownership by the partner agency is key for project success. However, challenges of weak partner capacity (mitigated by the use of long-term TA) existed.

In Tanzania, stakeholders took the lessons learnt into account but ‘there was a tendency to forget’. One TCP staffer found a barrier at an OSBP, raised the issue, and saw to it that the barrier was removed; but ‘sometimes if you don’t pass by for too long, they may revert.’ They recommended remote monitoring, or whenever someone was going through the OSBP for other reasons, that they would to check. ‘The EAC is not fully on the ground. They do training, and then leave.’

22 The exception is Rwanda, where RRA does not have the mandate to deal with infrastructure. The Directorate General of Immigration & Emigration manages Rwanda’s OSBPs, meaning the link between customs revenue and OSBP management is not as direct as elsewhere.
4.5 DEQ2.1 Effectiveness: Contribution Tracing

4.5.1 DEQ2.1 To what extent has TMEA contributed to reducing corridor trade times and increasing corridor volumes?

According to OPM’s Formative Evaluation of Ports and OSBPs, work plans and outputs were implemented at both ports and OSBPs (including IBM work) with minor project delays and some cost variations but not at a level critical to the overall projects. Project management and controls were deemed to be reasonable. Civil works at ports generally progressed satisfactorily in both ports, with some delays but project execution improved with better guidance and systems supported by TMEA. TMEA relationships and investments in capacity building were generally positive and appreciated. Cross-border time comparisons showed that efficiency had improved considerably from 2011 to 2016, with a notable reduction in the average crossing time from Kenya to Uganda from 14 to three hours. There were (and are) major questions on the potential effectiveness of the Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP, but regarding Malaba, where time and costs have temporarily increased due to still ongoing construction works, time and trade costs are expected to decrease importantly as a result of the OSBP. The roads works were begun by the WB, which did not finish the project; TMEA eventually secured additional resources to complete the works, later than hoped.

That report concluded that the improvements to civil works could be expected to contribute to efficiency gains (and reduced costs) and that the key measure of effectiveness of the TMEA activities contributing towards improved port infrastructure on the pathway to a reduction in trade costs has been achieved. The critical shortfall at ports related to reform and modernisation which was a key assumption in the TMEA results framework. The transition to landlord port models in the key container segment did not happen either with KPA or with TPA. Across all countries and at the corporate level, respondents report time reductions. These reductions come from individual projects and from components across the TMEA ToC. SO1 work at ports reduced dwell and truck turnaround time, and OSBPs and the RECTS kept cargo moving along the corridors. In SO2, permit processing at supported agencies was reduced and customs management systems ensured paperwork was available throughout transport; standards inspections times decreased with faster processing and harmonised standards.

The PE heard about these outcomes not only from TMEA and its partners, but also from external private sector firms using the infrastructure and ICT for Trade, standards, and other improved systems. TMEA also commissioned evaluations of many of its projects, components, and countries; results from those studies concur that TMEA met most of its planned S1 outcomes. The degree to which TMEA contributed to corridor volumes, however, is not substantiated in the data.

4.5.2 Contribution case study: PIO 1.3a Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP

The goal of PIO 1.3 was to speed cargos through border posts by converting them to ‘one-stop border posts’ (OSBPs). OSBPs would cluster border agencies from both countries at purpose-built facilities on each importing side of the border. The change hypothesis is that agents from both countries would jointly process cargo. Integrated border management (IBM) would allow electronic communication among each countries’ agencies for national processes, and between the two countries’ agencies, including prior notification of cargoes’ arrival. Border community committees would provide corrective feedback loops on the efficiency of operation. The hard and soft infrastructure would together result in faster processing of imports and exports, contributing to faster overall corridor times and lowered trucking costs.

The northern corridor ramifies as it passes through Uganda, with two main roads heading south to Rwanda and thence to Burundi and DRC. One of these roads passes through the Uganda-Rwanda border at Mirama Hills (Uganda) and Kagitumba (Rwanda). TMEA has converted this crossing to an OSBP, operating within the framework of EAC’s OSBP Act and a bilateral agreement between the two countries.

The contribution claim that forms the focus for the evaluation under this PIO is:

TMEA contributed to increased efficiency of trade through Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP through a combination of hard infrastructure projects, road work and institutional and soft infrastructure work that resulted in a reduction in average time to cross the border.

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TMEA’s projects that contribute to this outcome included IBM investments in both Rwanda and Uganda, and construction works in both Rwanda and Uganda; TMEA also funded the tarring of a 37-km stretch of road leading to the Mirama Hills post (Uganda side), and two bridges across the border.

In Rwanda, TMEA commissioned a feasibility report for OSBP construction and developed terms of reference for a design and supervision firm. With the Government’s lead agency, TMEA undertook a procurement process through which the construction firm was hired. TMEA also commissioned a land-title study (allowing government to reimburse landowners, as necessary), an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA), and a Time and Traffic Study (TTS) to assess baseline flows of trucks and crossing times across the border. A sensitisation campaign for the local community followed.

From the start of construction till handover to government, monthly site meetings and inspections took place, and TMEA was part of this along with their contracted supervision firm. After training, ~60 government agents moved to the new site and truckers were expected to begin to cross there in 2015. Two post-inauguration TTS took place, including measures of user satisfaction, and, in S2, a performance and sustainability study that included an assessment of freight processing times by agency. A similar process took place on the Ugandan side. After implementation, TMEA contributed to tarring the 37-km murrum approach road to Mirama Hills side for all-season use (including two bridges across the border) and (at the time of writing this report) the Rwandan government was widening and re-tarring 70km of the approach road to Kagitumba.

More information on each of these can be found in the rest of this chapter covering the entire PIO, and in Annex N in the CT Case Study data tables (with additional narrative on the projects, as well as specific data and sources).

Documents from the TMEA Rwanda office provide evidence for these activities; these are the bilateral OSBP agreement and other exchanges between Uganda and Rwanda; the construction feasibility study; a TMEA offer to fund, design, and supervise the OSBP; and the TTS. TMEA also provided procurement process documentation and contracts with TMEA for the civil works; bilateral meeting reports with TMEA involvement and the resulting agreement; training documents and procedures manual from the EAC and TMEA; and ICT and furniture procurement documentation. In addition to document review, the PE team confirmed these activities in interviews with partners, and conducted site visits during earlier evaluation fieldwork and again during the PE, allowing corroborating interviews with public and private sector actors.

Outputs were operational OSBP infrastructure on both sides of the border, including joint-agency offices; parking space for trucks, cars and buses; an immigration processing area; laboratories for RSB and MINAGRI; a clinic/dispensary; warehousing; a bank, as well as trained agents and users. TMEA later co-funded the approach road on the Ugandan side and two bridges over the river separating Kagitumba and Mirama Hills. TMEA also commissioned two post-implementation TTS. The table below is an abbreviation of a more detailed table in Annex N, where details on the evidentiary references are provided.

Table 5: CT Case Study: Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSBP structures and procedures in place</td>
<td>Virtually Certain &lt;br&gt; Evidence: PE site visit; evaluation interviews; activity evidence of civil works. Note, however, that there is no scanner at Kagitumba OSBP, per site visit and interview with official.</td>
<td>Virtually Certain &lt;br&gt; Evidence: PE site visit; evaluation interviews; activity evidence of civil works. TMEA ESIA report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM operational</td>
<td>Virtually Certain &lt;br&gt; Evidence: Institutional and legal framework documentation; bilateral CMS operations; interviews with immigration (Rwanda’s lead agency at OSBP), Customs and Standards; ICT – computers, LAN, IP phones, and internet; furniture in place as procured</td>
<td>Virtually Certain &lt;br&gt; Evidence: Procurement and ToRs, intergovernmental coordination meetings with TMEA participation (meeting minutes); respondent interviews with government and border users (from PGIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building and change management</td>
<td>Virtually Certain &lt;br&gt; Evidence: Extensive training documentation – times, dates, places, attendees, curricula – from multiple trainings with border officials and managers</td>
<td>Virtually Certain &lt;br&gt; Evidence: TMEA’s training materials, documentary evidence on convening and covering training costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through re-creating a ToC for this component (please see the response to DEQ5.1 in this chapter), the PE team identified that the three bold outputs above are critical for the results chain leading specifically to the key
outcome claim of reduced average border crossing times. These three have conclusive evidence both that they occurred and that TMEA contributed, as shown in the table.

TMEA also cited improved user satisfaction levels as an outcome at Kagitumba/Mirama Hills. However, there is no evidence that this contributed to the overarching ToC goal of increased trade in S1 directly. As such, it was excluded from the final CT analysis here. Instead, this ancillary outcome was considered in depth in Annex J and noted where appropriate in the main body of the report. An additional RF outcome on the implementation of gender action plans was also not considered directly linked to the key outcome claim either, or was there strong independent evidence of that implementation.\(^{24}\)

The TTTS provides evidence that border-crossing times for all trucks relative to the 2011 baseline had decreased by 1h 33 min (\(-87\%\)) by 2017. The changes were more pronounced where trucks carried containers, decreasing 1h 39 min (\(-93\%\)), which is logical as these are more likely to be on long-distance transit journeys. In each of the three years, the subcontractor that conducted these studies gathered data for only seven days, and in different seasons of the year. The RF notes that the 2016 study week fell in May during which rains immobilised some trucks, which must have played a role in the quite different findings for 2016 and 2017. This methodological weakness and arithmetic errors in the results claimed undermine somewhat the credibility of the interannual comparisons. Nonetheless, the RF claims ‘\(25\%\) achieved within three months of operationalisation’ and it seems very likely that the Kagitumba-Mirama Hills OSBP surpassed its goal of a 30\% decline in ‘Reduction in time (in at least one direction) to cross the border’ by the end of S1.

Reduced border crossing averages would not be difficult to achieve with the low traffic flow at the OSBP. Only 55 trucks were passing daily (total for both directions) according to the TTTS, of which 74\% were empty trucks entering Uganda. The remaining flow of around 16 trucks daily – which was even more than what evaluators saw in their visits – would be easy to process with the new OSBP and IBM. With the OSBP having such excess capacity, judging the TMEA interventions against the key outcome claim would paint too rosy a picture.

Several factors contribute to this low traffic level. The border was not, at that time, working on a 24 hour-7 days schedule. Also, TMEA’s work to tar the Mirama Hills road ended later than expected. When it finished, Rwanda began a 70km construction effort on its own access road. Transporters have also long used and seem to prefer the Katuna-Gatuna border crossing for its faster route from Kampala to Kigali. Most of these factors were out of TMEA’s control, but the low traffic level – while not invalidating the time reductions found by the TTTS – do not confirm that the OSBP would be able to maintain those reduced times if traffic were at the levels initially forecasted. The feasibility report on which the decision to intervene at this border post was made offers little clarity: figures sometimes lack unit information or clarification about the scope of its traffic predictions.\(^{25}\)

Data from NCTTCA and USAID satellite data also show that crossing times have increased since S1 ended, or at least that there is variability within a large range. However, given experience at other OSBPs and the successful construction and IBM efforts, it is still very likely that the OSBP surpassed its goal of 30\% reduced average border crossing time in S1. TMEA claimed 100\% contribution to this gain in their Results Meter. The evaluation found no other donors working at this OSBP, in interviews with government agencies, including border officials, and with those working on EAC OSBPs.

Based on evidence from other TMEA OSBPs and the construction, IBM, and training at Kagitumba/Mirama Hills, it is reasonable to predict reduced border crossing times. All of these are attributable to TMEA as there were no other interventions at the border post. It is ‘Very Likely’ that the OSBP meets TMEA’s much lower target of 30\% reduction. However, it is not possible to predict what level of traffic would challenge those gains. The evidence thus suggests that it is ‘Likely’ that the key outcome was realised, and that TMEA’s influence was central to it.

Another outcome indicator from the TMEA RF was not included here. That indicator, on the implementation of a gender action plan at the border, was not in evidence in most project documentation, or in any TMEA or partner interview responses, or site visit observations. The TMEA RF notes that the indicator was fully met in the design of the OSBP and its procedures, and TMEA training materials do reference gender considerations with respect to women cross-border traders. The effort appeared to align with the WB’s Cross Border Trader Charter, which was included in the TMEA training materials. However, gender does not appear in the EAC OSBP Act, Regulations, or Manual; ‘gender mainstreaming’ does appear in the draft EAC OSBP training schedule as one item among seven in a given day of training. There is an OSBP Operational Manual for Uganda and Rwanda which mentions both the Simplified Trade Regime and the Joint Border Committee (JBC) without mentioning gender, women, or cross-border traders; in fact, the JBC is required only to have representation from among the

\(^{24}\) An RF indicator on incorporating gender sensitive activities alongside IBM is excluded here. The RF reports its full implementation. TMEA training materials reference gender and women cross-border traders, but these do not appear in the EAC OSBP Act, Regulations, or Manual, or an Operational Manual for Uganda and Rwanda.

agencies stationed there. Taken together, the lack of these elements raise very important concerns about the effectiveness of any gender action plan TMEA might have proposed.

TMEA also claimed an impact: increased trade through the Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP, but the low traffic flow also negates a further TMEA claim that might have happened had the OSBP captured trade flows from the competing border at Katuna-Gatuna. The OSBP infrastructure is capable of handling volumes at least an order of magnitude greater than those measured so far.

In conclusion, the evidence suggests that TMEA’s contribution claim of reduced border crossing times through this OSBP is Likely. It is ‘Likely’ that the claimed outcome was realised, though ‘Virtually Certain’ that TMEA was central to the outcome.

Table 6: Conclusion: Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crossing times reduced from 2012 to 2017:</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Ug-Rw from 5 hrs to 1 hr 15 minutes (75% reduction)</td>
<td>• 2017 TTS showed 75% reduction against 30% target.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Rw-Ug from 1 hr 47 min to 15 minutes (80% reduction)</td>
<td>• TTS were conducted in different seasons, so comparisons are not entirely credible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low truck flows limit scope of outcome and confidence that gains would remain in the event of expected trade flows.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Virtually Certain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PE site visit; evaluation interviews; activity evidence of civil and IBM works; commissioned reports and procurement information; the lack of other donors or government involvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5.3 Contribution case study: PIO 1.3b Busia OSBP

The goal of PIO 1.3 was to speed cargo through border posts by converting them to OSBPs that cluster agencies from both countries at purpose-built facilities on each importing side of the border. Agents from both countries would jointly process cargoes. IBM would allow electronic communication among each countries’ agencies on their own side, and between the two countries’ agencies including prior notification of cargoes’ arrival. Border community committees would provide corrective feedback loops on the efficiency of operation. The hard and soft infrastructure would together result in faster processing of imports and exports, contributing to faster overall corridor times and lowered trucking costs.

The contribution claim that forms the focus for the evaluation under this PIO is:

TMEA contributed to increased efficiency of trade at Busia OSBP through a combination of hard infrastructure projects and institutional and soft infrastructure work that resulted in a reduction in average time to cross the border.

TMEA’s projects that contribute to this outcome included IBM investments in both Kenya and Uganda, and construction works in both Kenya and Uganda.

The TMEA work at Busia border began with a set of consultations with the previous development partner, the WB, with its East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP), which had not been completed. At Busia, the soft infrastructure component was roughly equivalent to that of Kagitumba and other OSBPs: establishing the institutional and legal framework, including a bilateral agreement; procuring furniture and ICT hardware; and aligning processes first between a country’s agencies and then between the two countries’ representatives. Hard infrastructure requirements met particular needs of the Busia border. Prior to the OSBP, the building facilities including the main office block, warehousing and inspection facilities, access roads, and staff housing were insufficient, and the crossing itself was inundated with standing rainwater during certain seasons.

Activities to rectify the hard infrastructure issues were substantiated in data provided by TMEA: ToRs, PARs, contracts and invoices with construction firms, site meeting reports, and contractors’ completion certificates. Soft infrastructure work was confirmed with bilateral workshop meetings, the memorandum of understanding between TMEA and Uganda, and the bilateral agreement between the two countries. Training was another important set of activities, confirmed by official letters between TMEA and government, training materials and attendance lists, and TMEA internal reporting on progress.

A committee structure at the OSBP was confirmed by ToRs and a government Letter of Appointment, as well as working group meeting notes on IBM and change management. The committee notes received from TMEA also
show the GoU requirements for inputs into training materials. Finally, from the EAC level, the Secretariat drafted a performance measurement tool for the OSBPs, which was submitted to the evaluation team along with meetings from an intergovernmental meeting to validate the tool.

The PE team corroborated these activities in document review, interviews with partners, and site visits.

More information on each step is found in the remainder of this chapter on the OSBP PIO, and in Annex N in the CT Case Study data tables (with project narrative, wider data, and sources).

**Outputs** in Kenya, and Uganda at the Busia border, included operational OSBP infrastructure on both sides of the border, administrative and inspections buildings; scanning and packing yards; staff housing; a firefighting station; access roads and gate houses; and trained agents and users. Documentary evidence of outputs and a site visit (with interviews) confirmed the existence of the outputs (infrastructure construction and IBM integration, internal committee structure, confirmation from officials on training and reports of improved morale). There were no reports of having yet been subject to the performance management tool, and self-interested reports of training, improved morale, and improved agency coordination but these findings lacked independent corroboration. The integrated operations of the OSBP were confirmed by the site visit as well, and by external private sector respondents. These included both Authorised Economic Operators (AEOs, supported under SO2) and purely external respondents. The use of environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) recommendations in construction and gender action plan were visible only in TMEA materials; however, in both cases, that these subsidiary elements of the outputs are less substantiated do not invalidate the key outcome claim which was designed to build primarily on the hard and soft infrastructure.

**Table 7: CT Case Study: Busia OSBP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed hard infrastructure (implementing ESIA recommendations)</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: PE site visit; evaluation interviews; activity evidence of civil works.</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: PE site visit; interviews; activity evidence of civil works. TMEA ESIA report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM operational (implementing gender action plans)</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: Institutional and legal framework documentation; observed IT and office equipment; border official interviews; private sector confirmation of faster processes; EAC Regulations, draft SOPs, training curriculum. RF reports implementation of gender action plans but no mention in EAC OSBP materials and regulations</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: Procurement and ToRs, coordination meetings between governments, TMEA participation in related meetings; interviews with government and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building and change management</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: Extensive training documentation – times, dates, places, attendees, curricula – from multiple trainings</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong> Evidence: TMEA-developed materials TMEA-convened trainings, procurement data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance management tool in place</td>
<td>Very likely Evidence: EAC reported that the first OSBPs had recently (Dec 2018) been used as a pilot of the tool. No report yet in evidence.</td>
<td><strong>Virtually Certain</strong> A report of the tool and TMEA meeting notes on validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved staff morale around infrastructure improvements</td>
<td>Likely Evidence: URA staff: ‘staff morale was higher because they had new offices &amp; internet, computers… software, intercom…good residential units that were better than those in the area.’</td>
<td>Very likely Evidence: TMEA involvement in improving facilities (per activities evidence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved interaction and coordination between government agencies</td>
<td>Likely Evidence: ‘Increasing interaction and coordination between government agencies and between countries. ’[Border Agencies] were forced to improve on delivery…inefficiency by one ministry leads to delays in the whole system.’ Busia border officials</td>
<td>Very likely Evidence: Multiple reports from steering committee and other meetings on IBM procedures, with TMEA in attendance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through re-creating a ToC for this component (please see the response to DEQ5.1 in this chapter), the PE team identified the **bold** outputs above as critical for the results chain leading specifically to the key outcome claim of...
reduced average border crossing times. The bolded outputs have the strongest evidence both that they occurred and that TMEA contributed to them.

TMEA’s RF reported outcomes of improved operational efficiency leading to a reduction in border crossing times; improved user satisfaction levels; and incorporating gender sensitive activities alongside IBM. Other outcomes discussed included reduced trade costs, increased tax collection, and the start of a transformation to professional trade and an improved trading environment for women. Each of these is explored in turn.

The 2016 Busia TTS provided evidence that border crossing to Kenya for all trucks had decreased by 1h 9 min (-80%) compared to the 2011 baseline. Crossing times into Uganda had decreased by 11h 35m (-79%). However, traffic was significantly higher in the 2011 sample because it was conducted in the high-volume month of December, and because at the time of that baseline, Malaba border post staff were on strike. This undermines somewhat the validity of interannual comparisons. Nevertheless, the robust improvement appears to be beyond the goal of a 30% reduction by the end of S1.

This is also independently corroborated by AEO and other private sector users, as well as data from Uganda Revenue Authority data from the Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System and ASYCUDÁ World data on clearance times. Partner and stakeholder interviews confirm TMEA’s involvement. The infrastructure and IBM programming were TMEA’s remit, while government interventions were complementary and reliant on TMEA funding. One other donor, the EU, began working on the Regional Integration Implementation Programme during S1 but that work was directed towards a border economic zone and supporting women cross-border traders and as such had no effect on crossing times. TMEA claimed 100% contribution to this gain in their Results Meter, given their unique relationship to the OSBP hard and soft infrastructure, while other donors worked on different OSBPs. The evidence supports a ‘Very likely’ rating that the claimed outcomes were realised, and that TMEA’s influence was central to them.

User and community satisfaction data showed moderate responses about improvements in the infrastructure on the Uganda side, with about 50% satisfaction, against a target of 70% in the RF. Responses from the Kenyan side were quite negative, at 18% (also targeted for 70%). The 2017 OPM formative report fieldwork found the Kenyan side buildings and physical plant to be in a much poorer state, including recent buildings quite dilapidated, unsafe water, regular electricity outages that halted clearances an average of three times a week for an hour or so each time, and other failings. The PE evaluation fieldwork team reported that these issues were largely resolved, although power and connectivity outages remained a problem for both sides at times. During PE evaluation interviews, electricity and connectivity outages were reported by an EAC ministry staffer along with several external private sector respondents, calling them ‘teething pains’ of the new system; this was reported to be of varying frequency, from ‘regularly’ to ‘most of the time’; one respondent also cited a poorly designed sewer system that caused floods. Overall the evidence was not compelling that user, staff or community satisfaction had risen consistently, though it should be added that the survey was taken just as the OSBP was opened with IBM service.

There was no strong independent evidence of implementation of gender action plans, an RF outcome indicator. The RF reported their full implementation. TMEA training materials reference gender and women cross-border traders, but these do not appear in the EAC OSBP Act, Regulations, or Manual, or an Operational Manual for Uganda and Rwanda.

Reduction in costs of trade were supported in a series of evaluation interviews with AEOs and with firms that had had no contact with TMEA. The fully independent responses of the latter are strong evidence of the effect; however, respondents were not able systematically to quantify that savings, since transport costs are bundled and vary greatly by type and size of consignment.

Increased tax collection was reported by Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) and they provided revenue time series data to support the claim. The data do show increased revenue in absolute terms over the period (2011-2017) but do not show how the revenue represents better revenue collection over time. Better revenue collection would mean either that trade that previously evaded the system now used the OSBP (i.e., because the OSBP made using the formal system more predictable and quicker), or that the increased efficiency and capacity of the OSBP allowed URA to capture increased revenue from trade increases, or both. No data were provided on reduction of informal trade away from borders. Data on trade volumes and values were provided, but these show a more volatile picture of trade increase over the period. It is not clear that any increase in revenue can be attributed to the OSBP, or to TMEA’s efforts there.

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The claim of having begun to transform from informal to more professional trade, including an improved trading environment for women, is highly subjective as an outcome. Still, strong qualitative evidence from respondents at the border, including women traders, support the claim. For the claim of professionalisation, several respondents in the PGIS fieldwork stated that they were using the system and appreciated it, because of the security and speed. The PE team found numerous reports in the press of the continued existence and expansion of some informal trade around Busia, detailed in the report’s response to DEQ5.4, above. The results for women traders have stronger data than exists for the claim of increased formality.

Transforming to a more professional trading environment, implementing gender action plans, or having higher user satisfaction were not necessary for reduced border crossing times. In the case of reduced trade costs and increased tax collection, they are further along the results chain than reduced border crossing times. As such, these were all excluded from the final CT analysis. Instead, these ancillary outcomes are considered in depth in Annex J and noted where appropriate in the main body of the report.

In conclusion, the evidence suggests that TMEA’s contribution claim of reduced border crossing times through Busia OSBP is true. It is ‘Virtually Certain’ that the claimed outcome was realised, and that TMEA was central to the outcome.

**Table 8: Conclusion: Busia OSBP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crossing times reduced from 2012 to 2016:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Ke-Ug (14hr 20 mins to 2 hrs 57 minutes (79 % reduction)</td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong></td>
<td><strong>Virtually certain</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ug-Ke from 1hr 26min to 17 minutes (80 % reduction)</td>
<td>Nick Porée &amp; Associates (Pty) Ltd. 2016 Time and Traffic Study. 80% reduction against baseline into Kenya, 79% into Uganda. Baseline may have been elevated due to a staff strike at Malaba that would have driven traffic to Busia. Corroboration comes from two additional sources:</td>
<td>Partner and stakeholder interviews confirm TMEA’s involvement; other donors’ and government said to be complementary. Results Meter cites 100% contribution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 SO2 PIO 2.1 Strengthening EAC Regional Integration

5.1 Summary

The Arusha Programme or TMEA-EAC Partnership Programme (TEPP) was a major expenditure for TMEA in S1: some 19% of project funds overall, and over 40% among SO2 components, was spent on these activities, called ‘enabling’ by the TMEA ToC. The investment in the EAC corresponded to the early TMEA focus on supporting regional integration, though funding did diminish over S1, when donors tightened the un-earmarked funding on which it relied.

Three main components guided the Arusha Programme Strategy: supporting the full implementation of the SCT and corresponding reductions in trade times and costs; policy efforts around improving the business environment; and building EAC capacity in financial management and in ‘monitoring and reporting progress in implementing regional integration.’

These aligned closely with TMEA S1 investments at national levels, particularly those investments that aimed to fully implement the SCT and reduce trade times and costs, and policy efforts around improving the business environment. In terms of capacity building, the long-term perspective was to improve the EAC’s capacity so that it could play the supra-national role with which it was charged.

5.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

5.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

The causal links and assumptions underpinning the Arusha Programme’s logic were evidence-based and verified to a modest extent, with more documented attention to strategic and operational requirements than in other TMEA components. The Arusha Programme (TMEA-EAC Partnership Programme, or TEPP) was tasked with providing key enabling activities to support the EAC and Customs Union; enhancing coordination between national-level TMEA investments (infrastructure, IT for Customs, NTBs, Standards, inter alia) and the legislative and regulatory requirements at EAC level; and helping to build up the strength of new national-level ministries charged with implementing EAC policies. The Strategy reflects TMEA’s perspective on the ‘big picture’ of Single Customs Territory (SCT) and Customs Union implementation.

The TEPP was also discussed in the 2012 Transport and Economic Corridors Strategy, which highlighted the focus on regional integration, despite challenges with this approach: ‘African governments have concluded a very large number of regional integration arrangements, several of which have significant membership overlap. While characterised by ambitious targets, they have a dismal performance record’27, but also, potential to be effective, according to the Strategy. One key tenet of the TEPP is its alignment with the TMEA ToC across multiple components: ‘TMEA’s programmes will continue to be implemented with the RI [regional integration] mind set, impacting positively on the EAC Secretariat’s efforts, and vice versa.’ This coordination is seen throughout the S01 and S02 activities in S1, as well as the advocacy work with private sector in S03 and the support to women’s economic empowerment with the Women in Trade Programme.

A draft of the Arusha Programme Strategy document,28,29 produced in June 2012, offered a ToC diagram, shown below:

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29 During TMEA’s development of the S1 ToC, late in 2012 and into 2013, TMEA commissioned background studies that were reviewed as part of the earlier OPM evaluation work. These included: ‘Trade Competitiveness in the EAC’, ‘Review of the importance of Transport Costs’, ‘Completing the EAC Customs Union’, ‘Regional Integration in the EAC-the way forward’, and ‘Effectiveness of interventions aimed at improving capacity to implement trade agreements’. These documents fed into the overall ToC, and the Customs Union study was also part of the Arusha Programme design thinking.
The green blocks show the areas in which the Arusha programme was expected to work, which aligned with two of the three main objectives cited: developing a comprehensive framework for regional integration (particularly in the policy domain, and including work to strengthen the EAC’s negotiating position in the TFTA); and improved business environment for infrastructure investments including key components of the Common Market Protocol. A third area of proposed work involved improving EAC organisational effectiveness. The ToC has the same disadvantage as that of the overall TMEA ToC, in that it is more a map of needs than a description of what TMEA intended to do at inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact levels. Still, the Arusha Strategy identifies significant contextual issues and challenges for planning its work.

The Single Customs Territory (SCT) is a key facet of the Customs Union that, when implemented,

‘should entail the removal of all tariff and trade restrictions on imports by member states of goods originating in other member states and the imposition of the Common External Tariff on extra-regional imports at the port of first entry to the EAC. Each member state should receive a proportion of CET revenue corresponding to its share of extra-regional imports, which requires monitoring the final destination of extra-regional imports. Rules of Origin are required to identify the products originating from within the SCT and therefore exempt from tariffs, and to prevent the possibility of extra-regional imports being traded within the EAC as if they were locally produced. These rules should be simple, transparent and uniform, ideally based on some maximum proportion of extra-regional imports in value added.’


The SCT thus merited considerable attention for TMEA’s efforts at the EAC, given that the SCT encompasses both the rationale for regional integration and the component-level, on-the-ground practices that are required. TMEA shared their Results Chain for the SCT which offers a more in-depth look at the expectations around TMEA project logic, and was tied directly to the TMEA outputs and outcomes that were to support its achievement. This results chain was at least partially retrospective, as it is dated in 2016, but shows earlier milestones such as the 2013 EALA adoption of the OSBP Act. The document provided the opportunity to review and guide programming areas that had effects across the TMEA components.

At the same time, there are limitations to the results chain as presented. Since the SCT affects so many areas of work within TMEA in general and the Arusha programme specifically, the results chain steps are at a high and quite general level, not unlike the overarching ToC. Assumptions are not included, to track the conditions in which TMEA expected to be working many of the steps would require considerable political will to implement, for example, coordinated Customs trainings across the EAC. A list of assumptions underpinning the work at the EAC accompanies its indicators in the TMEA RF:

1. Cooperation between respective governments and adherence to bilateral and EAC trade agreements is assured
2. EAC partner states prioritise regional trade policies over national trade policies and priorities
3. Governments have capacity to prepare and negotiate laws and procedures
4. A strengthened EAC institution is able to negotiate between and on behalf of partner countries
5. Regional integration is sustained and receives public support
6. National bureaux have the capacity to implement regional harmonisation of standards
7. International recognition for the accreditation of standards
8. Partner States will take appropriate measures to ensure peacebuilding and state building frameworks are developed and implemented especially in fragile and conflict affected States and Situations
9. Partner States, private sector, and civil society organisations (CSOs) are committed to embedding transparency and tackling corruption

This list of assumptions is helpful for contextualising the EAC work. Some of the assumptions were quite general and high-level, such as the first assumption. Cooperation and adherence around particular components of SCT implementation, for example, would be much easier to monitor and act upon, for example. For example, governments prioritising regional over national trade policies would be more helpful as an assumption if it specified which regional trade policies were key, and then provided a means to track how national governments took on those policies, from among the many that are tracked in the Common Market Scorecard (CMS). The CMS, which looked at de jure compliance, did provide a way of following how well some key assumptions held true during the life of S1, as did the work to develop the EA Monitoring System (EAMS). The CMS laid out the areas in which Partner State commitments were and were not being met, and Regional Monitoring Group activities show that attention was paid to the reasons behind non-compliance, including concerns rolled up from National Implementation Committees. The TEPP and TMEA pipeline of activities to redress these issues, referenced in the meeting minutes, showed that TEPP had reacted to these assumptions not being met.

The political nature of the findings of the CMS were useful both for the TEPP and the EAC, but also for pushing Partner States to comply. One respondent noted that when scorecard findings were presented in meetings, ‘it generated results.’ Since TMEA and the EAC used independent consultants for the rating process in each country, the CMS had a neutral reputation. One EAC staffer said, ‘it was a challenge to the Partner States. They did not want to be seen to renge on earlier decisions and commitments’ made in the process of participation at EAC forums. As such, this intervention provided its own feedback loop into strengthening Partner State compliance: clear data, neutrally collected, providing an impetus for changed behaviours.

One assumption not considered here is that intra-EAC and international markets would buy national exports, which faltered as well, given the decrease in intra-EAC trade over S1. This assumption seems particularly important to monitor, given that liberalisation and facilitation of trade (as TMEA’s SO1 and SO2 investments were designed to accomplish) can benefit some types of companies more than others – such as the large and agile companies accustomed to take advantage of such openings, by sending imports to regions like East Africa.

32 Developed collaboratively, as with the Regional Monitoring Group who met to refine indicators on the implementation of the Common Market Protocol. Per EAC Secretariat reports from the Regional Monitoring Group.
33 EAC. 2016. East African Common Market Scorecard 2016: Tracking EAC Compliance in the Movement of Capital, Services and Goods. In partnership with the International Finance Corporation. De jure compliance means that the legal structures had been adopted at the Partner State level; de facto compliance was not measured, per the Scorecard’s methodology.
34 EAC. Undated. Planning and Research duties and responsibilities (list).
35 The Scorecard’s conclusions note that, ‘the pace of implementation of the 2014 Scorecard recommendations has been rather slow’.
This particular assumption has important implications for consumers and for domestic firms: higher imports may bring consumer prices down somewhat, but domestic firms may not be able to compete. Such conditions would raise private sector opposition to integration – which could stall results.

The TMEA RF was meant to monitor intra-EAC trade but did not set annual targets and reported no later than 2015 estimates, and a projection in 2017. TEPP programming, however, included funding for the production of the EAC Trade Report, from which the TMEA RF data were sourced – indicating that the EAC Trade Report was not complete by the end of S1 implementation. However, if data were not readily accessible, they would not be able to support thinking around assumptions and necessary adjustments to implementation. Data from other contemporary sources indicate that intra-EAC trade was falling, including from the EABC, which reported that, since 2014, EAC exports have decreased each year\(^{37}\) and total intra-EAC exports amounting to only US$2.5b in 2016.

International data show show stagnation in intra-regional trade over the course of S1.\(^{38,39,40}\) The International Trade Centre (www.trademap.org) shows a slight increase again in 2018, but overall the figures show a steady gain in the years prior to Trademark’s S1 and then, at best, a levelling off.

**Figure 7: International Trade Centre data on intra-regional trade in the region (excl. South Sudan)**

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Partner states continue to disagree over rules of origin, standards, preferential treatment for some goods, like dairy and second-hand clothing, and special tariffs for others, like pharmaceuticals and sugar. There are also trade stoppages such as the recent problem between Uganda and Rwanda at the Katuna-Gatuna border post\(^{41,42}\) and related developments between Tanzania and Rwanda in response.\(^{43}\) Traffic was diverted to Kagitumba-Mirama Hills against popular wishes,\(^{44}\) and the heads of state were reported to have made accusations against the other. The disagreements between Tanzania and Kenya that are hypothesised to be rooted in their variable levels of growth continue, with resulting protectionist policies and the more frequent

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\(^{39}\) The EAC Trade Report cites a small increase from 2013-2017, but the increase is less than the amount reported traded by South Sudan, which was not included in the 2013 figures. The EAC Trade Reports, supported by TMEA, the use of data from Partner States’ Revenue Authorities, Central Banks and National Statistics Offices. From EAC Secretariat. 2018. EAC TRADE AND INVESTMENT REPORT 2017 Accelerating Market Driven Integration. March 2018. Available at: https://www.eac.int/documents/category/trade-investment-reports

\(^{40}\) Comtrade data show an overall decline from 2013-2017, with no data reported for South Sudan. These data, and those in Figure 3, are in use in the evaluation’s TGIS.


\(^{44}\) However, this may have been an opportunity for a positive development, since the Rwandan government and TMEA are interested in seeing traffic increase at the latter border.
eruption of NTBs, as reported by government and private sector respondents across the sample of interviewees, as well as the press.\textsuperscript{45} It is perhaps not surprising that most of these problems are not with the EAC per se, but bilateral; the previous EAC ended in 1977-1978, in part because of the perception of unequal gains from RI, and inadequate correction of those unequal gains.\textsuperscript{46}

But which of these issues – or unrealised assumptions – limited the component from reaching its goals? Important SCT goals were reached: TMEA supported the development of a destination payment system, of more integrated and higher-quality customs management systems,\textsuperscript{47} and of training border officials in the new SCT procedures – the upper levels of the SCT results chain.\textsuperscript{48} It is not at the level of project results chains that the EAC component’s activities were stalled, but rather in how the political economy evolved over the life of S1, how governments became more protectionist, favouring national rather than regional trade goals and agreements, and violating two of the nine assumptions around TEPP.

TEPP activities in S1 support a re-created ToC as shown in the Figure below:

**Figure 8: Re-created ToC for PIO 2.1 Enhanced EAC regional trade integration**

![Diagram showing re-created ToC for PIO 2.1 Enhanced EAC regional trade integration]

TEPP produced important outputs – strengthened SCT and Common Market Protocol including revenue sharing protocol and system; a strengthened EAC that tracks and disseminates compliance information; regional trade architecture in place; and accountability through the Common Market Scorecard (CMS) and a linked monitoring system. But the causal link, then, to increased trade, was not realised. Some of the assumptions offered at top right were necessary for increased trade to materialise, but they did not hold true.

EAC-supporting projects were evaluated in early OPM research. Two of these – supporting EAC’s videoconferencing facilities and their financial systems – raised questions for the evaluation team in terms of

\textsuperscript{45} The East African, 2019. Tanzania, Kenya now row over border screening. March 9, 2019.


\textsuperscript{47} There is an important exception here, in Kenya, where integrated Customs Management is still being constructed and tested, but there have been gains elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{48} TMEA. 2016. SCT results chain--updated14Sept2016.pdf.
relevance, for having only tangential impacts on trade, for working through EAC ministries rather than in those that deal with Trade directly, and for insufficient measurement of capacity building and other indicators. The evaluators also noted that the mainstreaming of gender in the TMEA OSBP work had not been included in EAC training and other documentation on the OSBPs, and that many hoped-for reforms were still not in place.

On the other hand, as an enabling rather than direct component, the PE team can make a connection to a non-trade goal, in the long-term strengthening of the body that would eventually govern a more fully integrated East African trade regime. In this, TMEA can point to important achievements, including the EAC’s better performance vis-à-vis financial standards, the resulting increased involvement from bilateral donors, and the financial savings incurred through supporting videoconferencing for the many uses to which the equipment is put.

Building in the CMS, EAMS, and EAC Trade Report was a thoughtful way to help to spur national compliance and better data collection and reporting. During the life of S1, using indicators and data to compel countries to do better did have influence. But since the assumption of greater commitment to and appetite for integration has not proven true, and the CMS and Trade Report are no longer regularly released, that incentive has weakened. The EAMS, had an extended period of down-time while its ability to synchronise across countries was improved, but has not regained the leverage it established during S1. At the end of S1, the RF reported that all national EAMS reporting systems were functioning and linked to the regional EAMS but that the target of 50% of relevant agencies reporting had not been met in Kenya; theirs and Tanzania’s systems were reported as stalled until the EAMS in Arusha had been updated; and Rwanda and Burundi reported they received regular updates from agencies but without reporting through the linked system.

Events outside TMEA’s control played a large part in this ToC not coming to fruition: the TFTA has not been ratified in an environment of reducing appetite for RI; protectionism and bilateral disagreements increased rather than decreased; intra-regional trade picked up early in S1 but dropped off after 2015; and the political disagreements have stalled the Summits for lack of quorum. TMEA’s broad mandate also meant that some of the assumptions around causal links that other components were to address – like eliminating NTBs and adding consequences and remediation to an amended bill (#2), putting in place sustainable capacity for ICT for Trade (#5), helping the private sector increase exports to meet ambitious targets (#6), TEPP’s own project with the IFC to institutionalise a regional business formalisation process (#7), and advocacy for policy improvement in business competitiveness (#9) – also did not materialise, or not fully so.

The quality and reliability of data on what this PIO achieved vary in the RF. The RF tracks outputs from the work on the SCT with a set of indicators that changes each year in S1, depending on the focus of TMEA’s work. There are some strong indications of progress, such as the establishment of working groups, training of nearly 1500 public and private stakeholders, the adoption of the OSBP Act, systems interfacing, and the development of particular studies and manuals (such as that for OSBPs). Some gaps could usefully be filled, such as with the development of a regional action plan for the implementation of the World Trade Organisation’s Trade Facilitation Agreement. No information is given in the RF on that implementation, which would be a key link between the EAC’s work and trade. Also, there is attention in the RF to the harmonised duty remission and exemption framework, but the exceptions and “sensitive products” that challenge that model are not tracked. It would be valuable to see the difference in exceptions and sensitive products over time, as that would show the coverage of national commitment to intra-regional trade, and where that commitment falters.

Other RF indicators tally the number of research papers and analyses conducted by partner states around gaps and convergence with the Common Market Protocol, and laws drafted in support of harmonisation. While these are excellent project-level indicators, and show important support to countries to develop research, analytical and legal drafting skills around a key theme, they are less effective at showing the cumulative effect of this work on the output goals of the programme. At outcome level this is represented one of the two indicators, regarding the % of volume of selected goods cleared under SCT for all partner states. This is targeted to be 100% by the end of S1 but figures are not provided in the final RF; moreover, the term ‘selected goods’ is not clearly defined, nor what the exceptions might be that would show areas for future work. The second indicator for the PIO is the cumulative number of reforms identified in the CMS being implemented, but data are only provided through the 2014 EAC CMS. The RF shows contradictory information as well, such as Burundi’s progress (shown as 0 of 25 identified reforms) as 28% progress. The indicator itself is problematic because TMEA’s intervention is not known; presumably TMEA is intervening to help countries comply with these reforms, but there is no indication which ones or to what extent, nor what other interventions might also contribute, nor the scope of each reform and whether implementation in one financial year is a strong indication of continued implementation.

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Combined with other activities in SO2, PIO 2.1 should also contribute to TMEA’s support to the WB Doing Business indicator (specifically, the Trading Across Borders sub-index). Where the EAC (through TMEA support) was able to implement the SCT, this connection is profound, such as in the integration of systems and the destination model for revenue payment. The connection is weaker where there are no monitoring data on border compliance (that is, the degree to which border officials follow the SCT rules) – which under the Standards Component (PIO 2.4) is shown to be uneven, at least for harmonised standards of the most frequently-traded goods.

In conclusion, though a formal ‘ToC’ process like that seen in other development programming was not documented, some of the TEPP activities in M&E provided a pathway to monitor some, if not all, key assumptions, and progress was adapted accordingly. At the top of the re-created ToC for this component, with an ultimate goal of supporting an improved trade environment, there is evidence that TMEA enabled the EAC for its role in regional integration. However, the strength of the ToC and its causal links and assumptions is considerably weaker because of political economy events that thwarted TMEA’s efforts, partial but incomplete successes in other TMEA components, and poor indicators and data quality for telling the story of what they did accomplish.

5.2.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

As described in the previous section on the TEPP results chain and theory of change, the work in Arusha was closely aligned with the EAC’s strategic and operational goals. As with other TMEA components, the agenda for the TEPP was accorded with EAC at multiple levels to ensure strong alignment, based on the EAC Development Strategy, 2011/12 – 2015/16 subtitled ‘deepening and accelerating integration.’ The strategy defined key drivers for regional integration including ‘creation of a strong legal framework; strategic selection and harmonisation of prioritised programmes at national and regional levels; application of common policies and gradual elimination of all barriers to trade,’ with which TEPP and the TMEA components aligned. Support at the EAC Secretariat focused on Customs IT integration and included a study on SCTs around the world to provide best practices for TEPP and the EAC to pursue together.50 At the same time, it was reported that other donors have not committed significant funding to the EU, and a donor respondent said the EAC had a poor reputation for management.

TEPP activities supporting EAC’s organisational development helped to place the institution in better stead with potential donors, particularly the EU. The Capacity Development Action Plan included a needs assessment based on a previous audit (2008) whose recommendations had not yet been fully implemented, based on a Stock-take in 2011.51 A closing audit with Bureau Veritas identified only three minor areas of noncompliance before certification.52 TMEA and the EAC established an oversight committee to work together on programming and monitoring TMEA support around OSBP’s, customs, the SCT study mentioned above, harmonisation of commercial laws, strengthening of fiduciary systems, the Tripartite FTA negotiations, video conferencing system and results-based budgeting and M&E systems.

The monitoring work (EAMS) described in the response to DEQ5.1, above, also supported the institution to follow up on Partner States’ compliance with the directives issued from the EAC. After the systems were in place, including monitoring of line ministries and rolling up indicators to the regional level, the need to synchronise the systems pulled the EAMS offline, where unfortunately it remains. There is also uncertainty about the continuation of the Common Market Scorecard, last produced in 2016.53 Still, the S1 design included these elements in alignment with EAC priorities and requirements.

Specific issues were cited in the evaluation interviews about assumptions not coming to fruition. ‘The Central Corridor has taken much longer,’ cited one EAC staff member, echoing concerns about electronic cargo tracking not taking off in the corridor, the limits of co-operation with Burundi in terms of capacity, and the language barrier. Instability in imports, purchasing power, services at Dar Port, and politics in Burundi have contributed to a much less successful corridor effort in terms of reducing times, costs, and uncertainty. Private sector respondents said their clients preferred to use Mombasa Port even when Dar Port was closer and more direct.

50 Adam Smith International. 2012. Study on the Attainment of a Single Customs Territory (SCT) for the East African Community: Lessons and Best Practices from other SCTs.
51 EAC. 2011. EAC Stocktake - Main Report – Draft. Also reviewed: Attachment 1(a) of the Stocktake, which reviewed progress against issues raised by the Fiduciary Risk Assessment undertaken in 2008 by Helen Dean, on behalf of the European Union.
53 One EAC staffer reported that now Common Market Protocol (CMP) Biannual reports are discussed at coordination committee meetings, and that these reports are ‘more complete’ than the Scorecards – showing that attention is still paid to compliance. However, the CMS had an external visibility while the biannual reports appear to be more an internal tool.
which they said illustrated the importance of ‘not being sure of when your shipment will arrive.’ The same respondents from the private sector also cited important reductions in the time to transport from Dar, which they credit more to ‘the reduction in the document clearance process’ rather than the infrastructure improvements – but the uncertainty, the 100% verification, and the introduction of VAT have outweighed their willingness to use that channel in most instances.

5.2.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

Issues cited in other chapters and in the main body of the report also affect the work in this component: national elections focus attention at country level and away from regional goals, as well as introducing instability. Technical teams and goals are straightforward but at the political level, adoption of regional legislation and regulations is slowed by changes in governments and parliaments. Staff changes at district level affected implementation of particular projects, such as at the OSBPs, as well. Some value chain work with the industrial section of the EAC is hampered in particular sectors: second-hand clothing issues ‘are a political hot potato’, for example, and in pharmaceuticals, dairy and sugar, due to different levels of development in those sectors: ‘our countries tend to want to provide greater protection.’ China supports infrastructure in the region, and is therefore close with government, but their imports often compete with domestic industries.

A broader challenge over the life of S1 has been decreasing national appetite for integration: ‘the honeymoon is definitely over’, according to a private sector body. Many of these came from changes in governments and in governments’ priorities. RI no longer works as well in the region as a rallying call, according to donor, partner, TMEA staff, and private sector respondents. Since the end of S1, and even before, the language TMEA used to describe its work has evolved and is less related to regional integration, per se; even TMEA’s logo on early programme documents read ‘Supporting East African Integration’ where new documents and the website say ‘Growing Prosperity through Trade.’ This is also reflected in the reduced scope of EAC-related programming in S2, and the linking of the current Arusha Programme’s budget to Country Programme budgets.

Evidence of this change in appetite can be found among the growing bilateral disagreements (‘trade wars’)54, and in Partner States’ noncompliance with, or failure to domesticate, regional legislation. Both the TFTA and the EPA have stalled, after years of national and regional efforts, though TMEA’s capacity building for negotiators should continue to support national negotiation. EA Partner States with membership in multiple Regional Economic Communities (RECs) use the competing rules as bargaining chips. The President of Burundi has skipped the last three Summits; without a quorum, decisions cannot be made; since the current Secretary General is Burundian, this situation is exacerbated. At least two states are significantly behind on their promised dues to the EAC, affecting operations and planning. Tanzania’s interest in co-operating with TMEA, if not the whole integration enterprise, has cooled, though Tanzania has agreed to co-operate with Rwanda alone.

Rwanda shuffled its cabinet and placed the EAC-related ministry under another ministry.55 At the same time a Continental Free Trade Area has been proposed and has changed the discussion around intermediate goals like the TFTA.

All of this has affected the component. Evaluation respondents, including TMEA staff and leadership, do not think of this as the end of RI, but note that such a process is ‘generational’ and bound to suffer setbacks, even serious ones. The conditions leading to the impulse to group together regionally amidst a competitive global economy have hardly changed, but the optimism about integration ‘at a gallop’ has been slowed.56 The EAC Partner States may be somewhat less homogeneous than countries that other RECs attempt to group together, but there are still national disagreements that are profound and historic. Conflict in two of the six states has exacerbated asymmetries, and filibustering action by one has limited the EAC’s ability to make decisions. Perhaps most importantly, the EAC’s budget is small relative to its ambitions, and its partner ministries in the Partner States are new and have less political influence. If integration cannot deliver on its promised benefits,


which these underfunded actors will be hard-pressed to do,\textsuperscript{57} momentum for the enterprise may continue to diminish.

In Kenya, there was a positive political economy development said to be related to TMEA’s S1 trade policy work, namely, the creation of Parliamentary and cabinet committees on trade issues, according to two Ministry staffers. A former TMEA Country Programme Director from Kenya was serving as a Permanent Secretary at the time of evaluation fieldwork, and was reported to have built on interest generated as part of TMEA projects to create these committees.

5.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

EAC’s own initiatives are limited, due to limited budget, so TEPP support to particular areas such as the Customs directorate made much of that work possible. TEPP projects aligned with EAC initiatives in support of RI, and in very concrete ways throughout S1, with trade goals like integrated customs procedures, OSBPs, and standards harmonisation. As governments’ priorities shift away from RI, as described in the response to DEQ5.4 above, the complementarity lies in these more concrete efforts to reduce time and costs of trade. However, neither the EAC nor the national ministries working with EAC, have extensive budgets to complement. In that way, TMEA’s focus on RI, including TEPP efforts to publicise compliance as with the EAMS and CMS, raised the visibility of this goal while also giving it traction through the concrete projects conducted.

Uganda and Rwanda, being landlocked, have great interest in reducing the time and cost of trade, which TEPP activities supported, but the extent to which the two countries still strive for RI may have abated over the life of S1; Rwanda’s subsuming of its EAC ministry to another ministry has weakened its status. However, Country Programme and TEPP activities remained complementary, such as in standards harmonisation, elimination of NTBs, and establishment of OSBPs, which complement national government efforts to reduce trade time and cost.

Among the seven MEAC respondents at national level, reports were generally positive. They said that their ‘mandate is to promote co-operation and trade facilitation within the partner states’ and ‘TMEA’s approach aligned tightly with [our] policies and priorities.’ Another said, ‘our priority areas match’. In another country an MEAC respondent reported that ‘TMEA did not sufficiently list to the specific needs of the different countries/stakeholders regarding what they wanted to work on: countries had to align to TMEAs development objectives.’ This sentiment was rare across the evaluation interviews. Across these respondents from national MEACs, integration was not highlighted as a priority: instead, trade goals were.

5.3 Coherence and coordination

5.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

As with other components, TEPP and TMEA were praised by their EAC and EAC ministry partners for:

- Consistently high calibre of technical assistance, particularly among those embedded into the EAC
- Strong leadership from the TEPP office in Arusha
- The close and regular working relationship TEPP staff had with their EAC teams
- Stakeholder engagement during needs assessments, throughout the life of projects, and for particular NTBs
- Developing common standards
- Implementing common ICT solutions that were interoperable
  - Raising the profile of issues around trade barriers and trade facilitation.

Contextual conditions also strengthened TEPP and its partners’ successes. Respondents at the EAC praised the vision of their own Director General for his focus on goals. Respondents at two ministries of EAC issues cited the longevity of project leadership for the consistent successes of their initiatives with TEPP. Political will, including citizen interest, in regional integration was seen as a strength by one respondent. Another noted that using the

mandatory nature of the Common Market Protocol and other agreements to spur national adoption had been an effective tool in S1.

Weaknesses of the working model included the other side of the same coin: the reliance on slow and political legislative processes at the regional and national levels made the integration process long and uncertain. Since many efforts at the EAC level had not been domesticated at the national level, this produced a gap between decisions in Arusha and their implementation: market, policy and capacity failures continue to restrain integration, with significant lack of compliance and regulatory barriers. Some industrial support projects had hung up on political interests, as in the case of used clothes and sugar. One respondent noted that the goal of increased trade in services was made more difficult by the lack of counterpart professional bodies to harmonise professional qualifications.

In terms of the working model, the most frequent comment heard from partner respondents was that delays were common in working with TEPP, in terms of contracts, approvals, and procurement. Budgets constraints and donor requirements during S1 meant that per diems were kept low, which had a perverse effect on participation. Senior staff from governments sometimes delegated such travel to lower-level staff, who had less ability to get things done.

Another commonly cited concern was that the reduction in resources for TEPP had affected their projects, primarily near the end of S1 and after it ended: ‘TMEA now has a low investment here’, one said, which made the EAC as a whole weaker. Another cited the effect in terms of staff: ‘there is a smaller technical team now, which means there are limits to what they can help with. We need sector-specific TMEA leads with the right technical know-how.’

5.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

Complementarity during S1 between national and regional levels of TMEA was strong, for reasons described in detail in the response to DEQ5.1, above: key TEPP activities at EAC level paralleled those in Country Programmes thematically, and worked to institutionalise the goals of the Country Programmes in the regional body. This included especially the Customs IT team with training of OSBP staff and monitoring their performance, and in the support to implementing best practices in the SCT. Other TEPP efforts were directed more at capacity building at the EAC, which overall could be conceived as complementary, but did not require close and constant coordination between regional and national levels during S1.

In S2 the Arusha Programme is, in budget terms, very tightly aligned with Country Programme work – funding for Arusha much come from the Country Programmes and therefore must be seen to be very complementary and coordinated. A TEPP respondent referred to this as having brought ‘greater coherence’, which may indicate less coherence during S1 – though this was never mentioned in evaluation interviews.

5.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

Respondents reported that TEPP worked across components, in attempting to fully implement the SCT and to support OSBPs in alignment with standards, ICT and infrastructure efforts. The model of corridors was cited as a cross-cutting mindset that, in addition to the above components, also took into consideration the eliminate NTBs. An embedded TMEA staffer at the EAC reported always incorporating standards as part of negotiations towards the TFTA. One respondent from a national EAC ministry cited collaboration with the other ministries’ staff on migration, revenue, standards, trade and justice with regard to the OSBPs’ multiple roles. A respondent in a similar role in another country cited TMEA’s similar programming across Country Programmes as a synergy in itself: ‘there were platforms to discuss our challenges and plans together.’

Notably, respondents reported on synergies with TMEA SO1 and SO2 components, but not SO3; the design of S2 appears to incorporate more synergies with the goal of improving business competitiveness and increasing intra-EAC trade. The Business Competitiveness Portfolio Review of 2014 noted that national apex bodies’ public-private dialogues were key for raising private sector issues ‘to the highest possible national levels resulting in swift progress on the domestication of EAC decisions.’ An EAC staffer concurred on the importance of this, citing his team’s work with the Customs team on the Common External Tariff (CET): ‘we need to get intra-EAC trade to be 40-60% of our trade.’
5.3.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

Governance was reported to be a hindrance to project activities: EAC and EAC ministry respondents more frequently cited delays and limited budgets, compared to the rest of the evaluation interviews. This was attributed in part to having to clear project expenditures through the Nairobi HQ. However, where projects were unable to deliver all outputs, political economy reasons were more important than delays or budgets. At country level, where the EAC ministries’ representatives often chaired the NOCs, the governance model was praised: ‘we meet quarterly to assess performance and produce solutions.’

5.3.5 DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

Most respondents did not offer comments on the donor operational model; one cited ‘no effects’ on the effectiveness of TMEA investments because of the donors or how they interacted with the EAC. TMEA staff did note that more donors were willing to work directly with the EAC as a result of TMEA’s capacity building efforts. The only constraint mentioned was the variety of evaluative exercises that came through the office from different donors, which took staff time and that of partners for each review.

5.3.6 DEQ5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

TMEA staff were praised for ‘hand-holding’ and ‘technical backstopping’ in their work with EAC and ministries, and in particular for close alignment with the agencies’ goals at country level. Among the seven MEAC respondents at national level, reports were generally positive. They said that their ‘mandate is to promote cooperation and trade facilitation within the partner states’ and ‘TMEA’s approach aligned tightly with [our] policies and priorities.’ Another said, ‘our priority areas match.’ In another country, an MEAC respondent reported that ‘TMEA did not sufficiently listen to the specific needs of the different countries/ stakeholders regarding what they wanted to work on: countries had to align to TMEAs development objectives.’ This sentiment was rare across the evaluation interviews. Across these respondents from national MEACs, integration was not highlighted as a priority: instead, trade goals were.

Ownership, per se, was not explicitly mentioned among respondents at EAC level; this may be because many of the staff, with whom the evaluation spoke, were actually TMEA-supported, embedded roles.

5.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

One regional respondent reported that donors had previously found the EAC to be unreliable in terms of funding and fiduciary management; this had been the impetus for TEPP’s support to fiduciary capacity building. TMEA built on the Quality Management System, which was funded by GIZ, in developing the EAMS with the Planning Division. Following the needs assessment that identified which aspects of a 2008 audit were not yet implemented, TEPP support went towards the development of the EAC Financial Management System and the implementation of the Financial Rules and Regulations and Budget Management System. A respondent from one of the affected offices noted that this work earned them a compliance status that encouraged other donors to work with the EAC, resulting directly from the TEPP investments.

At the time of evaluation fieldwork, several donors were found to be active, including GIZ, USAID and EU liaison offices in Arusha that work on EAC issues, along with AfDB. EAC Customs staff reported that the work on training clearing and forwarding agents was coordinated across these actors. An EAC staff member working on industry support cited different donors’ efforts by sector, such as GIZ with the pharmaceutical sector and UNIDO with technical support, complementing TMEA support in leather goods and clothing, among other sectors. TMEA and the WB co-operated on the Common Market Scorecard with the EAC, and the WB studied opportunities for integrating inter-modal transport, towards a ‘regional transport policy and strategy’, per Article 89 of the EAC.

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58 EAC. 2011. Fiduciary Risk Assessment, A review. Attachment 1(a) - EAC Fiduciary Risk Assessment review. A review of progress against issues raised by the Fiduciary Risk Assessment prepared by Helen Dean, October 2008. The earlier review was undertaken on behalf of the European Union. “To the extent that recommendations of the EU institutional review were not reflected in the 2008 FRA, they have been taken into account in the Fiduciary Risk Review Action Plan.”
Treaty, by estimating growth needs and priority investments. JICA’s complementary focus on OSBPs and surface infrastructure aligned with reports from other respondents throughout the evaluation.

TMEA was said to have supported negotiation capacity building more than other partners, and at country level, TMEA’s Country Programme support to EAC ministries was said to have been nearly unique according to respondents in three countries. ‘We have some funds from the EU but TMEA has become the umbrella’, said one ministry staffer. Another noted how donor coordination was implicit under TMEA as a multi-donor effort, and how this allowed synergies: ‘now we don’t have to deal with small efforts from different donors, and it is greater than the sum of its parts. Our efforts are owned and run by locals, unlike efforts with [individual donors] who would come in and tell us what we ought to do.’

Two EAC staff respondents, among those embedded by TEPP, reported that their role includes coordination of donors, with quarterly reporting on how and on what initiatives donor funds are being used. Another reported the need for greater coordination, particularly among interventions to support agricultural value chains.

5.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

One successful approach cited in evaluation interviews was engaging through the multi-dimensional aspects of the SCT, which was said to be richer and more effective by working on multiple fronts. Another respondent said that being able to work among different cultures and nationalities had proved fruitful for TMEA team members in Arusha. Embedding technical staff was almost universally mentioned, along with the ongoing close relationship with the TEPP team.

Improving financial and M&E performance proved useful in working with the EAC, since donors now appear to perceive the EAC as a stronger partner. Using M&E systems, including the EAMS and the CMS, also had traction. The CMS showed concrete results in digestible ways that encouraged Partner States to want to raise their own compliance.

The TEPP team also cited understanding context and building relationships to support what were often very political efforts: ‘politics will always have precedence over technical proposals’, according to one donor reporting on the issue. Using accountability tools such as the Common Market Scorecard – with transparent and independent researchers in each country – and the EAMS also comprised a strong approach for showing governments just where they were in the process and what had to be done to comply. Respondents noted that government representatives wanted to be seen as compliant and, in some multi-lateral meetings, suffered a loss of respect – so bilateral approaches were also employed in lieu of regional forums at times, as in the case of NTBs, to allow governments to save face.

5.4 Sustainability

5.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

The EAC Customs directorate is training trainers in the methods and materials used for border officials working at the new OSBPs, where revenue authorities are reported to have ‘taken over’ for TMEA in implementing ongoing training. ‘There is an Act and regulations that guide operations’, they said, which will make this work sustainable. Both embedded staff and other EAC staff work on contracts, which means these types of institutional measures need to be in place for sustainability. Some of the TMEA-funded TA staff are now funded by the EAC directly, and so their work and the built capacity has been sustained; one TMEA staffer said these TA roles had important effects on trade facilitation efforts, such as with customs and data support. In supporting various sectors to strategize for their value chains, the sectors themselves were said to need support, according to one EAC economist, because they had no independent funding of their own. A staff member recommended retreats for joint planning, as had been done in their work with GIZ.

TEPP ensured there was a policy around the video conferencing and capacity building investments, so that these would continue after S1 as EAC functions. The EAMS is said to be included in national budgets, but may require ongoing support as the national-level EAMS were not rolling up results to the regional level at time of evaluation fieldwork. Support to the CMS has not continued since 2016, but if the EAMS can fulfil that function,
that would institutionalise the function rather than having it project-based and -funded (as with the CMS). The EAC Trade Report appeared less institutionalised the most recent report coming out in 2017.

Secretariat technical teams reported that they had already interacted with REC peers – SADC and ECOWAS – on M&E they had learned from their participation with TMEA. This had become a regular exchange across RECs.

Sustainability at the national level was reported to be more precarious in some aspects of TMEA programming: the NMCs for eliminating NTBs had an institutional structure but would have to be funded to continue meeting, particularly in bilateral and regional forums. Ministry officers trained in negotiation was reported to be the most likely capacity to be sustained, as staff turnover was not high.

5.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

Stakeholders were deeply engaged throughout the programme; many were embedded by TMEA for their particular technical skill areas, so their engagement was required by their roles. Other partners at the EAC were part of the PPC and other regular working groups, and as a rule felt free to reach out to TEPP at any time: ‘constant consultations can iron out a lot of sticky little issues.’ The Customs team and TEPP had developed a tool to evaluate OSBP’s and were field-testing it during evaluation fieldwork.

EAC respondents, like partners in other components, appreciated TMEA’s project management: strategic planning, timelines, prudent use of resources, and monitoring and evaluation, with a focus on ‘tangible results.’ Respondents also said they would replicate the consultative model of engaging stakeholders for the sake of flexibility and ownership.

At country level, EAC ministry respondents reported that raising citizen awareness was something they would take forward from their TMEA engagement, as it had raised the profile for the ministries and for RI. One also noted that having peers in other Partner States became an immense help to implementation, and that they would be taking that lesson forward.
6 SO2 PIO 2.2 ICT for Trade

6.1 Summary

The goal of PIO 2.2 was to make trade systems, agencies, and procedures more effective in the region. Effective trade is facilitated by simple regulatory systems, non-duplicative requirements, and streamlined procedures. Taken together, improving EA national systems would reduce costs and time to trade; it was hoped that this would reduce barriers to entry and incentivise trade as a result. In proposing Information and Communications Technology (ICT) solutions to trade challenges in this PIO, TMEA undertook Single Window Information (or Interface) for Facilitating Trade (SWIFT) systems, a Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System (RECTS), and national Customs Management Systems (CMS) support. Another avenue of support was the Authorised Economic Operators (AEOs) programme in some countries, through which firms could enjoy expedited border crossing following an application and audit process, a win-win system for Customs who can focus inspection on consignments likely to pose greater risk.

SWIFTs represent a streamlined way to access the agencies or entities to which traders must submit customs declarations, import/export permits, certificates of origin, and trading invoices. Users save time when the functions are all accessed online, and when all required agencies for a given consignment are satisfied through the system. Online payment is often a feature as well.

TMEA also worked to improve national CMS in S1. Good CMS are dependable and minimize customs time and processing; in addition, TMEA worked with country systems to assure interoperability and exchange of necessary information in the region. TMEA projects trained staff and managed the change process within customs organisations. When systems work well compliance is improved and tax revenue safeguarded. An electronic CMS also offers the benefit of real-time tracking of processing times, appeals, arrears and other data that improve functioning for traders.

TMEA also established the RECTS, whereby national bodies could monitor shipment compliance, reduce inspections and time to clear, and reduce transit time. Such a system can also be part of a system to improve security with CCTV and Automated Number Plate Recognition, among other improvements from tracking. TMEA worked to implement these systems in three countries, including training staff nationwide. End results for traders would be greatly facilitated shipping, and time and cost reductions.

6.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

6.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

The causal links and assumptions in PIO 2.2 were verified through outputs and, to some extent, outcomes, in reducing time, costs and risks of trade. In a document explaining its ToC from May 2014, TMEA wrote that ‘efficient trade facilitation must include effective trade systems and processes. Effective trade systems are critical to the success of TMEA’s outcomes under SO2 (“Effective Trade Systems & Processes” and “Efficient Trade Facilitation”) when structured within a framework which reduces barriers to the private sector and which leads to: (a) enhanced government revenue collection; (b) improved documentation processes and savings in terms of cost and time; and (c) enhanced transparency and accountability.’ These goals were to be reached through SWIFTs, RECTS, AEOs, CMS and transport observatory projects, as stated in a separate SO2 strategy document from 2015. The ToC document states beliefs that can be interpreted as causal links. However, the two texts do not identify these as causal links, nor do they discuss any assumptions that underpin the ToC at component level.

The TMEA ToC offers a set of assumptions that apply at a general level. For example, within the SO2 section TMEA reports ‘The logic above is underpinned by a number of assumptions.’ These include:

- Implementing the EAC regional trade agreements will contribute to enhancing the trade environment in the region;
- There is sufficient demand by partner state parliaments, public sector, private sector, and civil society organisations to drive the regional economic community agenda forward.

• Regional trade policies will be prioritised by partner states over national trade policies and priorities.

These assumptions are explicitly applied to the Strategic Objective as opposed to the ICT for Trade (ICT4T) component.

The 2012 Transport and Economic Corridor Strategy\textsuperscript{62} that predates the ToC shows more of the program’s thinking about ICT4T. The document discusses delays at border posts stating the ‘Although clearance of goods in East Africa has improved in the last ten years, thanks mainly to enhanced use of ICT, there are still long delays at border posts.’ This document also discusses a lack of access to trade requirements and regulations whereby ‘Traders in the EAC currently spend numerous days visiting multiple government agencies in various locations to obtain regulatory information permits, trade licenses and clearance certificates to complete import and export processes, resulting in huge costs and time losses for traders.’ This shows TMEA strategic planning included thinking about problems and their causes. This document also presents evidence on how Single Windows (page 30) support trade. It does not present causal links or assumptions underpinning this component.

Performance evaluation fieldwork in Rwanda suggests the electronic Single Window was introduced there based on a WB trial in Singapore. This trial is reported to have proved to be a viable initiative, saving time and money for the private sector, and offering cost reduction for government. The PE team did not find reference to the evidence of that case in TMEAs documentation, but the team did know of the earlier project.

TMEA did collect evidence of causal links during and after implementation of ICT4T projects. The HQ team commissioned time and transit surveys to attempt to verify whether integrated border management (IBM) at the OSBPs was making a difference in time to cross the borders. These surveys were done prior to the OSBPs being in place, at handover to respective governments, and again six months later. TMEA also checked evidence via internally commissioned evaluations for the single windows after implementation.

The 2014 ToC diagram does not discuss ICT interventions, rather identifying the PIO as ‘2.2 Effective trade systems, agencies and procedures.’ Projects ultimately allocated to the PIO included the SWIFTs, CMS, AEOs, RECTs, and corridor observatories. The PE team has found no documentation of evidence or verification of causal links between these projects and the PIO prior to implementation; however, TMEA has commissioned endline evaluations of the Single Window projects, suggesting ex-post evidence around the outcomes as well as the assumptions that underpin those investments.

In the absence of a component-level ToC, the PE team developed the following figure to show the team’s understanding of the component from the fieldwork. Included in the figure are a set of viable alternative explanations, and basic assumptions pertaining to the ICT for Trade space.

\textsuperscript{62} TMEA. 2012. Transport and Economic Corridor Strategy.
Interviews with TMEA programme staff suggest the general approach was one of the Headquarters team identifying ICT4T projects. These intervention ideas were then presented to Country Programmes, who according to programme staff would then allocate funds for the projects. Following this allocation Country Programme staff would work with appropriate agencies and develop the project ideas, with ongoing technical support from component-level team members at TMEA Headquarters, including regular travel. As a result, this component was more centrally controlled than most other components with activities in each country; the technical requirements for planning such interventions appeared to require a higher level of systems understanding than was available among country teams.

The ICT4T activities were tightly linked to soft infrastructure at ports and border posts, as ICT integration was key to the functioning of the Single Customs Territory (SCT). The SCT required a way to streamline and rationalise how consignments were received, inspected, cleared, and paid for (in terms of duties or tariffs). TMEA and partners developed a destination model, in which nationals from a destination country work at the two ports and receive and process the shipments that are bound for their country. Duties are collected electronically and forwarded to the destination country. With one customs document, rather than multiple, the consignment leaves the port with a seal, and may pass the OSBPs en-route to its destination unopened. At the inland port, it is finally cleared by customs. Customs management integration made this system possible, and TMEA's technical support to the SCT was critical for the RI gains that were made.

At country level, TMEA reports that, of the 170 agencies that conduct trade-related transactions, TMEA worked with ‘45 to 50’ in S1 and aim to raise that figure perhaps to 100 by the end of S2. Many of the trade-related transactions are with agencies that emit permits around product standards, thereby contributing to the quality infrastructure of each country. Taking into account the discussion below in the section on PIO 2.4 Harmonisation of Standards, providing all of these agencies with systems does help them run more efficiently for the transactions in the medium term, but leaves in place a system that is not in synch across the EAC countries, and which remains burdensome for exporters. Supporting the range of agencies may even help to perpetuate the fractured and overlapping mandates of these agencies in each country, and the separation of the countries' systems one from the other. When more agencies wished to be included than had been originally targeted,
TMEA did its best to include them – but whether those were the right priorities from within a wider systemic assessment was not considered.

Even if TMEA had ultimately decided to support the individual agencies until such time as political will emerges around harmonising the quality infrastructure, a component-level ToC should map which agencies are to be prioritised and how that selection better supports reducing process times and costs, or would more likely have the effect of increasing trade through that mechanism. Or, additional mechanisms could be proposed, such as an inclusivity campaign around use of the systems by SMEs, in support of S2 targeted industries and entrepreneurs, including women, rural producers, or other targeted groups. In the same vein, the processes put online in S1 could be looked at critically in terms of barriers to entry, with an eye towards proposals for permit system reforms that could favour increased business formalisation.

The transport observatories do not appear in the TMEA ToC but have been included as one element among many in the re-created ToC, above. This element, however, has considerable overlap with other components, in terms of providing important data for decision-making at ports and with respect to corridor trade times. It is notable that those observatories collect no data around exports, skirting the parallel gap in national data on the measurement of export gains. Reductions in time and costs of transport and the overarching goal of increased trade then can be seen more from the perspective of imports, which is not well-aligned with the ultimate programme goals around inclusive development.

A second issue around the Northern Corridor Observatory, in particular, is its central relationship with the Mombasa Port Charter Community (MPCC). This agreement, actively pursued with TMEA taking a key leadership role, is a positive step towards ownership of the results and the solutions to shared problems. At the same time, it is a body very much affected by politics. Since this element of SO1 is not in the ToC either, but rather arose out of opportunities spotted and acted upon by TMEA, the fact of its existence is itself spoken of in glowing terms. The process since signature of the original Charter in 2015 to put in place any agreements to work on common goals (‘key performance indicators’ or KPIs) continues to the present day; a ToC process that included this element would have put in high relief that this MPCC is actually quite a challenging format through which to enact change. Iterative reviews of progress could have given the TMEA team a more critical vantage point from which to consider their investments in the MPCC, from which to step back or step up their efforts.

The corridor websites are part of their contribution to data transparency. For both Northern and Central Corridors, these websites and the reports and data they make available can be a boon for policy makers who make use of them. There are, however, missing data in some time periods; data quality is difficult to check because data collection and processing are not made clear; and variability in particular is not available – only averages. Some parts of the websites are more user-friendly than others, particularly around the use of the data. One central challenge for users is downloading raw data, or having tools to do those analyses online (if data must be kept confidential). The functionality that is offered is rudimentary, with data arrayed in ways that work well for one type of data but not all, yet the arrays are used for all data. These are not useful for researchers or government users. Each dataset on each tab should be examined for how users would likely use the database, and analyses updated.

Individual projects did not always go according to plan or timelines. One major effort under this PIO – the integrated Customs Management System (iCMS) in Kenya – remains unfinished at the time of this writing. Since Kenya’s system will need to be integrated with those of the other countries on the Northern Corridor, and since the system is to be integrated with port customs management, its effect on the EAC-wide goals is very important. The reasons for the project’s delay were outside TMEA’s control, but that does not diminish the effect, which is not modelled in the results chain – because the results chains are project-specific. The results chain also did not consider the inter-agency needs within Kenya that have further complicated the development of the system. A component-level ToC would need to show the interrelations and knock-on effects of projects not performing to plan, to be able to anticipate and mitigate the consequences. Such a ToC would also beg the question of why certain agencies were prioritised over others.

Another project, undertaken in Rwanda to establish a Single Window for the Ministry of Health, suffered setbacks before completing successfully and integrating to the overall Rwanda Single Window. This project was reviewed as part of an earlier OPM evaluation deliverable, and details are found in that report’s Annex Five. The earlier evaluation team noted that TMEA appeared to have learned from previous efforts in Uganda that had faced similar problems.

TMEA did produce result chains for projects, but did not do so at the level of ToC PIOs or components. Some of these result chains did consider assumptions but no evidence has been found to show they were monitored or verified. The TMEA Management Information System did, however, have indicator data that tracked project progress.

TMEA planned for risks at project level to mitigate problems. The programme team at Headquarters reports using targeted change management strategies based on extensive pre-project assessment. This involved mapping all stakeholders to identify risks to the project. As an example, they would then set up three tiers for a project – a steering committee at high level, mid-level management committee, and a technical group, with the explicit goal of managing different levels of risk and of building ownership among the agencies involved.

Agency and private sector respondents – the latter including both TMEA partners and firms unaligned with TMEA – suggest that most of these systems serve the purposes for which they were intended; they were designed and developed with considerable stakeholder input and training before launch, and there is evidence of integrated, system-wide thinking about how finished projects would work together. The latter is especially notable in Single Windows that house several government agencies’ portals together, and in integration efforts in Uganda and Rwanda where customs management systems and permit processes were linked together for better results.

Respondents from the private sector, including logistics firms, other system users, and apex bodies praised the suite of ICT4T projects for reducing time, costs, and risks of trade – the RECTS being primarily cited for reducing risks of theft and diversion of vehicles. In most of the private sector interviews, respondents said the Single Windows and customs management integration saved time, which had the effect of reducing costs.

The results chains and the re-created ToC miss, however, whether those saved costs pass through to consumer prices, a key development for the overarching goal of inclusive growth. While the re-created ToC is strong up to the level of outcomes – more so than most other components – this key assumption was not monitored, making the causal logic at that macro level quite weak. The strategic outcome goal of increased trade also lacks substantiation, and the OPM TGIS appears in an early draft to refute that such increased trade occurred as a result of the changes at border posts, including the time reductions attributable to ICT4T interventions.

The use of a ToC at component level would have added a layer of documentation and strategy discussions to TMEA’s workload. However, there are some important benefits that make a ToC at component level more useful for country- and regional-level programming than is the overarching ToC (presented and discussed in the main body of the report).

First is the use of a visual for discussion among peers, who have the opportunity to interrogate the logic in a group setting, and to ensure the terms and parameters of the projects are understood in common. The discussion is then directed around the causal mechanisms necessary to move from one level to another, the features of interventions that are necessary for causal mechanisms to work, and how a given country’s programming decisions might fulfil or not fulfil that causal package.

Moreover, the team would have the opportunity to discuss how that causal package might be enhanced or limited by the causal packages from among other components, or how other components might need support to their causal packages from the ICT4T component. The interrelationships between ICT4T and OSBPs and ports are obvious but were not explicitly considered in TMEA’s documented ToC or results chain work. Others that might be overlooked without a thorough process could include export capability, where ‘export-ready’ SMEs would need to be users of ICT4T systems; advocacy, which could be a source of support for disseminating observatory data or putting it to use in advocacy efforts; simple app development that could be used to track women cross border trade in an ongoing fashion to test that PIO’s assumptions; or any number of other opportunities and needs within the overarching TMEA ToC. The essential Corridor Observatory data and other less systematic efforts could be used to increase the results and measurement principle put forward in the Paris Declaration, to support both TMEA learning and that of partner states and agencies.

Indicators for outputs and outcomes should also be discussed in this process. In ICT4T, the outcome-level indicators are Reduction in overall average customs clearance time (including inspections); Reduction in the total number of export and import, and reduction in number of transit trucks carrying risky consignments under physical escort. In discussing the strengths and weaknesses of a proposed ToC, and attaching proposed indicators to the ToC to see where they are effective and where they are not fit for purpose, the TMEA team might for example notice that none of the indicators captures the time savings from SWIFTs as differentiated from the CMS, and that no interventions are explicitly proposed that would reduce the total number or the cumulative demands of import/export documents. The indicator on escorts was 100% resolved in one year of TMEA’s S1, and therefore has the look of low-hanging fruit. The space in the RF might have been taken up with something more useful, such as working on indicators to capture whether one of the explicit goals of the
RECTS – increasing compliance with customs duties. One TMEA ICT4T representative recognized that there was a lack of rigour during Strategy 1 (S1) pointing out that data collection was not synchronised with programming.

In retrospect over the life of S1, the causal links appear broadly intact at output and even outcome levels but the link to impact is not at all clear, given key data that are not captured. Setting the component’s goals within a ToC would have provided guidance for prioritisation of agencies and activities, though the key benefit would have been the iterative process to re-visit that prioritisation, especially in light of challenges with important projects like the Kenya iCMS. A ToC for the component would also force the team to take into account the relationship with other components, including the all-important data that the Observatory projects were collecting, and to plan for indicators that would better relate the story of changes in exports and any price reduction pass-through to the public – or the lack thereof.

Thought leadership in the component can propose refinements, such as a change management focus, as happened with TMEA. Thinking through the ToC as a team would also facilitate a discussion about necessary conditions for success, for which each country team participant would likely have concerns in light of national contexts. The proposed Assumption 2, above, refers to good management of the systems, including electrical current and connectivity necessary for their functioning. As these were seen in the evaluation to have failings in some contexts, programming could be designed to focus attention on that issue. At the very least, as with promising sustainable budget support, a MoU with partner governments should make clear what the requirements are, with explicit agreement that the partner would cover those requirements. In another example, if a sector destined to use a new ICT4T system – such as women-owned, export ready SMEs – is not computer literate or does not have readily accessible computers, the ToC process is when that should be uncovered, discussed, and planned for.

Planning for assumptions should also include testing those assumptions during the life of the project, to ensure that women SME owners are being assisted to use computers at the level necessary for the eventual system, or that governments are upgrading electrification structures near remote OSBPs in time for their inauguration, for example. There is no evidence of such use of ToC, strategy, RF, or assumptions for this purpose in the component. The PE team has stated that the entire TMEA team’s dedication and sectoral knowledge are unlike (and superior to) those of most other development programmes, and certainly they were thinking about these issues and working on them conjointly during the life of S1. The strength of the results logic behind this PIO indicates that these efforts were straightforward in a way that other efforts – such as advocacy or NTBs – were not, and that ought to have been documented. Still, there is no substitute for an iterative process that systematises that reasoning, debate, and ongoing measurement to be sure that the necessary conditions hold true in each country, with each agency, with each target sector, over time and while enduring unpredictable contextual changes.

6.2.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

The ICT4T component strongly supports EAC regional trade development priorities of promoting efficiency in production and investment incentives with a view to promote the Community as a single investment area, with particular alignment to the EAC Customs Union and Common Market Protocol – two of the EAC’s four pillars. More specifically, the ICT4T component has supported:

Table 9: EAC regional trade development priorities, and related ICT4T support projects

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAC Regional Trade Development Priorities</th>
<th>Related TMEA activities</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EAC Pillar: Customs Union and the SCT</strong>&lt;sup&gt;95&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><strong>‘Interconnectivity of customs systems to facilitate seamless flow of information between customs stations and a payment system to manage transfers of revenues between EAC Partner States’</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>‘…supporting the process of economic development through the establishment of a SCT’</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trade:</strong> …‘harmonising trade policies… with a view to promote the Community as a single investment area.’</td>
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<sup>95</sup> [https://www.eac.int/trade](https://www.eac.int/trade)

<sup>96</sup> [https://www.eac.int/customs-union](https://www.eac.int/customs-union)
### EAC Regional Trade Development Priorities

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Industrialisation, SME development; investment promotion &amp; private sector development</th>
<th>Related TMEA activities</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Improving competitiveness of the industrial sector to enhance the expansion of trade [...]</td>
<td>• Reducing import/export processing times and costs to make EA exports (and EA companies) more competitive</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Providing an enabling environment for the private sector [...] through continuous dialogue</td>
<td>• Linking AEOs and revenue authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>•</td>
<td>• Involving private sector system users to comment upon and test systems</td>
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| Gender, community development and civil society: [...] approaches towards disadvantaged [...] groups, including women, children, the youth, the elderly, and persons with disabilities aimed at employment creation, poverty alleviation and improving working conditions. | • Developing systems for use by SMEs owned by women and other disadvantaged groups to improve their access to markets |

TMEA ICT4T investments in Single Window systems, customs management and cargo tracking have promoted efficiency. Private sector representatives report clearing processes in the Northern Corridor have improved with border processes being more straightforward than previously. Completed CMS are reported to have changed with increasing technology leading to fewer border delays. Evaluation interview findings are in line with those reported in the TMEA RF, in reductions of time to cross targeted borders, and in reduction of the need to escort transported goods. At the same time, it is important to note the challenges to these gains reported by disinterested private sector respondents: significant system down-time, systems that do not fully cover the list of permit-related tasks for a given consignment; national level government changes which have rolled back time savings; and a small percentage of users with insufficient computer literacy to use the systems, among those TMEA EC and women in trade projects targeted.

At the end of S1, several projects were in progress but not completed. This included the iCMS in Kenya, which was delayed 18 months in a disputed bidding process and further when the winning bidder changed ownership. Uganda’s SWIFT was reported to be advancing but not functioning at the end of S1. The component has made ongoing progress since the completion of S1, though the Kenya iCMS remains in process.

6.2.3 **DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?**

Changes in policy and political economy have impacted the ICT4T component, particularly in Kenya and Tanzania. These changes have not impacted the component’s overall relevance.

In Kenya, a private sector apex body reports that periods of high political tensions (i.e. in 2014 and 2017) caused exporters to adopt a cautious approach, reducing trade and the use of TMEA-supported ICT systems; this was confirmed by border officials and one national staffer from a government ministry. Businesses fearing damage to their goods and vehicles in areas of unrest reduced their levels of trade; this was confirmed by private sector operators and apex bodies (‘trade practically stopped’), donors in Kenya and Uganda (‘the elections had an important impact’), and government officials at the border and in Nairobi (‘every time there is a Kenyan election traders are more wary and decrease trade’). This lowered the need for trade related documents (such as Certificates of Origin and import/export permits), reducing the overall TMEA ICT4T component impact.

Political economy has affected the impact of TMEAs ICT4T support to the Tanzanian Revenue Authority (TRA) more positively. Initially TRA is reported as not wanting to harmonise their systems and receive payments through an electronic payment system. However, political good will towards the initiative shown by the Prime Minister (between 2015 to 2017) is reported as having supported the adoption of digital systems.

Policy and the political economy are suggested as being generally favourable in Uganda towards TMEA’s ICT4T component. Fieldwork shows a positive relationship between URA and AEOs, a set of importers/exporters and logistics operators who TMEA audited and cleared, granting them a status that expedites their border processes. This led to mutual benefits. Some government agencies have limited adoption of Single Window components retaining manual verification procedures such as the physical stamping of printed documents.
6.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

The TMEA ICT4T component strongly complemented other ongoing initiatives. TMEA focused on supporting government agencies to digitise their trade and logistics services. TMEAs ICT4T work to reduce the time and cost involved in customs clearing processes complements general private sector business regional trade investments at the firm level. This component supported and complemented other initiatives promoting trade in the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the South African Development Community (SADC). TMEA use of the AsycudaWorld system complements UNCTAD work in this area.

TMEA’s ICT4T was complementary to regional private sector support initiatives such as USAID’s East Africa Trade Hub, which develops and tailors trade-enhancing activities to specific countries and sectors, as informed by national African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) strategies. It also identifies and works with private sector associations and companies to foster impactful trade and investment in the region. TMEA ICT4T is also complementary to initiatives at a country level such as the aBiTrust initiative in Uganda, which focuses on supporting SMEs and six agricultural value chains, including coffee. They work on production, productivity, and post-harvest handling. aBi Trust representatives see TMEA trade facilitation work, including ICT4T, as complementary.

6.3 Coherence and coordination

6.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

Strengths

Tax collecting institutions such as URA and KRA reported increased tax revenue (see Table 10 and Table 11), up to 2016.

Table 10: Ugandan Tax Revenue

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<tr>
<td>Central Government Taxes</td>
<td>3,848,335</td>
<td>4,447,576</td>
<td>6,598,264</td>
<td>6,877,691</td>
<td>8,267,363</td>
<td>10,069,095</td>
<td>11,383,515</td>
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Source: URA Table 4.3 B (a): Classification of Central government Revenue 2012/13 – 2016/17 (Million Shs.)

Table 11: Kenyan Tax Revenue

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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>298,799</td>
<td>338,152</td>
<td>408,787</td>
<td>460,335</td>
<td>538,744</td>
<td>628,301</td>
<td>707,227</td>
<td>810,245</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Assembled from multiple on-line government datasets

Adoption and use of ICT4T systems by larger, high-capacity private sector actors (shippers and logistics firms consulted for the evaluation) have been robust. Good English language skills and Internet access were two reasons for this high-level of adoption. Outreach through freight forwarding associations, industry apex bodies, and other groups of traders to train users has helped to train a wider cross-section of users. One smaller logistics firm in one country was not informed of regulatory changes by that country’s freight forwarding association, despite the firm’s active participation in training, indicating that the communications are not always ideal.

The working model for ICT4T is more centralised than for other components, because of the high-level of technical knowledge needed to support the projects during implementation. While this places great demand for travel and detailed remote oversight on the headquarters component team, the model appears highly functional.

66 I.e. the COMESA Regional Integration Implementation Programme to improve the ‘doing business’ environment.
67 https://asycuda.org/en/
68 https://www.eatradehub.org/trade_promotion_agoa
69 http://www.abi.co.ug
Weaknesses

The PE team found uneven government ownership across national institutions. Political will was less evident in Tanzania during S1 and progress was slower as a result. The Ministry of Agriculture in Uganda has been slow to up take TMEA supported ICT4T facilities.

A related challenge is that each country has multiple agencies that are not always coordinated: in Kenya, multiple certificates from separate agencies are needed for some of the commodities most frequently traded across borders – notably foodstuffs. This compounds the informational barrier to entry for new traders, increases uncertainty and processing time for established traders, and can be exacerbated by successive administrations, such as when new initiatives are announced. An example is the recently established Anti-Counterfeit Authority in Kenya, as the result of a high-profile presidential concern. An apex body in Kenya has received numerous reports from its members since the new Authority was introduced: ‘KEBS might give you a certificate one day but then the police stop your shipment tomorrow. Among the institutions mandated to support trade facilitation, there is a lot of confusion.’

The ICT4T component works less well for smaller private sector actors that do not have good English language reading and writing skills and/or have lower levels of Internet access. Where apex associations and/or the logistics platform are not as strong or where smaller actors are not linked to these platforms, some smaller users reported that communication about the changes and upgrades to ICT platforms were not shared equally.

6.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

The ICT4T component clearly complemented TMEA OSBP work. OSBPs provided the ‘hardware’ in the form of infrastructure at borders, along IBM to ensure integrated processes. The ICT4T component (in working on the CMS in Uganda, for example) provided the system for goods to move quickly through the border points. Containers that are sealed using the RECTS also enjoy streamlined transit and border processes, and even respondents in South Sudan noted the value of tracking shipments from Mombasa through the border at Elegu/Nimule.

TMEA’s work with trade information portals also helped traders to have the necessary documentation, while Single Windows sped up permit approvals. Team members reported close collaboration on planning and implementation for integrated border management. There is also a national inter-agency complementarity inherent in the design of single windows, in which the ICT4T team works with distinct agencies to create a system that works across the whole of government.

6.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

ICT4T has synergies with other parts of the TMEA model as discussed in the response to DEQ 5.7. The sum of the OSBP and ICT4T parts has delivered good results in some areas. For example, at the Busia border, OSBP and ICT4T components – RECTS and CMS in particular – complement each other. It made good sense to implement both aspects of the programme to achieve best results, and to do so along the entire corridor.

Government representatives in Tanzania reported TMEA bringing together traders from different countries to understand the benefits of the new border trade environment. The Tanzanian Revenue Authority is reported as using these meetings to explain their rules and regulations and to listen to feedback.

TMEA training under its export capabilities component may also have benefited from the ICT4T activities. For example, FPEAK was a regional programme that supported the certification of agricultural producers of Global GAP projects in Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. FPEAK’s Enhancing Market Access Project to train farmers to implement GAP standards ran from 2011 – 2015. It is probable that successful farmers or their buyers accessed markets in a way that used ICT4T facilities.

6.3.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

TMEA S1 experience suggests the program’s governance arrangements supported the delivery of high quality and timely outputs. TMEA uses similar governance arrangements across countries and components. These emphasise use of interagency, public, and private, multiple stakeholder processes in all countries. For example, each country has a NOC that meets quarterly to report on project progress, identify challenges and gaps, and
Annex J: PIOs

discuss solutions. The high-level nature of the NOC membership – normally including a Permanent Secretary as the chair, and a private sector leader as the deputy – were often able to facilitate solutions.

6.3.5 DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

Fieldwork results suggest the operational model at donor level was appropriate for delivering the TMEA ICT4T component. Donors are generally well coordinated at country level through key enablers such as working groups, NOC participation, and formal and informal networking. Joint funding and donor representatives attending TMEA coordination events helped efficient project delivery. Key informants suggest donors understood and approved TMEA’s way of working and that they are aware of each other’s projects.

Key enablers that need to be preserved are donor sector working groups and donors sending representatives to NOCs. Respondents suggested different donor reporting systems represented a remaining constraint.

6.3.6 DEQ5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

The ICT4T component was well aligned with some country systems and agencies. This has contributed to effective ownership and impact. For example, ICT4T support aligned closely with country customs revenue authorities in Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda. Strong ownership was seen in URA and tax revenues have increased (see Table 10). A donor representative highlighted country ownership at URA seeing this agency as ‘very engaged’, contributing to the successful TMEA ICT4T modernisation programme.

One revenue authority reported that its corporate strategic plan and sector strategic plans, which have full government approval, requires that TMEA support must align with the government’s strategic plan. TMEA’s alignment provided demand-driven projects. ‘The proposals [we] submit to TMEA are already aligned with our institutions’, said one. The ICT4T design components of focusing on people, the simplest best systems, and change management support this approach.

Ministries’ adoption of online processes is not uniform. For example, in Uganda the Ministry of Agriculture (MAAIF) Department of Crop Inspection and Certification and the Ugandan Bureau of Standards have not fully adopted the online portal system. Physical stamps are still required on some documentation that can compromise impact in terms of cost and time taken to fulfil required procedures. In at least two countries, planned Single Window projects did not always come to fruition or get all planned agencies on board. In Tanzania one TMEA beneficiary reports that the Single Window is not operational as the Tanzanian Bureau of Standards and Tanzanian Revenue Authority have their own systems.

6.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

The focus and activities of the TMEA ICT4T component are consistent with and additional to other development programmes in the region. Examples include:

- UNCTAD: particularly work on e-platforms and the e-business or trade portal. The SWIFT uses UNCTAD Asycuda World software.
- WTO: the ICT4T component is reported as consistent with the WTO trade facilitation agreement
- Trade hub: TMEA ICT4T work complements the USAID Trade hub work
- EU Tradecom facility: This facility is reported as they always liaising with TMEA to ensure complementarity.

At an ICT4T component level, TMEA has facilitated improved coordination. Stakeholders involved in ICT4T report improvements. For example, one standards bureau reported about TMEA’s pool of donors that the ‘coordination among those donors is much better.’ The revenue authority respondents in two countries reported explicitly about the importance of the donor coordination that TMEA represented: TMEA ‘worked in tandem and worked well for [us]’. A key private sector apex body reported, ‘There was often duplication of donor activities around trade before TMEA. Now there’s a donor group that meets regularly, TMEA represents a pool. With regard to trade and business environment I would credit that coordination and streamlining to TMEA.’
6.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

The TMEA ICT4T component collaborated on CMS integration and the OSBPs with the EAC Secretariat, supporting the embedded technical experts with regard to system interoperability and the construction of relevant manuals for region-wide use. The EAC team reported a very close and positive relationship with TMEA ICT4T leads with shared priorities and an ability to look at the systems from multiple dimensions and perspectives.

6.4 Sustainability

6.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

The sustainability of ICT4T benefits will depend on future government funding. TMEA worked to include commitments to system maintenance in the MoUs that were signed before the systems were created. The signatories therefore understood their responsibilities to maintain and update the ICT4T systems TMEA have developed with them. This will require state funding to maintain and build human resource capacity (inside the institutions and often among users as well), maintain computer hardware and server capacity, and cover costs of software licenses (i.e. Asycuda World).

When discussing ICT4T sustainability TMEA representatives highlight:

i. Investment in lower cost, simpler versions of technology to make sure governments will continue using them

ii. Being inclusive and getting government buy-in up-front

Some government representatives reported commitment to fund the systems resulting from TMEA investments, such as CMS and eSW. These representatives highlighted a legal process as well as a commitment to use domestic taxes to continue support, and echo the MoU commitments made at projects’ inception.

Revenue authorities in one country recognised that due to staff turnover, some knowledge built might be lost, and reported being mindful of building internal capacities to sustain existing systems. They also said that project governance structure would support sustainability as this was something that is set whether particular people are there or not to sustain the project implementation process.

Representatives for a Single Window agency suggested that (software) developer expertise would be hardest to sustain, suggesting that government agencies cannot handle this complexity. They also reported that components, such as analytics, data mining and revenue streams would be sustainable and that they would make the Single Window less subject to political change. They viewed the Single Window as a central pillar to link systems together. One of these partners had a contract with TMEA with a provision for building time with the developer to transfer skills and knowledge for internal capacities. Another model is under design in Kenya, to have a transaction fee for maintenance. The relevant ministry has promised to continue to provide and support Internet access and ICT infrastructure, and intend to enter into a maintenance plan to maintain a data centre facility. To help ensure sustainability these systems are captured in a Corporate Plan up to 2021 and beyond.

Some donors emphasised the importance of sustainability especially with government taking over budgets for Single Window systems. They reported concern about unclear responsibilities for funding maintenance but recognised Ugandan and Kenyan Governments saying they will fund these activities in future.

6.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

Performance evaluation findings suggest ICT4T government stakeholders were engaged in a consultative, demand-driven process, in line with the Paris Declaration Principles. During initial consultations TMEA presented ideas for support options such as Single Window systems, CMS, Authorised Economic Operators and the RECTs. These ideas were developed with implementing institutions including revenue authorities through proactive consultation to develop more detailed project documents. Responses to the evaluation by government stakeholders were overwhelmingly positive on these issues: TMEA was ‘close to the ground’ and always available with necessary technical inputs, providing ‘very good project management’ and ‘timely procurement
processes’ (Kenya); used a demand-driven process and ensured the transfer of knowledge (Rwanda); reflected ‘political will in the region’ and a ‘brilliant’ approach in which ‘stakeholders come up with solutions themselves’ (Tanzania), shared ‘lots of analysis and meetings before starting’ and aligned with the Customs Union and OSBP Act (Uganda).

As projects were implemented, stakeholders engaged in regular participatory events – Steering Committees at project level and National Oversight Committees over country programming. At a component level, TMEA also facilitated stakeholder engagement. One revenue authority representative reported ‘TMEA involved all key stakeholders to appreciate business processes that increased understanding of business models.’ TMEA continued regular monitoring, backstopping and provision of technical support (in the form of designers and developers but also in change management) to ICT4T projects during implementation while regularly engaging stakeholders.

Stakeholders such as MEAC representatives reported TMEA as a good donor with an effective ‘hand-holding’ approach that included steering committees that guided work planning and budgeting. A national Chamber of Commerce also valued TMEAs approach, praising the ‘TMEA work ethic including “hands on support”; system support and up-to-date hard- and software.’ Another MEAC representative suggested a ‘need for more engagement between Government and TMEA with clear roles and responsibilities’, where TMEA had worked at times as ‘employer, implementer, or financier.’ A need to set up a Standing Committee comprising of government, private sector and civil society representatives to document and ensure continuity was suggested – an approach TMEA used with other partners, suggesting it would be possible to replicate in this case.

Some stakeholders report taking lessons learnt from TMEA support into account. A revenue authority working on a complex CMS process reported making a ‘specific sustainability plan with a budget and report being highly committed to sustaining the (TMEA-supported) facility, staff members are assigned and we made sure we went through the knowledge transfer and troubleshooting.’ They also keep a Lessons Learnt Log that includes challenges and mitigation measures in place for future application. It is less clear how other ICT4T stakeholders take TMEA lessons into account. A TMEA representative reported governments focus more on revenue collection than on exports, suggesting that TMEA needed to understand these revenue authority priorities in order to be most effective in engaging with these agencies.

6.5 **DEQ2.2 Effectiveness: Contribution Tracing**

6.5.1 **DEQ2.1 To what extent has TMEA contributed to increasing ease of trading across borders?**

According to OPM’s Effectiveness and Outcome-level Evaluation, TMEA projects scored well on effectiveness and the evaluators’ overall assessment was that they were well implemented and that outputs are contributing to the wider outcomes of the TMEA ToC. Most outputs were not achieved on schedule: there were delays in the completion of activities caused by the multi-stakeholder, multi-country aspect of the projects including changes in political circumstances. The report also suggested that most projects would achieve their outputs, given time. Another key issue across most SO2 projects was a lack of institutional capacity. In several cases, capacity building initiatives had to be changed during the course of implementation to accommodate new understandings of gaps and challenges. The report recommended that across all projects, extending timelines and allowing more room for likely delays would, if not lead to more effective projects, at least allow for more realistic project management.

6.5.2 **Contribution case study: PIO 2.2 ICT for Trade (ICT4T)**

The CT case study examined some projects in each of the four countries being studied, per the sample. The goal of PIO 2.2 was to make trade systems, agencies, and procedures more effective across the region. Effective trade is facilitated by simple regulatory systems, non-duplicative requirements, and streamlined procedures, including those that can be performed online. ICT for Trade interventions began with stakeholder consultation to identify priority systems that aligned with TMEA mandate. Once a system gap was understood from the perspectives of its stakeholders, PIO 2.2 team prepared PARs and business flow process documents that were further vetted with stakeholders.

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Next, the team set up a steering committee at high-level in the receiving institutions, a mid-level management committee, and a technical group. Projects were monitored during development, and change management processes were included throughout, including capacity building on systems.

Main projects included:

- Introduction of ASYCUDA World in Uganda and Rwanda (ReSW) to upgrade its previous Customs Management System for better integration with regional Customs and national agency systems;
- AEO programme in which firms applied to revenue authorities and were audited by TMEA, as a means to manage risk and facilitate expedited trade for registered firms;
- SWIFTs in four countries supporting agencies’ import and export permit processes; and
- Creation and launch of the Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System (RECTS) covering Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda on one system.

The ICT4T activities linked EAC countries’ Customs Management Systems (CMS) together for the Northern Corridor, and within countries to speed processing of cargo in the SCT. The integration of Customs systems allows customs agents at ports and OSBPs to jointly process cargo, and with integrated Single Window (SWIFT) functionality, the systems include the necessary permits for each consignment, as with Rwanda’s electronic Single Window (ReSW). SWIFTs also allow private sector users to apply for permits prior to transport, often from multiple agencies, through portals with consolidated and streamlined trade information. Authorised Economic Operators (AEOs) are firms that TMEA audited in order to approve their expedited processing at OSBPs. And the Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System provided security for consignments that once had to be escorted, in slow-moving convoys, along the Northern Corridor. Trucks that stopped en-route can now be instantly identified and, if necessary, authorities can be dispatched to assist them – a key activity for reducing risk. All of these were to provide time savings for traders and for government agencies charged with processing them, resulting in the TMEA’s key contribution claim through this component.

More information on each of these, including country-specific systems, can be found in Annex J in the chapter on PIO 2.2, and in Annex N in the CT Case Study data tables (with additional narrative on the projects and country experiences, specific data, and sources).

The key contribution claim that forms the focus for the evaluation under this PIO is:

TMEA contributed to increased ease of trading across borders through a combination of ICT for Trade interventions resulting in time and cost savings for traders.

The table below sets out the main ICT4T activities against the types of time savings they were to have at different points in trade processes.

**Table 12: Main ICT4T activities and their theorised contribution to time savings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Main activities and rationale</th>
<th>Time savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>ASYCUDA World in Rwanda and Uganda; better integration between agencies and countries in the EAC</td>
<td>Singular processing of duties that are automatically sent to destination country; transit paperwork arrives at OSBP before goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEO</td>
<td>Firms applied to and were audited by TMEA to earn expedited trade processes as a means to manage trade risks</td>
<td>Firms that were accepted were able to cross borders without inspections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWIFTs</td>
<td>Supporting agencies’ import and export permit processes</td>
<td>Reduced time to access permits and process documents for trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECTS</td>
<td>Covering Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda on one system that obviates the need for escorting sensitive cargo</td>
<td>Ending the need to wait for escort and travel in convoys; reducing time for emergency response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PE team received robust evidence from TMEA country offices and HQ of the ICT4T activities; these included initial documents such as feasibility studies and PARs; meeting minutes from stakeholder sessions, design documents including business process flow for one SWIFT; internal M&E and project reports; external evaluations on a SWIFT and the ReSW (commissioned by TMEA); a piloting report; training attendance lists and agendas; and a manual for one SWIFT.

Outputs for ICT4T activities included delivery of systems – SWIFTs, CMS/ReSW and RECTS – and trainings for systems users. The CMS outcome is supplemented with reference to the system of Authorised Economic Operators (AEOs), because of their important link to the CMS and the further availability of data on their use of
the CMS once they have been approved. Documentary evidence and multiple site visits and interviews confirmed the existence of the outputs. Multiple disinterested responses from private sector system users reported faster processing times, including both AEO users and others without that status. Other donors’ inputs, where infrequently encountered, were complementary to programming. UNCTAD and TMEA worked together to upgrade ASYCUDAWorld in Uganda; but the WB’s initial work on electronic cargo tracking was left unfinished when TMEA took it up.

Table 13: CT Case Study: ICT for Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of CMS – software, data centre, registered users web application, housed in governments</td>
<td>Virtually certain: Evidence: Site visits, including reviewing systems; partner, AEO and other private sector users confirm use of systems at OSBPs; usage data suggest increased use; TMEA M&amp;E and TMEA-commissioned evaluations.</td>
<td>Virtually certain: Evidence: Procurement, design, and operationalisation evidence alongside complementary investments from other donors and government; TMEA was key actor in systems cited here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking (RECTS)</td>
<td>Virtually certain: Evidence: Site visit confirmed RECTS system in use; evaluation interviews with AEOs and external private sector confirmed its operation.</td>
<td>Virtually certain: Evidence: Interviews confirm TMEA role and other donor groundwork – WB left ECTS unfinished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of SWIFT systems and portals</td>
<td>Virtually certain: Evidence: Usage data in one country; Partners, AEOs and external private sector interviews confirmed usage in Rwanda and Uganda</td>
<td>Virtually certain: Evidence: Evaluation interviews confirm TMEA role; reports including evaluation of SWIFTs and one of ReSW Rwanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainings for systems users</td>
<td>Virtually certain: Evidence: Training data; TFDA Swift Portal Report on training of trainers and sensitization; external interviews confirmed SWIFT and CMS trainings, including apex bodies in the transport sector</td>
<td>Virtually certain: Evidence: Interviews confirm TMEA role; Training attendance register in TMEA-commissioned evaluation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through re-creating a ToC for this component (please see the response to DEQ5.1 in this chapter), the PE team identified all of these outputs as critical for the results chain leading specifically to the key contribution claim of easing trading across borders. Though other donors and government initiatives worked with revenue authorities and in parallel programming, it was TMEA’s interventions that delivered the systems, dedicated funding, and personnel, and ensured training. Based on the evidence, it is ‘Virtually Certain’ that each of the outputs occurred, and that TMEA was in large part responsible for them. There was one important exception: the integrated CMS (iCMS) in Kenya, a centrepiece for the region-wide functioning of the system, has not yet been delivered, as it was delayed by a contested bid and other implementation challenges.

Partner agencies selected for SWIFTs were important agencies in terms of volume of transactions potentially to produce outcomes, but it would also have been possible to prioritise agencies differently (please see the PIO in Annex J for that analysis).

The evaluation then considered the evidence for TMEA’s claim of having contributed to reduced time and costs to traders. The RF indicators for the component are helpful but not entirely conclusive, because of the wide range of programming. The indicators are shown in the following table:

Table 14: Outcomes: ICT for Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in clearance time</td>
<td>Very Likely: Average times imprecise across some 45 different systems.</td>
<td>Very Likely: Evaluation interviews say TMEA’s responsibilities in delivering these systems were distinct from those of other development partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Logistics firms, freight forwarders’ association, shippers report streamlined process; no paper; monitor progress online. Ugandan firm said average time better by half.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• TMEA SWIFTs Formative Evaluation reports time reduced from 86 hours (3.6 days) to 10 hours… 89% reduction against target of 80%.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• TFDA SWIFT Report: 98% reduction in time to acquire permits, licences, or certificates, from average 135 hours to less than 2 hours.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex J: PIOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in number of transit trucks under physical escort</td>
<td>Virtually Certain Evidence: Usage data in one country; Partners, AEOs and external private sector interviews confirmed usage in Rwanda and Uganda</td>
<td>Virtually Certain AEOs and partners said TMEA’s role was necessary to get RECTS in place; agency efforts were complementary; WB left ECTS unfinished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in trade costs</td>
<td>Very Likely Interviews confirm cost reductions. Association cites 15% reduction in costs on certificates of origin; major logistics firms report labour costs saved; TMEA Formative Evaluation of SWIFTs reports ‘Cost per transaction from US$58 to US$8 (86% reduction against target of 80%) contributing to estimated savings of US$9m over the life of the project. One Kenyan exporter said costs had remained constant.</td>
<td>Very Likely Evaluation interviews say TMEA’s responsibilities in delivering these systems were distinct from those of other development partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The outcome in reduced clearance time is backed by strong indications from a TMEA-commissioned Formative Evaluation on the SWIFTs from 2018, which calculated an overall 89% reduction against a target of 80%. A Tanzania SWIFT portal report cited a 98% reduction in time from 135 to 2 hours; however, from evaluators’ visit to see the system, the calculation appeared to have been taken from a subset of simple permit cases, rather than reflecting the full range of situations. The methodology for determining the initial 135 hours was not documented, and did not fully square even with the description of laborious pre-SWIFT processes and visits to various offices. A 2015 report from Rwanda showed positive gains where TMEA focused on the Yellow Channel because of its high level of documentary processing; gains in the Yellow Channel were shown to be sustained and improved upon by the end of S1, in a set of Rwanda government reports. Data from CMS were made available by one country, but the revenue authority could not delineate for the evaluation team how much of overall clearance times were for CMS processing and how much for other functions. The responses from AEOs, other private sector users, logistics and shipping firms almost unanimously confirm substantial time reductions in Uganda and Rwanda, but could offer no robust average figures of the extent of the reduction that came from ICT4T systems.

Interviews with partners and donors confirmed TMEA’s key and unique role in providing the technical expertise for the new systems. The evaluation team is confident that users enjoyed time reductions that were generated by TMEA’s work though the average time reduced is difficult to quantify for all users because so many systems were affected (45 as reported by TMEA for S1). The evaluation team calculates a probability of ‘Very Likely’ that the key contribution claim is true and that TMEA is responsible for the change.

The OSBP CT case study and its underlying data also support significant time reductions for border crossers into Uganda, but what proportion of that time savings is due to the CMS, the eSW functions of ASYCUDA World, expedited status (AEOs), or other OSBP time reductions is not known. Two concerns are important to note. The ReSW study used to substantiate time and cost reductions in Rwanda is four years old. Second, the delays in the Kenya iCMS are important here, as the system will eventually be a vital part of the Customs system used by Northern Corridor countries, and no reductions in time related to this intervention can have materialised.

TMEA claims 100% reduction in the total number of transit trucks under physical escorts in 2016, against a baseline of 50 trucks per day in 2013. Logistics firms in the three countries confirm time savings and the elimination of the difficulties and slow pace of convoy transport, while also reducing risks to their consignments. No further information is given, but interviews with logistics firms in the three countries affected indicate that escorts are no longer in use, which has resulted in reduced transit times and the elimination of the risks of transport in convoys.

Because of the more unitary nature of the indicator and the source of change, the probative value of evidence for this outcome is rated Virtually Certain to have occurred, and to have been contributed to in large part by TMEA. Eliminating escorts would logically speed up transport of goods, as would the fewer interventions on

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71 Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA). 2017. Time Release Report. RRA Customs Services Department, Period October to December 2017. Rwanda: Kigali. It is important to note that the Yellow Channel (on which TMEA focused) processed around 10% of all shipments. The ReSW Formative Evaluation cited above also noted that overall the Rwandan government was inspecting 42% of all shipments in 2014, triple the percentage inspected in 2012 – which RRA credited to increased staff availability for this work. However, time savings in the less-risky channel are less valuable, if more shipments are being inspected in the Red channel, as the report makes clear. No data were available on how inspections evolved past 2014.

72 Two concerns are important to note. The ReSW study used to substantiate time and cost reductions in Rwanda is four years old. Second, the delays in the Kenya iCMS are important here, as the system will eventually be key to Northern Corridor Customs processing, but what was targeted in the RF was not realised during S1.
transit shipments when under using a RECTS eSEAL. A 2018 report on RECTS performance shows that approximately 20% of all trucks in a given month used eSEALS, and that, at least in Uganda, e-monitored shipments took significantly less time than those not e-monitored\textsuperscript{73} – although transit shipments would always pass through OSBPs more quickly, with or without eSEALS. Because of this ambiguity and the lack of clearer data on the time specifically saved by RECTS, this outcome is not considered for the time and cost key contribution claim for the component.

TMEA’s assertion of reductions in the cost of trade are fairly well documented. While the evidence did not confirm an average amount of that reduction, since agency and consignment experiences vary widely, there was consensus among system users that the time savings was well over half the pre-system time. One respondent noted that the reliably shorter time resulted in a decrease in the firm’s working capital requirements (and time savings would generate cost savings, though the rate is unknown and likely variable). A TMEA formative evaluation showed an average document processing cost of $58 reduced to $8 through implementation of the SWIFTs. An end-of-project evaluation for the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) SWIFT costed the saved transaction costs from an average of $80 prior to the system, to $30 when it was running smoothly.

The PE team’s confidence in the evidence is high for both the reduction of transit trucks under escort and the reduction in cost of trade, due to the strong qualitative and quantitative evidence presented from independent sources, including current users. The evaluation data also included discussions with partners and donors about other donor and government initiatives that were happening alongside TMEA’s investments, in order to eliminate alternative explanations and understand how actors worked together towards common goals.

Partner private sector organisations like Uganda’s Coffee Development Authority, representing Uganda’s biggest export, among other such organisations worked closely with TMEA and described the effects of the interventions for their permits and consignments. This, combined with the understanding of other donor and government efforts, increased confidence in the unique contribution of TMEA to the outcomes. Those gains would have been stronger had the iCMS been completed, but even without it the operationalisation of the SCT through the transport corridors as well as the prerequisite permit processes generated gains in time that contributed to easing trading across borders. The suite of data provided high confidence at the level of outcomes, and resulted in a calculated probability of ‘Virtually Certain’ that TMEA’s key contribution claim is true, based on the evidence.

TMEA also claimed impacts in terms of an increase in trade, backed by URA export trade volumes data from the Busia border. Evidence on import figures from the Port Charter Dashboard was unavailable on multiple dates; the site returned the message ‘Website under development’. In the case of each of these pieces of data, however, no data were available tying TMEA to any increases, and so the PE does not confirm that TMEA has made impacts on trade.

In the CT interviews, TMEA added an outcome-level indicator on reduced trade cost, which is corroborated by the SWIFTs evaluation for those projects which reports an 86% reduction against a target of 80% (though the target and the indicator do not appear in the RF), yet there are no data on cost reductions as a result of the CMS, RECTs or AEOs. An association representing Uganda’s largest export reported a 15% cost reduction on certificates, including certificates of origin. A firm from another value chain in Uganda reported that the trade costs reduced enough for them to decrease the amount of working capital on hand. As we do not have data on the other initiatives, however, the PE cannot confirm the amount of these cost reductions across the component. TMEA also claimed impacts in terms of an increase in trade, backed by URA export trade volumes data from the Busia border. Evidence on import figures from the Port Charter Dashboard was unavailable on multiple dates; the site returned the message “Website under development”. No data were available tying TMEA to any increases, and so the PE does not confirm that TMEA has made impacts on trade.

In conclusion, the evidence suggests that TMEA’s contribution claim of time and cost savings resulting from ICT4T interventions. It is ‘Very Likely’ that the claimed outcome was realised, and that TMEA was central to the outcome.

Table 15: Conclusion: ICT for Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in trade time</td>
<td><strong>Very Likely</strong>&lt;br&gt;Average times are imprecise across 45 different systems.</td>
<td><strong>Very Likely</strong>&lt;br&gt;Evaluation interviews say TMEA’s responsibilities in delivering these systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{73} Kenya Revenue Authority, Rwanda Revenue Authority, Uganda Revenue Authority. 2018. Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System (RECTS). Half Year July-December 2018 Report. TMEA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|         | • External interviews strongly confirm the savings in time and a Ugandan firm said average time better by half.  
|         | • TMEA SWIFTs Formative Evaluation reports reduction from 86 to 10 hours or 89% (against 80% target.)  
|         | • TFDA SWIFT Report: 98% reduction in time to acquire permits, licences, or certificates, from average 135 hours to less than 2 hours. | were distinct from those of other development partners. |
| Reduction in trade costs | **Very Likely**  
Interviews strongly confirm cost reductions, such as 15% reduction in costs on certificates of origin; labour costs; average costs per transaction (SWIFTs evaluation) from US$58 to US$8 (86% against target of 80%) contributing to estimated savings of US$9m over the life of the project. One Kenyan exporter said costs had remained constant. | **Very Likely**  
Evaluation interviews say TMEA’s responsibilities in delivering these systems were distinct from those of other development partners |
7 SO2 PIO 2.3 Eliminating Non-Tariff Barriers

7.1 Summary

Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) have been a challenge to regional trade and integration in East Africa. They account for a significant proportion of high trade costs in the East African Community (EAC). They drive up business costs of importing and exporting goods, make business regionally and globally uncompetitive, and increase prices to consumers across the entire region. Article 13 of the EAC Customs Union provides for immediate removal of all existing NTBs on importation of goods originating within the region.

Since 2010, TMEA has partnered with the EAC Secretariat, national governments, the private sector, and civil society organisations for the elimination of NTBs. In S1, TMEA supported regional frameworks for the identification, monitoring, reporting and elimination of NTBs. This has included three main avenues of investments:

1. Establishing SMS and online reporting systems, and raising traders’ awareness for use of those systems
2. Strengthening existing National Monitoring Committees for escalation and eventual elimination of reported NTBs
3. Supporting industry to develop evidence-based research and position papers to advocate for the removal of NTBs with government and the NMCs
4. Holding quarterly regional forums on the elimination of NTBs, reporting on the updated Time-Bound Matrix quarterly, and supporting bilateral meetings on given NTBs, as necessary.

7.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

7.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

During S1 the causal links and assumptions underpinning the S1 NTBs component ToC were evidence-based or verified at output levels, though at the level of outcomes the component fell short of reaching its systemic goals. In a document explaining its ToC from May 2014 TMEA report ‘reduction of Non-Tariff Barriers is directly linked to improved trade facilitation. TMEA is directly supporting initiatives on this issue both at the national and at the regional levels.’ An SO2 strategy document from 2015 discusses the importance of eliminating NTBs for making the region more attractive for business. However, TMEA states its beliefs as opposed to presenting evidence of, or verifying causal links for, this component of the ToC. Nevertheless, strong evidence (WB, UNCTAD, ITC, and other) around the costs of NTBs to regional trade are in evidence and TMEA staff members are conversant in the underpinnings of the development problem.

The ToC offers a set of assumptions that apply at a general level, though they do not specifically reference the NTB component. For example, within the SO2 section TMEA report, ‘The logic above is underpinned by a number of assumptions. These include:

- Implementing the EAC regional trade agreements will contribute to enhancing the trade environment in the region
- There is sufficient demand by partner state parliaments, public sector, private sector, and civil society organisations to drive the regional economic community agenda forward
- Regional trade policies will be prioritised by partner states over national trade policies and priorities.

These assumptions are seen as applying to the Strategic Objective as opposed to the NTB component per se.

The 2012 TMEA Transport and Economic Corridor Strategy that predates the ToC shows the programme’s thinking about NTBs. The document reports ‘NTBs present a great challenge to the movement of goods around the EAC region. NTBs have an enormously negative impact on the economy of the region as they hamper the timely conveyance of imports and exports. Their elimination would lower the cost and time taken to transport

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goods. This suggests TMEA were thinking about problems and their causes. However, this does not show that TMEA presented clear evidence or verified causal links that underpinned the NTB component of the ToC.

TMEA did review NTBs early in S1 implementation. TMEA supported a study called [n] NTBs Impact Study In The East Africa Community; A Legally Binding Enforcement Mechanism For The Elimination Of Identified NTBs In The Form Of A Proposed Draft Bill On NTBs in July 2012. TMEA also collected evidence that were related to relevant causal links during and after implementation, including through an internally commissioned evaluation in early 2016.\textsuperscript{77}

The TMEA 2014 ToC lists two NTB subcomponents, ‘Efficient national NTB mechanisms’ and ‘Regional legal NTB resolution operational.’ The ToC describes the importance of working from both levels, and says TMEA is working on ‘improvements in the regional legislative framework. As a result of action by TMEA, the EAC legislative framework should be improved to include the possibility of sanctions for Partner States which refuse to eliminate existing Non-Tariff Barriers or which create new ones.’\textsuperscript{78} The NTBs Act was passed by the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in 2015, and ratified by Partner States in 2018, but without regulations it is not yet effective. TMEA includes passage of the Act in their RF: they hired a consultant to write the draft, and reviewed the text with stakeholder groups. Over time, dozens of studies of NTBs have been conducted by the EAC, Partner States, TMEA, and industry.\textsuperscript{79} Still, national legislation has not been harmonised.

TMEA projects for the PIO included supporting SMS and online reporting systems, national NMCs, and quarterly regional forums and updates on the time-bound matrix. The PE team found no formal documentation of how TMEA thought the projects would reach their intended goals, through which causal mechanism or linkage. TMEA did produce result chains for projects, however, some of which did include assumptions. The TMEA Results staff discussed with the PE how the ToC effort was introduced to TMEA (as it was introduced programmes around the world in the same time frame), involving iterative discussions and drafts, which ultimately became an important part of the MEL strategy.

The earlier process to revise the ToC in 2014 highlighted programming outside the mandate of the ToC, which was stopped or minimised; and from that time forward, results chain thinking was part of project design and the PAR process. Project teams were required to link their proposals to the overarching ToC at that time, and by S2 the work with ToCs is an established part of project practices; however, for the S1 ToCs and results chains, the evaluation team did find gaps in the quality of those early attempts, and questioned the use of the ToCs and results chains as ‘living document’ to guide programming by testing causal linkages and assumptions.\textsuperscript{80}

Interviews with staff members suggest the RF and national results chains were key implementation guides for the NTB component. TMEA staff report that the ToC was being developed during S1 and projects were not linked to programme-level outcomes; however, TMEA leadership say that the project approval process did evolve to link projects to programme-level outcomes formally, and also included the project-level ToCs. The teams also monitor their project-level progress quarterly using the MIS. One example of a national results chain is shown in the figure below:


\textsuperscript{79} Northern and Central Corridors of East Africa Corridor Diagnostic Study Bibliography

This results chain has much greater detail about project work elements, and represents concerted team-level thinking about the causal links between steps in programme logic. As with several project-level results chains viewed by the evaluation team, immediate questions about the quality of this product arise, and about its relevance to the RF. First is whether project activities actually map to this plan, or if the results chain was superseded by events and not updated. There is very little here, for example, about the SMS system for which indicators in the RF show a certain amount of priority. The results chain does not show increased reporting of NTBs, whether through the SMS system, online systems, or through NMCs and their national private and public sector members and connections. The chain at top right on training stakeholders somehow leads directly to removal of NTBs, without causal logic about how their training supports that aim. The utility of the results chain appears limited as a way to talk about the actual ToC and its strengths and limitations, and how to move that process forward.

TMEA also provided a monitoring plan linked to this results chain, to demonstrate how assumptions were part of team deliberations. There is indeed one assumption for each pink and blue box from the figure, and one each for nine of 13 indicators around the green boxes, though these are just a few words each. The PE team found no documentation to indicate these assumptions were monitored or data used to check the validity of the results chain. At the highest level, the assumption is inherently political, regarding institutional mandates and willingness to remove NTBs; it may be that, in line with other evaluation findings, monitoring assumptions like this one was not documented, but was discussed among the team, in order to ensure TMEA’s neutral posture.

In the absence of a component-level ToC, the PE team has developed the following figure to show the team’s understanding of the component from the fieldwork. Included in the figure are a set of possible alternative explanations, and basic assumptions pertaining to work on eliminating NTBs between EAC Partner States.
A component-level ToC like this looks at the overarching strategy that involves both national efforts and what the regional team worked to accomplish, and would have proved a useful tool for identifying problem areas, political economy assumptions, and data needs. As TMEA worked in S1 without an iterative process to link national and regional workstreams, the critical leap from their outputs to outcomes in the contentious and yet amorphous space around NTBs was successful for particular NTBs but no data show a more durable causal link holding.

One issue around using ToCs is taking advantage of what the project teams learns in the course of implementation. For example, publicity around the SMS system in one country was reported to have led to ‘a fundamental change in the approach of customs services. Customs officers, while still policing trade and collecting revenue, adopted the role of trade facilitators. They helped truckers and traders to complete forms, where necessary. As a counterpart to this, truckers, previously meek, became more assertive. If they did not already have them, truck drivers bought a mobile phone… or got one from their company.’ Though this datum represents just one voice, if project staff start to see patterns like this, it would be useful to incorporate thinking about the users’ experiences of themselves as part of a larger goal. That might inform outreach to improve system use, or plans to work on how border officials treat truckers.

Another issue is that there is an inherent loop in the work on NTBs, in that they continue to appear – on different products and in different sectors, between different countries or groups of countries, and around different issues. This raises the issue of the lack of consequences for countries in the EAC that put NTBs in place, and of a regional remediation process. TMEA supported the EAC-based communication around the issues, regionally, bilaterally and within countries with the NMCs. However, removing the incentives, or encouraging disincentives to placing NTBs by working towards amending the EAC NTBs Act might have made a greater difference.

Moreover, with a component-level ToC the team would have had the opportunity to discuss how the hypothesised causal package could be enhanced or limited by the causal packages from among other components, or how other components might need support to their causal packages from the work on reducing NTBs. NTBs clearly affect corridor transport times but, apart from the reduction of the number of weighbridges
(in itself an important accomplishment) the data to validate that the eliminated NTBs were high-priority or particularly costly, that overall NTBs decreased, or that the effort made a durable contribution to reductions in time were not pursued. There are also no data to show the NTBs removed contributed through ad valorem equivalents to reductions in transport cost or time.

In fact, the indicator TMEA uses to substantiate its progress in this component is only suitable at the output level. The outcome-level indicator, as written, is the number of high-priority NTBs eliminated (disaggregated by country) against the total number of NTBs still reported as outstanding. However, what was actually reported was the simple number of NTBs eliminated. TMEA might have focused efforts on a methodology for identifying NTBs that are high-priority, as suggested in the NTBs evaluation that was commissioned.81 This was not undertaken during S1, leaving a gap in the data, particularly since this was the only outcome-level indicator.

Thought leadership in the component, through a component-level ToC process, can propose refinements. Thinking through the ToC as a team would also facilitate a discussion about necessary conditions for success, for which each country team participant would likely have concerns in light of national contexts. The assumptions in the re-created component ToC, above, representing possible spoilers and basic conditions, were almost all challenged in some way during S1. Sustainability appears to be a problem, for example, in terms of funding NMCs and regional forums. An online portal for reporting NTBs in one country appears not to have had any new entries since 2016. The ToC process is when such potential problems should be brought up, unpacked, discussed, and decisions made about how to address them. Many NTBs are rooted in politics and have powerful interests at stake. Regularly examining the political economy around the NMCs was an unmet need in this component, particularly since TMEA counted on national governments to sustain them.

Given the contention among private sector respondents that there are more NTBs than ever in 2019, TMEA needs to undertake a critique of the working model for this component. It may be that the differences between governments have expanded to a degree that even a major development actor like TMEA cannot get sufficient traction on these issues. If so, TMEA investments risk being swamped by events. However, a candid process involving key national stakeholders and expert viewpoints could debate and delineate what would be more likely to work, or recommend redirection of resources.

7.2.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

TMEAs support to reduce NTBs closely supports EAC regional trade development priorities. Under Article 13 of the Customs Union Protocol, the EAC Partner States have agreed to remove all existing non-tariff barriers to trade and not to impose any new ones.82 TMEA supported the drafting and enactment of an EAC NTB Law in 2015. TMEA also support regional negotiations that include public and private sector actors – nationally, regionally, and bilaterally – to remove NTBs. The NTB component has also supported:

Table 16: EAC regional trade development priorities, and related NTBs projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAC Regional Trade Development Priorities</th>
<th>Related TMEA activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **EAC Pillar: Customs Union and the Single Customs Territory**83 | • Developed SMS and online system to report NTBs, and national and regional mechanisms to follow up on the NTBs.  
• Reduced NTBs to bring down transport times and costs, and minimise opportunities for corruption  
• Supported NMC, bilateral and regional meetings of government and private sector to resolve NTBs  
• Supported EAC Technical Working Groups on SCT, and regional Time-Bound Matrix with quarterly reports |
| • Elimination of NTBs |  
| **Infrastructure: Coordinating, harmonising, and complementing transport and communications policies; improving and expanding the existing transport and communication links; and establishing new ones.** | • Supported the removal of weighbridges and checkpoints to reduce time and cost of transport |

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82 https://www.eac.int/trade
83 https://www.eac.int/customs-union
### EAC Regional Trade Development Priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tripartite: 'The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite is accelerating economic integration for the people of the Eastern and Southern African Region'</th>
<th>Related TMEA activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Implemented Tripartite NTB system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialisation, SME development; investment promotion &amp; private sector development</td>
<td>• Worked with industry apex bodies and other private sector and civil society representatives, including women’s groups, to ensure their voices are part of the dialogue on trade regarding NTBs that each face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improving the competitiveness of the industrial sector to enhance the expansion of trade […]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Providing an enabling environment for the private sector […] through continuous dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Secretariat-level interventions to increase EAC capacity</td>
<td>• Produced regional Time-Bound Matrix updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender, community development and civil society: […] approaches towards disadvantaged […] groups, including women, children, the youth, the elderly, and persons with disabilities aimed at employment creation, poverty alleviation and improving working conditions.</td>
<td>• Included women traders in NTB NMCs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ assembly from EAC website and a range of evaluation interviews and data

#### 7.2.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

Evaluation respondents indicate that policy and political economy have impacted the success of the NTB component. Specifically identifying NTBs and the political economy is challenging as ‘identifying and classifying NTBs is often not straightforward, as specific administrative practices and legislation have evolved over time in response to political economy developments at the national and local level.’ However, the elimination of NTBs remains relevant as they increase the cost of doing business, result in lost business opportunities and create waste. The have a direct bearing on the region’s competitiveness and on each of the Partner States’ economies.

TMEA staff members recognise that NTBs are political and unpredictable. Business rivalries and connections between senior government representatives and businesspeople challenge actions to remove or reduce NTBs. New NTBs are commonly reported as replacing those that were eliminated. Key informants also identify the importance of political will. In Kenya, an industry body reported that Tanzania has put all sugar-based products on its Sensitive List and has levied 35% duty on them, despite an EAC Council decision that directed Tanzania to remove the products from the sensitive list to allow its free imports per the Single Customs Territory rules. As there are no punitive measures to compel a state to comply with the Council rulings and directives, nothing can be done unless there is political will at the top to comply. The issue was still under discussion at the time of performance evaluation fieldwork.

#### 7.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

These NTB interventions complement other ongoing initiatives. TMEA Arusha Programme reports other interventions such as those supported by JICA (strictly OSBPs and surface infrastructure), the WB, the Norwegians, EU GIZ, USAID, AfDB, CIDA Canada and SIDA Sweden in the trade arena. A private sector apex body in Kenya confirmed this complementarity with several of those initiatives and the IFC as well. The Kenyan government confirmed JICA’s work in building OSBPs with a real-time cargo monitoring system within the border itself; WB’s construction at border posts; AfDB’s border facilities; and COMESA’s training of border officers. Efforts to reduce NTBs should support all other interventions aiming to increase trade.

#### 7.3 Coherence and coordination

#### 7.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

A strength of the NTB model is that it has supported the visibility of NTBs, through sensitisation campaigns in a variety of media, including print and radio. Advertising the SMS reporting mechanism also increased awareness.

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64 Bernhardt, P. (2012). NTBs Impact Study In The East Africa Community: A Legally Binding Enforcement Mechanism For The Elimination Of Identified NTBs In The Form Of A Proposed Draft Bill On NTBs, p. 7.
among the transport sector which industry groups reported as helping decrease delays and the number of roadblocks on the Northern Corridor.

The TMEA NTB model has removed some NTBs. The updated EAC time bound programme on elimination of non-tariff barriers as of May 2017 showed one hundred and sixteen NTBs were resolved since 2009. A Kenyan industry association reported that in their first project supported by TMEA, they identified 14 NTBs over two years and managed to address 37 NTBs, for which they credited TMEA funding for research. They further reported that the funding supported clearly written position papers with recommendations that helped when approaching government to address the NTBs.

NTBs are difficult to define and prioritise, according to TMEA team members as well as leading trade sector institutions like the World Trade Organisation. Nor does resolving an NTB through the NMCs or any other process mean it will not resurface. New NTBs can also arise, as in Kenya, where devolution has made it possible for counties to levy fees on transport. Industry representatives in Kenya reported that ‘all Partner States still apply NTBs related to sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT), rules of origin (RoO), and cumbersome customs documentation.’ An industry apex body in Tanzania reported that the Tanzanian government acted directly and quickly to ban imports of specific commodities, such as Kenyan carrots, in response to competition with domestic production, creating new NTBs. A logistics firm in Tanzania report ‘more NTBs now than before.’ This respondent gave the example of transport of chemicals: ‘they need a certificate from Tanzania Chemical Agency. However, truckers are stopped in Kenya where the police ask them to have a certificate from the Kenya Chemical Agency, which was never the case before.’

As examples of perennial challenges, a Kenyan apex body reports an example of attempts to address NTBs at regional level. These include Kenyan confectionary exports banned by Tanzania arising from the Kenya’s duty-free sugar imports. A Multi Sector Task Force was set up in 2018 to solve the issue. Tanzania and Uganda complained about sub-standard Brazilian sugar. A positive ruling was made by the EAC after regional verification. However, Tanzania still objected while Uganda accepted. Tanzania is trying to protect its nascent industries - denying EAC partner states access to their market while China, SADC and others are accessing the same. A meeting has been scheduled between Tanzania and Kenya on in March 2019 to resolve the issue. Another example provided was tobacco. A Tanzania / Uganda complaint has persisted for 18 years. Excise duty is added onto this product in violation of the EAC CMP and WTO including National Treatment rule. The matter is being handled through the MEAC with the EAC Policy Organs.

Respondents and the 2016 NTBs evaluation point to the need for an effective EAC Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The current mechanism is reported as not providing a Partner States the option to go to court. This is in spite of the presence of the EAC Court as an organ of the Community. The NTB Act was ratified by all Partner States in 2018 without accompanying regulations making it ineffective for the time being, as both reviews and setting up regulations are going on at the same time.

‘Partner states currently have the leeway to eliminate NTBs at their own pace,’ according to Lilian Awinja, former executive chair of the EABC in an online article. There are no procedures or consequences for imposing NTBs, nor any measures to redress for NTBs having been imposed. Deadlines are also extended when NTBs are not resolved, which contravenes the ‘time-bound’ goal.

Alongside the official NTBs reports, and comprising what some estimate to be half the trade in the region, informal traders often face NTBs that go undocumented. These traders, as a focus of the TMEA ToC, have been incorporated in some NMCs, but systematic attention to these issues is not an explicit component goal. Informal traders are, in the majority, women – which is also part of TMEA’s ToC. Working with them on the issue of NTBs – particularly if a grievance mechanism is formalised and explicitly includes all NTBs, whether affecting formal traders or informal – would be an important step forward. EASSI reported that NTBs have increased since S1 ended, sharpening the need for resolution of these trade inhibitors through women traders’ representation on NMCs. Cross-border women traders in Nimule related that, while one illegal roadblock was removed, and one side of the OSBP completed, traders are still asked for ‘tax’ payments from other government officials who stop them en-route to the border.

One traders’ association in Uganda suggested that traders would use the SMS grievance reporting for NTBs in different countries, saying that traders could challenge border officials if they were at fault. This is a different perspective compared to a regional transport association representative who reported the SMS (‘201hash) system was not used efficiently. This key informant felt some lorry drivers do not know it, some illiterate lorry

86 The Eastern African Sub-regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women, EASSI Scorecard on implementation of the EAC elimination of non-tariff barriers act, November 2016
drivers cannot use it due to the language barrier (English)\textsuperscript{87} and also because those implementing an NTB can prevent a driver texting for support.

7.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

The TMEA NTB component has strong complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels, while also making use of bilateral meetings that are said to be more effective for eliminating given NTBs in practice. The component has sponsored quarterly regional and national NMCs that include government and private sector representatives that meet to report and discuss NTBs. Informants report quarterly NTB Regional and Trade Committees, the Sectoral Council of Trade, and Industry, Finance, and Investment (SCTIFI) and the Council of Ministers addressing NTBs. All country teams support the project at the level of the EAC Secretariat as well.

TMEA respondents in one country reported that the Chamber of Commerce and Ministry of Trade were bought together at a national level to form an NMC that includes key stakeholders from both private and public sectors. In Kenya, a national apex body reported that TMEA work is aligned with the facilitating trade in an effort to implement the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, reduction of NTBs, and encourages good trade policies and members’ use of best practices.

An industry association in Kenya collates NTBs from 14 sectors and feeds this information into a master matrix (known as the Time Bound program) as evidence for action. This is used in their work to back up NTB claims at NMCs, by coordinating at national and regional levels:

‘If it’s about Certificate of Origin then Kenya Revenue Authority (also on the NMC) has to confirm. For veterinary or other products, then the relevant regulatory body is requested to give its opinion. Another case may be non-compliance with set standards with a sign of quality such as diamond mark by the Kenya Bureau of Standards. Once the problem is confirmed then a strategic approach to manage it is agreed upon which proves the effectiveness of the mechanism. An example is if Kenya is importing tea from Tanzania and an NTB arises, the issue is reported to the MEAC, which reports to the quarterly Regional NTBs Forum. Concerned regulatory authorities such as KEBS must attend that meeting to state their position on the matter. The offending Partner State must be represented (e.g., Tanzanian Bureau of Standards or Ugandan National Bureau of Standards). Reported NTBs are summarised, discussed, and decisions made.

At a national level, another strategy reported is regular interaction with the relevant Ministries and Agencies, while at the same time association leadership meets with top government officials to put forward its cases. The industry association is also networked in the other Partner States to lobby for support on common problems.

A Tanzanian apex body also described the national and regional coordination on TMEA NTB, reporting that in the first phase of their work they stimulated NTB dialogue with the public sector. Quite a number of NTBs were resolved, though others arose as well. Bilateral dialogues were held with Kenya and with Rwanda, that paired the public sector standards and revenue agencies together along with the business community from both countries. They also developed a matrix of issues and a shared agenda, from which several issues were resolved.

7.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

TMEAs NTB model complements other components such as its ports, OSBPs and ICT4T initiatives. Trucks that carry goods from ports, through OSBPs and use ICT4T can perform their task quicker and at lower cost if NTBs are not present.

The TMEA leadership team in Kenya claim that ‘projects are designed to address problems holistically, and therefore include NTBs as part of trade related issues.’ A private sector apex body in Uganda confirmed the synergies of working on infrastructure, policy and individual NTBs at once. TMEA also brought the issues of NTBs to women traders’ associations with whom they worked under SO3 to begin to understand and help to reduce the NTBs that affect cross-border women traders in particular, as described by UNCTAD, the WB, and the ILO.\textsuperscript{88,89,90} Some of these participants went on to form part of Kenya’s National Trade Facilitation Committee

\textsuperscript{87} The system uses drop down menus in English.
\textsuperscript{90} WB 2013. Women and Trade in Africa: Realizing the potential.
as a result, around the NTBs issues that were identified. In Tanzania, a private sector apex body said that the NTBs work complemented their own advocacy work with Parliament.

Some Ugandan women cross-border traders in associations reported having been asked to serve on NMCs, which allowed them to bring particular NTBs that affect their membership unequally. Women respondents to early PGIS field visits reported they would be glad to tell officials about the NTBs they face, if they were invited to do so, so including these women might warrant expansion to other sites.

7.3.4 DEQ 5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

Lead actors at ministries of EAC affairs were closely involved in the programme’s governance arrangements because they often chaired the NOCs. Partners from MEACs were particularly pleased with governance because of their ownership of the set of activities in this way, feeling they had ‘access to TMEA at all levels’ with respect to NTBs. Another ministry respondent specifically praised the responsiveness of their TMEA country office team on NTB matters.

7.3.5 DEQ 5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

Respondents from among NTB projects cited no problems with the donor operational model, and were quite positive about how TMEA’s working model delivered results for them, including bundling donor interests and funds to have more impact (MEAC and EAC respondents and private sector partners). There were references to TMEA acting as a ‘buffer’ by government respondents in two countries, such that the agencies did not have to respond directly to donors’ requests for information. One respondent noted that donors ‘are not hands-on support like TMEA’, so it was more effective to be in contact with TMEA than to have any interaction with the donor operational model directly.

The donor operational model was not reported as impactful (in either positive or negative ways) with respect to NTB programming.

7.3.6 DEQ 5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

The TMEA NTB component did align with country systems and agencies, including the ministries working on EAC issues, Ministries of Trade, Chambers of Commerce, and private sector associations. This alignment has developed ownership and contributed to impact as NTBs were reduced. Ownership and impact are tempered by the re-emergence of NTBs.

In line with the Customs Union protocol, in 2009 the Partner States established the EAC Time Bound Program on Elimination of Identified NTBs, which TMEA has directly supported since 2011. TMEA supported National Monitoring Committee (NMC) meetings as well as bilateral and regional forums, while also developing the online/SMS reporting systems and raising awareness around their use.

Governments and private sector are represented on the NMCs in each TMEA country. TMEA support these partners to upgrading time-bound matrix. TMEA NTB also funded the setting up of SMS system in each country. In Uganda, this system is housed in the Ministry of Trade. The TMEA supported national NTB reporting and monitoring system (using online / SMS reporting) with an active NMC engages country agencies (i.e. Ministries of Trade, National Police forces) and has developed country systems with these agencies. A senior transport association representative report that as a result of the TMEA NTB support a WhatsApp group has been created by a senior commercial officer in the Ugandan Ministry of Trade. Truck drivers meeting NTBs use this to contact the association as a way of finding a solution. In Tanzania, the implementer had a dedicated staff member available to receive the SMS messages from their system, and routed those that were deemed actual NTBs to appropriate government interlocutors.

Two concerns emerged for the PE team in hearing these accounts. First, data on SMS NTB messages and how the decision of veracity of the NTBs were determined were not available. There were suggestions in the interviews of ‘hundreds’ of text messages that were not actually NTBs, but how that determination was made was unclear. Some respondents mentioned that case resolution would be communicated back to each complainant, but in the case of these non-NTBs, that practice would likely feel like an affront to the user,
particularly if automated. Since raising awareness of the system is also a challenge, the system could use these opportunities to educate with standard scripts. Collecting data on these non-NTBs would also give important information about perceived barriers.

Second, in two countries’ cases, respondents told of using the phone numbers of friends and acquaintances at border posts to resolve issues quickly. While the impulse to resolve something quickly is laudable, it raises concerns that the paths to resolution are more informal and based on individual contacts, than on systems that could be institutionalised. When queried further, the respondents both said the system was sound and would work no matter who was working at a given duty station.

7.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

The focus and activities of the TMEA NTB component are consistent with and additional to other development programmes in the region.

Efforts to eliminate NTBs are consistent with other regional development programmes that aim to support trade such as:

- Trade hub: TMEA NTB work complements the USAID Trade hub work
- EU Tradecom facility: This facility is reported as they always liaising with TMEA to ensure complementarity.
- A TMEA donor in Uganda reported that they coordinate with EU and USAID Trade Hub, which should have helped consistency and coordination.
- A private sector body reported TMEA help led to a project with USAID’s Trade Hub aiming at the elimination of NTBs.

Overall donors are reported as being aware of each other’s projects. A TMEA donor representative reported looking into the details in Tanzania where they work a lot on forestry issues. This representative highlighted the importance of NTBs on product values suggesting efforts to reduce these barriers as being additional to their support.

At a specific NTB component level TMEAs support to NMCs has helped coordination by facilitating the regular coming together of government and private sector organisations. TMEAs regional support engaging with the EAC also helps to ensure component consistency and additionally. An EAC staffer reported taking responsibility to examine how donor programmes work together to avoid duplication. This was reported as being performed each quarter of the year.

7.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

TMEAs NTB approach works with the EAC. The component includes regional NTB reporting and monitoring systems with an active Regional Monitoring Committee. The TMEA country office team reported a responsive and flexible approach. Ministry stakeholders and a TMEA donor representative suggest the approach was fit for purpose. As described in Section 7.3.1 this approach has contributed to the removal of some NTBs. However, the regional approach has been less successful at enforcement and preventing the re-emergence of NTBs.

One TMEA donor suggested a stronger relationship with other regional bodies such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa, other RECs (COMESA, SADC), and AfDB, which has a specialised Trade Policy Training Centre in Africa, and leading Think Tanks.

7.4 Sustainability

7.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

The reported re-emergence of NTBs questions the sustainability of benefits from the TMEA NTB component. TMEA has reduced NTBs but long-term benefits from this are compromised by the emergence of new barriers and constraints on trade. Sustainability is also in question after the end of S1, in terms of the frequency of
national and regional meetings of the NMCs and their representatives. Whether national governments and the EAC will continue to fund the efforts is at present uncertain.

Private and public sector participants in the NMCs say they will continue the efforts to eliminate NTBs. One ministry representative suggested alignment with government Strategic Plans and other agencies to create new budget lines to fund activities. Another country’s ministry representatives suggested that addressing NTBs is now embedded in the priorities of the partner states and this will help sustainability. An active private sector representative also felt benefits would be sustainable and promised to continue working with the EAC and Partner States.

Some implementers reported that they would require the extension of support. They suggested that TMEA did not look at sustainability when developing the NTBs SMS reporting, and that their SMS reporting initiative slowed down as funding and technical support declined near the end of S1. A donor representative reported having ‘supported policy creation and implementation and deployment… but I don’t see sustainability because everything stops when the funds end.’

TMEA staff members recognise the challenges of sustainability, indicating the particular sustainability difficulties of information systems and of funding NMCs and regional forums. The Kenya website for NTBs reporting has no more recent entries than 2016 in its ‘News’ section, while at the same time the access to the NTB reporting area of the site appears not to work. If that has been the case since 2016, the system could be said to be functionally inoperable.

Interviews with TMEA suggest a change in focus for Strategy 2. TMEA staff report that in S2 planning TMEA will the measure cost of NTBs by sector and support domestication of (Regional) Acts addressing these issues.

7.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

The TMEA NTB component works closely with government, chambers of commerce and other industry associations, and private sector associations. These stakeholders engaged in regular meetings and national and regional levels and some also acted as project implementers, while others contributed materially to the information on NTBs, such as with position papers.

One ministry representative reported the value of TMEA engaging stakeholders early in project implementation to collect perspectives and get buy-in. MINEAC suggests a lesson from NTB efforts is that bilateral negotiations are an important tool to produce results on given NTBs. With a similar massage about engagement, A Ugandan traders’ association felt that TMEA’s needs assessment approach was useful and reported that they would use it again. A Kenyan apex association suggested that they would take forward the structured approach of joint action plans on NTBs that they had used with TMEA. They also reported plans to continue to engage with counties, ‘urgently’, through the Council of Governors and County Assembly Forums, as they did during the TMEA project.

TMEA representatives also identified some lessons and ideas for the future, such as integrating Northern and Central Corridors observatories into the discussions on NTBs. They also suggested ongoing work with women to understand NTB impacts on them; raising awareness on NTB mechanisms in the logistics sector; and tracing root causes of NTBs to be more effective in uprooting them.

Advocacy team members at TMEA also suggested focusing their programming in S2 on NTBs, standards, SPS, tax, trade policy issues, transport, and logistics. They felt they could be more effective in S2 by broadening target groups to include legislative bodies, trade facilitation agencies, and Head of State engagement. They also reported the intention to work more at subnational level in S2, as well as with COMESA, TFTA and CFTA. This TMEA team also felt that working on the Northern Corridor in particular would be more likely to be met with political goodwill and success on NTBs and other issues.

7.5 DEQ2.2 Effectiveness: Contribution Tracing

7.5.1 DEQ2.1 To what extent has TMEA contributed to increasing ease of trading across borders?

The evaluation’s CT sample included NTBs at regional level and for Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, as part of the effort to measure effectiveness of SO2 (DEQ2.2). NTBs have been a challenge to regional trade and integration in East Africa. They drive up business costs of importing and exporting goods, make business regionally and globally uncompetitive, and increase prices to consumers across the entire region. Article 13 of
the EAC Customs Union provides for immediate removal of all existing NTBs on importation of goods originating within the region.

Since 2010 TMEA has partnered with the EAC Secretariat, Partner State governments, the private sector and civil society organisation in the elimination of NTBs. Main projects included:

- Supporting National Monitoring Committees (NMCs) with technical assistance and facilitating meetings at the national and regional level
- Supporting the use of bilateral channels to resolve given NTBs
- Putting in place SMS/Online based NTB reporting at the national level
- Supporting a Tripartite Online NTB reporting system in concert with the AfDB
- Drafting and reviewing the EAC NTBs Act

More information on each of these, including country-specific systems, can be found in the remainder of this document on PIO 2.3, and in Annex N in the CT Case Study data tables (with additional narrative on the projects, as well as specific data and sources).

The key contribution claim that forms the focus for the evaluation under this PIO is:

TMEA contributed to easing trading across borders by eliminating NTBs, which decreased average time and cost to transit.

The PE team received documents from TMEA country offices and HQ that provide wide support of their activities: these included budgets, membership lists and reports from NMC meetings and regional fora; ToRs for an EAC impact study on a legally binding enforcement mechanism and an accompanying report; NMC work plans and reports from market observations; a national strategy for one country’s efforts; reports on long-standing NTBs; the Time-Bound Matrix; monthly reports on Tripartite NTB mechanism technical assistance; country reports on project and indicator progress; reports from SMS NTB reporting; regional NTB forum reports and updates to the Time-Bound Matrix; an external evaluation of the NTBs component (commissioned by TMEA but carried out by a contracting firm); and a manual for the use of the online reporting mechanism in one country. The PE team have high confidence in data provided at the Activities level, resulting in a probability level of ‘Virtually Certain’ to represent our collective belief in the claim, after reviewing the evidence.

Outputs include the development and operationalisation of NTBs reporting and monitoring systems, research, and position papers, operational NMCs, and the passage of the NTBs bill, as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTB monitoring/report systems developed; operationalisation support</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence: interviews with national partners; TMEA formative evaluation; some industry associations report use; others say there are challenges for their users; country programme work reports (no SMS in Rwanda)</td>
<td>Evidence: confirmation of TMEA’s role from implementers, traders, industry associations, NCTTCA; system activity reported to TMEA by implementers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research/position papers developed and published</td>
<td>Very Likely</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence: 21 papers cited in RF; four of these were reviewed by the evaluation team. No evidence of publication.</td>
<td>Evidence: products refer to TMEA and/or were carried out by NMCs with TMEA support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional and national NMCs operational</td>
<td>Virtually certain (S1)</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence: reports from NMCs; industry apex body report cites NMCs; interviews, including an association respondent cites multiple levels of meetings</td>
<td>Evidence: NMC reports; interviews tie NMCs to TMEA support: transporters, women’s association.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTB Act passed</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence: EAC confirms passage and ratification; documents on drafting and legislative processes; industry note ratification (2018) without regulations</td>
<td>Evidence: TMEA reports, drafts, and recommendations; interviewees report that political will limited national uptake</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two additional outputs were cited by the TMEA team: Regional and national NMCs operational, and NTB Act passed. Respondents reported attending NMC meetings, presenting research and evidence, and collaborating with private and public sector participants, per the lists of attendees TMEA provided to the evaluation. There
were also reports of links between NMCs and an EAC-level sectoral council, as well as the Council of Ministers addressing NTBs. The NTBs Act output evidence included a proposed draft bill commissioned by TMEA, references to the process in a supplemental bill, and industry respondents who lamented the lack of regulations accompanying the bill, ratified 2018.

Through re-creating a ToC for this component (please see the response to DEQ5.1 in this chapter), the PE team identified the three bold outputs above as critical for the results chain and leading specifically to outcomes of time and cost savings for users. The evidence suggests that it is ‘Virtually Certain’ that the outputs were delivered and that TMEA caused or contributed to them. TMEA’s role in the outputs was confirmed by NMC members, private sector apex bodies and a CSO, along with extensive reporting: ToRs, minutes from NTBs Act drafting sessions, and others. The indicator on position papers could not be linked to the causal package. The PE team has high confidence in the data provided at the outputs level, and when taken together, they serve to increase confidence in the results chain leading to the key contribution claim. The evidence suggests a probability level of ‘Virtually Certain’ to represent our collective belief in the claims after reviewing the evidence.

TMEA claims one outcome in the RF for NTBs: Number of High Priority NTBs eliminated (disaggregated by country) against the total number of NTBs still reported as outstanding. TMEA reported eliminating 116 NTBs in the RF, supported by the formative evaluation in which 87 had been resolved by 2016. However, the indicator specifies ‘high-priority NTBs’, and has a denominator: ‘against the total number of NTBs reported as outstanding’ – but neither priority nor the denominator are included in TMEA’s RF reporting. Each eliminated NTB would have had an effect, reducing transit time for affected goods, but the number alone gives us no notion of the scale or importance of those removed.

Respondents provide mixed reviews on the elimination of NTBs, in that participants in the NMCs were able to point to their work on some of the 116 NTBs they had worked on and seen the benefits. Some private sector respondents pointed to gains, particularly in weighbridge and checkpoint removals. Weighbridges and checkpoints were identified as priority NTBs in a 2015 study, and were most often cited by respondents as contributing to reduced transport times. But these total no-more than a handful of the 116-total removed, and the time and cost reduced is not quantified in any evidence obtained by the PE team. Respondents also reported ‘more NTBs now [2019] than before.’ An apex body supported in evidence-based advocacy reported that all partner states continue to apply NTBs in all sectors and types: ‘phyto-sanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, and cumbersome customs documentation.’

Uganda’s RF reports a different set of figures, based on NTBs reported through their own systems, including the NMC. Uganda reached a cumulative percentage of 92%, or 178 out of the total 193, of NTBs reported were resolved, against a target of 70%. The denominator in this case is total reported, not the ‘outstanding NTBs’ in the corporate level indicator. Tanzania reports 44 cumulatively against a target of 13, but without denominator.

NTBs increased in the five EAC countries from 2014 to 2016 according to the Common Market Scorecard. Kenya’s NTBs more than doubled (from 10 to 23) and Tanzania’s more than tripled (from 7 to 24); about half of new 2014-2016 NTBs reflected charges ‘equivalent to the tariffs that had been removed as part of the CMP [Common Market Protocol] commitments’. While TMEA supported additional NTB eliminations up to the end of S1, the acceleration of their generation and the uncertainty about the value of those eliminated in terms of time or costs are critical blind spots.

The evaluation team notes the absence of an effort to amend the NTBs Act to enforce consequences and remediation for NTBs, but this was not part of TMEA’s work plan. When countries complain of a new NTB and raise this concern to the EAC level, dialogue can help to resolve the issue – as happened with the NMCs – but there is no legal recourse through the EAC or its bodies, nor a mechanism that would sanction those countries that impose new barriers or fail to eliminate existing ones. In conclusion, the number of NTBs eliminated is insufficient as a standalone outcome indicator (though with the ‘high priority’ standard and the outstanding NTBs denominator in the original indicator might have been sufficient), and the costs or time saved as a result cannot be quantified, that would contribute to ease of trading across borders. The key contribution claim cannot be substantiated through CT, despite strong data attributing the work to TMEA.

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Table 18: Conclusion: Elimination of NTBs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Number of High Priority NTBs eliminated (by country) against the total number of NTBs still reported as outstanding | • Formative Evaluation reports significant progress in identifying and resolving NTBs in the programme  
• Traders were happy with removal of roadblocks.  
• Multiple press reports, logistics firm, apex industry body, and Common Market Scorecard document report little progress on NTBs | **Virtually certain**  
TMEA support to NMCs and SMS are well-documented, but no outcome is found.                                                                                                                      |
8 SO2 PIO 2.4 Harmonising Standards

8.1 Summary

Businesses are faced with multiple technical regulations in each EAC Partner State, as well as different standards with which to comply. Correctly, TMEA see this as counterproductive for increased ease of trading across borders. It adds to the cost of doing business as the private sector must comply with different sets of standards and burdensome technical regulations. Therefore, the positive implications of a functioning Standards Quality Metrology and Testing (SQMT) infrastructure in all EAC Partner States for the EAC private sector willing to export regionally and internationally is crucial.

In practice, a common market protocol allows for the free movement of goods between countries in an economic community. However, there are standards-related technical barriers to trade (TBTs). The product a company makes according to national standard, cannot be exported unless it meets the standards of the receiving countries. TMEA’s ToC was to harmonise standards so our producers can make products that are acceptable in each country.

At the regional level, this PIO began from a study conducted with the East African Business Council (EABC) to identify the top twenty most traded goods. The team then convened regional meetings to agree on a process and procedures for setting the standards. Technical standards meetings followed, with representation from private sector, government including bureaux of standards, and academia from each country seated to determine the standards for the twenty most traded products. Agreed-upon proposals for the standards were sent to the WTO and to national governments and private sector for comment. Since gazetting, country compliance at borders in allowing products using the harmonised standards to enter per the law was shown to be varied in 2013; compliance with the East African Standards (EAS) ranged from 26% in Tanzania to 86% in Burundi, while Rwanda complied with 40%, and Kenya and Uganda over half. Only 18 EAS had been adopted by all the partner states, out of 359. Another study was underway at the time of this writing to check on compliance in 2019.

In addition to the top twenty traded products (which were reported by the EABC study to represent some 75% of intra-regional trade), TMEA’s regional standards team managed to harmonise standards for another 170 products, though some are still in the process of full harmonisation through the gazetting procedure. Some were at the request of the private sector and others were products like packaging that affect multiple sectors.

Country projects in S1 had similar trajectories: engagement and priority-setting with government partners, provision of testing equipment, training of bureau staff, and outreach to the private sector on standards, to raise awareness and attempt to ensure that companies took the standards on board. In some cases, the projects helped SMEs to become certified in international standards.

8.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

8.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

During Strategy 1 the causal links and assumptions underpinning the standards component of the ToC were evidence-based or verified to the level of outputs, but not to the level of expected outcomes. In a document explaining its ToC from May 2014, TMEA reported ‘an important aspect of TMEA’s work on trade facilitation is the issue of standards, which are vital for the EAC region, both in terms of enhanced business environment and improved business competitiveness.’ As with the ICT4T and NTB components TMEA appears to be stating its beliefs as opposed to presenting evidence of, or verifying causal links for, this component of the ToC in this document. In Table 2 of the same document, ‘Improved Business Competitiveness Project Examples’ there are examples of how projects are expected to contribute to expected outcomes. These imply causal links but do not clearly identify them to underpin a component-level ToC.


The same document makes assumptions that apply at a general level. For example, within the SO2 section TMEA reports, ‘The logic above is underpinned by a number of assumptions.’ These include:

- Implementing the EAC regional trade agreements will contribute to enhancing the trade environment in the region;
- There is sufficient demand by partner state parliaments, public sector, private sector, and civil society organisations to drive the regional economic community agenda forward; and
- Regional trade policies will be prioritised by partner states over national trade policies and priorities.

These assumptions are written to apply to the Strategic Objective as opposed to the Standards component itself.

The TMEA Transport and Economic Corridor Strategy\(^7\) that predates the ToC shows some of the programme’s thinking about standards. That document reports that un-harmonised regional standards pose a great challenge to the movement of goods around the EA region. The document does not discuss this challenge further, but it does present evidence of standards harmonisation supporting trade and shows that TMEA was thinking about problems. While this is valuable, it does not clearly verify the causal links that underpinned this component of the ToC.

The 2014 ToC does not clearly identify a standards component. The TMEA Results Framework (RF) does have a Programme Intermediate Objective (PIO) addressing standards. The evaluation found no documentation of discussion of the causal mechanisms or packages linking the individual projects (one-two per country over S1, plus the regional programming) to the goals of the PIO before implementation.

Performance evaluation fieldwork suggests the standards component evolved during S1. As initiatives developed, some were allocated to SO2 and others to SO3, reflecting how TMEA was intervening with each. For example, a TMEA country component staffer reported that the work focused on provision of equipment to test the products fell under SO2 while supporting company certification went under SO3. One TMEA standards advisor at country level reported that M&E frameworks were set up halfway through S1, in 2014.

Though the formal use of the ToC with assumptions and causal links is not documented, it is clear TMEA spent time thinking through some of the implications of their work. In one country, the TMEA team reported that their assumptions were enhanced with experience. ‘We assumed correctly that, supporting [the standards bureau] for accreditation would result in better services and that buying its laboratory equipment would reduce time and cost of testing to clients. However, we wrongly assumed that training firms about standards would produce better quality goods. There were steps between training and better goods that we had not anticipated. Similarly, we wrongly assumed that certification would necessarily lead to access to markets. In fact, the SMEs also needed commercial opportunities and the knowledge of how to access them.’

The PE team re-created a ToC to represent the S1 work in the standards component, in the figure below:

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\(^7\) TMEA. 2012. Transport and Economic Corridor Strategy.
The standards component had regional and national level interventions. These were parallel to each other, rather than hierarchical. That is, the interventions at national level did not feed into the achievement of regional efforts: national standards-related projects had a set of activities – similar to one another – in strengthening national standards bureaux, while the regional project aimed to harmonise the standards to which EAC partner states agreed. This meant there were indicators for the regional project and for the national projects in the TMEA RF; they are, in effect, separate components within the ToC, both pointing to reduced transport time and cost but not closely related.

The work at the regional level is at least as political as it is technical, in bringing together different actors around a defined set of important standards; at national level, the projects were more technical in nature. One way TMEA might have worked to ensure that harmonised standards from the regional level were mutually respected would have been to include programming around that goal at national levels – or, at a minimum, more regular testing of the hypothesis that a harmonised standard would be mutually respected and thus reduce border crossing time for intra-EAC trade. Knowing when and where the harmonised standards were rejected, and for what reasons, would have been useful as an overarching tool to apply leverage at national levels to achieve compliance.

The national level interventions worked to improve quality infrastructure, but for their part would have benefited from a regional project that strategized around the eventual compatibility of these systems. This issue is related as well to inter-agency competition within countries, in which overlapping mandates can and did thwart standards enforcement at times. TMEA committed to working at a regional and systematic level, so these issues ought to have been documented and prioritised in programming. The result is a set of standards for which mutual recognition is unknown, and national bureaux of standards with better equipment and training but without improvement of or right-sizing of each nation’s quality infrastructure, and without an eye towards a regional system for upholding standards. To be sure, the efforts proposed here bring political challenges that equipment purchases do not face; but it is also true that at least two countries (Rwanda and Uganda) have worked with
other donors who also provided new equipment in the ten years prior to TMEA’s launch. TMEA, working at a more strategic and systematic level with an integrated ToC, might well have been able to achieve something beyond these more piecemeal efforts, similar to the DFID-supported Commonwealth Standards Network.

The ToC and assumptions represented here faced several spoilers – one of which is the reluctance of countries to accept products made with the harmonised standards upon entry. At the technical level, TMEA brought national actors together to create a system for harmonisation across countries, and then to use that system to harmonise standards – based on a study of the twenty most traded commodities prepared by the East African Business Council (EABC). The regional team was able to harmonise a list of 196 standards through the regional process they helped to develop. However, mutual recognition of those standards at borders remains challenging, and data on whether or not countries have improved at this were last collected in 2013 (at which time compliance varied on the EAS between 26% in Tanzania and 86% in Burundi, with 18 of 359 EAS adopted by each EAC Partner State.) At an operational level, compliance is in the hands of individual agents at borders, and there were no data to show that the level of compliance with these harmonised standards has improved.

Another assumption is that standards harmonised through the TMEA process will do so fairly across the range of firms and actors interested in given commodities. However, there is a potential for larger industry players to sit on technical harmonisation committees and to crowd out representation from SMEs and potential market entrants. SMEs also have greater challenges in and incentives for maintaining standards, and their success is conditioned on sufficient markets at prices that cover the costs of compliance to the new standards. Partner states, too, have an important disincentive to comply as revenue from testing is an important part of agency income. Therefore, compliance is a loss for the relevant agencies. TMEA staff have discussed the need to minimise these limitations in planning for S2.

The use of the RF as a guide to the causal logic underpinning the standards component, given the focus programmers must put on reaching their RF targets, would not cover the component comprehensively. An output on aligning national standards bureaux with the 2006 EAC SQMT Act was pushed into S2 because the Act is under revision and amendment; and one on Mutual Recognition Agreements was seen to be out of step with actual procedures. On the positive side, two countries working on national legislation showed some progress; and upgrades to the national standards bureaux facilities and staff training appeared to have some success, but with infrequent reporting and the absence of consistent targets, baselines, and data. An output indicator on sensitising SMEs showed fifty workshops (cumulative) held with 15-40 firms each, across three active countries. The degree to which these outputs can be expected to lead to the outcomes – the causal package and linkages – is compromised by indicator and data quality.

At the outcome level, the five indicators and the baselines, targets, and data against them did not allow for a clear picture of progress in the component, relative to the overarching goals of reducing time and costs for trade.

**Table 19: RF outcome indicators for Standards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Results and challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in the total number of product standards technically harmonised at regional level</td>
<td>196 standards harmonised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of additional tests performed by National Bureaux of Standards</td>
<td>No targets; data are not comparable nor are they clearly ‘additional’ to pre-TMEA levels; number of additional parameters that can be tested using new equipment averaged around 30 per country, except Tanzania where this had not progressed. 98 Numbers of additional tests carried out varied widely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SMEs certified by Bureaus of Standards</td>
<td>28 in Rwanda, but all affected by certification proving too costly for firms with uncertain demand for the improved goods that would result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in the average time to test and issue relevant certificates for selected goods for intra-regional export</td>
<td>Country data are not comparable. ‘Selected goods’ are not defined. Continuous data for Rwanda, patchy for the other countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of MRA agreed and implemented (regional and bilateral)</td>
<td>Indicator dropped by TMEA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators for the RF on standards are of mixed utility for the component as designed and do not support the achievement of outcomes. The increase in number of products harmonised is a strong output indicator but at outcome level, as it is in the RF, it lacks follow-up on the key factors of scale and of compliance. With respect to

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scale, the figure of 196 harmonised standards is not benchmarked against the wider system of standards to be harmonised, though evaluation research suggests it is around 15-20% of those already harmonised by the EAC without TMEA assistance. An article written by TMEA staff and published by the IFC cites the first 170 standards as ‘relating to 40% of the key top 20 products traded across the EAC region’ 99—meaning that only eight of the top twenty products were harmonised. The indicator leaves this unclear. Additionally, the EAC is said to have harmonised 1526 standards, out of an estimated 6000 national standards among the partner states, as at March 2019, and since passage of the EAC SQMT Act in 2006. 100,101 Those figures put the achievement of TMEA in a somewhat different perspective and demand further thought about the ToC: If the EAC itself could harmonise standards at that rate, is the value-add of TMEA’s investments sufficient? Perhaps the value of TMEA’s S1 work in standards lay in prioritising the twenty most traded products, or in establishing momentum and regionally accorded harmonisation processes and procedures. If so, it is useful to demonstrate the thinking behind such decision-making.

The data reported for numbers of additional tests are not comparable; some appear to refer to the number of new types of tests that the new equipment allows standards bureaux to undertake, that they could not do before, while other data appear to refer to additional throughput of tests in faster machines. From the Formative Evaluation, an average of around 30 new testing parameters were said to have been added in each country, except Tanzania where new equipment had not yet been used. Data from national bureaux did not clearly differentiate between what is additional since the new equipment was provided. Numbers of SMEs certified is quite small, and as such not a strong indicator of change that would potentially affect levels of trade.

Testing time figures are also not comparable in the RF, and a key phrase in the indicator is never defined or used with the indicator: ‘selected goods.’ In terms of compliance, the WTO says the ‘mutual recognition of inspection certificates’ remains a key challenge in its 2019 report on the EAC, 102 TMEA staff reported missions to examine compliance in 2013 and again in 2019, which does not allow for frequent enough data to undertake remedial actions with countries that are not in compliance. This links up with the need for regional regulatory measures to be in place in the case of non-compliance, as is true for the NTBs component as well: the EAC has the opportunity to enforce mutual recognition of the harmonised through the NTBs Act but to date this has not been employed.

Even if standards for all the thousands of products and variations produced in the EAC were harmonised, there might continue to exist important differences between Partner States’ standards and quality infrastructure. These differences include important structural and policy asymmetries, which affect legislation, the division of quality assurance tasks across agencies, the way they build or maintain technical strength, and the various political economy interests related to standards. Deficiencies in one country, in for example accreditation or metrology, make alignment with another country (or with the EAC) more difficult. A regional private sector apex body felt that TMEA’s national investments with bureaux of standards had strengthened those agencies’ appetite for regional integration, and that each one had gone on after TMEA interventions to facilitate bilateral and regional activities with their counterparts. This may have opened an important avenue for further collaboration.

Through TMEA’s efforts to harmonise, and the national-level work to upgrade labs and training, the physical plant and the mechanics of testing will be made more homogenous and linked to international standards and trainings. But the different systems in each country create their own constituencies and interests, and may not act or react to challenges in harmonised ways. It may be that the institutional framework arrangements that will support regional integration of the greater standards landscape overall are not yet in place.

8.2.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

The TMEA standards component strongly supports EAC regional trade development priorities in Standards and Measures. Under Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the East African Community, the EAC Partner States

100 http://www.eac-quality.net/the-sqmt-community/eas-committee/mandate-of-easc.html
101 Luise Nudi Rasanga, A Research Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Master of Arts in International Studies, August 31st 2013Available (excerpt) at: http://idis.uonbi.ac.ke/node/941
recognised the importance of standardisation, quality assurance, metrology and testing for the promotion of trade and investment, and consumer protection, among other things.\textsuperscript{103}

TMEA initiatives to harmonise standards by work with National Bureaus of Standards supported EAC regional trade development priorities to assure standardisation and quality, protect consumers, and facilitate the free movement of selected goods in the EAC.

The TMEA standards component has also supported:

Table 20: EAC Regional Trade Development Priorities, and related Standards projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAC Regional Trade Development Priorities</th>
<th>Related TMEA activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **EAC Pillar: Customs Union and the Single Customs Territory**\textsuperscript{104} | • Supporting harmonisation of standards at EAC level for seamless intra-EAC trade of selected goods  
• Supporting national efforts to improve and speed testing services at borders |
| **Trade**: Rationalising investments and the full use of established industries to promote efficiency in production, as well as harmonising trade policies, investment incentives and product standards, with a view to promote the Community as a single investment area. | • Standards Reform Acts, Policies, Bills, and technical regulations; work with Standards Committee  
• Providing lab equipment and supporting inspectors at borders to reduce transport times and cost  
• Supporting private sector (incl. SMEs) in standards |
| Industrialisation, SME development, investment promotion and private sector development | • Reducing import/export times and costs to make EA exports (and EA companies) more competitive  
• Support to private sector and public actors in coming to regional consensus on technical standards |
| Gender, community development and civil society: [...] approaches towards disadvantaged [...] groups, including women, children, the youth, the elderly, and persons with disabilities aimed at employment creation, poverty alleviation and improving working conditions. | • Women and Trade programme and export capability projects worked with entrepreneurs and export-ready firms on standards, post-harvest procedures (in several market chains), and market access |

Source: authors’ assembly from EAC website and a range of evaluation interviews and data

8.2.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

Changes in policy and the political economy have not impacted the component's relevance to increasing trade, but they have impacted the standards component.

Standards conformity and legislation vary between countries and there is a lack of reciprocal acceptance of standards in some cases – one frequent example is between Kenya and Tanzania, as the evaluation found in many interviews and in press reports.\textsuperscript{105,106,107} In one country, a staff member reported that ‘political economy brought changes at the top management level quite frequently which proved to be a big challenge in time lost’, which was confirmed by the standards bureau: ‘Political problems around elections got us stuck. (We) had to do the stakeholder consultations afresh because everyone was new.’ Legislation that would have made a difference for the agency became stuck during the project: ‘in the middle of it was the elections; everything came to a halt. That affected moving the legislation. Can’t travel, can’t consult stakeholders, can’t call meetings.’ This was confirmed by an agency staffer in the neighbouring country: ‘the election in Kenya led to the delays in timing and confirmation of meetings. Some of the meetings in Nairobi were cancelled or postponed.’

\textsuperscript{103} https://www.eac.int/trade

\textsuperscript{104} https://www.eac.int/customs-union


Another country’s standards work was subject to changing political will; there was little progress during the early years of the programme, related to engagement with that country’s Bureau of Standards. The Bureau rejected the work with TMEA initially, until a change in senior leadership. TMEA designed a standards project with them, though staff reported the project as ‘moving slowly’: output targets had not been reached by early 2019. A staffer reported, ‘We didn’t have the benefit of political will and [the country] has no standards or quality policy. Processed foods and pharmaceuticals go through [multiple agencies that] are not harmonised, which affects local businesses.’ One case involved ‘imported semi-processed palm oil to be refined and processed, but one agency ‘determined it wasn’t processed’ which affected the tariff to be applied, while ‘the oil waited in port.’ A regional private sector body cited repeated use of ‘stays of application’ and uneven application of the duty remissions scheme, both of which denied the premise of preferential treatment for intra-EAC trade. The respondent linked this to an overarching political economy challenge, the diminishing strength of the regional integration mandate. (Please see the response to DEQ5.4 in the main body of the report for more detail on this.)

Political will in another country was pronounced, by contrast. Respondents reported that great interest on the part of the Government of Rwanda, as the country lacks economies of scale and is unable to compete on volume. A staffer reported ‘the Rwanda Standards Board was... committed to do what TMEA wanted to do. So, both the donor and the partner owned the result. The activity was not just donor-driven but also a priority for partners.’ The motivation for the country’s support was the goal of driving exports and reducing imports: ‘work has not been focused on developing standards, more on support to companies in order to allow exports that improve its trade balance. Otherwise the country would end up increasing imports of products that meet those standards.’

8.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

The TMEA standards component did complement other initiatives, though these were most often donor initiatives rather than those coming from government or the private sector. TMEA coordinated with other donors (such as ITC and GIZ): ‘TMEA reached out to GTZ to avoid duplication and gaps and to exploit opportunities.’ In addition, this respondent reported, ‘COMESA had different programmes working with SMEs and regional sourcing. Its capacity building complements TMEA work.’ In Uganda, a project staffer from another donor noted that it was challenging to coordinate their work, which ran parallel to that of TMEA but in different sites. Both TMEA and the other donor project attended stakeholders’ meetings annually. The donor project representative said that while their projects did not overlap, they felt TMEA were not as forthcoming or open to working together.

Related projects in Rwanda were queried by a TMEA-commissioned country evaluation and the groups were said to be complementary and coordinated to avoid duplication; these included the Rwanda Development Board which worked with a group of exporters to improve their standards; USAID’s COMPETE, which harmonised 22 grain standards; the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA) which harmonised cassava and related products’ standards and the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) project, which fortified products and harmonised five standards. TMEA also intervened with the Rwanda Agriculture Livestock Inspection and Certification (RALIS), working with honey producers to help them meet EU standards and gain market share in Europe.108 TMEA standards support was also complementary to initiatives at a country level such as the aBiTrust109 initiative in Uganda, which supports SMEs and agricultural business in six value chains including coffee. They work on production, productivity, and post-harvest handling. Representatives see TMEA work on regulation, standards and enabling environment as complementary as the Trust does not get involved in these areas.

8.3 Coherence and coordination

8.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

Having an engaged and committed partner for work in standards helped one country team. The respondent felt that this led to the partner owning the result, which the respondent called ‘a priority for partners. The agency in question highlighted their management’s commitment to improve internal processes. The TMEA project was in line with their core mandate of supporting enterprises and promoting trade. Another country agency also mentioned the importance of the shared priority goal of wanting to develop EA standards. Greater commitment

109 http://www.abi.co.ug
to this goal was found in the landlocked countries, indicating that incentives to ease trade may well be stronger where trade is harder to effectuate.

Part of that success involved regular communication, according to one respondent, including regular participation in the country NOC for progress updates across the TMEA portfolio. This agency had another donor project in progress with a coordinator who was ‘not as strong’. The agency initiated a discussion with Trademark and DFID partners institution-to-institution, and brought the issue up in the NOC. The weakness was communicated to that donor’s headquarters and the situation improved.

A country agency reported that the private sector was eager to know about standards and how they could fit into the new certification scheme. The respondent indicated that this interest was due to the private sector’s desire to access other markets. The agency reported that the TMEA system made a standards certification service available that was ‘accredited and cheap.’

A TMEA standards staffer suggested that the capacity of the SMEs was a constraint, financially and structurally. For example:

- Many SMEs are lean organisations – when one trained person leaves, it sets the organisation back considerably.
- The culture of standards is not fully embedded. So TMEA organised awareness raising to ensure consumers knew to seek high quality goods; the production of high-quality goods was said to be important to government.
- With limited capital, investments in achieving higher standards are risky. Companies need to know there is a market for goods that are essentially more expensive to produce.

At national level, a firm reported that inspections and permits from the main standards agency had affected her business. ‘It’s an annual process. The first time was quite easy, but the second time… the certificate has never arrived. It is already time to reapply for the third one but of course I cannot get the third one because I am missing the second! I will have to start over I am afraid. I think [the agency] forgot their SMEs while they were dealing with the sugar crises.’

Observations suggest the component has not stopped standards being used as NTBs. One private sector group reported that their Bureau of Standards introduced pre-shipment verification of conformity (PVOC), in which selected companies outside the country have to verify imports before shipment. This includes a container with mixed cargo, in which each item is subject to PVOC, adding significantly to the time and cost of imports. The group reported that the government did not consult business players before the decision, which he said exemplified the lack of trust between public and private sectors.

8.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

Variable progress among countries in addressing standards suggest complementarity and coordination between TMEA’s national and regional level partners is not optimal. Within TMEA, collaboration between levels appears more fluid, despite their partners being at odds.

Corporate TMEA was focused on the regional level, with TMEA Arusha having a coordination role. At that level, TMEA’s work was organized around the harmonisation of standards, and their work on regulation fed into TMEA’s country level efforts.

EAC Secretariat had a work plan on standards in Strategy 1. Working with the EABC to identify the most traded products in the region, the EAC produced a priority list of twenty commodities. The EAC began by working to get agreement from Partner States on a set of procedures for the discussions on harmonisation. Then they conducted training on the principles and procedures for harmonisation. Sector-specific groups would sit together, discuss the issues, come to consensus, request feedback from interested stakeholders, and thereby minimize the room for push-back from Partner States or the private sector with regard to the methods for determining harmonised standards.

EAC then commissioned a series of technical committee meetings by sector in line with those procedures. The technical committees sat to decide the standards, then they gave a timeline for Partner State feedback on the text of the standard. Standards were gazetted by the EAC Secretariat organs. Countries had up to six months to withdraw their national standards and start using the harmonised version from the EAC. Standards bureaus were to notify members and begin to certify according to the new EAC standard. Other bureaus have an obligation to accept products harmonized to regionally certified standards, without further testing or certification. In 2013, the
EABC sent a team to test how the products meeting the EAC standards were being accepted by Partner States, and found that compliance varied greatly: between Tanzania which complied with 26% of EAS and Burundi which complied with 86%. Across the EAC, just 18 of 359 EAS had been adopted by all EAC Partner States. By early 2019, EAC was looking again at the rate of adoption, to understand how the standards had fared since the first verification exercise.

One country’s TMEA staffer reported that the harmonisation has yet to be accepted at national levels, citing maize grading in particular. The range of product standards is extensive, and TMEA has had to prioritise which standards to harmonise—a total of 196 in S1. ‘A lot of work remains to be done’, according to TMEA staff. Another staffer mentioned problems with corruption in certification of substandard products.

8.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

The TMEA standards component is designed to complement the programme’s ICT4T and OSBP work. Reducing testing times and training inspectors at borders should speed processes required to cross borders. Supporting standards-related Reform Acts, policies and technical regulations is also complementary. Having harmonised standards and consistent legislation around the region should also boost the movement of goods that use ICT4T and OSBP facilities.

Women’s co-operatives and other export capability project participants were supported under SO3 activities to allow them to produce higher-value products. TMEA provided milling machines for exporting cereals towards the end of Strategy 1. There was a need to develop an applicable (lower) standard because the one country’s standard mark proved too complex for them to achieve.

8.3.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

TMEA’s governance arrangements were widely reported to be favourable for their demand-driven model, the strong technical support offered, and the ready availability of TMEA teams for their partners at any time; this was also true among respondents working on Standards projects. NOCs at country levels were singled out for praise in terms of several projects that touched on standards, as in export capability and women in trade programming. At regional and national levels, three partners noted challenges with the speed of procurement and disbursement through TMEA; one mentioned ‘new rules’ that had emerged late in S1 that were more burdensome.

8.3.5 DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

No respondents from standards projects had comments about the donor operational model, other than to express their appreciation for donor funding.

8.3.6 DEQ5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

The TMEA component worked to align with country systems. TMEA representatives report TMEA worked with East Africa Standards Committee, legislators, national standards bureaux, ministries, and the business community in the harmonisation process, and nationally on projects to improve performance of standards’ bureaux and their clients. In one country it was reported that the legal reform process, including getting and Act through parliament, took much more time than originally envisaged, a situation that was worsened by ongoing changes at the level of the agency’s managing director.

In another country the agency partner reported that TMEA shared the agency’s objective of wanting to develop national standards and harmonise these regionally. TMEA conducted a study on the most traded commodities in the country, which helped the agency focus and prioritise.

In a third country, respondents across the spectrum reported dedication to alignment and to making the system work. An agency representative called ‘TMEA support ‘different’ to that of other donors, involving regular steering

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committee meetings chaired by the government as well as important and valuable NOC meetings each quarter. The respondent went on to note how government and TMEA complemented each other, as when TMEA provided capacity building for accreditation, while the government paid for the accreditation.

The TMEA staffer working on standards emphasised the priority that government put on aligning regionally and emphasising quality. An exporter in the country reported that aligning standards was likeliest to achieve impact, as it remained vital to work alongside government’s framework and aligned with prevailing political will. An agency respondent noted that the agency could rectify non-conformity before it became a problem that harmed product safety and risked a loss of faith in the food processing sector. And TMEA and the government partner noted the benefit of having the standards agency within the same ministry that developed national cross-border strategy.

One way this particular country programme differed was in training agency members alongside private sector employees. Agency staff thus became familiar with the companies that they would authenticate and validate through certification procedures.

8.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

The focus and activities of the standards component were consistent and additional to those of other development programmes in the region. Because standards were a focus of TMEA intervention both at government level (with bureaus of standards) and with export capability projects for SO3, TMEA country teams had to ensure coordination with actors working at both of these levels. Two landlocked countries appeared to have advanced the most with these prioritised efforts.

One country’s TMEA staff reported close coordination with the range of other donors working on standards, including the Netherlands, the GIZ and the German Metrology Institute, Swedish Standards Institute, and ITC. Some of these were also funding a regional private sector apex body in standards work. TMEA coordinates closely with the range of actors to avoid duplication of training or equipment provision, avoid gaps, and exploit opportunities. This key informant also reports COMESA had different programmes working with SMEs and regional sourcing. Its capacity building complemented TMEA’s work.

A second country’s standards bureau identified other development programme support from East African Grain Council (EAGC), EABC, SISI (Swedish International Standards Institute), WB (for seeds and planting materials, ASARECA, USAID-Trade Hub, and GAIN (Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition). This informant felt improvements had occurred in coordination and partners had become more interested in supporting activities.

8.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

Two TMEA respondents reported that serving as a liaison between national institutions, the EABC and the East African Standards Committee (EASC), in the case of Standards, was a useful role for TMEA, noting that TMEA’s participation allowed for ‘keeping partner states informed about progress and possible points of collaboration’ and that ‘The EAC’s work on regulation fed into TMEA’s country work.’ A private sector apex body said that TMEA’s flexible alignment with the EAC mandate had helped to maintain the ultimate focus: promoting intra-EAC trade. The respondent also mentioned the importance of aligning activities to the EAC calendar.

Maintaining the focus on the long-term goal of regional integration and putting that into practice at national levels appears to have been a helpful strategy for TMEA, though apart from these two responses, there were no other approaches suggested within the standards component.

8.4 Sustainability

8.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

Three countries’ Bureau of Standards representatives expressed strong commitment to sustainability. These representatives’ felt their governments would continue to fund standards testing and development.
One agency reported that they have ‘integrate[d] 2012-2017 and 2017-2022 [TMEA] activities into the strategic plan and performance management system and budgeted for them.’ On a more pessimistic note, however, the representative hoped ‘funding and activities continue given budget cuts.’

In a second country, TMEA supported the agency to justify to the Ministry of Finance for a new budget line so that the next accreditation could be charged to government. This justification was reported as successful, which should help ensure sustainability, as budgetary inclusion implies institutionalisation. The TMEA staffer reported that some companies have changed how they operate to meet certain standards, while others report not having enough money to do so. A dairy producer reported that standards have become ‘part of their production system.’ The producer noted that the HACCP certification and the working environment it implies are now at the top of the dairy’s list for future food-processing investments. On TMEA’s training of auditors and pharmacists, the TMEA staff member felt these trained people would be sought after in the market and therefore the investment would be sustained. A TMEA leader in the country felt, however, that it would be useful to add a legal framework to ensure the work continued and was sustained.

One government agency representative reported strong commitment to sustainability: ‘of course, it will be sustained. We are confident. For example, in regard to standard development, we are certified, and we are going to maintain our certification.’ The agency has gone on to plan its own five-year project on certifying companies, financed by the government. ‘Our action plan includes greater and greater scope of government responsibility,’ according to the agency representative.

In another country, the agency representative reported the government’s commitment to fund standards development, in line with the EAC legislation on Standards, Quality, Assessments, Metrology and Testing, which he felt served as a yardstick for the country to ensure sustainability.

8.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

Overall TMEA engaged stakeholders in this PIO through a consultative approach with national bureaux of standards. Respondents were generally unable to clearly articulate how lessons would be considered.

In one country, the responses from the national agency were unclear about how they would take lessons learnt into account. For example, a respondent suggested a lesson was to ‘try not to be ambitious’ which they said was to be operationalised by ‘scaling down on some costs through use of technology.’ The agency did say they had learnt they needed to actively engage stakeholders and to manage communication better. They also said they would be more selective of their partners, who they felt should all be as ‘keen’ on the work. Another country suggested that a lesson learnt was the importance of visibility.

At the regional level, a TMEA staffer noted that lessons were learnt on technical, integration, project, and change management. This was echoed by a representative of a regional apex body working on standards, who added that replicating TMEA’s professionalism and VfM had become goals for himself. Among the lessons learnt that were mentioned at national and regional levels, there was little discussion of precisely how they would be carried into the future or put into place. The regional level S2 does show TMEA’s intentions to increase support to the private sector in meeting standards, which was not mentioned with respect to sustainability but was reported as a challenge in one country.

A TMEA staffer in another country reported that the partner bureau had developed the objective of selling standards testing services to other EAC member states as a way to avoid duplication of accredited labs in the region. This suggests the laboratory may have spare capacity. The agency also certified more than fifty companies, financed by the government. ‘Our action plan includes greater and greater scope of government responsibility,’ according to the agency representative.

Another lesson that was to be taken into account concerned the lack of data on whether products using harmonised standards were accepted at all borders, as the TMEA staffer at regional level said the last data collection had been in 2013, when compliance in allowing these certified, harmonised products into EAC Partner States varied greatly. Harmonisation will be less effective if the countries continue to reject goods traded intra-EAC, and without data it is impossible to know if their work has had the desired effect.

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8.5 DEQ2.2 Effectiveness: Contribution Tracing

8.5.1 DEQ2.1 To what extent has TMEA contributed to increasing ease of trading across borders?

PIO 2.4 was designed to improve Standards Quality Metrology and Testing (SQMT) infrastructure in all EAC Partner States at national and regional levels. Regionally, the component undertook a major effort to harmonise standards for the twenty most traded products in the region, and to develop and implement harmonisation procedures that Partner States had agreed upon. TMEA commissioned a study to select the top twenty most traded goods in the region, which was conducted by the EABC, a TMEA-supported regional apex body for the private sector. TMEA then sponsored a process by which the EAC countries could participate in the development of procedures to harmonise standards. When they reached consensus on the procedures, TMEA then convened a series of technical sectoral committees using the new procedures and designed to focus on safety and health. Proposed standards were circulated for review and, when finalised, gazetted by the EAC Secretariat organs.

At the request of the private sector, the process was used with many more standards than the original 20. Most of a list of 196 standards, including variants of the original twenty, packaging standards which affect many products, and other products altogether, had completed the process at this writing. In March 2019, during PE fieldwork, the principal EAC standards officer was in the process of examining whether all national standards had effectively been withdrawn in favour of the harmonised standards. By April or May of 2019, TMEA reported, the EAC will have updated results on the rate of adoption of the harmonised standards compared to a 2013 baseline exercise, which showed that compliance varied greatly across the EAC.

At country level TMEA invested with national standards bureaux to draft legislation and technical regulations; identify priority gaps in equipment and training and fill these; ensure border posts had the requisite equipment and trained staff to speed up processes; and conduct outreach on standards with the private sector. Details on these, including country-specific data, are found in the remainder of this chapter of Annex J, and in Annex N in the CT Case Study data tables (with project narrative, wider data, and sources).

The key contribution claim that forms the focus for the evaluation under this PIO is:

TMEA contributed to the ease of trading across borders by harmonising regional standards and by increasing the capacity and effectiveness of national bureaux of standards.

Evidence from TMEA country offices and HQ confirm that their activities were delivered; at regional level these included the EABC study on the 20 most traded goods; PARs; minutes from the procedure-setting sessions, and the resulting procedures; and documents from a technical working group. At national level TMEA contracted a baseline survey of national standards bureaux, procured necessary equipment and trained staff in how to use these, drafted legislation and regulations (Kenya), conducted a public awareness campaign (Uganda), built the bureau’s capacity to provide accreditation in HACCP (Rwanda), and produced M&E and project reports. There were projects as well to sensitise private sector actors, mainly SMEs, in standards and to support these actors to get relevant certifications for their products.

Outputs include the upgraded Standards Bureaux and trained staff; work on key legislation (Kenya only); and sensitisation of private sector stakeholders on standards, as shown in the table below:

Table 21: CT Case Study: Harmonisation of Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Bureaus of Standards testing upgraded and staff trained</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence: site visits, including to labs, and partner interviews; training reports; PARs; reports on testing at central and border locations</td>
<td>Evidence: MoUs, contracts, procurement docs; partner reports to TMEA; PARs; partner interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya SQMT Policy, technical regulations; review Standards Act</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence: Interviews with TMEA staff; draft bills created; interviews with TMEA and partners on the as-yet incomplete legislative process</td>
<td>Evidence: TMEA contracts and contractor reports for drafting legal documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TMEA’s role in the outputs was corroborated through extensive documentary data on the procurement of new equipment and training in its use, in each country, along with stakeholder interviews in capital cities. Work on legislation in Kenya was also substantiated with TMEA contracts and the finished legislation. Stakeholder sensitisation workshops were reported as part of TMEA-supported programming with the national bureaux. The output-level indicator for the standards work at regional level, on mutual recognition agreements, was null, as TMEA decided not to pursue these.

Through re-creating a ToC for this component (please see the response to DEQ5.1 in this chapter), the PE team identified the first output, on upgrading testing facilities and training staff, as critical for the results chain leading specifically to the key contribution claim on easing trade across borders, through increasing standards bureau capacity and efficiency. There was no output on how harmonising standards would lead to easing trade across borders. The other two (ancillary) outputs were not necessary for the causal mechanism towards the key contribution claim. The evidence supports a probability level of ‘Virtually Certain’ that this output occurred and TMEA was responsible for it.

An output-level RF indicator for the standards work at regional level, on mutual recognition agreements, was null, as TMEA decided not to pursue these. This meant there was no output on how harmonising standards would lead to easing trade across borders. The other two (ancillary) outputs were not necessary for the causal mechanism towards the key contribution claim.

For the key contribution claim to have been realised over the joint regional and national component, several pieces of data were available in the RF, with supporting evidence identified during the PE and a comprehensive TMEA-commissioned Formative Evaluation.\textsuperscript{113}

Table 22: Outcomes: Harmonisation of Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder sensitisation activities /workshops on product standards</td>
<td><em>Virtually certain</em> Evidence: regional Standards Survey baseline report; Rwanda twinning project report; Kenya workshop details and documentation; Uganda report on sensitisation workshops</td>
<td><em>Virtually certain</em> Evidence: regional and country office TMEA reports; interviews confirming TMEA role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{113} AYAAH ENTERPRISES. 2015. The formative evaluation of the standards harmonization and conformity testing programme. Final draft report. August 2015.
That there was an increase in the total number of harmonised product standards is strongly supported by TMEA documentation, EAC gazetting of the harmonised standards, and partner reports. Interviews and national-level documents confirm the role played by TMEA to bring public and private national actors together to propose standards at the regional level. Though TMEA recognised that there was less participation of SMEs in these committees than they would have preferred, the team is working to ensure sufficient SME participation in S2 standards efforts.

The 2006 EAC Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing (SQMT) Act, Section 24(2), requires: “Partner States shall recognise as equal to their own, certification marks awarded by national quality system institutions of other Partner States provided that which the administrative provisions with control the use of the marks meet the obligations in this section.” 114 EAC Partner States have adopted this Act and should, therefore, comply with its mandates around accepting goods with these certification marks that would be applied when goods are tested in the EAC and found to be in compliance with harmonised EAC standards. At the same time, this was not actively and repeatedly measured or verified during S1, by the EAC or by TMEA. The EAC did find in 2013 that compliance varied greatly among Partner States. The PE team noted that the absence of targeted efforts to ensure national bureaux and their border staff respected the regionally harmonised standards was a critical gap. At outcome level, there ought to have been an indicator designed to report on the degree of mutual respect for the new standards at borders. The harmonised standards were an important policy-level gain but without these types of interventions and data, there is no way to know whether compliance had improved for more goods in more instances, which would show the ease of trading across borders.

This only indicator at outcome level for the regional effort effectively ‘skips’ the output level, since the mutual recognition agreements were not pursued. The lack of more recent evidence than 2013 on whether countries are complying to allow entrance of products meeting harmonised standards weakens the degree to which the harmonised standards alone constitute an outcome-level indicator. If the current EAC review determines that more countries are in compliance with the harmonised standards, that would demonstrate a more outcome-level achievement, but as the Standards component did not work to influence government uptake, there is little that would tie that compliance outcome to TMEA’s efforts.

The Formative Evaluation provided evidence on testing times that referenced a Notified Certification Mark (NCM) used by standards bureaux to signal to border personnel that the products met harmonised East African Standards (EAS). The study says that products ‘with the NCM’ went from multiple days to a half-day or less in five countries, Tanzania excepted when dealing with foods or drugs.115 However, NCMs are not documented in national or regional standards project or component reports, nor were any indicators developed to monitor progress on either the certification of businesses with NCMs (with the exception of Rwanda, where very small numbers of businesses were given an S-Mark) 116 or to monitor whether those marks actually did result in mutual recognition at borders.

Another issue that would need to be clarified is how many businesses were now using such marks, compared to pre-intervention. Only a handful of businesses were reported to have achieved marks in one country’s TMEA-supported project, and no reports in the other countries on this issue. The extent to which the new standards could have facilitated trade is directly tied to how often the new system of standards and marks is actually used. Combined with the evidence that recognition of EAS was monitored only once in 2013, and compliance was quite varied, the PE cannot substantiate this reported level of reduced testing time or related costs. The harmonised standards were an important policy-level gain but without these types of interventions and data, there is no way to know whether they made a difference that would relate to the ease of trading across borders.

Other data do present evidence about the outcome claim. Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda reported additional testing (at both central and border sites) using TMEA-supplied equipment. Testing time was reported to be reduced as a result of the new equipment and training, according to interviews, reports, and the Formative Evaluation. For national level projects, the number of additional tests performed by national bureaux of standards has been provided, along with some narrative on the contribution of new equipment. Two types of data were provided. The first regarded the ‘additional range of tests’ or parameters for testing; the number of new types of tests the new equipment allows them to do, which is substantiated by the 2015 Formative Evaluation. New equipment allows, for example, twenty different products to be tested, or for more extensive testing of important parameters, meaning an improvement in capacity. Second is the simple number of tests conducted of all types, or ‘usage’: the number of tests that are conducted. More and faster equipment should also allow standards bureaux to conduct more tests, meaning an improvement in efficiency. Data that were

114 EAC. 2006. EAC Secretariat. 2006. The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing Act, TMEA.
provided by TMEA and by national partners were not systematic; no baselines or pre- and post-project trends were offered. These data therefore show no strong trend, because they essentially report how many times the bureaux tested products by the end of programming supported by TMEA.

Interviews with partners about their other development partner programmes confirmed that although such projects exist, they were not directly responsible for new equipment or training that would have reduced testing time.

Providing new equipment does not guarantee additional tests (efficiency) or the correct use of new capabilities (capacity), but conditions would have to be exceptionally unfavourable – such as extended power outages, low demand for the tests, or complete failure to train staff – for the new equipment not to be used. RF targets and data appear to mix the types of tests, so the actual achievement of additional tests – either additional in capacity, or additional in efficiency – is not known. Across the region, there is almost certainly increased usage, but how much varies by country. Efficiency, though less specific, would actually be the stronger outcome-level measure in terms of how the activities changed standards bureaux’s work; the ‘capacity’ interpretation of the indicator does not show whether that capacity was availed. A better indicator would show how improved range compared to benchmark (or at least baseline) standards for the necessary types of tests, and how usage of that increased range had improved.

The time savings at OSBPs attributable to standards support are not separated in the data: bureau respondents (HQ and border) report that testing times are down dramatically but the time to test may not be the same as the time from entry of a consignment for processing and its release, as part of the overall clearance time. The Formative Evaluation shows time reductions in testing as well, but without fitting that into the context of the OSBP it is not possible to know whether the faster testing resulted in faster standards processing at borders. The full time would include, at a minimum, any waiting time prior to being attended by the Standards staff member, the time for the test, and the time for issuance of the certificate, as the indicator reflects. That time is not captured as yet but that is planned as part of an OSBP IT upgrade discussed for S2. Finally, the indicator specifies ‘for selected goods for intra-regional export’ but no selection is made, and the data reported are for different goods, nor whether these goods were specifically destined for intra-EAC markets.

There are important evidence gaps for the national level projects. RF data on the number of additional tests performed by standards bureaux are not systematic. The PE team pursued these data repeatedly with TMEA and directly with partners, but over and over, partners provided reports that were deeply flawed – no baselines or trendlines pre- and post-upgrades, no differentiation between types of tests, no data reflecting the improvements in detection (based on more sensitive equipment), no disaggregation for tests done at the capital city laboratory versus in mobile labs at borders, no staff numbers for those trained outside the capital, and other gaps. To substantiate the participation of upgraded standards services in reduced border crossing times, we requested data on how long it took to inspect consignments at border posts, as well as data on reduced charges to traders. Instead, we received reduced lab testing times and reduced lab testing costs. There is no way to know from the data whether these reduced costs were passed on to traders, and since testing is a revenue source for these bureaux, there is a need for evidence of the actual change.

Across the region, there is certainly additional test capacity but how many, and the strength of the RF evidence and new evidence gathered by the PE, vary by country. While tests in upgraded labs take less time to carry out as a result of new equipment and training, a result which is strongly evidenced in the Formative Evaluation, this does not automatically equal reduced testing time to cross borders. The latter relies on proper documentation of products arriving at borders, mutual recognition of the standards between partner states, and border officials’ application of that mutual recognition
According to the 2015 Formative Evaluation, TMEA had not yet begun to work on mutual recognition agreements (part of the TMEA programme design overall, that in the end was not conducted). The Formative Evaluation provided evidence on testing times that referenced a Notified Certification Mark (NCM) used by standards bureaux to signal to border personnel that the products met harmonised East African Standards (EAS). The study says that products ‘with the NCM’ went from multiple days to a half-day or less in five countries, Tanzania excepted when dealing with foods or drugs. However, NCMs are not documented in national or regional Standards project or component reports, nor were any indicators developed to monitor progress on either the certification of businesses with NCMs (with the exception of Rwanda, where very small numbers of businesses were given an S-Mark) or to monitor whether those marks actually did result in mutual recognition at borders.

Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya all conducted outreach with SMEs, but only Rwanda and Uganda report certifying them. The RF stated that for Kenya, certification would have required direct budget support to the standards bureau, which was not allowed. Reported information on outreach activities is strong in Rwanda, where the evidence includes actual certification documentation and evaluation interviews with SMEs that have been certified. The success against the outcome of increasing market access and reducing costs (cited specifically for Rwanda), however, is not quantified. As noted above, this indicator was not considered critical for achieving the key contribution claim.

Cost reductions are based on time saved and on costs saved in paying for tests. The 2015 Formative Evaluation of the Standards Harmonisation and Conformity Testing Programme reported an average reduction across the three countries from US$500 to US$205, and ample detail about reduced costs by country and by test in its annexes. In PE interviews and shared reports, Kenya reported reduced prices on aflatoxin rapid results at borders from approximately US$50 to US$20; Rwanda reported that not having to send tests abroad reduced costs but did not specify those costs, or any other savings. As with the time indicator, these data show reductions in cost at the lab but do not explicitly assure that time to cross borders was affected by these changes.

In conclusion, the key contribution claim of easing trading across borders as a result of the standards interventions cannot be substantiated. The evaluation team note the lack of evidence to support a causal relationship, without inferring that there is no causal relationship. The key contribution claim cannot be substantiated through CT, despite strong data attributing the work to TMEA.

Table 23: Conclusion: Harmonisation of Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of standards harmonised (and gazetted)</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually Certain TMEA RF reports 196 standards harmonised; formative evaluation and EAC Gazette from 2016 confirmed 79 at that time; UNBS confirms participation in harmonisation processes.</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually Certain TMEA activity evidence on harmonisation and gazetting; evaluation interviews with TMEA and EABC; Formative Evaluation; Technical committee report However, no outcome is found without mutual recognition</td>
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</tbody>
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9 SO3.1.1 PSO- and CSO-led policy formulation

9.1 Summary

SO3 projects cover a wide range of activities, including support to industry associations to increase private-sector led policy formulation, work with informal cross-border traders, working to increase access to markets for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and developing logistics platforms. 37% of the total TMEA portfolio was SO3 projects, but they only accounted for 13.6% of the budget. Earlier OPM evaluations on SO2 and SO3 effectiveness noted that some of the SME-related projects were more akin to market development work rather than trade promotion projects. The report, for which fieldwork was conducted in 2016, summarises its review of SO3 projects as follows:

The portfolio of projects has performed reasonably well, and many projects are contributing to the outcomes of greater market access and trade, with some weaknesses on efficiency and sustainability. SO3 projects have delivered a range of different outputs to support business competitiveness including technical assistance to support traders and organisational strengthening of civil society and professional service organisations. These institutions are beginning to use their voice effectively to influence changes in NTB notification and economic integration issues. However, it can be argued that the focus of some SO3 projects is less central to the TMEA mandate.

The Business Competitiveness SO counterbalances TMEA’s work in clearing and building the trade ‘pipeline’ in SO1 and SO2: SO3 includes interventions to improve select value chains in the landlocked countries, address firm level engagement and interventions for the equitable distribution of benefits, and provide advocacy and networking linkages for the entirety of the TMEA ToC. The S1 work to build logistics platforms is also housed in SO3. These interventions provide opportunities for TMEA to engage directly with women and groups that are marginalised, such as in projects with informal cross-border traders or export-ready co-operatives or SMEs.

Improving logistics operations could also have important effects for the poor, since transport costs figure importantly in consumer prices. This component is also where TMEA interfaces most directly with the private sector and civil society, to support the inclusion of industry, SME, and civil society voices in national and regional dialogue on trade.

Project beneficiaries for SO3 represent the breadth alluded to above: small-scale, often informal women traders; co-operatives working with selected value chains; logistics actors such as freight forwarders and transport companies; business membership associations and apex bodies of such associations; and civil society organisations trained to effectively engage in policy advocacy. In each case for SO3, activities strengthened their abilities to become part of a formalised trade system.

9.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

This PIO seeks to strengthen the engagement and advocacy of the private sector organisations (PSOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) on regional integration and trade issues. The key activities conducted toward this goal included lobbying, policy briefs, recommendations, drafted laws, multi-agency convening, and Public-Private Dialogues (PPDs).

Advocacy aimed to reduce high-costs of trading through key issues such as competition, standards, tax, Common External Tariff (CET), Single Customs Territory, and the inclusiveness of the benefits from trade and transport facilitation and private sector development. The projects in this component were expected to contribute to increased transparency in trade processes; enhanced potential for cross-border trade and investment in both goods and services; and streamlined regulations for traders. Projects have been effective in delivering the expected outputs and are clearly linked to outcome targets.

9.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

Advocacy support to private sector and civil society, explicitly directed towards ensuring the presence of their voices and interests in trade dialogue, is a long-term prospect. At the same time, project outcomes from this PIO


often supported other components, as opposed to end goals in themselves. In its 2014 ToC, TMEA acknowledges this by denominating this PIO ‘enabling’ rather than ‘direct’: the relationships, evidence-based advocacy, and effects of dialogue were always going to be difficult to measure at the outcome level.

TMEA reported some of its early thinking about the role of the trading environment in trade facilitation in the narrative from its 2014 ToC: enhancing trade requires that regulatory regimes are transparent, coherent and comprehensive; that competition policies are enforced; and that market participants can take full advantage of competitive markets open to trade and investment. The Transport and Economic Corridor Strategy (2012) that predates the ToCs shows that for this to be achieved, PSOs and CSOs play a critical role in lobbying for policy development and implementation and holding state actors to task to ensure transparency, accountability and responsibility. TMEA claims to have adopted a different approach by bringing CSOs and PSOs into the picture as equivalent to the EAC Secretariat and National Governments (p.36). The importance of private sector perspectives for trade policy is undeniable and TMEA’s efforts laudable.

TMEA developed a strategy for this component in 2012, in a file titled Regional Strategy PSO CSO, outlining the importance of defining and availing entry points for the private sector and civil society in dialogue on trade. In laying out the context for investment in this component, the document highlights contemporary characteristics that were promising: positive regional growth figures; improving scores for Partner States (PS) in the WB Ease of Doing Business indicators; EAC and PS efforts towards fiscal, monetary and investment policies; the potential of increased trade in services; and the presence and activism of private sector apex bodies in the region. The important challenges discussed were the dearth of data on causal mechanisms around trade, the lack of awareness of benefits of regional integration, governance issues and corruption, tax disincentives to trade, infrastructure deficits and high costs of trade. The paper also gives substantial attention to the capacity gaps among private sector and, especially, civil society bodies in the region in terms of furthering trade-focused agendas.

The component is part of the overarching ToC, and there are project-level results chains from the Project Appraisal Report (PAR) process. At the meso-level, between projects and the programme, there is less evidence of systematic or documented thinking about ToCs, causal links, or assumptions. This would be particularly challenging in this PIO: thinking strategically about each of the sectors and advocacy efforts does not lend itself to aggregating. It is certainly possible to think of advocacy efforts as elements within other components that assist those components to be successful; or, advocacy efforts could be conceived as cross-cutting the other Pios, rather than having a standalone relevance or internal consistency that would guide strategy. TMEA in S1 appeared to work on advocacy in both ways, with individual advocacy efforts helping particular processes in other components, but also working on advocacy directly with many private sector actors, in a concerted effort to improve private sector response in trade dialogue. Civil society was represented, but less frequently, in these efforts, in part because few CSOs operate in the trade arena.

The Results Framework (RF) for the PIO 3.1.1 provides some indication of how TMEA proposed that this work would ultimately measure its successes. Two indicators are used at the outcome level: ‘number of PSO/CSO recommendations adopted’ and ‘number of recommendations specific to women traders adopted.’ These simple indicators do not allow TMEA or donors to assess whether, for example, a new or revised law – which is subject to change as it proceeds through government review and then through parliamentary approval – is: (a) on track in terms of key content; (b) effectively addressing the outcome sought; and (c) likely to achieve the desired improvement in the specific policy area. While research for evidence-based policy making will not be easily aggregated at the outcome level, there are ways to evaluate research quality that might be employed at outcome levels to gauge TMEA’s success in supporting organisations to improve these skills. Research quality rubrics have been used in other development programming; one example is RQ+, developed by Canada’s International Research Development Centre. One aspect that the ToC process ought to capture, as well, is how there are often ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ as a result of a policy change, and neither the results chain nor the indicators track how input from one industry or sector supported by the programme might prejudice conditions against another industry or sector, or against any other group, including people living in poverty.

Advocacy efforts are not simple to measure, and the time horizons for achievement of the wide range of TMEA advocacy project goals (as opposed to simple RF goals) make a simple indicator appealing but entirely unhelpful at outcome level. These indicators could be marginally useful at output level, in giving simple numeric targets for the projects to accomplish, but at outcome level the indicators the change is only whether or not the

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122 A similar indicator is also used at output level, where it is arguably more appropriate, to count the number of recommendations presented to the public sector through position papers, presentations, and other avenues.

recommendations were adopted, which does not provide useful depth on how the implementation of these projects feeds into a larger whole. At the level of individual advocacy projects, the results chains developed in the PARs provided guidance, but do not feed into the overarching ToC in the way other components do.

In thinking through how advocacy might have used a component-level ToC to improve strategic thinking and monitor assumptions, the PE team developed a ToC for the advocacy function, as shown in Figure 13 below:

Figure 13: Re-created ToC for PIO 3.1.1 PSO and CSO-led policy formulation (Advocacy)

Included in the figure are a set of possible alternative explanations, and some assumptions pertaining to the advocacy projects seen in fieldwork. These include:

- Private sector is willing to invest their time in TMEA-supported advocacy;
- Private sector and civil society have the capacity to engage in advocacy, and sufficient influence to move policymakers;
- Policy makers are willing to engage, listen and enhance trade standards, policies and procedures in ways that improve poor trade;
- Advocacy efforts will not help one group at the expense of another; and
- Policy changes are enacted and implemented, and the intended effects are realised.

Successful advocacy relies on assumptions and factors that are outside the manageable interest of the project and programme; this is also true for ICT for Trade projects, for example, but for advocacy these factors include a wider array of potential spoilers. In the case of advocacy, then, project-level results chains with attention to specific assumptions were probably more helpful than would be general assumptions such as these. However, assumptions like these could start the discussion for advocacy undertakings. In addition, if advocacy is to remain a focus area for TMEA as a component in its own right, outcome indicators should focus on improved capacity, improved leverage, and ultimately more inclusive policy formulation. Purpose-built metrics that take repeated
measures with external assessment combined with inputs from the organisations’ own membership would be more useful than counting recommendations adopted, and would highlight areas for continued improvement. Such tools are highly qualitative, and require time to develop; however, advocacy efforts also require that organisations expert and embed multiple skill sets, to be considered successful at the outcome level.

In this PIO, respondents said that two main assumptions did not always hold true: one, that political goodwill would hold, which failed when government and security circumstances changed. The second assumption that did not hold was that TMEA assumed organisations’ capacity was sufficient to implement the projects. This caused a change to programming to incorporate capacity building. This was seen as well in OPM’s SO2 and SO3 evaluation report from fieldwork in 2017, and continued to be an issue, according to respondents. One project lost a year of implementation time and had to be extended because of the departure of two organisation leaders. This delay was longer than most, but the problem was not confined to one organisation. Capacity limits were such that the departure of one person could essentially halt projects.

The Regional Strategy PSO CSO document is thorough and thoughtful on important themes that set the stage for this component. As with other components, the PE team assumes and saw evidence of TMEA actors continuing to think through these issues in depth throughout the life of the programme. Their level of connectedness with influential actors, deep sectoral knowledge, and day-to-day work to move the advocacy projects forward would demand it, and the TMEA team is uniquely positioned to understand and respond. At the same time, it is notable that the conditions at the time of the writing of that strategy have changed dramatically. In such conditions a more iterative ToC process would provide more formal and documented attention to assumptions and the causal mechanisms by laying these out for the teams, subjecting them to scrutiny, and planning around and monitoring them. For advocacy, this process may well be better conducted at project rather than component level, given the wide spread of thematic and political economic issues around each. However, the case of assessing and then building capacity is one area in which all advocacy projects need to excel, even if their specific capacity needs may differ.

Such a process would deliberately interrogate the causal mechanisms understood by the team and represented in programming. In particular for this ‘enabling’ component, such a process also provides an ongoing opportunity to identify areas of support for other components. How the outputs and outcomes are measured should also be open to query, though this level of flexibility can be frustrating for donors. The S1 outcome indicators for this component, as noted above, produced RF data that are difficult to interpret: other ways to measure progress are necessary but since donors require log frame-style monitoring at this level, these kinds of indicators result. The story they tell about the broad and deep efforts of TMEA’s work is not compelling.

9.2.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

Overall TMEA’s support to reduce transport time and costs through improved policy formulation in this area closely supports EAC regional trade development priorities. The complementarity and coordination between the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (EAC) and TMEA support to the private sector and civil society to influence developments in the regional’s economic integration process were stipulated in the TMEA’s key strategy and programme documents. This was ensured in practice through identifying and working with interlocuters and champions for the reform process with a regional voice, among them the East African Business Council (EABC) and the East African Civil Society Organisations’ Forum (EACSOF).

The CSO- and PSO-led advocacy component has also supported:

Table 24: EAC regional trade development priorities, and related Advocacy projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAC Regional Trade Development Priority</th>
<th>CSO and PSO-led Advocacy Component Support</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Providing an enabling environment for the private sector […] through continuous dialogue</td>
<td>Private sector and civil society-led policy formulation efforts, across countries and agencies</td>
</tr>
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</table>

125 See TMEA’s Regional Strategy PSO CSO document.
TMEA also indirectly supported bilateral dialogues between the EAC countries which offered an alternative venue to promote regional trade. This was particularly useful in the event of an issue that required other country authorities’ involvement. It was apparent to the evaluators in the case of creating a Single Market for rice within the EAC that Tanzania Private Sector Federation (TPSF) was using its convening and consultative role with other governments in the region (i.e. Uganda and Rwanda) to work towards that goal. The performance evaluation found that this was largely attributable to evidence-based advocacy whose impact was augmented by the findings of a set of advocacy-related TMEA-funded studies on rice, pulses, and cassava.

9.2.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

Discussions in the TMEA EAC office in Arusha with managers and staff highlighted the lack of ‘political goodwill’ and commitment from the member states as a main problem: the EAC Summit level meetings were adjourned multiple times due to the failure to form a quorum. For example, discussions on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) for the progressive removal of trade barriers between the partners was stalled, negatively affecting the regional integration and trade agenda promoted by TMEA-supported PSOs/CSOs. Added to that, the varying levels at which each country wanted to pursue regional integration goals created tensions and subsequent divisions across countries: a ‘coalition of the willing’, comprising Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, was set up with the aim of fast-tracking implementation of some projects in the region.

On a similar note, evidence drawn from discussions with PSO/CSO partners indicated that the EAC regional integration process has been uneven and highly politicised, in particular harmonisation of standards and taxes, Common External Tariff (CET), and Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) continue to constitute barriers to regional trade. Interviewees alluded to a number of cases of non-recognition of harmonised standards or the emergence of new NTBs, saying that these issues were more present at the time of evaluation fieldwork than during S1.

At the national level, work with the Tanzania National Business Council to provide forums for the private sector to engage with the government, was delayed after the 2015 elections until 2017. National private sector actors were therefore unable to reach policymakers with their concerns, taking its toll on the general business environment both in the country and the region. Similarly, a civil society apex body echoed similar issues facing following the General Elections in Kenya in 2017, which led to a fragmented political environment and delayed the implementation of some reform initiatives pioneered by CSOs.

126 In these bilateral meetings, TPSF brought representatives from the public and private sector of Tanzania and another EAC country; a series of meetings organised between KBS/TBS, KRA/TRA, KPA/TPA and business community from both parties (KEPSA/TPSF) where a number of issues were discussed and resolved.  
127 In 2015, Tanzania declared a rice shortage, banned rice exports to Rwanda and Uganda and imported rice from Pakistan, which was not to be re-exported. Rwanda and Uganda then claimed that the rice imported from Pakistan remained in Tanzania and that the export ban should be lifted.
128 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are a scheme to create a free trade area between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP).
129 TMEA’s effort to support PSOs/CSOs culminated in a ‘consultative dialogue framework’ which has to a certain extent allowed civil society to become part of the regional integration process. Regional apex body partners have been central to the regional dialogue process, while TMEA funds regular consultative meetings at national level.
130 This partnership held high-level meetings which other EAC members did not attend; it was feared that this might spur Tanzania to pull out of the EAC.  

Conflict beginning again in 2016 in South Sudanese, caused the TMEA office to close, and the staff to move to Kampala for reasons of security. A representative from a private sector body noted that TMEA had created a space for private and public sector to be heard, and the private sector was eager to engage again with government. ‘Without TMEA we cannot get the attention of government.’ He suggested a South Sudanese staff member be hired in the Juba office so the work could continue.

9.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

The complementarity was ensured through the following project cycle of needs assessments, stakeholder consultations and ongoing monitoring and reporting through mid-term and end of project evaluations and field visits. As reported across the components, TMEA worked through a demand-driven model. For example, TMEA’s work complemented country priorities, such as the ‘Big 4 Agenda’ of the GoK131, or the Tanzanian ‘Big Results Now’ initiatives under the former president. A national transport apex body noted the functional complementarity between TMEA’s and their work: ‘We don’t have to align [with TMEA] 100%, but where we do, we work together.’ TMEA and the private sector participated together in Public Private Dialogue (PPD) platforms, involving CSOs and PSOs at national and regional levels, representing a wide range of sectors. TMEA complemented PSO and CSO organisations’ own agendas in part by selecting organisations whose goals were in alignment with the TMEA mandate.

9.3 Coherence and coordination

9.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

Evaluation responses from government partners, CSOs and PSOs confirmed that TMEA often, though not always, worked in a complementary fashion to their own agendas. Many respondents reported that TMEA provided significant attention to inclusiveness with its efforts to bring everyone from women traders to small and medium entrepreneurs together around the table, as confirmed by one transport industry apex body: ‘They are responsive, including to civil society; bringing even fishermen into part of a larger policy discussion.’ TMEA staff were said to have brought excellent technical knowledge to regular meetings and to knowledge sharing sessions. This contributed to the good working relationships between TMEA and its partners which in turn resulted in effective delivery of the projects, according to a private sector apex body partner. Facilitating public-private dialogue with events, activities and platforms funded significantly contributed to investigating challenges and identifying solutions in sectors where the CSOs and PSOs operate. It is notable that the demand-driven model that received so much praise with agency partners was not so pronounced among private sector and civil society respondents, including export capability associations, co-operatives, and grassroots project respondents. This seems to reflect both the more diverse agendas among these groups as well as, perhaps, some of the greater capacity development needs among them, which TMEA was often obliged to address because of due diligence concerned.

TMEA’s model of working with national and regional apex bodies in particular brought added advantages to the overall goal of regional integration: (i) some such structures were present in all EAC countries, to varying degrees; (ii) they had functioning governance structures and large membership for ensuring influence (some being mandatory); and (iii) they shared TMEA’s mandate to take reform initiatives forward. TMEA’s 2012 strategy document noted significant challenges with many of these organisations in limited research, advocacy and governance capacities, and variations between countries, that would require TMEA’s assistance to bolster, with important consequences for sustainability. Umbrella organisations at regional level existed even at the beginning of S1, but were nascent particularly in the case of civil society. And while private sector organisations with a mandate to increase and facilitate trade are common, civil society bodies with a focus on issues around trade are fewer and smaller, making it more difficult to bring civil society into the discussion at scale.

Specific weaknesses identified at programme outset were focus areas for programming. For example, the Kenyan branch of EACSOF said TMEA was the first organisation to work with them in a concentrated fashion, during which project they were able participate actively in committees sponsored by the EAC ministry in Kenya, and in the Mombasa Port Charter Community to ensure civil society interests were represented in port decision-making. Their inputs to ensure women in business, people at borders, and very small enterprises were not left out of decision-making around trade facilitation and included advocating around corruption and its effects to

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131 There is, however, need to further support and align programmes to national priorities, i.e. Vision 2030 and the Big 4 Agenda as Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) prioritise public investments, policy reforms and incentives on the same hence crowding resources for more significant impact. (Swim with the tide). For further details see: Integrating Public-Private Sector Dialogue for Trade and Investment - Kenya Country Annex, 12 June 2018.
Annex J: PIOs

minimise gains for these groups. However, it was noted in evaluation interviews that this level of engagement had not been reached except in Kenya. Representatives of this body also reported that before TMEA support the actual mechanisms for dialogue with the EAC were weak, but combined with TMEA support for the MEAC and business organisations, EACSOF gained greater access.

Advocacy support in collaboration with capacity development helped PSOs/CSOs equip themselves with in-depth technical knowledge and understanding of the challenges facing their respective sectors to play a greater role in policy (re)formulation. Trademark East Africa Research and Advocacy Challenge Fund (TRAC) in particular was reported to be instrumental for private sector and civil society organisations to harness evidence-based advocacy to the best advantage of their members. A national council of shippers cited evidence-based advocacy as key to their strong position vis-a-vis the government: ‘We used TMEA’s support to communicate with and make our case to the government.’ Other apex bodies echoed these findings, and all agreed that the increased institutional and advocacy capacity enhanced the private sector’s engagement in forming policy recommendations and pushing for their inclusion at government levels.

While TMEA’s partners and stakeholders have implemented these types of projects, obstacles to effective implementation of crucial aspects of policy formulation remain. For example, in the area of encouraging harmonisation of standards, coordination issues are still not being addressed effectively, which was flagged as a concern by a number of PSOs/CSOs interviewed across TMEA countries. But this is the very area where progress is essential if the authorities are to make any meaningful progress in achieving their ambitious targets for trade.

The main internal constraint on the projects was the absorption capacity of the recipient organisations, many of which were small and lacking adequate financial management and general capacity. The projects battled to show results and absorb grant funding which often resulted in delays in implementation, as confirmed by the TMEA programme implementation staff: ‘one problem when it comes to advocacy is that the programme timeframe is two years generally. That is an extremely short time for change, especially at the regional level. A lot of those programmes were dropped along the way.’ However, biannual monitoring meetings showed signs of success in terms of keeping the projects on track.

9.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

The direct feedback from country directors and country office staff suggests that cross-learning between country office teams is occurring and that the matrix management structure is facilitating organisational learning and sharing of knowledge. During the fieldwork, assessors noted that effective collaboration between the country offices and technical coordinators is key to project success. However, the discussions in the TMEA countries offices with component leads indicated more direct and regular communications with and visits by the TMEA headquarters (HQ) technical coordinators would be ‘desirable.’

9.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

Evidence from the fieldwork has showed signs of synergies across different TMEA components: the projects under SO2 designed to identify, report, and eliminate NTBs to trade have been complemented by the support provided to PSOs to advocate for public sector change. The collaboration of private sector apex bodies in Tanzania was cited as a particularly good example of working together to eliminate NTBs. Similarly, this component capitalised on synergies and links with relevant projects delivered under SO3, such as the Uganda Staples Export Capability Project where grain warehouses were supplemented with the development of policy briefs on the maize value chain to increase the quality and competitiveness of this sub-sector in Uganda.

For SO1, the advocacy component was essential in bringing the Dockworkers’ Union to the table at Mombasa Port who initially showed stiff resistance against changing the labour gang sizes from eight to four persons to improve port efficiency. TMEA also ‘effectively’ leveraged synergies that were organically developed between different components delivered by the same partner organisations, so long as the partners managed to retain that institutional knowledge. This happened when TMEA worked with one partner in multiple different areas, such as Eastern African Sub-regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI) with whom TMEA worked both on improving processes for traders, especially women (PIO 3.1.2), and private sector/civil society-led policy formulation on concerns specific to women traders.
9.3.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

Evidence drawn from discussions with PSO/CSO partners suggests that the governance structure is somewhat confusing for partners particularly in the projects where teams from various levels of TMEA are involved. Overcoming this confusion requires clear communication with the partner around roles and responsibilities (and in particular accountability and authority) shared between the country and regional TMEA offices in any given project. Another issue expressed frequently was that PSO and CSO engagements that require capacity building, in particular, tend to require longer time frames than the one- to two-year projects – which often had to be extended – offer.

Inordinate delays in centralised functions, such as procurement, brought about calls for devolution of procurement responsibilities to country offices as the lack of streamlined processes became a burden on performance, progress or planning. One partner related: ‘Procurements from Nairobi office and project management were slow. We implementers were the ones affected. The outputs we were due to deliver were not delivered on time, and if, for example, we missed the quarter’s activities as hoped, we missed the chance to engage with the parliament… because perhaps by the next quarter or next year, when the session met again, the interests might have changed.’

The NOCs are a consultative forum providing advice to the TMEA Board from each country. The NOCs were found, during interviews with regional and country offices, to be broadly effective and efficient, notwithstanding a few examples of limited and slow communications between the NOC and the TMEA Board.

9.3.5 DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

The operational model at donor level was overall found to be ‘efficient’ for delivering programme outcomes. Partners, however, stated discomfort with donors’ strict reporting requirements, regular evaluations, and audits.

9.3.6 DEQ5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

TMEA as a demand-driven programme by design and in practice\textsuperscript{132} called for collaboration and coordination with national agencies, to ensure their objectives were aligned. TMEA and its PIO3.1.1 partners worked closely with the respective government authorities and other CSOs and PSOs in all countries of operation. A professional association particularly emphasised the role of co-operation established with the government agencies in successfully delivering the projects: ‘we have no choice but work hand in hand with government and they have been very supportive as the [TMEA funded] project was in the line with the national commitment to regional integration.’ Close collaboration with government authorities in the process of project implementation not only has ensured government buy-in, but did also help change public opinion in favour of regional integration, as stated by one of the CSOs interviewed: ‘People were hesitant initially about EAC integration; sceptical that their land would be grabbed and so on, but they realised it [EAC integration] was all about opportunities. Working with government, as we used to implement these activities together helped achieve outcomes. We took relevant government agencies to forums and people received first-hand information from government itself which helped change people’s mindset.’ A regional CSO dedicated to integration reported that TMEA worked well both with EAC and Partner States; this made working together more fluid since the umbrella organisation works to align with EAC legal and policy frameworks.

TMEA country programmes established consultations and strategic alliances with highly influential advocacy bodies to enhance the impact of the overall advocacy efforts. From the design stage of these projects TMEA aimed to work with the most respected and connected associations and organisations, so that government would more readily accept policy papers and products. A partner involved in logistics platform advocacy emphasised particularly the importance of leadership in the national logistics platform as the most influential and critical element in the policy area. Part of good leadership, he said, was the ability to align members’ interests with government priorities and to represent members’ interest in high-level platforms – as well as the influence and access to be invited to the table.

\textsuperscript{132} As confirmed during the discussions with PSO stakeholders supported for advocacy.
9.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

The PE found opportunities to capitalise on synergies between different development programmes through close coordination with their partners, and by learning what others were doing at donor working groups and NOCs. These were also important for avoiding duplication and identifying gaps. The CSO and PSO partners were often found to have ongoing projects funded by other donors towards enhancing regional trade. There was no evidence in this PIO of a coordination role for TMEA among donors, and it was mentioned that systematic coordination could enhance programme effectiveness and reduce the risk of overlap or duplication of efforts.

9.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

Some of the successful approaches TMEA adopted in working with regional institutions in this component were:

- Working with apex bodies with regional mandates to influence EAC programmes or policies: e.g. the MoU signed between Eastern African Sub-regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI) and EAC Secretariat for engagement on gender mainstreaming in EAC programmes and Policy. Other project partners, such as traders in Kampala and a manufacturing apex body in another country also have regional trade mandates, representing the interests of business owners, traders and entrepreneurs operating regionally. The latter group, for example, regularly convene an East African Community Manufacturers Network to discuss regional challenges such as the Common External Tariff (CET);

- Using a two-tiered approach to stakeholder engagement and advocacy, in which discussions first take place at the national level to help PSOs form a unified voice, and then taking the unified platform to the EAC level;

- Conducting studies for evidence-based proposals with a regional focus, such as one partner’s Intellectual Property Rights Study 2016-17. As a result, regional apex bodies have found value in developing an evidence-based advocacy approach on trade issues;

- Building capacity, where necessary, which helped (i) diversify a partner’s thematic area of focus, (ii) increase their ability to work on policy reforms that could better address the needs of their members; and (iii) increase their acceptance as a legitimate partner by national and regional authorities; and

- Where capacity was strong, using TMEA’s strong network to bring proposal forward, as in the case of a CSO-led effort on Inclusion of Gender and Human Security dimensions in the EAC Peace and Security Protocol.

Some of the policy papers developed by the larger apex bodies triggered significant change at the regional level. One example was using a regional forum (an EAC Summit) to implement changes on taxes based on rules of origin, as with cooking oil. Another way they have been successful is by routing advocacy papers and recommendations through Sectoral Committees, like the Sectoral Committee on Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (SCTIFI).

9.4 Sustainability

9.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

TMEA took sustainability into account when identifying programme partners, looking at:

- TMEA partnerships with larger and more influential apex institutions with relatively stable revenue streams from membership fees and also funds from other donor agencies;

- Diversifying support across PSOs and CSOs – though this was more difficult with the latter – and working to build coalitions that would outlast the programme’s support; and

- Linking CSO and PSO partners with regional level apex bodies as well as other donor-led platforms and initiatives, such as the East Africa Trade Hub (EATH).

TMEA also conducted needs assessments during the PAR process, to target their efforts in capacity building more successfully. Still, capacity deficits were difficult to predict and to manage within some of the partner relationships. Within the constraints of project planning and M&E, projects were charged with milestones and

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133 Rule of Origin on edible oils subsector – all such goods were denied entry to Tanzania. Note that the oils are imported as raw materials, processed in Kenya, and re-exported, which triggered the tension between countries.
deliverables on timelines that take implementers’ and TMEA staff time and attention; adding in capacity building is possible but was not always the priority. The exception was particular capacity gaps were addressed with targeted technical assistance, such as around financial capacity.

The continuing capacity development needs were pointed out by partner and TMEA respondents in the evaluation as a risk for sustainability. In particular, smaller, and less-diversified organisations reported they would not be able to continue their work without further funding. This was presaged in the Regional Strategy PSO CSO paper TMEA prepared in 2012, which highlighted the need for realistic expectations and timelines. ‘Long-term funding with pilot initiatives and disbursements based on deliverables is a better option where possible, as short-term funding can actually diminish organisations as they become project based rather than having long term cohesive programming.’

As might be expected, larger, more established organisations were less susceptible to losing their way post-TMEA, but there were many groups that were not sufficiently funded by their membership – whether civil society or private sector. Even the larger organisations feared they would not be able to continue the particular programming supported by TMEA.

On the other hand, many respondents were positive enough about their experiences to insist that the work continue. They had established connections with relevant government agencies, had stronger capacity to prepare clear and evidence-based arguments, and had strong incentives to continue. In one example, a private sector apex body in Tanzania expected that the coalitions they established with their government partners would last beyond the lifetime of the project. TMEA also collaborated with given partners to make context-specific recommendations about the types of support might be most feasible in their contexts, involving diversified funding from subscriptions, services, and donors.

9.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

Some partners report taking lessons learned from TMEA support into account. One private sector apex body cited the ability to deliver projects on time and high-level of professionalism developed through their work with TMEA as the main lessons learned. Another CSO emphasised the value of TMEA engaging stakeholders – especially government partners – early in project implementation to ensure government buy in. Close working relationships established through ongoing engagements with government was reported as essential to effective project delivery, and a strategy that organisations would continue to use going forward.

A Kenyan partner reported that they would take forward the lesson of working with county-level government that had been conducted successfully with TMEA, and continue to work with the MEAC team with whom they had built a strong relationship. The longevity of MEAC staff was considered a rarity; it was hoped this would continue so the CSO would not have to start over to get buy-in. The respect accorded to TMEA was also a boost for their advocacy efforts, and the organisation reported benefiting from their association with TMEA. Finally, they reported that concrete issues such as women cross border traders provided an important avenue to pursue their mandate with government, EAC and the private sector.

TMEA representatives also identified some lessons and ideas for the future:

- Measuring results in advocacy is not an easy task. The results framework should not only look at outcomes but also the processes that lead to those outcomes;
- In S1, programme timeline was generally two years; however, policy change takes time to mature and become a priority especially at the regional level. Clearly the relationship with partners should be of a long-term nature; it takes time to improve organisations’ capacity to generate evidence through research, and to build relationships through which to inform policy processes and issues;
- Advocacy programme in S1 was too broad, focusing on a wide variety of areas. The focus should be limited to areas that are directly linked to regional trade facilitation; and
- Regional issues required engagement with multiple bodies simultaneously to strengthen the chances of success in trade integration, where shifting of political interests is a fundamental reality. In S1 the focus was on national- and EAC-level bodies, but concerted collaboration with other supranational bodies, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was reported to be an important strategy. The advent of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) was said to be a ‘game-changer’: by uniting with such an effort, national governments could be pressured to take concrete steps instead of simply rhetoric about removing barriers to trade.

134 TMEA. Undated. Regional Strategy PSO CSO; citing an Oxfam CSO participation roundtable from April 2012.
10 SO3 PIO 3.1.2 Improving processes for traders, especially women

10.1 Summary

The women in trade portfolio at TMEA is tasked with improving border systems and processes for cross-border women traders and women-owned enterprises to achieve higher incomes and better livelihoods. Removing barriers to the effective participation of women and small businesses in particular was at the core of the S1 programming. TMEA focussed on putting in place gender sensitive frameworks and training women cross-border traders (WCBTs) and in some cases women entrepreneurs, as in Juba and Nimule, South Sudan. The programme is spread over six countries in addition to some regional interventions.

Improving processes for traders, especially women is important to the Business Competitiveness SO because if border posts functions in an environment governed by gender-responsive frameworks, women cross border traders (WCBTs) are treated fairly and systems favour and facilitate increased cross-border trade. When WCBTs are trained on standards and procedures, empowered to demand rights, and functioning within the formal system, their efforts are better remunerated, without excessive obstacles at the border to limit their business. Improving systems for women traders also benefit men, who share the benefits of reduced time to cross the border, and the incentive to use formal border crossings. This process assumes both demand (from empowered traders) and supply (from competent and impartial government officials at the borders) are in place to facilitate better functioning.

The component builds on its comparative advantage; ensures alignment and partnership, wherever possible, with other development programmes in the region to avoid duplication of efforts; links well with other ongoing TMEA initiatives under SO1 and SO2; and learns from successful interventions and business models implemented on the ground and adapts accordingly – UN Women on enhancing capacities of women’s associations and networks to influence policies at the national level; Agricultural Markets Development Trust (AGMARK) on capacity building for cross border traders; WB on development and roll-out of a Cross-border Charter for cross border trade facilitation; ITC on export capacity building for especially women owned enterprises to name a few.

The component made in-roads into creating gender sensitive frameworks, and increasing knowledge and capacity of WCBTs both nationally and regionally. The regional project at EAC level contributed well to this component, particularly because of the two MoUs between EASSI and EAC Secretariat for engagement on gender mainstreaming in EAC programmes/policies. In addition, most of the programme implementors interviewed reported that Joint Border Committees (JBCs) (now to be Joint Border Trade Facilitation Committees (JBTFCs), transferred from USAID to TMEA support under its Integrated Border Management (IBM) programme) were effective for cross border consultations and engagements. At the national level, the trainings on key (EAC) trade processes, skills, and knowledge of formal trade (and some certification) and markets were largely successful in empowering women informal traders.

These efforts culminated in reduction of time spent crossing the border for small traders, which was reported particularly by women traders in Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya; greater formality with Certificates of Origin and the use of the Simplified Trade Regime (STR); and some changes in income and increased knowledge. The claims need to be substantiated with further research into the long-term effects on income for the effects on poverty reduction to be fully assessed.

10.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

10.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

The component is part of the overarching ToC, and there are project-level results chains for most projects. At the meso-level, between projects and the programme, there is a Women in Trade PAR with a ToC, but this was reported to be ‘illustrative’ only. Still, it is evidence of some systematic thinking about theories of change, causal links, and assumptions. While country programmes and the programme HQ certainly considered contextual issues, change mechanisms, and ‘causal packages’ across the PIO 3.1.2 component, the language and...
practices of T0Cs were not fully put in place. PIO 3.1.2 projects are also ‘enabling’, rather than ‘direct’ projects, indicating that TMEA believes the component would not achieve trade gains on its own but would support other interventions’ success by creating favourable conditions.

Some of the intermediate outcome indicators (e.g. increased value and volume of trade by Women Cross Border Traders (WCBTs) in the EAC) actually show a more ‘direct’, rather than ‘enabling’, relationship to trade, at least for the numbers of women supported – which the RF reports to be around 15,000.\textsuperscript{137} The component can therefore be seen as proposing both direct and enabling activities. The enabling nature of the PIO rests in the work on gender-responsive frameworks for cross border trade, which is much more policy- and advocacy-related, with a longer time frame. The RF indicator lists activities that have happened under that rubric, but these vary in scope and scale. Under the OSBP component (PIO 1.1.3), gender action plans with budgets were to be developed for ‘selected/targeted’ OSBPs. That team ensures that these are in place, but the PE found no evidence to substantiate that claim, and noted that the attention to gender in TMEA’s border official training was not repeated in the training and procedural materials developed by the EAC.

The direct projects in this component (and in PIO 3.2 Export Capability, in the chapter that follows, in which projects also often focus on women farmers and entrepreneurs, and co-operatives with many women members) served a valuable function within the TMEA ToC, in that the effects on poor people’s lives – in line with DFID’s mandate – were more direct. SO1 and SO2 were designed to produce reduced times and costs of transport, which was to lead to increased trade, which in turn was to lead to economic growth, and then to poverty reduction. Not only is there an implicit and substantial time lag in such a causal pathway, the innumerable exogenous factors and ambiguous causal mechanisms also make attribution to TMEA impossible. At the same time, TMEA donors, particularly DFID because of its mandate, impressed upon TMEA the importance of showing that their system-level access to trade and trade facilitation efforts did improve the lives of poor people. TMEA recognised that working to support women cross-border traders would be a direct way to affect poverty, women, jobs, and economic empowerment; in this way, TMEA theorised, the export capability projects are ‘not your typical value chain projects’ by virtue of an explicit focus on linking to export, which better places the work under the TMEA mandate.

There is significantly more emphasis in the portfolio on helping the target group: enhancing awareness of EAC trade procedures and building capacity on certification, quality control, standards, regional trade dynamics and protocols through tailor-made trainings, rather than the business environment in which they were operating. For example, though the projects were to report on an indicator on policy and tools, the TMEA RF states that none have been completed in Kenya. Rwanda has shown commendable interest in the issue, reporting that they developed and adopted gender responsive frameworks for cross border trade. They constructed day care centres near borders to improve conditions for women traders with small children. However, the existence and implementation of comprehensive frameworks is not reported in the RF, and what that framework should comprise is not clearly articulated in framing documents. Systematic measurement of enabling results under this component has proved difficult.

The TMEA S1 pathway for the enabling and direct projects would, in theory, reinforce one another. Women in direct projects would take advantage of improved systemic conditions for their trade, while the existence of more and more knowledgeable women cross-border traders would be a natural constituency for supporting policy change. Women traders did frequently report feeling more knowledgeable and confident to be able to demand their rights, in at least three of the border posts visited by the evaluation team. On the other hand, policy framework formulation was not portrayed as successful in the RF, and respondents felt there was still a great deal to do to make such frameworks a reality more widely across the EAC. Similarly, the outcome indicators are valuable indications of the national border project efforts with women traders, including perhaps indirectly of rights-demanding on the part of women and men cross-border traders. They do not, however, measure the progress of policy and frameworks efforts.

There are a number of projects focused around sensitising female traders on export requirements, access to finance and financial risk management, and the PGIS respondents indicated a high-level of satisfaction and knowledge gain, if not always the income gains that were hoped for. Respondents in Rwanda reported that women who were not initially beneficiaries formed their own co-ops so that they could apply to TMEA for inclusion. This is an indication that benefits to participants were viewed positively, enough so to make women go out of their way to be able to participate.

\textsuperscript{137} Actual figures are unclear, because some are reported cumulatively and others year-on-year. Also, there are three total indicators counting women trained within this component, and it is not clear whether a woman trained by the project twice, or in two different curricula, is counted as an individual, or as a training recipient in each.
The overarching Women and Trade PAR provided a ToC from another programme as illustrative for its own proposed work, but there is no evidence of such a structure being used thereafter as a guiding tool. The PE team re-created the following ToC based on the RF and on discussions with partners and TMEA, as a point of departure for discussing how and in what ways the programme addressed causal links and assumptions:

**Figure 14: Re-created ToC for PIO 3.1.2 Improved processes for traders, esp. women**

Without a visual aid such as this, or some other systematic process, the PE team did not identify strong causal mechanisms for, for example, ensuring that trained women would formalise their businesses, or that developing policies and bills on gender would necessarily translate into improved security and a space where women traders could demand their rights. A 2018 Gender Review posits that TMEA lacks a gendered ToC in which the pathways for change on issues of gender are clearly mapped, to provide guidance to what TMEA implements, particularly in gender mainstreaming.  

At the same time, women at Busia, Taveta/Holili, and even Elegu/Nimule reported that they did in fact feel they had rights and increased knowledge, and that they were more able to face border officials with their concerns, including formally through Joint Border Committee participation. However, there was also evidence from a TMEA Results team survey that women with income increases were not often reinvesting in their businesses. Successful activities such as networking with other women’s organisations elsewhere when Irish potatoes were sought, or shea butter could be procured, were useful but isolated successes that these traders did not always pursue in a systematic way that would make them more than one-off windfalls. Other respondents reported that temporary income increases were used for consumption smoothing, and repayment of debt.

Had there been a documented assumption that women would use their new income to grow their businesses, and had TMEA collected data on that assumption, they would have seen it fail, and had the opportunity to re-tool activities to better meet the needs of participants. As suggested in the UN Foundation Roadmap document mentioned above, very poor women’s subsistence-level businesses are not just very small SMEs, rather they are susceptible to cultural practices (like sharing windfall income across extended family) as well as to existing conditions (like high debt loads and uneven market demand) such that they may not have the same goals as the programme (like growing businesses).

Some assumptions of the component during S1 are explicit and provided in Country Strategy documents. These tend to be fairly high-level and abstract on address issues such as the presence of a conducive environment

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encouraging women-led businesses and traders\textsuperscript{139}. Various other assumptions are implicit – and these can all affect the validity of a results chain to varying degrees. Some of these include:

- Assumptions on capacity of implementing organisations especially PSOs/CSOs were overly optimistic which required more technical assistance than planned;
- Assumptions on government and key stakeholder engagement in key discussions would yield the expected policy change or business environment reform, but policy change took time to mature and become a priority, which required updating some milestones and targets; and
- Assumptions on an expected increase in income were not realised in the initial years of the project. Women traders had different needs and priorities for their income than was expected and reinvesting to grow their businesses was not often high priority. However, project actors observed anecdotally that as basic needs were increasingly met, rate of reinvestment increased. The decision making between reinvestment versus consumption smoothing among beneficiaries is skewed, posing a risk to meeting project goals.

At the same time, even positive developments were under-explored in the Women and Trade PAR results chain. Respondents reported empowerment gains they had not expected from participating with TMEA. A cross-border co-operative participant in a study tour said women were ‘empowered even in their households. Women working outside the home were once considered delinquent but after the study tour, we changed the mindset…. Husbands became more supportive.’ One interviewee from the Poverty and Gender Impact Study said she was able to bring her sister to join the interviewee’s business, lifting her out of prostitution; the interviewee said this was also true for other women working as prostitutes in the vicinity. These kinds of gains, too, in the course of S2, should be measured and incorporated into ToC and strategic thinking – to maximise these benefits, or deal with the challenges identified during implementation.

As with the export capability projects, beneficiaries’ levels of poverty and education in particular proved to be critical to improving livelihoods and sustaining the gained benefits, which were not comprehensively considered in overarching strategy documents such as the ToC narrative and the Transport and Economic Corridor Strategy; the latter mentions having identified strong partners for that work\textsuperscript{140} but nothing about beneficiary characteristics. The Women in Trade PAR similarly did not touch on these issues, though it references A Roadmap for Promoting Women’s Economic Empowerment\textsuperscript{141} from the United Nations Foundation. That document brings together research from 18 studies on such programmes and concludes, \textit{inter alia}, that the ‘very poor’ have quite different needs when it comes to becoming economically empowered to move from subsistence-level businesses to more formality and stability. This issue was identified once implementation was well underway, but had it been part of strategic planning, it is possible that interventions would have been designed differently.

Project review reports, annual business plans and other project documents combined with regular field visits were used as the main sources of information to update the performance against each indicator. It was reported as a major constraint that there was no baseline data collected to quantify the project benefits (projects relied on the use of secondary data), and to better target their efforts. In other cases, baseline data collected were not adequate to report against all the indicators. The evidence underpinning their decision-making was therefore weak.

Challenges with the results framework emerged in implementation because the RF did not lend itself to reviews or updates. By omitting explicit definition and clarity about the key steps/links and associated assumptions along results chains (particularly relating to policy reforms), the implicit theory of change could not be reviewed and adapted in the light of new evidence and experience.\textsuperscript{142}

TMEA project managers and component leads reported being overburdened by the level of detail included in the RF (i.e. there were numerous projects in each country with outputs for each into RF) which prevented tracking progress from outcomes to impacts along the results chains in each country. Indicators at output and outcome levels overlap on the issue of training, in part because outcome-level indicators do not specify how the key outcome-level gains are to be measured (such as women with increased knowledge, or who are trading formally). The clearest and arguably most important outcome indicator – increased income – was measured infrequently. While results from the final survey showed some impacts on income, likely from TMEA projects, as an indicator to guide improvements in the programming it was not as useful.

\textsuperscript{139} TMEA Tanzania Country Programme Evaluation Final Report; and Tanzania Country Strategy document.

\textsuperscript{140} TMEA. 2012. Transport and Economic Corridor Strategy.


\textsuperscript{142} Some RF targets were revised in March 2016 in line with the 2015/16 Annual Review recommendations.
Women and Trade programming was, at the time, new to TMEA and different to their other project work. As such there was an experimental nature to the programming. TMEA did work adaptively to meet demand for the project – which included women hearing about the activities and forming co-operatives so they could be included – and scaling up the efforts. In S2, donor funding is much increased, and the programme is geared to be rolled out more widely.

10.2.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

This component supported EAC regional trade development priorities by design, with regard to gender, community development and civil society. EAC priorities include identifying ‘approaches towards disadvantaged [...] groups, including women, children, the youth, the elderly and persons with disabilities aimed at employment creation, poverty alleviation and improving working conditions.’ The PIO trained cross-border traders in using the Simplified Trade Regime (STR) and increased their income; included women in Joint Border Committees and women’s organisation representatives in NMCs for the elimination of NTBS; and worked with entrepreneurs and export-ready firms on standards, post-harvest procedures in several market chains, and market access.

10.2.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

Where there was a major change in the counterpart government or private sector organisations, outcome targets in this component were not achieved. For example, the ongoing political tension between Rwanda and Burundi, which started in 2015, has disrupted cross border trade between the two countries.

Pro-Femmes in Rwanda, on the other hand, reported working in a calm and supportive environment with continuity of the government and trade policies. For instance, the Government of Rwanda accepts Rwandan ID cards for border crossing from Rwanda to Uganda and to Kenya and issues free daily border passes for women living in sectors abutting the border, which makes cross border trade considerably easier for Rwandans.

Understandably, women cross-border traders were strongly affected by conflict erupting in South Sudan. Inflationary tendencies damaged South Sudanese buying power and Ugandan traders along the Northern Corridor lost business when contracts were not honoured. PGIS respondents report that the inputs for their businesses became scarce and markets dried up. One exception was shea butter; women's networks from among the TMEA projects helped South Sudanese sellers find buyers, late in the S1 time period. It was also notable in their responses that women trading from either side of the border reported that border crossing time had reduced, and taxes were regular and predictable, even though the Nimule OSBP construction has halted. Conditions apart from the border post were much worse, however, for women traders on the South Sudan side: almost no government services, inflation, lack of credit or hard currency for purchasing in bulk. However, women reported having become the main family breadwinners in many households and they continued to trade in spite of the challenges.

Stakeholders discussed and heralded gender as important, and made some like incorporating women into Joint Border Committees, and traders’ representatives into NMCs for eliminating NTBs. The gains participants have made by being organised into co-operatives and other types of organisations are also critical, in large part because that creates a stronger base of support from which to demand change. But gender-related issues and policies remain more challenging to implement successfully, which was particularly evident in the work on gender-sensitive frameworks.

10.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other on-going initiatives (both government and private sector)?

Component leads interviewed for the evaluation report making efforts to avoid duplication of activities in relation to initiatives funded by other donors and governments. For example, the initial programme design involved needs assessments to identify gaps and opportunities to leverage existing initiatives as well as to coordinate with programmes supported by other donors or organisations that shared a similar agenda. Stakeholder mapping helped identify implementing agencies with whom TMEA could collaborate to deliver the programme.

The Women in Trade PAR references TANTRADE, KENTRADE and revenue authorities as potential linkages, but reference no specific projects. No partner respondents in the region reported any programming to support women in trade, in the evaluation interviews.
10.3 Coherence and coordination

10.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

In this component, a part of the TMEA funding was used to organise learning events allowing the government authorities to learn from experiences shared by other countries in EAC – e.g. annual workshops where relevant experiences were shared, and in some instances study tours to other countries were arranged. Study tours were organised to other borders to see how other WCBT associations operated to provide their members with a sustainable practical skillset and knowledge of formal trade. Partner and stakeholders’ overall assessment of these opportunities for knowledge exchange was positive. Technical assistance (TA) efforts were pursued quite energetically by the respective TMEA staff members; their counterparts praised the scope and timeliness of the TA and its responsiveness to their needs.

However, TMEA’s working model for this component had some weaknesses that came up in the discussions with CSO partners, including:

- The regional trade regimes (in particular EAC Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary (SPS) measures) went through a number of amendments in S1 period. This required the CSOs to keep abreast of any changes in the political landscape as well as inform the project beneficiaries who often lack access to knowledge and information regarding the new procedures and policies. This came at a high cost to TMEA’s CSO partners who were already resource poor. This was due to lack of adequate attention TMEA had given in the original programme design to political fragility as a significant risk factor that could increase the cost of project delivery;

- The target group’s education level was overestimated; most WCBTs were poorly educated: some could not read materials or struggled to understand the new concepts about trade which required further simplification of the information conveyed; and

- There was a lack of access to business permits (i.e. women were mostly operating out of their homes and hence did not have business permits which was a precondition to obtaining a certificate) that constituted a barrier for women to getting their products certified by the Tanzania Bureau of Standards. TMEA helped set up a processing centre as a temporary solution to this problem but the supply did not adequately meet the demand.

10.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

There were clearly defined roles and responsibilities in place, requiring close co-operation and collaboration between national and regional levels. The level of engagement of component leads with the technical advisors based in the corporate office was reported to be sufficient and appropriate.

In addition, the PSOs/CSOs supported by TMEA in this component were networked with other TMEA funded organisations or projects in other EAC countries. The partners were also encouraged to coordinate and collaborate with their counterparts in other EAC countries through regular learning and knowledge exchange meetings:

- The regional partner already had a regional focus which facilitated the programme implementation both at the national and regional level; and

- The East African Women in Business Platform (EAWiBP) (which is also funded by TMEA) help its member associations and their individual members to draw learnings from each other’s experiences.

10.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

Synergies among TMEA programme components and with other donor-funded initiatives brought about greater results than could have been achieved by TMEA itself alone. Uganda Women Entrepreneurs Association Ltd. (UWEAL) attends the regional forums on NTBs engaging the governments and other authorities in dialogue about the unique NTBs women cross-border traders and trading entrepreneurs face, including sexual harassment.

Using pre-existing working relationships established with the women co-operatives in TMEA projects, Pro-Femmes identified the recipients of a GIZ-funded programme aiming to facilitate access to market for women traders using information and communication technologies.
Annex J: PIOs

Cross-border trade strategies developed under SO2 provided a framework for the women in trade component to operate in. The Rwandan MINICOM’s Cross-border Trade Unit provided oversight to all cross-border trade interventions and established Joint Border Management Committees. Uganda and Kenya OSBPs were also reported to have established such committees, and to have ensured the participation of women traders’ association representatives.

10.3.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

Interview responses on the effectiveness of the current TMEA governance arrangement in achieving high quality and timely outputs are mixed; some respondents have lauded the platforms that allow knowledge and information sharing, particularly the NOCs. Pro-Femmes, TWCC and others participate in the quarterly meetings in their respective countries, which also provides space for these organisations to meet and promote their agenda with key government stakeholders.

TMEA also channelled ad-hoc technical assistance to its partners where necessary which turned a normal donor-recipient relationship into more of a collaborative partnership which enhanced programme delivery. Within TMEA structure, there was flexibility for country programmes to be able to identify their priorities and needs as long as they contributed to the goals set at the regional level. This was especially manifested in a wide range of funding arrangements employed depending on the capacity of each partner (transition from grant to financial aid with some partners (UWEAL) and directly funding the activities without channelling any funds to the partner in other cases (Tanzania Women Chamber of Commerce (TWCC)).

Others identified a set of impediments to project implementation:

- Projects that are significantly delayed have often actually been given unrealistic timeframes for project delivery, as confirmed during discussions with TMEA project managers. More time is required for building ownership of the processes of project formulation, implementation and monitoring, and furthering understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the partners, especially of government agencies;
- Administration, human resources, and procurement are centralised, in that decision-making lies with the corporate office. This is cumbersome, and quite slow; and
- Beneficiaries in one country reported being confused over the leadership of the project: TMEA country or corporate? When corporate technical advisors visited the field, frictions emerged based on different viewpoints as to how the projects should be managed.

10.3.5 DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

On the operational model at donor level, TMEA has managed to appropriately and efficiently tap into resources made available by the donors which should be broadly preserved, although some concerns raised by programme teams should be noted:

- Donors were strict about feedback, regular evaluations and audits, which created fatigue among the project partners; at the same time the programme management team found that the standard donor requirements helped improve TMEA’s operations: ‘DFID Audit recommendations led to improvements in procurement policies that were previously slowing down the implementation’;
- It was reported that TMEA headquarters is acting like a buffer zone between the donors and the country offices; i.e. handling the issues at the corporate level in order not to cascade down the organisation any potential negative impact or distinct reporting demands from individual donors; and
- In discussions with the TMEA teams, they said the focus of TMEA is becoming more donor-influenced with the donors as the locus of control. Donor support will continue to be the core of TMEA funding, so this is not entirely surprising, but with the separation of the Board and the Council it might represent a new trend.

10.3.6 DEQ5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

Programme strategy and implementation model under this component are aligned to each country’s priorities, and are relevant to, and appropriate for achieving, regional and national trade facilitation goals. This included national cross border trade strategies (e.g. Rwanda) as well as other official relevant national strategies such as National Development Plan and National Export Development Strategy. Having adequate buy-in and
establishing ownership of the interventions among government and national stakeholders are key to ensuring the effectiveness of the component; however, this has so far proven challenging. In particular, more work needs to be done for adoption of ‘gender responsive frameworks’ across government, though respondents report positive progress in Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya.

10.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

There are multiple other agencies with related mandates operating in EAC countries, such as UN Women, International Trade Centre (ITC), GIZ, among others. TMEA is in communication with donors through a Private Sector Donor Working Group, and Trade and Infrastructure Working Group, and attends trade facilitation and regional integration related events and platforms organised by donors. While women in trade issues are not linked specifically with a coordination mechanism, there were limited cases of clear collaboration among donors.

TMEA partners and stakeholders reported on the importance placed on ‘complementarity.’ One national women and trade project noted that a United Nations (UN) Women initiative on cross border trade was also active in promotion of women empowerment during the same period (2012-2016). While UN Women established a platform for women in cross border trade so that they could voice their issues, after project completion TMEA worked to boost platform membership and used IT to organise campaigns and meetings.

The WB has had an active team researching and working on challenges for women cross-border traders for the last decade. In 2014, they piloted a Cross-Border Charter that used a simple list of precepts to focus efforts to improve border conditions across relevant agencies for women and for all traders. These were:

- No abuse or harassment;
- Efficient processing and no discrimination;
- Transparent duties, fees, and taxes;
- No bribes; and
- Clear documentary requirements.

The Women in Trade PAR referenced this effort, as part of its Key Linkages section along with numerous other donor activities. With training and awareness building, and a hotline for complaint reports, it seems a promising basis for collaboration and was later seen adapted for training of OSBP staff. TMEA staff at HQ noted that, while each country has donor coordination groups, to which TMEA send country directors or senior programme directors, there is not a coordination structure that is dedicated to efforts supporting women in trade, nor with the regional focus that the Women in Trade programme had. Given the spread and depth of interventions in this arena, coordination across women in trade implementers is a gap. That staffer said such a structure was on the agenda for S2.

10.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

Some of the approaches that were effective in working with regional institutions include:

- Working with apex bodies with a regional focus to act as a focal point with EAC;
- Direct TMEA country level support provided to lobbying, such as one organisation’s advocacy on the issue of WCBTs who cross border with babies, which resulted in the construction of day care centres in some sites. This aligned with the EAC Gender policy.
- Coordinating with the EAC on the simplification of trade processes for WCBTs and ensuring the agreed measures cascade down to member states; and
- Working with the national authorities who attend regional level meetings and have decision-making power on key issues, such as Ministries of Trade and Industry. The Rwandan Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM)’s Cross Border Trade Unit was set up to support the implementation, coordination, monitoring and reporting on cross border activities and involved in establishing Joint Border Management Committees.

143 Setting up and strengthening cross border platforms and encouraging women to attend border community meetings were their key activities.


145 Under the EAC Customs Union, the Simplified Trade Regime (STR) is a special provision aimed at specifically at small traders who regularly transact in low value consignments.
Rwanda also supports the ‘Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs’ (CEPGL)’s ‘Joint Action Committee for Women in informal cross-border trade in the Great Lakes Region.’

Other regional institutions in Africa have also been engaged, such as COMESA. Cross border trade with the DRC takes place under COMESA auspices, and trader capacity development must follow COMESA regulatory requirements. As such, in Rwanda besides developing tailored training manuals in Kinyarwanda, explaining the simplified EAC trade regime, Pro-Femmes also produced manuals for the COMESA simplified trade regime.

10.4 Sustainability

10.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

In general, TMEA’s delivery model under this component focused on capacity-building and other technical assistance provided to women cross border traders. The trainings provided especially on the EAC trading rules and regulations/procedures as well as on standards, business management, and bookkeeping helped equip women traders with knowledge and skills to trade formally. In addition, study tours were organised to other borders to see how other WCBT associations operated to provide their members with a sustainable practical skillset and knowledge of formal trade.

Given the limited life of each project and the likelihood of further support, the role of other stakeholders is particularly important to anchor sustainability. In some instances, other development partners (e.g. German Cooperation Agency (GIZ) in Cyanika border in Rwanda) or the government complemented TMEA’s work. Other examples include a revenue authority in one country working with women’s co-operatives to build on the outputs achieved with TMEA; standards bureau officials training WCBTs on certification and standards; a ministry cross-border trade unit providing oversight to all cross-border trade interventions; and the establishment of establishing Joint Border Management Committees at five borders (Mutukula, Busia, Malaba, Namanga and Mutukula).

After completion of the projects, much will depend on government commitment to provide local resources for continuous support to enable cross border trade to grow and flourish. Experience to date has shown that lack of access to finance (to fund the immediate needs and reinvest into business), small production scale, and demand side factors (such as varying consumer preferences) constituted barriers to entry into regional markets and have the potential to compromise sustainability.

Advocacy was part of the component intended to support gender responsive policy formulation, but the creation and implementation of gender-responsive frameworks is difficult to trace in the systems on the ground. The regional project at EAC level contributed well to this component, particularly because of the two MoUs between EASSI and EAC Secretariat for engagement on gender mainstreaming in EAC programmes/policies. But MoUs for engagement are only a first step in changing policy and developing gender-sensitive frameworks that affect the trading experiences across national border landscapes and more needs to be done.

10.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

There is a well-structured and clearly defined formal stakeholder engagement system, including regular meetings with partners and informal engagement through TMEA’s call for their inputs into relevant research and reports.

Economic empowerment projects for women involved in cross-border trade have left lessons on what works, and what needs to be further improved. Value addition (moving up the value chain), product quality (certification and packaging) and marketing (branding, negotiation, and market linkages) were identified as central to promoting locally produced products in export markets. These factors informed the subsequent programming approach, which included setting up joint processing facilities, events organisation, and facilitating traders’ participation in national and regional trade fairs, among others.

146 For trade with the DRC, the CEPGL’s cross border community agreements have been instrumental in facilitating trade through the creation of cross-border community agreements which allow the movement of people between CEPGL member states and Rwanda using specially issued travel pass cards.
11 SO3 PIO 3.2 Export capability

11.1 Summary

The export capability portfolio at TMEA was tasked with improving the competitiveness of high-value sectors both in regional and national markets with a specific focus on land locked EAC countries: Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

Export capability (EC) is important to the Business Competitiveness SO because exporting widens the market available to domestic producers and thus increases potential demand and the prospects for higher prices. In turn, larger scale production leads to economies of scale which lower unit costs and increase competitiveness and thus boost profit margins for domestic producers. Thus, to develop and transform their economy, the EAC countries need to develop a competitive private sector with the capacity to compete and export value-added products to the EAC markets and beyond.

The component has a strong regional dimension underpinned by national initiatives and is adopting a market systems approach to sector development that stimulates more inclusive markets and generates expanding benefits to smaller market actors. The programme is built on the principles of TMEA: build on its comparative advantage, take cognisance of already existing initiatives and avoid duplication, build upon successful interventions and working business models, address specific priorities at the national level in a demand driven manner, link well with the other Business Competitiveness workstreams, ensure harmony with SO1 and SO2 activities, and leverage existing TMEA partnerships and networks along the value chain to create complete interventions.

A 2014 analysis for EC projects identified three sectors – tourism, coffee, and staples – and how these fit into the SO3 TOC. The coffee project was managed regionally but implemented at the national level in Rwanda and Burundi; staples work was country-specific where funds were disbursed to countries and overseen at country level with corporate oversight; and tourism projects were operated on a hybrid model both at regional and country level, according to a former component staff member. An EC project under tourism was created to improve the sector’s performance in the region by contributing to the sector’s export capabilities expansion and diversification, with the goal of increasing the revenue of small and medium-size enterprises in the sector.

According to the formative evaluation of the TMEA-supported Traidlinks Programme (Rwanda and Burundi) Lot 1, the project was highly relevant because lack of export capacity is one of the major challenges in Rwanda and Burundi, and the activity worked to address it. A staples project conceived in S1 was newly underway during PE fieldwork in 2018 in Rwanda, while smaller ones in Uganda were already completed. The staples interventions were expected to contribute to regional poverty reduction and improved economic trade goals. The project strategized to ensure adoption of the harmonised EAC maize grain standard and increase the amount of traded grains. The project also focused on improving grain warehousing capabilities by supporting grain traders and/or exporters to upgrade grain handling and storage facilities.

Tourism had both a regional component and individual country components. Tourism was selected as a target sector to improve trade in services due to its potential to impact the Regional Tourism Services, according to the Corporate SO3 lead. Although the project was suspended a year early due to an unsatisfactory due diligence finding, key activities included capacity building (e.g. trainings, recruitment and developing action and workplans) for the private sector associations, tourism association boards and PP dialogue councils in Rwanda and Uganda as well as ensuring regular public-private sector meetings. This was supplemented with support to identifying and upgrading tourism products for promotion (i.e. multi-country tour packages); training tour consultants on these product offerings; developing joint marketing initiatives; facilitating business to business events and fairs for business linkages; and some research work on community profit sharing models.

Outputs reported were the strengthened dialogues between the public and private sector stakeholders; and the improved marketability of (new) national and regional tourism products from the land-locked countries. In the short and medium-term, the beneficiaries have more options for tourism packages and regional relationships.

with their peers. An advocacy component led to the establishment of the East African Tourism Platform and a Single Tourist Visa. These gains may be built upon in S2.

The EC activities had the lowest budget allocation among the components, even though they had the greatest potential of supporting firms and contributing directly to increased trade, according to the SO3 portfolio review.\textsuperscript{154} (p.21)

11.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

11.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

The EC component was part of the overarching ToC, and there were project-level results chains for most projects. At the meso-level, between projects and the programme, TMEA undertook a review to evaluate candidate sectors; identify stakeholders, risks, geographic focus areas, and staffing requirements; and propose a framework for the EC interventions.\textsuperscript{155} The document identified existing TMEA programming that would support the proposed investments and TMEA’s comparative advantage, while assuring that the EC component would not intervene at the production end of the market. The document shows systematic thinking around the interventions and their contribution to improved business competitiveness, while avoiding duplication with other interventions through a dedicated platform. Moreover, the document identifies characteristics of systems it will support, to reduce cross-cutting constraints across entire sectors. In particular, TMEA’s review suggests the work will focus on areas where TMEA already had a strong level of engagement, like transport, logistics, standards and services.

TMEA staff responsible for design also discussed systematic thinking about ToCs, causal links, and assumptions. Country programme and HQ staff considered contextual issues, change mechanisms, and ‘causal packages’ for projects or clusters of projects, though the language and practices of ToCs were not fully put in place across the EC component. The ways in which the set of EC projects might contribute to the larger goals of improving competitiveness were carefully broken out in the Framework document, but the actual portfolio of EC projects also changed over time. Projects at times worked at both system level and with groups of producers, where farmers were identified to have an important weakness (such as quality assurance), as exemplified in Rwanda’s work with coffee farmers.\textsuperscript{156}

As suggested by the OPM assessment of SO2 and SO3 following fieldwork in 2016, the scope for SO3 was broad. Among the projects in SO3 appeared some that were somewhat tangential to system-level access to trade and trade facilitation, though TMEA staff had clear rationale for each choice. Some donors raised the question around these interventions as to whether TMEA was the most suitable funder of activities that intervene in specific sectoral value chains at the level of production quality (e.g., primary processing by coffee farmer cooperatives). This was reported during the evaluation period and reported as a source of friction when the projects were initiated as well. Whilst these types of projects have an element of improving trading standards, some donors called into question whether TMEA should themselves be taking such a ‘deep dive’ into the market system of specific agricultural commodities. As a result, donors ensured that the EC projects were limited to the size of pilots, and the long debate around these issues gave a late start to the projects within S1.

The EC projects served a valuable function within the TMEA ToC, in that the effects on poor people’s lives – in line with DFID’s mandate – were more direct. SO1 and SO2 were designed to produce reduced times and costs of transport to lead to increased trade, which in turn were led to economic growth, and then to poverty reduction. Not only was there an implicit and substantial time lag in such a causal pathway, the innumerable exogenous factors and ambiguous causal mechanisms make attribution to TMEA impossible. At the same time, TMEA donors, particularly DFID because of its mandate, impressed upon TMEA the importance of showing that their system-level access to trade and trade facilitation efforts did improve the lives of poor people. TMEA recognised that this type of project has a direct link to poverty, women, jobs, and economic empowerment; in this way, TMEA theorised, they are ‘not your typical value chain projects’ by virtue of an explicit focus on linking to export, which better placed the work under the TMEA mandate.

However, the extent to which the EC component projects worked together with common goals was not consistent across the interventions. The range of projects (tourism, staples, horticultural projects, coffee) was wide, and their effects were at a pilot level, compared with the efforts of SO1 and SO2. If SO1 and SO2 worked

\textsuperscript{154} DMT Consultants Ltd (2014) Final Report, Portfolio Review of the TradeMark East Africa: Business Competitiveness Programme


to ‘build the pipeline’ as discussed in the main body of the report, these projects attempted to ‘fill the pipeline’ with exports. This was important (as reflected in the greater balance between these two sides of the equation in TMEA’s S2 programming) and, where successful, the projects made good connections for certain producers with relevant buyers, including for export. However, as noted in an assessment of portfolio composition in 2014, TMEA needed to strike a better portfolio balance between pro-poor projects and projects that contributed to quantifiable increases in exports. Many projects in the portfolio were too small to make a difference in increased trade.

The PE team re-created a ToC for the EC component, as shown in Figure 8 below:

Figure 15: Re-created ToC for PIO 3.2 Export Capability

The Framework document contains elements such as these, but was not updated as the EC component evolved. Such a process would have added a layer of documentation and strategy discussions to the TMEA team’s workload. However, an iterative process could also have strengthened the case for the EC projects individually and at the level of systems, as also suggested in the Business Competitiveness Portfolio Review, to ensure the mix of projects would have a consistent, measurable effect on exports while also serving social goals.

The ToC process allows for a top-down and a bottom-up review that put two distinct programming goals on the table for debate. Looking top-down, the discussion is about why the component is useful in the context of the overall ToC – which the PE research suggests is because projects would have helped fill the pipeline created in SO1 and SO2 with national exports, and that they would directly affect people living in poverty, which SO1 and SO2 were harder-pressed to demonstrate. As these two rationales require different approaches the team would use the TOC process to unpack the challenges behind each and make the case for how the selection of projects would meet those challenges. The Framework document went a long way in attempting to show how the interventions would unblock bottlenecks, but it was theoretical, and much was changed in the actual interventions.

The second function of the ToC process is examining the ‘how’ of the component – or looking bottom up at the causal mechanisms through which the projects were to achieve the changes at output and outcome levels. This was well addressed in the Framework document, in which the reviewers assessed potential spoilers and threats, as well as useful opportunities for coordination with teams in other components – such as with PIO 3.1.2 on improving trading processes and women in trade, with whom collaboration might have yielded results that were greater than the sum of their parts. The Framework document also made less specific statements about the
linkages to TMEA’s other interventions (like transport, standards and services), some of which were ultimately realised (as in localised standards work with staples) and others which could have been usefully unpacked by project teams (like the ways transport effects from SO1 would interact with these projects, or the overarching lack of regional standards on staples testing and certification). A cross-border group reported that ongoing networking among co-operatives had helped them share information and access markets. However, co-ops were also found to be unfamiliar with the standards and unprepared to meet them in some projects, according to a TMEA staffer. Language issues were one reason co-ops failed to meet standards, in this staffer’s experience, which information was used for planning S2 programming in these border areas. SMEs in another country were found unready for certification as well, which tested sustainability; elsewhere, beneficiaries were not computer literate enough to take advantage of IT systems. Each of these circumstances – with bearing on project success – should be part of ongoing discussions around assumptions and change mechanisms underlying their design.

The system-level thinking put forth in the Framework document provided a backbone for an ongoing discussion about necessary conditions for success, for which each country team participant would likely have concerns in light of national contexts. The externally contracted SO3 portfolio review suggested that ‘TMEA efforts to improve export capability must be carefully designed to increase the capacity of firms of different sizes to compete domestically, regionally and internationally. This involves a deep understanding of the challenges the private sector faces. Challenges external to the firms may be addressed through enhanced business regulation and efficient trade logistics. Challenges within the firms however require firm level interventions e.g. improved business management skills, new product development skills, quality management etc.’ PE respondents reporting on challenges in EC activities often related that the capacity of the farmers’ or women’s associations who were contracted to carry them out were severely constrained, including the costs and challenges of certification. Assumptions about association capacity in a Tanzania case did not bear out, for example: ‘Early assumptions about capacity of partners were too optimistic…. They hence were given short-term technical assistance to adapt; that was not part of their initial programming’. An HQ staffer reported the same: ‘The capacity of the associations or apex bodies that TMEA worked with is not very strong. They do not have a lot of human or other resources. Many of them come into problems just trying to run the project. The capacity of the leader and institutional governance was weak, and we had to shut down [one] project.’

Projects that worked with co-operatives to certify production in order to add value and access better markets also faced challenges, both when certification and maintaining higher levels of standards were costly and when markets did not pay enough to cover the increased costs. Certification allowing Rwanda honey producers were ultimately successful, in that the increased costs were offset by better prices in European markets; but for French beans in Kenya, producers could not reliably meet quality standards and eventually found domestic markets for cut beans instead – which paid better, according to project team members, relative to the costs. SMEs trained under PIO 2.4 by the Rwanda Standards Board only infrequently decided to certify following training, because the costs of certification were greater than the better prices they could get for exporting. Clearly, component and project planning must be compelled to test assumed causal pathways. In addition, economic empowerment does not work for all people in the same ways, as discussed in the PIO 3.1.2 chapter above; the very poor require different and sometimes more intensive interventions to move from a subsistence-level business to one that provides more sustained business growth.

A TMEA staffer noted that ‘I think there was quite a silo approach in S1. There was an opportunity to work very closely together, but it could have been better. I think because of the theory of change being linear, you don’t

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157 Among the products supported by EC projects, tea and coffee appear in the list of standards harmonised in PIO 2.4 on Standards; tea and horticultural exports were among those affected by work with permit agencies under PIO 2.2.
have time or head space to create those linkages.’ Nevertheless, the portfolio worked closely with standards, certification, women in trade and logistics teams, according to the staffer, and through better connectivity and a greater focus on export capability throughout the S2 activities, there will be more synergies across TMEA.

Planning for assumptions should also include testing those assumptions during the life of the project, to ensure that women SME owners were being assisted to use computers at the level necessary for the eventual system, or that governments upgraded electrification structures near remote OSBPs in time for their inauguration, for example. There is no evidence of such use of ToC, strategy, RF, or assumptions for this purpose in the component. The PE team has stated that the TMEA team’s dedication and sectoral knowledge are unlike (and superior to) those of most other development programmes, and certainly they were thinking about these issues and working on them conjointly during the life of S1. Still, there is no substitute for an iterative process that systematises that reasoning, debate, and ongoing measurement to be sure that the necessary conditions hold true in each country, with each agency, with each target sector, with each implementing partner, over time and while enduring unpredictable contextual changes and market weaknesses.

TMEA did produce result chains for projects, but did not do so at the level of ToC PIOs or components. Some of these result chains did consider assumptions but no evidence has been found to show they were monitored or verified. The TMEA Management Information System does, however, have indicator data on processes and project-level assumptions.

The RF offered teams an implicit ToC during S1, but this was less adept at capturing the system-level gains proposed in the Framework document; rather, it comprised a list of indicators that worked only for segments of the portfolio. The EC component changed over the course of S1: while projects like FPEAK (supporting good agricultural practices among horticultural product growers) were part of early TMEA work, the study that launched concerted EC activities in three sectors dates from 2015, and the indicators are closely related to that tranche of projects and the overall thinking about EC projects – which changed considerably over the course of S1. For example, the overarching ToC included plans to work on trade in services, which eventually was limited to a set of small interventions in the tourism sector.

The small scale of projects and differentiation across countries meant that the RF indicators were different from country to country – which, while positive for showing project level outcomes, limits the degree to which an overarching picture from the component could be assembled. Two outcome indicators collected at country level did not appear in the corporate RF, on new exporting SMEs and SMEs newly accessing markets. Those might have been particularly interesting in terms of the Framework document and the re-created ToC shown and described above.

Indicators were also very problematic, as described as well in the 2017 DFID Annual Review. It is unclear which projects reported to which output indicators, for example, on numbers of entities (SMEs, companies, associations, co-operatives, etc.) trained in improved standards. Then, at outcome level, there were four indicators that could express how trainees have improved production: entities implementing trading standards, entities certified, entities accessing new markets, and entities newly exporting. Whether participating in given trainings would result in one, some, all or none of those outcomes is not clear, and the figures offered do not show a logical progression through a results chain. And in most indicators at least some data did not align with the definition of the indicator: figures for individuals participating in training are reported rather than entities, making comparison or aggregation impossible. At the same time several indicators were defined as ‘entities, disaggregated by gender’ which is illogical. All the same, two TMEA staffers working in EC specifically mentioned the utility of the RF for pausing to think about assumptions and relevance.

11.2.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

Export capability work supported EAC regional trade development priorities around increasing exports, ensuring inclusive development, formalising, and simplifying cross-border trade at improved border posts, and enhancing business competitiveness. Given that the nature of the EC work tended towards smaller producers and traders, it is notable that the EC projects were in line with political and economic efforts at a level far removed from their immediate milieu. The Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK) project worked to link producers in three EAC countries to international buyers; the ITC project worked to help export-ready women entrepreneurs in urban sites to source inputs and to export; UWEAL helped producers in various parts of Uganda to link together, and then internationally, on the production and sale of staple foods; and a set of interventions with women cross-border traders helped to formalise their businesses and co-operatives, learn about and use the Simplified Trade Regime, and have tools and support to increase their businesses. The evaluation of the Export Capability Programme in Rwanda and Burundi suggests that the SO3 interventions in
those two countries are ‘…consistent with TMEA’s Theory of Change and objectives of increasing business competitiveness and trade; the EAC Partner States’ trade policies, export strategies and priorities of increasing exports.’ (p.iv)\(^{160}\)

The goals of the projects, as designed and implemented by TMEA, reflect the parallel between the SO and EAC’s focus areas around increasing exports, ensuring inclusive development, formalising and simplifying cross-border trade at improved border posts, ensuring private sector and civil society participation in trade dialogues, and enhancing business competitiveness. TMEA and its government and private sector partners largely agree that these goals shaped the interventions; respondents from among EC projects (both organisers and participants) describe the value of these goals for their businesses.

To the extent that national development plans also parallel the EAC priorities, TMEA was also working upstream on the same agenda, and more broadly with donors and private sector priorities. TMEA has supported regional meetings and forums and worked with individual PS Ministries and members of Parliament, for example, on loopholes in the EAC Treaty, cross border trade strategy, EAC Gender Bill. The TMEA corporate office harmonised its financial year to match those of the Kenyan government and the EAC Secretariat, to improve planning and budgeting. As acknowledged by a donor at the regional level: ‘TMEA is well-placed to get into discussions with EAC’ but the interviewer claims that ‘…When TMEA began, EAC had launched a CU but it wasn’t working. Making the CU work was a top priority. Through support to SCT, that strongly addressed EAC’s top priority. Attention to borders was a top priority, for free movement of people, goods, and services. Other priorities: increasing trade. That, obviously, is a top priority for countries. TMEA for the reasons mentioned did not really contribute much towards that.’

In particular, public-private dialogues have been particularly effective with the East African Business Council (EABC)\(^{161}\). EABC in Tanzania focuses on regional integration and trade development with the mandate of advocating for private sector interests in regional integration: ‘EABC is the avenue through which private sector, civil society and others are brought into regional integration discussions (through consultative dialogue framework). We have a space to tell our policy issues as high as the summits’. The respondent continued: ‘EABC is recognised by all policy makers. We harmonise private sector positions at regional level. We are the cement of the private sector regional integration process. In the recent summit we gave our opinions from private sector and they reaffirmed the leading role of private sector in regional integration.’ Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) in Kenya has a membership of 950, 500 small, medium, and large manufacturers working in fourteen sectors including construction, mining, and electrical. TMEA supports KAM on capacity building of SMEs in market linkages (especially EAC and COMESA markets) and access to finance.

11.2.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

Government handovers, policy pivots, election periods, and instability and other security issues had important effects on export capability projects. For example, interview data indicated that in Tanzania, after the 2015 elections, the government changed its mind to allow Rwandan freight forwarders to take business. During S1, most countries had several agencies responsible for issuing permits, and often traders were subject to multiple requirements that represent a barrier to entry both in terms of the costs and time for accessing the permits, but also because traders must get information about all the requirements for their products. This was exacerbated in 2018 in Kenya, when a new and powerful authority charged with leading anti-counterfeit efforts was introduced. Respondents reported that the way laws were applied was now unclear, and inspection times were increasing again, due to new requirements for 100% inspection. EC participant groups did not report facing these challenges, but one buyer/aggregator of small producers’ horticultural projects did confirm that the new requirements were adding time and cost to exports. Major importers interviewed also confirmed the problems.

Kenya has introduced devolution – which had an effect on SO3, requiring an increased budget to cater for the devolved government system and counties were imposing NTBs. According to TMEA Kenya engagement at the county level could have been better given the new devolution county structures and that they should have aligned their strategy with local counties and consult the county governments especially those on the corridors and at nodes. Again, this was not reported directly by EC projects but was reported by those who may be involved in moving larger shipments of their goods.

It was reported by the private sector partners that ‘Market perception was that Burundi was a tough market from which to export coffee’ following the conflict in the country. The TMEA-supported FPEAK project that worked


\(^{161}\) An apex body of private sector associations and corporations in East Africa with the purpose of driving the EAC integration process through trade and investment.
with farmers co-operatives to link them with buyers could not work in all countries as planned, because of the political crisis in Burundi.

Political stability and security in the region were suggested to be an important factor in affecting the programme performance and its relevance across the region and no country seemed to be immune from it. Burundian ‘chaos’ was said (by a Government partner in Rwanda) to have led to loss of the market in Bujumbura and Rwandan distribution centre in Burundi. The Tourism project could not be implemented in Burundi due to civil unrest hence only Uganda and Rwanda realised substantial results. TMEA Uganda also highlighted the effects of political instability in South Sudan: When the war broke out in South Sudan businesses reported losing money which was one of the key export markets for Uganda. Discussions with the donors working in the same field suggested that the majority of exports (maize and beans) were still informal. South Sudan was suggested to have a dysfunctional government without certain government authorities, such as Revenue Authority, which complicated the trade with the country. Informal maize export prices were affected for the last three-four years when the situation there became difficult and Uganda shifted to the bigger Kenya market, and South Sudan contracts were not honoured. The Burundian conflict has largely affected the trade across the Rwanda-Burundi border as well as the DRC security issues were also influential for Uganda. EAC PS was argued to be at different development stages as stated by a donor organisation in Uganda: ‘…Before they seemed to work together very quickly. …And these countries were at almost different levels of growth, and you want them to coordinate and work together.’

Different and conflicting interests and priorities also undermined the work. For example, in Tanzania, according to one TMEA staffer, government did not want to engage with the private sector. The private sector, in turn, wanted the government to change their agenda to meet EAC rules, but politicians have made other changes so meeting EAC rules has become a more distant goal. Some EAC countries pushed for more transparency in export to enhance trade, but others did not like it. According to a donor organisation interviewed: Ugandan government is argued to have started shifting its priority focus from agriculture towards the oil industry given the recent oil discovery.

It is suggested that ‘The spirit of EAC integration is not good’. In particular, a ‘coalition of the willing’, consisting of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda wanted high-speed integration and side-lined other EAC countries, but Burundi and Tanzania were not given the option to benefit. The imposition of a Kenya railway-development levy of 1.5% of the CIF value of imported goods infringed the Customs Union Protocol. This created a big problem that lasted several years until Kenya and Tanzania agreed to remove their extra levies. In 2016-17, the global price of pulses declined, and prices plummeted from $120 to $15/10kg as a result of which farmers made losses and the market collapsed, with low prices sending pulses to animal feed. In 2015, Tanzania declared a rice shortage, banned rice exports to Rwanda and Uganda and imported 200,000 tonnes of rice from Pakistan, which was not to be re-exported. Rwanda and Uganda then claimed that the rice imported from Pakistan remained in Tanzania and that the export ban should be lifted, according to a TMEA staffer. Private sector confirmed the rise of (trade) protectionism in EAC: ‘One partner state is refusing certain goods based on a disagreement between heads of state. …We need to work on denial of preferential treatment for political reasons. But the honeymoon is definitely over.’

However, a couple of respondents claim that there was no effect of political economy on the programme while another in Rwanda suggested a positive effect since political economy events have helped them to upgrade what they were doing for the entire value chain, improving their capabilities to serve their business people from farmers to traders.

11.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

Across the countries, there is a variety of other ongoing initiatives that TMEA SO3 export capability portfolio complements. These initiatives are led by both government as well as donors. Among the government initiatives, there are a National Export Development Strategy and Industry Policy in Uganda as well as Uganda AgroBusiness Alliance, Uganda Manufacturers Associations, and the Ministry for EAC Affairs. In Kenya, the government is focusing on ‘the Big Four Agenda’: ‘The agencies are realigning to those four, namely housing, agriculture, manufacturing and health. Lots of focus on agriculture. Till 2022 at least; it’s an acceleration of 2030 Vision.’ The government-led activities are argued to be prone to changes. For example, according to one TMEA staffer, ‘organisations active in the sector are mainly governmental. This leads to changing regimes and power changes that come with unwritten policies and led that alter performance.’

Among the donor-led initiatives, respondents mention EU, SIDA and WB in Uganda; EU support ‘green’ hotels, WB improves product knowledge through publications, while UNDP is improving business ecosystem in tourism and USAID financing the government in the conservation sector in Uganda. AbiTRUST and USAID work on grain trade policy, while AGRA supports inputs and productions and WFP is engaged in post-harvest handling, Kilimo Trust in Uganda. In Kenya, there is an engagement with Netherlands on training centre, USAID, and Global Communities/USDA. In Rwanda, there are CBI, ITC, GIZ, UNIDO, among others.

According to a TMEA staffer, numerous NGOs work in this sector too e.g. CARE International, World vision, New faces New Voices, and International Alert, suggesting ‘there is enormous potential for more inputs to TMEA’s SO3 activities, so there is room many others without duplication.’

According to the private sector respondents, TMEA complements other ongoing initiatives. One private sector partner stated: ‘Where TMEA is involved a lot is physical infrastructure to facilitate trade like OSBPs, modernisation of the port – for us we’re looking at the soft side, where we think there’s a need for trade policy. We can work more and more effectively when the soft support is attended to. So, it’s complementary but the soft side presents the greater challenges.’ Others echoed these findings: ‘TMEA’s work in other value chains for perishable products helped their project to be successful. They export coffee by sea and all the work along the corridor undertaken by TMEA was important to them – mostly they go through Mombasa but sometimes Dar depending on the buyer’s preference. So, corridor work is important, mostly the northern corridor but also the central corridor.’ Similarly, another private sector actor stated: ‘Since TMEA is promoting regional trade through facilitation by reducing time taken to import and export goods by automating our auction, we align ourselves with SO3 making our tea very competitive in both the region and world markets.’

11.3 Coherence and coordination

11.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

The strengths and weaknesses of the working model seem to vary from one country to the other as the experience of working with TMEA varies for different partners. What is obvious across the projects and countries is that TMEA is effective in bringing together and working with a variety of partners including the private sector and media.

TMEA staff suggests that implementing activates through partners is better than doing it themselves as it allows a wider impact although there is a risk of not having enough. TMEA Rwanda suggests that the current working model incorporates two important perspectives: the country director provides strategy for a project based on country realities, while the regional technical leads knows about regional constraints. This provides a wider range of ways to customise TMEA interventions in Rwanda and does not require more time for decision-making. The planning of procurement is centralised and undertaken by the regional office which could be a long process but once the project starts it proceeds quickly. According to a private sector partner, TMEA’s model of access to finances is faster and easier than with other donors and employees are flexible and available at all time. In contrast, one of the partners in Uganda suggests that TMEA approvals from Nairobi were slow and problems were all along from the due diligence, change of management up to slow absorption capacity and beneficiaries feeling disconnected from the project.

Engaging with stakeholders including those from the private sector from the beginning and working with them throughout the implementation and conclusion of the project is key to the success (e.g. technical meetings, formation of networks, coordination across different issues, preparatory meetings, advocacy events among others). The TMEA team argued that good coordination between government, private sector and civil society leads to ownership and sustainability. In particular, engaging government (central and national e.g. county level), their buy-in, and breaking working in silos are crucial for the model to be effective as well as the capacity of partner institutions and their engagement. Donors interviewed agreed that working with governments openly and making work plans available to the public are helpful to avoid duplications although TMEA’s work plans are argued yet to be seen. Similarly, there is a suggestion from one private sector partner in Kenya that TMEA needs to improve its communication with the partners, be more organised and understand the sectors they support.

11.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

According to the interview responses from the TMEA SO3 leads, the SO3 component reported to the country directors and received technical support from the TMEA HQs, although there was no specific finding in relation
to the export capability component. TMEA HQs also visited the country teams when needed although such visits could have been more, according to one TMEA staffer in Tanzania. Likewise, TMEA Rwanda suggested that ‘…The component worked with the results team in Nairobi: setting baselines and working on mid-term evaluations and end of project evaluations; determining technical inputs, providing references, evaluating reports, and reviewing quarterly report, outputs and communications. According to TMEA HQ, ‘Good learnings from the three structures – some were better others. A combination of regional and country-specific implementation seemed best. Regional programme was very efficient, and you could do cross-cutting studies.’ It was also highlighted at the TMEA country level that it was important to keep a balance between the regional and national level involvement to avoid unnecessary involvement in operations by the regional staff. However, TMEA HQ agreed that coordination between the regional and national could have been better: ‘We were not as good at bringing everyone along, we could have done better at that, but didn’t get full engagement from countries. Country-level management struggled to get involved with regional components.’ And there were not enough resources to work on regional and national projects, according to TMEA HQ: ‘As the last component to come on (2016), resources were limited – just one staffer working on this. Supporting regional projects and countries was a real stretch’.

TMEA also promoted close communication and coordination between the counterparts implementing these components. Opportunities to capitalise on synergies between activities pursued and implemented by different agencies were to certain extent exploited. Given the interrelated nature of some of the programme components, leveraging synergies between them was quite important to successful implementation. For example, TWIN in Rwanda benefited from other TMEA funded projects including value chain development for perishable products as well as other projects along the Central Corridor, such as development of OSBPs, elimination of NTBs among others, as TWIN relied on Dar Port to export coffee to overseas markets.

11.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

There are four ways of how the model is bringing greater results than the sum of its parts. First, it is suggested that the design of the projects and programmes are done in such a way that they complement each other within TMEA but also do so with other ongoing initiatives. For example, according to a private sector partner in Kenya: ‘By supporting the Tea Directorate to automate its processes and services, it created synergies with our own automation of the tea auction.’

Secondly, TMEA designs projects to address the problem holistically for example, according to a TMEA staffer: ‘…ports, revenue systems, borders, corridor and roads improvements, trade and export strategy work with the Ministry of Trade, working with informal and women traders, getting farmers to be export ready, working with Bureau of Standards to reduce testing time and increase efficiency in testing samples, regional integration work and also reducing NTBs and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs).’

Thirdly, there are forums where coordination and partnership take place such as NOC which brings together the representative of partners and donors to achieve synergies and reduce duplications of projects at donor and government level. Both TMEA and its partners emphasised the value of NOC for co-operation: ‘They put us in touch with various forums where we wanted to engage. We appreciated their contact people and brainstormed with them’. ‘Therefore, achieved synergies by including more bodies / agencies in actions. TMEA was also invited to join existing forums e.g. UWEAL Steering Committee.

Fourthly, synergies were achieved through specific units/bodies. For example, as stated by TMEA Rwanda, ‘the Rwandan MINICOM’s cross-border trade unit provided oversight to all cross-border trade interventions in Rwanda’ while honey working group in Rwanda brought together different government agencies to discuss the issues around the honey production, processing and marketing which was set up with the help of TMEA.

However, there are a few cases when better synergies could have been achieved especially with regard to beneficiaries. According to one donor organisation in Uganda, there was good coordination and synergies at pooling of resources but not at implementation. TMEA, USAID’s East Africa Trade and Investment Hub (EATIH) and other organisations “…could have sat and agreed on how the support to the beneficiaries should have gone to different aspects in case of a common beneficiary, …The beneficiaries had to attend many meetings and trainings which could have had a negative effect on their productivity. The beneficiaries could have been fatigued. Some organisations should have worked in different areas or for different groups e.g., male traders, female traders, etc.” TMEA Tanzania also emphasised that there was a lack of synergy in relation to cross-cutting issues: ‘S1 did not have strong cross-cutting themes so synergies were not emphasized. It took some time before SOs 1 and 2 worked together.’
11.3.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

Across the TMEA portfolio teams there is a consensus that having both country and regional level offices is strategic for building a holistic approach since ‘regional technical leads provide the advantage of a broader perspective.’ ‘A regional perspective informs the TMEA institutional structure. This creates programme synergies so that at no point does a country implement a programme that does not have a regional perspective. This ensures coherence across the programme.’ At the same time, there is flexibility for the national TMEAs to customise the regional approach to a national approach and to align the resources available to address the needs of each country of operation. This is also echoed by a donor organisation in Uganda, who suggests that each TMEA country’s NOC decides for their own countries since they know the priorities of their countries better than those from other countries.

However, as highlighted by the TMEA country teams, constraints did arise because of centralised corporate services at HQ when approval processes were delayed e.g. administration, procurement, and human resources. There was also suggested to be an issue with TMEA accessibility to the private sector partners, as stated by one private sector partner in Kenya: ‘TMEA should be facilitative. Are they creating a WB-type organisation?’

A few interviewers suggested that they have not come in contact with the TMEA’s governance in their work apart from working with TMEA country offices. For example, one civil society organisation in Uganda suggested that they had a vague knowledge of TMEA governance since they only interacted with the country office. Some projects had interactions with several TMEA country offices, e.g. one private sector partner in Rwanda worked with TMEA Rwanda and Burundi offices and except the funding delays did not experience other complications.

11.3.5 DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

According to the TMEA staff responses, the operational model at donor level was appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA: ‘The donors’ operational model was efficient for achieving TMEA’s outcomes. Problems, if any, are TMEA’s own in implementation. Donors are strict about feedback, regular evaluations, and audits. This makes partners feel uncomfortable. Other projects may have lesser requirements, but donors want to know how their money being spent, which is justified: does TMEA achieve the results in its results framework’. ‘A good model. …All donors understood and approved TMEA’s way of working. There was no need for different reporting for each donor’.

The positive feedback about the model is also echoed by donors who ‘ensured that there was no duplication of projects. At one time, there were 21 donor-funded projects supporting the promotion of potatoes in Kabale. This arrangement eliminates these duplications.’

The private sector respondent suggests that they know donors exist, but they do not interact with them.

11.3.6 DEQ5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

Similar to other components, EC uses the NOC to engage with partners. The NOC model promotes ownership by having national leaders in charge, and impact by holding projects accountable. A Uganda participant compared the NOC to having to go to ‘court’: ‘It harmonised the stakeholders. NOC was like a court but good. It had many important people like the Commissioner General of URA once chaired the NOC.’ Apart from NOC, alignment was reported to take place in the incorporation of government feedback through constant engagement. Similarly, a TMEA staffer in Tanzania said the TCP was 95% aligned with local agencies and systems, based on TMEA first identifying interventions, assessing which agency can play what role, and bringing together partners that can collaborate to deliver the programme. If capacities are weak, then TMEA strengthen their capacities to ‘help TMEA achieve what they are trying to do.’

From a government perspective, one respondent in Rwanda said TMEA ‘is aligned with their priorities without imposing their own agenda on them. Among NGOs, [they] would choose to work with TMEA.’ Another agency’s representative in Rwanda said they ‘got stakeholders involved to make sure what TMEA was doing was widely agreed.’

On the negative side, a tourism board representative in one country said they ‘ticked the donor boxes’ in terms of alignment but that changes during implementation forced them away from their original plan. The respondent
said it felt as if the organisation had to align with donors, more than the other way around. A coffee project in one country said that TMEA was 'rigid' in its mandate and left the project without flexibility to course-correct; the problem, this respondent said, was that the problem for growers was productivity, not certification and getting premium prices – but as TMEA's goal was the latter, the project felt they had to comply.

11.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others' development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

There was a consensus that donor coordination exists and that it has improved, as in this report from a donor representative in Uganda: 'Now donors talk to each other. They have the working group(s). There is no more fighting for space among donors: 'They give the money and state the results they want, fund and look for achievements jointly. All achievements can be claimed by all donors.' According to a partner in Tanzania, TMEA worked and coordinated well with ITC and UN Women in cross border projects. One group set up, strengthened cross border platforms, and encouraged women to attend border community meetings, while TMEA completed trainings, worked on market access issues and put in place an SMS reporting system. The third organisation UN Women established a platform for women in cross border trade so that they could voice their issues. UN women phased out in 2016 but TMEA continued and built on the prior programming.

However, it is admitted that it took time to improve coordination. A TMEA staffer in Rwanda suggested that coordination improved over the course of S1 when TMEA and other donors began to work together. A TMEA team lead in Kenya attributes such improvement to TMEA: 'Coordination has greatly improved among actors with TMEA support. For example, through the port charter platform and several other public private dialogue mechanisms initiated and supported by TMEA, there is great evidence of better coordination and focus on delivery of results. TMEA is also directly involved in coordination through its management structures e.g. NOC, Board and Council meetings. These structures provide direction on implementation.' In Uganda, one respondent said, ‘donor coordination has improved over time through donor coordination meetings and NOC'.

However, there is a call for more donor inputs to support the activities: ‘There is enormous potential for more inputs to TMEA’s SO3 activities, so there’s room for many others without duplication, according to a staff member in Rwanda. And a Uganda donor said coordination could still be better.’

11.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

There are a variety of approaches suggested by the respondents as being successful in working with regional institutions such as the EAC, foremost among them TMEA’s own responsive and flexible, demand-driven approach, according to a Kenyan TMEA respondent. Working through the TMEA Arusha office was helpful for a Tanzanian SO3 project lead, because of the close relationship TMEA has with EAC staff. A Rwanda team member noted that the suite of regional bodies, including COMESA, gave status to TMEA-sponsored efforts.

It was also beneficial to link with EAC initiatives on the ground, reported a Rwanda TMEA team member, as the TMEA efforts at awareness-raising were aided by linking with an EAC cross-border trade initiative. Similar reports came from Ugandan and Tanzanian TMEA teams, who felt their work, when backed by the EAC, was more legitimate. A Uganda donor representative noted that work with EABC brought together private sector organisations that together had much more advocacy and lobbying power than tackling a problem from a national perspective.

Lobbying the GoT was also reported to be a successful tactic in Tanzania: ‘When an activity has a link to regional issues, [such as] when there were policy issues linked to the implementation of the Common Market Protocol (CMP), it was important to lobby government about common market protocol issues (e.g. for change of national polices and laws to comply with the protocol’s targets set for each country, such as eliminating NTBs, etc.). Lobbying made sense so that Tanzania’s private sector could benefit’ and the government took seriously those concerns related to the EAC CMP. The same respondent collaborated with national partners that have a specific mandate to intervene in regional matters, namely, a standards bureau.
11.4 Sustainability

11.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

There are different ways of understanding sustainability among the respondents but most of them suggest that benefits of the TMEA-supported projects will be sustainable. For some, it is about financial sustainability. A TMEA staff member said one project would be sustainable ‘because the private sector has invested in it. It has 70% funded by the private sector; TMEA is gradually withdrawing funds and support from that. The rest requires constant vigilance and push back against the policies that can reverse everything put in place.’ Other EC projects were at risk when they were totally dependent on TMEA financing, according to one donor respondent: ‘There was no element of cost sharing. They gave 100% financial support to some organisations […] When they delayed to fund, some platforms collapsed. [These projects are] still funded 100% and there is no exit strategy.’

Larger producers in EC projects were reported to be more successful at sustaining than their smaller counterparts, for example from a Rwanda EC project: ‘bigger farmers are likely to continue to use certification and then export because they benefit from economies of scale.’ Smaller farmers struggled to bear certification costs. A similar challenge is faced by private sector respondents in Kenya where the partners were ‘working on a formula that will be acceptable to members/stakeholders to pay for the amount that can be used to sustain the system beyond donor support.’ In Uganda, financial sustainability was also an issue for upgrading systems after TMEA is gone since this is costly for the company on its own, according to a private sector respondent. Other partners seemed to feel protected once they had a certification: ‘Companies cannot go back after earning their global Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) certification and seeing the benefits of it,’ according to a government official referring to an EC project’s participants. A Kenya private sector respondent agreed: ‘[It’s about creating] awareness and linking farmers to importers. Farmers will continue with the GAPs because it means market access.’

Some skills that were taught are considered to be sustainable, according to a project implementer in Tanzania; this was echoed by a Rwandan civil servant who said TMEA trained not only the implementers but also their partners. A TMEA staffer in Rwanda said that knowledge creation around the value chain was sustainable: ‘The knowledge of how to trade will not quickly disappear. Growth of knowledge of value-added technologies should continue, expanding into new markets.’

Government’s interests and involvement were reported to be a prerequisite for sustainability, for example, for EC investments at borders: ‘Engagement in cross border trade will sustain because government is also creating the enabling environment for this’, according to a civil society EC partner. Similarly, in Kenya, tourism project results like the National Tourism Blueprint 2030 are argued to be sustainable since tourism is a leading economic sector that can help the government achieve another national policy Vision 2030. By extension, when projects are not prioritised at government levels, sustainability is threatened: ‘initiatives to eliminate NTBs and [ensure] issuance of certificates of origin are ongoing but it is a continuous struggle’ according to a TMEA staffer in Tanzania. A Kenya private sector respondent noted the importance of formalised government engagement: ‘a structured approach of joint action plans.’

Selecting the right partners by conducting an initial situation assessment was said to be important for sustainability. For example, a Rwanda government partner said it was key to be careful when selecting target markets and identifying challenges. Supporting a cross-stakeholder approach was also reported to sustainability: ‘Private sector, with government, and with civil society, helps structure linkages that will last as well as linking via platforms’ said a Ugandan TMEA staffer. A private sector respondent in Uganda echoed the sentiment: ‘Together as a platform it’s a better model to inform the government of our preferences. […] The government is listening more to [our] sector than when [we] dealt independently with associations.’

Ownership is said to go hand in hand with sustainability, according to a Kenyan TMEA representative and a Uganda donor: ‘Local persons being owners of the new policies – grassroots stakeholders – they are more likely to accept and enforce implementation’.

Respondents to the PGIS added that they would sustain their new formal status because their businesses did better as a result, and because ‘Our understanding has been changed: we don’t want to smuggle anymore.’
11.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

It is widely reported that stakeholders’ engagement throughout the programme has improved, according to TMEA staff in Tanzania, for one: ‘Stakeholder engagement has expanded from S1 to S2. Originally there was only narrow engagement. The base is now broadened by sector and is attracting strong actors. Stakeholder engagement is strengthened by participation in various bodies (NOC, Project Steering Committees, annual retreats, quarterly review, and planning meetings with partners), reported a Kenyan team member. Mainstreaming and formalising producers has been part of the EC programming, so the sector feels more engaged.’

The lesson most commonly cited across the EC respondents is that of engaging and partnering with stakeholders in various sectors: ‘Partnership between private sector and development partners leads to improved outcomes’, said a private sector respondent in Kenya. Staying above politics while partnering with local agencies was reported to be vital. Processes should be participatory and adaptive, according to another Kenyan private sector respondent, because it is about ownership.

The technical assistance organisations received was said to comprise important inputs for ongoing sustainability, including the capacity to implement, financial management, gender mainstreaming and monitoring and evaluation.

11.5 DEQ2.3 Effectiveness: Contribution Tracing

11.5.1 DEQ2.3 To what extent has TMEA contributed to improving business competitiveness?

The goal of PIO 3.2 was to improve the competitiveness of high value sectors both in regional and national markets, such as tea, horticultural products, coffee, and maize, with a focus on landlocked countries. Export capability (EC) is important to the Business Competitiveness SO because exporting widens the market available to domestic producers and thus increases potential demand and the prospects for higher prices. TMEA worked on several projects at the level of farmer’s organisations (co-operatives, companies, aggregators) to improve business competitiveness, where TMEA report having a distinct comparative advantage. Larger scale production would lead to economies of scale, reducing unit costs, increasing competitiveness, and boosting profit margins for domestic producers.

The PIO budget was limited: from the first projects in 2011 to the end of S1, the PIO spent less than $15m. The PIO started with three sub-sets of interventions: trade in services, quality- and standards-related interventions, and export capability projects. Under trade in services, most of the work undertaken was in one set of tourism projects in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Kenya. The other two sub-sets – quality and standards, and export capability projects, could be said to have overlapped: projects assigned to the latter also touched on standards and quality, and projects assigned to quality and standards supported export capability. The evaluation team looked specifically at a set of projects in this second group as they had more in common, including outcome indicators, and therefore allowed for a somewhat more meaningful case study of achievements.

At this level, the scale of projects was generally small, and timelines were short as many of these were towards the end of S1. The contribution claim that forms the focus for the evaluation under this PIO is:

Through helping target sectors improve business competitiveness, TMEA contributed to increased export of those goods.

These interventions began with market analysis to identify gaps and opportunities in selected value chains or sectors that aligned with the TMEA mandate. Once this process had engaged stakeholder committees and identified gaps and their root causes, the team conducted design and high-level planning for the projects. In some cases, the projects developed and adopted new standards, as in the case of sesame in Uganda in 2016, or implemented EAC or global standards in other cases through training farmers, trainers, and auditors. The latter also developed and enacted by-laws/ordinances (such as on maize standards) on enforcement and implementation of standards.

Key activities from the different projects included market analysis; stakeholder committee discussions; sensitisation meetings and technical trainings on standards for farmers, trainers, and auditors; and exchange visits for SMEs and farmers’ groups. Where standards were already in place and implemented, projects pursued market linkages through sales missions and capacity building on negotiating price for better grades. Besides policy and technical engagements at the local and national levels to ensure government buy-in and facilitate
formulation of legal frameworks, TMEA conducted sensitisation meetings and technical trainings, training of trainers (ToTs), and learning exchange visits for companies and farmer groups. Simplified materials on standards were produced, translated into local languages, and disseminated during these trainings, which played a pivotal role in the transfer of knowledge and practices. In other cases, where standards were already in place and implemented, the projects pursued market linkages and capacity building on negotiating price for better grades. In Rwanda, the purpose of the Market Linkages Programme delivered by Traidlinks was to improve export market research for specific products, and eventually to facilitate face-to-face business to business (B2B) sessions along with sales missions between Rwandan exporters and potential importers in the export markets. The goals of linking farmers to government extension services were pursued on a small scale. In Tanzania, women traders were linked to the Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO) with TMEA support for them to get access to various support services, such as exemption from product registration fee (under TBS), along with market and production information disseminated by SIDO. Key themes resulted in a set of project examples:

- Capacity building and implementing recognised international standards (e.g. Global G.A.P, ISO 22000:2005, Fairtrade, and Rainforest Alliance) to coffee, tea, and horticulture sectors (e.g. French beans);
- Upgrading quality standards for staples; and
- Export development promotion, enhancing market access, and linkages of producers with potential buyers in Rwanda.

More information on these, including country-specific examples, can be found in this document covering the entire PIO, and in Annex N in the CT Case Study data tables (with additional narrative on the projects, as well as specific data and sources).

Evidence from TMEA country offices, HQ and project actors support the finding that activities were delivered, though not all projects engaged in all of the activities, given project diversity. Market analyses and marketing initiatives were conducted for some projects, as were sales missions. Some worked at the level of training farmers, trainers, and auditors to improve quality across bigger farmers' organisations. Again, the nature of these multiple, smaller projects meant that activities were not homogeneous. While it is therefore not possible to substantiate all activities cited in the CT case for all projects, TMEA provided some documentation on many projects and this was supplemented by evaluation interviews with partner organisations and (through the PGIS) with beneficiaries. As with other project groups in the TMEA portfolio, particularly in SO3, capacity varied among implementers.

Documents from TMEA country offices and HQ and interviews with project actors evidenced these activities; these included partnership documents (MoUs, contracts, ToRs and grant agreements); design documents including two PARS and two baseline and market studies; government documentation; training materials; simplified guides on standards (including illustrated booklets); photos of trainings, workshops and meetings; training certificates; project monitoring plans; end of project reports, and evaluation reports commissioned by TMEA but carried out by external contractors. Although some of the original documents were not seen, such as meeting minutes from stakeholder consultation sessions, and training attendee lists, the rest of the documentation obtained confirms and supports these activities robustly.

**Outputs** included trained farmer groups, standards adopted at country and individual level, and increased collaboration between government and the private sector. Rwanda TMEA staff added an indicator on the creation of business plans for exports.

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163 The PE team saw one of these cartoon books on a TMEA staffer's computer and noted the drawings are almost exclusively of men. While this does not answer an evaluation question per se, the literature on adult learning and change management suggests that seeing one's peers undertake a task is more likely to result in one taking up that skill.
Table 25: CT Case Study: Export Capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused the outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer groups or companies (entities) trained on standards</td>
<td>Virtually Certain Evidence: partner reports and evaluations; participant training satisfaction surveys; evaluation interviews with partners and beneficiaries</td>
<td>Virtually Certain Evidence: partner and beneficiary interviews; TMEA reports and meeting minutes; partnership/grant agreements; media briefs on some projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers, groups, and countries adopt standards and good practices</td>
<td>Likely Evidence: gazetting of sesame standards; bylaws and ordinances developed for some projects; evaluation interviews with project implementers</td>
<td>Virtually Certain Evidence: partner and beneficiary interviews; numbers and PDFs of certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration between government and private sector increased</td>
<td>As likely as not Evidence: stakeholder forum notes, approval processes, end of project reports and meeting notes; government participation in implementation from reports on particular cases around sanctions</td>
<td>As likely as not Evidence: TMEA reports on market linkages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported business consultants assisted exporters w/ export business plans</td>
<td>As likely as not Evidence: evaluation of one large EC project reported externally of the capacity building of local business consultants for this purpose</td>
<td>As likely as not Evidence: partner interviews showing TMEA involvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through re-creating a ToC for this component (please see the response to DEQ5.1 in this chapter), the PE team identified the two bold outputs above as critical for the results chain leading specifically to the outcome claim of increased exports – a critical goal for the Partner States as well. Indicators on increased collaboration with government and support for business planning may have helped some projects achieve their goals but were not convincingly tied to the results logic, and were considered ancillary to the CT case. Interviews with partners also confirmed that other donors worked on agricultural value chains, but with other actors and on other aspects of programming. Project respondents confirmed TMEA’s support was unique for their value chains. One such example happened in Rwanda, where UNIDO supported an ISO standard for food safety starting in 2010.164

The main outputs for purposes of the case study are the delivery of trainings on commodity standards and export capability, and the adoption of good practices and standards. Both take the form of counting farmer groups or entities. While these outputs were found to be achieved for some projects, they were not needed in others; one challenge with the EC component was the wide diversity among the projects, making indicators especially difficult. The number of groups or companies trained on commodity standards and export capability, resulting in increased awareness, and understanding of standards, is found in the RF. However, RF data are unclear: some countries reported individual farmers and some reported entities trained. The PE team reviewed end of project reports (FPEAK, SEATINI, TWCC), project monitoring plans (EATTA and FPEAK), project close-out reports (Traidlinks), and post-training reports (SEATINI and TWCC), and interviewed project actors.

These documents and site visits to some projects provided more information on the trainings. The FPEAK End of Project Report indicates that the project sensitised 8,155 farmers (reached directly) on the EAGAP standards in four countries in East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi). According to EATTA Monitoring Plan over 700 people were sensitised and trained by EATTA in ISO 22000:2005 across the EAC region. The RF also indicates that TWIN trained 620 farmers in total (20 coffee washing stations (CWS) on good practices applicable to CWS (500 farmers) and 120 farmers on coffee quality control) and two coffee co-operatives in Rwanda on lean methodology to improve efficiency at wet mills). 550 women in three zonal sites in Tanzania were trained on standards, food safety, rules and regulations and compliance requirements as well as premise inspection and registration, product certification and registration, labelling, packing, and packaging.

Evidence from the PE fieldwork suggested increased awareness and adoption of good standards among the companies and farmers trained, but data on this were not collected systematically. The projects’ logic is that farmer groups would adopt and maintain good standards if they were getting higher prices, which can happen through certification or better markets. Since (as is shown below) certification happened less frequently than

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164 UNIDO in collaboration with the Rwanda Bureau of Standards (RSB) launched in 2010 a training programme to encourage the implementation of, and certification to, ISO 22000:2005, food safety management systems. For further information, see https://www.iso.org/news/2010/08/Ref1606.html
hoped for some EC projects, it is possible that farmer groups would not maintain improved practices if their buyers would necessarily not pay more for the improved produce.\textsuperscript{165}

The adoption of good practices was supported by interviews with project participants as part of the PGIS, and by project reports and interviews with implementers. In terms of the adoption of standards – which was not part of all projects – there is evidence of the gazetting of a sesame standard and WTO’s announcement of Uganda’s new standard, as well as bylaws and ordinances where these were adopted locally, that provide confidence in the outputs for those projects.

However, the RF data are unclear, making the actual figure of number of groups trained or adopting good practices uncertain, so the scale of the outputs is difficult to determine. And, obviously, where projects did not require training in standards, they are not captured in the RF or in this case study.

The evidence confirms that it is ‘Virtually Certain’ farmers groups (or co-operatives or companies) were trained by the project, and that TMEA was responsible for the training. Across farm value chain projects, standards or good practices adoption was ‘Likely’, though TMEA’s contribution to those goals was ‘Virtually Certain’ – more data collection was necessary to substantiate the ongoing use of good practices and standards.

Other outputs that were not specified in the RF but offered by TMEA include ‘increased collaboration between government and private sector’ and ‘number of exporters supported through export advisory services in Rwanda.’ Although the latter is a national level output, it speaks directly to TMEA’s export promotion efforts at the regional level and substantiates influence claims. This is manifested in Rwanda’s incorporation of the TMEA’s Market Linkages Programme’s Export Advisory Initiative (EAI)\textsuperscript{166} into its revised National Export Strategy (NES), indicating collaboration between government and private sector, the first indicator suggested by TMEA. These export promotion efforts, in Rwanda at least, did succeed; partly due to the good alignment with the Government’s policy priorities. In a similar fashion, the SEATINI End of Project Report indicates that the project enabled formalisation of CSOs’ engagement with government agencies and their inputs into policy processes. According to TWCC Post-training Final Report, TFDA and TBS were also closely engaged in the delivery of trainings on product certification requirements and standards.

On the second ancillary indicator, it was reported that in Rwanda nine out of 19 trainees were awarded a certificate under EAI upon successful completion of the course. The evaluation of the Export Development Programme (Rwanda and Burundi) stated that their services largely remained limited to larger companies. Market demand for these services is not clear and so is the suitability of the course content and structure to the candidates’ needs and availability as reflected in high dropout rates.

Collaboration between government and private sector and the assistance in creating business plans were not deemed necessary for the increase in exports to have taken place. As such these have been deemed ancillary and not considered as part of the results chain for the overall EC case study.

For the key contribution claim, several pieces of data were available in the TMEA RF.

**Table 26: Outcomes: Export capability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in export revenue for entities supported</td>
<td><strong>Likely</strong> Partner data on export volume, value, and quality (but with unclear targets)</td>
<td><strong>Very Likely</strong> Evidence on inputs/outputs above confirming TMEA involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rwanda tea increased average 0.15% and about a third for certified producers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Traidlinks: larger companies increased exports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Export value up 36% and 24% in two Kenya sites.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Uganda maize farm prices from 400 to 1600 Ush</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entities certified</td>
<td><strong>Likely</strong> Traidlinks case and factsheet; export project evaluation; Partner databases, project monitoring plans</td>
<td><strong>Very Likely</strong> TMEA case studies on beneficiaries’ perspectives; evaluation interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in the number of people</td>
<td><strong>Likely</strong> Formative evaluation and case studies on one programme cites 38 full time jobs; coffee projects say 1,247</td>
<td><strong>Likely</strong> TMEA was the only project that supported FPEAK and EATTA during the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{165} A baseline survey of women traders in Tanzania sheds light onto export readiness of women-owned businesses in food processing, detergents and cosmetics sectors prior to trainings and could be used to track standards adoption and certification of trainees.

\textsuperscript{166} This was a 6-month training course on planning, market entry strategies, basics of international trade fairs and exhibitions, export costing and pricing, export logistics, packaging, labelling, standards, selling in foreign markets, financing export trade, and consulting basics.
For the key contribution claim, TMEA and their RF made several pieces of data available, around increased export revenues, certification of farmer entities, new jobs, access to new markets (or re-access to previous markets), reduction in rejections of goods, implementation of standards, and improving internal business practices. The evaluation examined each of these through data from TMEA and in partner and beneficiary interviews, review of documents and reports, and some site visits.

**Export revenues**: TMEA claimed to have achieved an increase in export revenues for the companies and farmer groups supported across the EAC region except for Tanzania. There are no data for Tanzania at the outcome level. This outcome was substantiated with the data collected by the implementing partners for reporting to TMEA. FPEAK data show that from 2014 to 2015, total value of French beans exported increased by 36% in Mwea and 24% in Meru in Kenya. A group of tea brokers reported better prices and profits due to the programme, according to their *Annual Project Performance Report* (Jul 2013-Jun 2014).

The final evaluation of *Export Development Programme (Rwanda and Burundi)* found that the programme successfully developed export capacities of enterprises and linked them to buyers, contributing to the increased export revenues for them: that is, the value of exports to the EAC region from supported enterprises in Rwanda increased from US$1.5 million in 2012 to US$15 million in 2015. No further information is given in the report, but an implementing partner in Rwanda confirmed this overall figure. The US$1 million figure reported by TMEA in its RF is assumed to be TMEA’s outcome claim for the amount of change for which they felt responsible.

In PGIS focus group discussions (FGDs) with women entrepreneurs supported by TMEA, export increases were cited at Elegu (but not Nimule) and in Nairobi, Kenya, but other sites visited (Hoima and Kampala, Uganda, and Nimule, South Sudan) said they had not had increases in their exports or their incomes. This was attributed to increased input prices, competition from Chinese and national imports, inflation affecting customers’ purchasing power along with poor exchange rates, and border taxes.

The Uganda Staples Project report impresses differences in the prices between their supported farmer groups and those in surrounding areas, per the TMEA RF and a SEATINI “Mini-evaluation”167: an average of 1,366 Ugandan shillings per kg compared to 900 Ugandan shillings in non-project districts. The evaluation heard one report that a USAID project had replicated TMEA’s work with SEATINI in other nearby districts, to take advantage of the new standards that were earning producer’s higher income. However, better market prices may or may not be linked to improved quality, as these could also come about because of other market issues. *The EATTA Monitoring Plan* claims that most of tea factories that were trained as part of the project recorded a price increase of US$0.15 to US$0.20 on average during the project period (2011 to 2014). It was, however, also noted that since the increase in price could be attributable to a number of external factors overall quality consistency for tea should be more important to track than price: e.g. in early 2014 tea prices plummeted due to increased supply of tea in Kenyan market for the reasons other than the TMEA programme.

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Some women entrepreneurs spoke to the PGIS team in interviews and focus groups on this topic. There were numerous mentions of increased input prices, competition, inflation, and, especially, increased taxes.

**Certification:** The RF provides unclear data on certification. Uganda has not reported on this indicator; Kenya reports in terms of individual farmers rather than entities certified; Rwanda reports 13 entities and at corporate level 25 are cited. Primary and secondary data collected confirmed the effectiveness of trainings in adoption of certification in Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya. Satisfaction surveys, partner reports (FPEAK), monitoring plans, and end of project reports and evaluations show some figures on certification and access to new markets for the entities supported. 748 farmers (Kenya 325, Tanzania 388, and Uganda 35) were approved as EAGAP compliant by the end of 2015. 429 farmers (41 in Kenya, 388 in Tanzania) eventually attained full GLOBALGAP certification directly through the project support. The RF indicates that 12 coffee washing stations/co-operatives were certified in the region (three Rainforest Alliance certification in Rwanda; nine Fairtrade certifications (four in Rwanda; five in Burundi)). Data from other partners on certification, on the other hand, are neither complete nor clear; for example, *EATTA Monitoring Plan* states that all trained tea factories were assumed to be ISO ‘certified’ because they ‘apply the knowledge gained’, but this does not have to be the case.

Project staff from TMEA and the partners note that participants at times did not certify because of the high-costs and demands of certification, often because they had uncertainty around the markets for their products – which by following certification procedures would be more expensive to produce. This was supported by the 2016 *Business Competitiveness Portfolio Review*, which found projects more likely to succeed when they combined training, certification support, and assistance in identifying and contracting markets for their produce. 168

**Jobs created:** TMEA also claimed impacts in the number of people employed in the supported sectors and value chains, which was backed by the Formative Programme Evaluation reports/TMEA case studies. The report confirmed that additional jobs were created due to business growth: ‘[…] the export growth has created additional 38 full time jobs.’ The changes in employment are not well documented by the partner organisations and there are no further data given to substantiate these claims, and so the PE does not assert that TMEA has made impacts of job creation.

**Access to markets, and renewed access:** Kenya reports 140 farmer groups accessing new markets, Rwanda reports 25, and Burundi reports 10, for a total of 175 – but the indicator is not reported at corporate level in the TMEA RF. South Sudan also reports but by number of entrepreneurs (500) rather than entities.

An external (TMEA-commissioned) evaluation report provides validation for the improved export capacities in the supported enterprises and market linkages created: 13 companies out of the 16 companies supported are able to export outside Rwanda (Uganda and Burundi) as a result of programme implementation. The same report also shows that the sales missions to Uganda and Burundi resulted in increased market access for Rwandan suppliers and brought about US$2.3 million worth of new contracts. For all the 26 companies which were active on the programme, 19 successfully exported to either the DRC169 or Uganda which represent a success rate of 76% - reported to be higher than that for a typical export development programme (50%). In Kenya, beans and peas were sanctioned by the EU due to pesticide residue non-compliance. With assistance from the TMEA project, the farmer groups undertook the necessary steps for Global G.A.P. certification (key market requirements for the products destined to Europe) and therefore returned to production since the imposition of the sanctions due to the maximum residue level (MRL). As a result of these measures, according to KePHIS data, EU notifications on MRL documentation and harmful pests on Kenya produce decreased considerably from 2013 to 2015 (FPEAK End of Project Report).

The TMEA interviews with companies supported in Rwanda, however, emphasise that despite improved export performance, results by the end of S1 fell short of expectations. 170 The RF reports that the 20 coffee washing stations were yet to access the new markets at the end of S1, though these were producing by the end of 2018 at a 14% increase in export value against a target of 25%, per an end of project report. 171 Interviews with project implementers across the region’s EC projects revealed that economies of scale and varying consumer preferences in export markets were barriers to access to new markets.

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169 Note that DRC became part of the programme to balance against political uncertainty and insecurity in Burundi following political uprisings since April 2015.

170 The requirements in the export markets, such as the DRC, have posed a huge barrier to Rwandan products, such as cement, iron bars, cassava, and sugar: this is mainly because the DRC had different set of customs rules and regulations to Rwanda. Some barriers were also created by Rwanda itself due to the ban placed on exports of some products, such as steel.

Reduction in rejections: Higher product quality is evident in lower rejection rates for the TMEA-supported goods or sectors. TMEA’s assertions of reductions in rejections are fairly well documented. ‘Upgrading Quality Standards in Agriculture for Uganda Maize and Sesame’ project in particular showed commendable results: the percentage of buyers rejecting maize produced by the farmers in Masindi, Nakaseke and Lira in Uganda were 80%, 60%, and 72% respectively in 2015. This was already reduced to 11%, 15%, and 40% in 2016. Similarly, to respond to the issue of Kenya beans and peas being sanctioned by the EU due to pesticide residue non-compliance, government agencies (Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KePHIS) and Horticulture Crops Directorate (HCD)) collaborated with FPEAK (see FPEAK End of Project Report). Rejections were reduced from 5% to 2.6% of total consignments from 2013 to 2014 and eventual lifting of sanctions on beans in July 2015. The project was found ‘instrumental’ in restoring the industry back to its earlier status.

Rejections of tea at the tea auctions due to sub-optimal quality was also reduced from four cases to one case from 2011 to 2013, but what proportion of that is due to TMEA is not known. Rwanda tea industry in particular showed great improvements in quality of tea sold at the Mombasa tea auction. They also received all the awards at the EATTA’s 2nd Africa Tea Convention held in Kigali in 2013. However, what proportion of this due to TMEA is not known as other donors’ inputs were part of the programming: in 2010, UNIDO in collaboration with RSB launched a training programme to encourage the implementation of, and certification to, ISO 22000:2005 food safety management systems.¹⁷²

Implementing trading standards: The RF has uneven data on this indicator. Uganda has reported in terms of individual farmers rather than entities implementing trading standards (though the figure is high – over 17,000, this makes the data not comparable with the other countries’ reporting) Rwanda reports 37 entities and at corporate level an unclear data set seems to indicate a total of 74 entities. The number of coffee washing stations/co-operatives implementing trading standards applicable to their sector is already reported above. The interview data from Rwanda confirm that TMEA’s support to government enabled private sector to meet trading standards (regional and EU standards) in honey, vegetables, and meat and dairy products, to name a few. Data are not systematic on this indicator and the information on how TMEA’s support led to these changes is not well documented.

Improving internal business practices: It is also noted that there was a special focus in programme on improving internal business practises of companies (as per Training manuals) however the PE team did not observe any evidence or data collected on this, which does weaken the contribution claim. In the PGIS FGDs, these improvements were prevalent in respondents’ comments, from general references to prudence and savings, to specific skill sets such as capital reinvestment, considering standards like Q-mark and S-mark (Uganda), customer engagement and business diversification.

Across these outcome indicators, five (in bold above) were considered important to the key contribution claim of increased export. These were increase in export revenue, improved access or re-access to markets, reduction in the rejection of goods, trading standards implemented, and entities certified. However, as noted above, not all projects in the component reported on these indicators; the variety within the component makes the calculation of the key contribution claim difficult.

Certification may not be necessary if standards meet buyers’ needs, for example. Job growth would not necessarily lead to gains in exports. Improved business practices may be necessary for one co-operative and not for another, depending on what is meant by business practices. The indicators likeliest to support the key contribution claim are reduction in rejections, increased access to markets, and increased export revenue. These are listed below, and some data are listed for each country (Tanzania did not provide data on these indicators).

Table 27: CT Case Study: Indicator data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in export revenue on TMEA-supported interventions</td>
<td>Tea: ~33% average gain Horticultural: 24-36% gain</td>
<td>Contributed to strong gains in national exports</td>
<td>Maize: 300% Maize flour: 500%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved (re)access to new markets</td>
<td>FPEAK: 140 farmer groups with 3,557 farmers accessing new markets</td>
<td>13 of 16 participating groups exported to EAC; RF cites US $1m in sales</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in rejections of the goods exported</td>
<td>Tea rejection dropped from 4 cases to 1 case</td>
<td>Unquantified in report but cited award-winning tea</td>
<td>Reductions differed by region but prominent improvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁷² See https://www.iso.org/news/2010/08/Ref1606.html
In conclusion, while these results are positive, they are not systematic across the TMEA projects. The CT method is less useful for the EC case as a case because of the heterogeneity of the projects and the insufficiency of indicators. Though increasing exports was a shared goal across the projects, the method of arriving at that goal differed, and data around actual increase in exports were not available across projects. Despite promising projects with experiences that may be useful for future programming (as described in Annex J), the key contribution claim cannot be substantiated.

Table 28: Conclusion: Export capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcomes, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in exports</td>
<td>L/UL/Likely Some export values improved in Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda; increased access in some projects in Kenya and Rwanda; rejections down in three countries. However, there is no steady baseline against which to measure increased exports across the component</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually Certain Project reports to TMEA and TMEA was reported to be the only organisation working with some of the projects. No outcome is found</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12 SO3 PIO 3.3 Effective and efficient logistics

12.1 Summary
The focus of S1 programming on logistics was to build industry capacity\textsuperscript{173} to reduce trade related costs and increase quality of logistics service provision. The logistics team write that their focus was on small logistics firms, to make them more able to compete. The component also worked to develop four logistics platforms – one each in Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya. The goal of these platforms was to unite various types of actors to improve services and have a stronger advocacy voice. The component was designed to contribute to effective and innovative logistics services, which is pivotal for product competitiveness in regional and global markets.

12.2 Programme relevance: ToC causal links and assumptions

12.2.1 DEQ5.1 To what extent are the causal links and assumptions underpinning the component-level ToC or results chain evidence-based or verified?

The component was part of the overarching ToC, and there were project-level results chains for most projects. At the meso-level, between projects and the programme, there was no ToC or strategy paper written. However, there is evidence of some systematic thinking about the problems in the transport sector in the overarching TMEA ToC, and attention to how the sector’s important interests could inhibit or facilitate trade in the Trade and Economic Corridor Strategy. While country programmes and the programme HQ team certainly considered contextual issues, change mechanisms, and ‘causal packages’ across the PIO 3.3 component, the language and practices of ToCs were not put into place.

Capacity building for logistics industry personnel is necessary for achieving effective and innovative logistics services. Although the component logic was compelling, as presented in the (ex-post) component rationale document provided by the TMEA team, causal links were not validated and backed by evidence. For example, the evaluation team’s interactions with the national freight and logistics platforms highlighted that capacity building should not be just for shippers, truckers and freight forwarders to carry out those roles, but also for leaders in the industry, so these service providers can more effectively engage with the relevant government authorities. While diagnostic studies were reported to have been conducted prior to all projects, only after the delivery of the freight forwarder trainings programme was a survey conducted\textsuperscript{174} on truck operators and fleet managers, which showed a critical need for professionalising the industry.\textsuperscript{175}

TMEA completely suspended its driver capacity-building activities due to an audit problem with the apex association partners who were to provide this service, despite a due diligence review prior to implementation. This meant the capacity building activities could no longer contribute to achieving effective and innovative logistics services in the EAC. The RF reports only this cessation of activities.

Component documentation indicates that the support provided to associations was instrumental to strengthening organisational capacity, through trainings and drafting strategic plans. An association reported that this improved the quality of their services as well as their relationships with their members: ‘TMEA’s support has enhanced [our] visibility which has built confidence in members and improved the membership and engagement processes.’

Results from S1 were reported in the RF to be quite low given the suspension of the major training project in Kenya. No outcomes were shown for this component in the DFID Annual Review 2017, nor in OPM’s assessment of SO2 and SO3. Yet improving logistics services is essential to reach TMEA goals, as a linchpin for reducing transport costs.

The PE team re-created a ToC for the Logistics component, as follows:

\textsuperscript{173} Programme Rationale – Logistics. Retrospective document provided by TMEA on strategy for the PIO.

\textsuperscript{174} Through another programme, called ‘Regional Road Transport Operators Training.’

\textsuperscript{175} It was decided to incorporate lessons from the freight forwarder training experience to develop a combined training programme with a “demand driven” approach for truck drivers and fleet managers along with freight forwarders.
Annex J: PIOs

Figure 16: Re-created ToC for PIO 3.3 Logistics

This ToC shows the diversity of pathways that needed to be successful to reach the impact of more efficient and effective logistics services, resulting in reduced costs. A ToC process around this component would also have had to pay attention to political economy, in that logistics firms in the economy often represent powerful – and competing – interests. Given that the suspended training project was reported to have been related to fraud, due diligence concerns appeared to require special attention among the assumptions and programming decisions.

Work under this component had some very positive outputs, particularly among the policy advocacy beneficiaries, who regularly reported their greater competence, access to public sector dialogue, and relations across logistics industries within countries and across partner states. However, political economy and economic interests specifically limited the degree to which the suite of interventions resulted in a critical mass of change towards more effective and efficient logistics operations. There is no evidence that technological innovations sponsored by TMEA were brought to scale across industries, for example, or about either the quality or the market acceptance of the three sponsored innovations.

Another important element was not included here, but was reported by TMEA respondents as an important focus: small logistics service providers (often SMEs). Larger firms are likelier to have many of the projected results in place: technologies that make the work more efficient (or financial capacity to acquire them as they emerge), in-house training on customs clearance or for drivers of specialty goods, and even relationships or influence with government interlocutors. They can add value with specialty services, according to the component rationale document. Small firms, staff confirmed in interviews, require particular support to remain competitive, yet TMEA support may be costlier when directed to them, and the conditions and assumptions around this need to be sufficiently unpacked. One such firm noted the requirement for surety bonds on containers for their goods, coming in from one or another port: ‘While big exporters have relationships with the shipping lines [and so get automatic credibility], [we have] to pay deposits on the containers from ports’. The S1 interventions do not show this focus on SMEs, so it was left out of the re-created ToC.

The only assumption explicitly stated in the RF was very high level and not well defined: ‘private sector companies and their representative organisations are willing and able to engage with TMEA’. Without a detailed
results chain, it is difficult to validate or review assumptions behind the links in those chains. Willingness and ability were not operationalised or evidence about them collected formally.

The RF for this component counted numbers of trained personnel and lacked strong measures of quality of training or the subsequent use of training in the industry. This weakened the case for any implied results logic that the training could have contributed to more efficient or effective logistics contributing to reduced time and costs of trade. The cessation of driver training was reported in the RF to have affected most other indicators for the component, which undercut the implied logic chain in which driver training would contribute to lower transport costs through increased compliance with road regulations and reduced fuel costs. The 2016 and 2017 DFID Annual Reviews questioned outcome indicator quality for this component as well.\textsuperscript{176,177} The PE team adds concerns about the utility of the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) indicator, assembled by the WB, which is based largely on perceptions data rather than on concrete time and cost indications;\textsuperscript{178} even if the LPI were taken as a strong indicator, the index is produced on a lag and only every other two years, and would reflect results outside TMEA’s manageable interest, reducing TMEA’s ability to manage performance on that basis.

Some indicators in the RF show no related results, such as those related to national logistics frameworks, except one reference to two such platforms being ‘operational’ – though no definition is given. There was no baseline survey on logistics industry collaboration conducted, which made it difficult to measure outcomes to which TMEA might have contributed. National progress towards such frameworks was, understandably, idiosyncratic. While it is clear that the country projects in those two countries made achievements, particularly from interviews, it is far less clear the degree to which these changes have become institutionalised or have affected the logistics services in the region. Moreover, the RF does not help point the way as a substitute for the lack of a component ToC or results chain.

At the outset of TMEA, logistics were covered only under the development of the economic corridor. Thinking about the component went through a revision process in 2013-2014 when the logistics component was moved to the business competitiveness programme to maintain a tight focus and increase its effectiveness. However, that meant that not until the training of freight forwarders had started in 2014 did the logistics component have its own results chain. The problem of weak baseline data persisted throughout S1, and was compounded by the cessation of planned driver training.

12.2.2 DEQ5.3 To what extent does the component support EAC regional trade development priorities?

The component indirectly supports EAC regional trade development priorities of ‘rationalising investments and the full use of established industries to promote efficiency in production, as well as harmonising trade policies, investment incentives and product standards, with a view to promote the Community as a single investment area’ through improving the quality and efficiency of logistics services.’ Transport and logistics costs are critical for business competitiveness, as contextual data show. For this reason, the work in this component is well aligned with EAC regional trade priorities.

12.2.3 DEQ5.4 How have changes in policy and in the political economy in the region impacted on the component or on its relevance?

‘Documentary compliance’ was cited as the main challenge in the sector – time and cost of securing required documentation to import/export has increased. Clearance and inspections required by customs authorities and those involved in standards or other regulatory processes take the majority of the time spent to import and export.\textsuperscript{179} The private sector and civil society respondents interpret this as ‘overregulation’ which imposes an unnecessary cost and time burden on them. Regular customs system outages and insufficiently trained customs officials are major issues that contribute to these inefficiencies. These processes were in flux during S1 and since S1 ended: changes in leadership and priorities in governments; additional authorities such as Kenya’s new

\textsuperscript{176} DFID 2017. Annual Review Final Report. For one logistics indicator the RF target was removed; for another, TMEA reported that no regional programme would be addressing that indicator.

\textsuperscript{177} DFID 2016. Annual Review Summary Sheet. Logistics indicators either ‘cannot be assessed’ or were ‘not likely to be achieved’, and there are no indicators to measure the establishment of logistics platforms.

\textsuperscript{178} The International LPI asks international freight forwarding companies around the world to rate their peers in each country on a set of six factors – one of which pertains specifically to logistics, which is the sub-index in the TMEA RF. The survey instrument is not available publicly, but the description on the WB website refers to a ‘scale from very low to very high’ by which respondents rate their trading partners’ logistics landscapes. Using such a nominal scale limits the utility of the findings, as the idiosyncratic values respondents place along the scale do not provide a basis for probability statistics. WB 2014. Appendix 5: The LPI Methodology. Available at: https://wb-pi-media.s3.amazonaws.com/LPI/2014/Methodology.pdf

\textsuperscript{179} Interviews indicate that: ‘The reduced costs are not translated into reduced prices for the consumers because the price of something else goes up simultaneously, e.g. the new regulations are put in place that come at additional costs to the logistics service providers. In other words, whatever is saved is wiped out by other things. The transit rates came down, but the local consumers have not felt it because of the exchange rate fluctuations among other things.’
Anti-Corruption Authority with new powers over processes; and emerging protectionist tactics or NTBs all affected the industry during S1.

Unstable, unpredictable, and non-transparent political environments also affected this component, which was particularly true in Kenya and Tanzania during S1, as confirmed by the importers/exporters and the associations. Several issues were heard in PE fieldwork:

- Formulating rules and regulations without prior notice, consultation, or impact assessments. Examples include a 2014 introduction of VAT on transit cargo ancillary services by the Government of Tanzania; and in 2015 introduction of the Single Customs Territory between Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in order to curb tax evasion in the DRC – putting Tanzania’s container throughput at the Port of Dar es Salaam in 2017 at a record low;
- Making conflicting rules and regulations (lack of policy consistency and coherence within and across policies);
- Tanzania’s membership in two Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Respondents indicate this allows Tanzania to use the competing rules of one REC to avoid compliance with countries in the other REC;
- Inconsistent or incomplete publicly available information on rules and regulations;
- Inconsistent enforcement of rules and regulations;
- Low information quality and transparency from the government agencies;
- Historic grievances and rivalries leading to lack of trust and co-operation, such as certificates issued by one board or bureau of standards not being recognized by another (despite conformity to accrediting body requirements, including in the case of TMEA support to standards harmonisation nationally and at EAC level); and
- Corrupt and rent-seeking practices and lack of transparency in the sector.

Particular political economy events were cited as disruptive to the logistics actors, such as the Kenyan elections and the conflict in South Sudan. The most important effect on the logistics component itself is likely the advent of the SGR, though the effects have manifested outside the period of S1.

TMEA activities continued through many of these issues, facing new NTBs or working with regulatory bodies on conflicting or incomplete process information. However, the driver training project was cut off before achieving its ends, reportedly because of an audit issue with the implementing association. A HQ TMEA staffer noted that this could not be resolved without ensuring that the association leadership was removed, because of an implication of fraud.

On the positive side, a regional apex body stated that the advent of the SCT made ‘operations more efficient, abolished some movement requirements.’ With efficiency came new jobs in the sector, according to the respondent. A national freight forwarders’ representative said the country preferred the Northern Corridor because of compliance that he said came along with TMEA’s programming: ‘In the Central Corridor they don’t comply. Most of us in the industry prefer the Northern Corridor because of the systems, political perceptions, and integration’.

12.2.4 DEQ5.5 Do these TMEA interventions complement other ongoing initiatives (both government and private sector)?

Respondents did not mention any government initiatives to improve logistics industry capacity, though interaction with governments increased with the advent of the logistics platforms in Uganda and Rwanda in particular. Private sector initiatives in this sector could be said to be housed in the associations and apex bodies for freight forwarders and transport operators; some of these had significant initiatives underway, often funded by donors. (Coordination with other donors’ projects will be discussed in the response to DEQ5.13, below).

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180 Tanzania is ranked 144 among 190 economies in the ease of doing business, according to the latest WB annual ratings, having deteriorated from 137 in 2017. One of the most important DB indicators is ‘Trading across Borders’ which records the time and cost associated with the logistical process of exporting and importing goods, including three sets of procedures: (i) documentary compliance, (ii) border compliance and (iii) domestic transport. It takes an average import cargo 498 hours and costs US$1,350 to complete clearance and inspection required as well as the port or border handling in Tanzania.


182 However, implementation of the SCT arrangement was fraught with challenges that saw DRC businesspeople increasingly preferring other ports in eastern and southern Africa, namely Mombasa in Kenya, Beira in Mozambique, and Durban in South Africa. This resulted in a drop-in cargo passing through Dar es Salaam Port. As such, the system under which Tanzania collects import duty on behalf of the DR Congo has seen Tanzania losing cargo after businesspeople found it hard to avoid tax here in the country and as a result the agreement was annulled. For further information, see: https://allafrica.com/stories/201803010730.html; http://news.tatoa.co.tz/revisit-drc-single-customs-territory-agreement-mps-advisory.
Engagement with the private sector through these representative bodies contributed to the sector’s ongoing efforts to increase efficiency and effectiveness as well as facilitate innovation. TMEA provided TA to strengthen the capacity of some of these organisations. The lack of financial resources and management capacity made it difficult for the partners to move forward with the design and implementation of projects.

The component did create a specific opportunity for collaboration with the private sector directly, through its Logistics Innovation for Trade (LIFT) fund. This challenge-fund style intervention put out a call for proposals which resulted in directly funding logistics industry players on industry innovations. Thirteen projects were ultimately supported in S1, of which four to five were expected to deliver innovative solutions or proofs of concept successfully.

12.3 Coherence and coordination

12.3.1 DEQ5.6 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the working model for this component observed to date?

Diagnostic and needs assessment before each intervention revealed poor capacity of small logistics service providers and an asymmetric information problem between the small and large firms in the sector. This ensured that systemic problems were tackled adequately, according to a TMEA staffer at HQ level. ‘We have mutual interests’, said one association representative, because TMEA’s mandate is also to improve transport and logistics performance on the Corridors. A platform representative in Uganda echoed this sentiment: ‘We’re moving in tandem. We’re helping donors and government to understand [private sector users].’

Directly funding some key positions in the organisations has been vital to achieve good traction, such as a full-time coordinator hired for the Logistics Platform in Tanzania. A dedicated staff member was very important for engaging with stakeholders, coordinating meetings with members and other industry players, and making a case for policy reform in specific areas to the relevant government authorities. This arrangement has also helped build trust among the association members and to effectively address internal disagreements between divisions within the organisations (as reported by Tanzania and Kenya association representatives. The coordinator role was critical for gaining the trust of government by presenting ‘one body and one voice’ from the platform, rather than smaller and more isolated associations on their own. This was emphasised in the interviews with the Logistics Platforms: ‘Our biggest achievement is to get the so badly fragmented industry to work together.’

A strength mentioned by many respondents was linking logistics industry actors to each other in the ‘platform’ model, and then helping the platform actors link to their international peers and relevant government agencies.

Capacity building in the associations was cited as a strength by one Kenyan group’s representative, in terms of professionalising the industry and improve government’s image of the sector. Training of trainers was said by another to be an efficient use of resources. TMEA revamped the training programme by working to introduce mandatory certification for freight forwarders and proposed such status for training of warehouse operators. They delivered some training on-site and adopted the ‘training-of-trainers’ approach to bring down the cost of trainings and strengthen the engagement of associations in training delivery. Ultimately the associations were empowered to certify trainees, which allowed them an income stream as well as industry legitimacy.

On the other hand, there were some weakness in the programme delivery model, including:

- Beneficiary mapping was inadequate. Associations organised trainings in capital cities while many potential trainees were more widely spread out. The freight forwarder training is six months in duration, so this cut out a number of trainees from attending while working in the sector;
- Lack of an embedded monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL, also known as M&E for monitoring and evaluation) function in TMEA from the beginning constrained the opportunity to learn from experience; an effective MEL function could have ensured that, for example, if new intervention ideas or initiatives are not working, the initiative can fail fast and scale down, adapt and make adjustments where initial assumptions fail to match reality on the ground; or scale up and replicate when effective reforms begin to gain traction;
- TMEA procurement process was reported to be long and cumbersome;
- Timeframes for capacity building interventions are set too short according to TMEA programme staff – longer-term projects (two-five years) would be more effective as that would enable building capacity of PSOs to include mentoring in lobbying and advocacy. The associations lack sufficient capacity for research and communications activities as well as MEL, and these could be built in house;
- SCT procedures are not yet thoroughly understood even in the industry, according to respondents in Tanzania and Rwanda industry associations;
Annex J: PIOs

- The Customs Union goal of free movement of labour has not been achieved, leading to limitations on use of trained personnel from landlocked countries to those with ports;
- Authorities do not always communicate new rules for Customs documentation, emerging single window availability, and other changes in systems, despite being in touch with logistics platforms for other purposes. Ministries’ rules also at times contradict one another, as in an S1 case with rules on chemical imports in Tanzania. This is one place a well-established platform could intervene helpfully; and
- In another case, communications from apex bodies to national firms were uneven: despite sending trainees to one apex body’s training, one firm was left out of the loop as customs rules continued to evolve.

12.3.2 DEQ5.7 Is the complementarity and coordination between national and regional levels optimal throughout all programme components and activities?

Relationships between the various country offices are of a good quality and characterised by the open sharing of information and the provision of advice. On the other hand, there were no signs of direct collaboration between national logistics platforms, which seemed like a missed opportunity to one platform coordinator. The Federation of East African Freight Forwarders Associations (FEAFFA)\(^{183}\) as an apex body has an MoU with EAC Secretariat on capacity building of its sector members and also participate in the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA)\(^{184}\) negotiations.

No specific issues were reported in respondent interviews about challenges in the relationship between country programmes and the HQ component team. However, there was turnover during S1 at the HQ level; if there were any issues before that key personnel change, they were not related to the evaluation team.

TMEA also supported its partners through funding high level policy meetings that brought together all the Commissioners and the Chairs of the National Associations and Director General of EAC on the customs matters to discuss sector specific issues. They collectively formed the ‘Curriculum Implementation Committee’ and held meetings in 2011 and 2013, as funded by TMEA; in Kampala and Bujumbura, respectively.

12.3.3 DEQ5.8 To what extent does the TMEA model bring greater results than the sum of its parts? How could this be strengthened?

Projects that fall under the logistics component are defined as ‘catalytic’, enabling the delivery of other components, and indeed there is an inherent logic and interrelationship between programming to improve cargo transit times in the region, and the component’s focus on logistics providers. As such, there has been strong coordination and synergies with various TMEA initiatives, demonstrated by increased efficiencies in the sector reducing trade times and costs. The evaluation found synergies between what the component purported to achieve and:

- Hard and soft infrastructure investments (e.g. OSBPs, roads, Integrated Customs Management Systems, single windows);
- Policy advocacy interventions that brought private sector actors into the dialogue process around the trade facilitation issues;
- Elimination of high priority NTBs (weighbridges, check points, technical barriers to trade); and
- Development and implementation of a Single Customs Territory (electronic cargo tracking system, and the approval of Authorised Economic Operators)

The investments in this suite of activities benefited from shared objectives, as well as economies of scale in implementation modalities and, notably, in data collection and M&E. While no baseline information was collected for the logistics component, data from across the programme such as the transport observatory data, Time and Transit survey data at the OSBPs, time reduction data from and for AEOs, and single window time reductions data would certainly have served the logistics practitioners.

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\(^{183}\) FEAFFA is the apex body of Freight Forwarders Associations operating in the five countries of the EAC.

\(^{184}\) The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) between the member states of three African regional economic communities – the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – has been heralded as one of the most important developments in African regional integration. The agreement aims to create a free trade area between 26 African countries, from the Cape in the South to Cairo in the North, creating a combined market of up to 625 million people. For more information, see: [https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/what-does-the-tfta-really-mean-for-regional-integration-in-africa](https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/what-does-the-tfta-really-mean-for-regional-integration-in-africa)
12.3.4 DEQ5.10 To what extent are the programme’s governance arrangements leading to the delivery of high quality and timely outputs?

There are signs of a misalignment of incentives in some areas between the TMEA Council and the TMEA Board. The structure by the team was considered rather burdensome, adding extra layer of complexity to programme delivery, including in the logistics component. Country strategies are meant to evolve to reflect rapid change in the national operating environment. However, this did not always happen, but the NOC platform served as a space to discuss these issues. Based on the interviews with TMEA partners, approvals and procurement processes were subject to significant delays.

Feedback from country directors and country office staff suggested that cross-learning between country office teams and the matrix management structure facilitate learning between country, regional and technical teams.\textsuperscript{185}

The assessment identified that lack of flexibility in funding restricted projects from being more rapid, flexible, and responsive to ongoing implementation needs. Respondents reported that, as detailed as the PAR process is, implementation deliverables that are decided before a project is on the ground can often be improved – if the project is allowed to adapt in its politically fluid environment. Two options to consider for TMEA in responding to this: either setting the budget once the work is underway or being responsive to the need to revise budget as the project needs change.

12.3.5 DEQ5.11 Is the operational model at donor level appropriate and efficient for delivering TMEA? What are the key enablers which need to be preserved, and what are the remaining constraints arising from donors’ systems?

TMEA staff at headquarters reported: ‘Donors have a strong say in TMEA’s programming – the scope and nature of interventions need to receive a green light by the Board, which is limiting the teams’ independence in design and direction to deliver the results.’ The balance between ‘freedom to operate’ and ‘compliance requirements’ changed over the duration of S1, particularly when the current system of a donor Council and the Board were established. The issues, however, were not particularly on view in the logistics component.

At country level, interaction between donors and TMEA were apparent at the NOC. Discussions at the NOCs and the resulting action plans suggest that relationships are functional,\textsuperscript{186} according to one visit to a NOC and many comments from partners and TMEA teams.

One freight forwarder in Tanzania reported that potential private sector partners were side-lined in favour of focusing on government partners as implementers, who was of the opinion that that had led to sub-optimal results: ‘[…] collaboration with the private sector is essential. There needs to be a committee for Public-Private dialogues (PPD) consisting of stakeholders at the Port to look at things from a commercial point of view as well. That has been a struggle so far,’ and PPDs might be more important to the private sector than has ever been during post-2015 elections period in Tanzania: ‘Management of TPA is an improvement in last couple of years, in terms of how things should be run – there is some engagement with the private sector. Although uncertainty still remains, currently there is a big push to engage with the private sector which is the most significant progress since 2015.’ The same point was also echoed by one TMEA staffer: ‘I cannot work with private sector directly: I have to work through representative bodies, but they have significant capacity deficiencies. That is where the national logistics platform makes the difference. We control all the money supporting them, we procure the TA and we pay for it.’ Notably, PPDs are an important feature of S2 planning.

12.3.6 DEQ5.12 Did this component align with country systems and agencies in an effective manner for ownership, and for impact? How could this be strengthened?

The current procedure\textsuperscript{187} in place to ensure the component is aligned with country systems and agencies was effective for ownership and impact. TMEA aligned with government in terms of the logistics platforms in bringing the players to the table together. At the same time, TMEA worked with the private sector associations and apex bodies in some degree of alignment with (sometimes conflicting) private sector priorities. Part of implementation would necessarily include TMEA stepping back to let the platform take the lead, while still helping them resolve any intra-platform frictions.

\textsuperscript{185} OPM. Workstream 2 – Deliverable 2B: Institutional and Organisational Assessment. (forthcoming)

\textsuperscript{186} Assessment team attended one of the NOC meetings in Tanzania (in December 2018).

\textsuperscript{187} Project design and implementation includes formal consultation with a wide range of private and public sector stakeholders. As a result, TMEA country teams have developed close links with influential stakeholder groups. Delivering impact includes tapping these contacts to engage constructively in implementing proposed projects.
Government stakeholder management was slightly complicated in Tanzania by turnover issues and the technical advisory support coming from Nairobi. This was reported to have limited the degree of ownership.

12.3.7 DEQ5.13 Are the focus and activities of the component consistent with, and additional to, those of others’ development programmes in the region? To what extent has the programme facilitated improved coordination?

The focus and activities of this component appear to be consistent with and additional to other development programmes in the region. Coordinating with other donors (e.g. WB Skills Development Fund in Uganda to train Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) drivers) enhanced programme effectiveness and reduced the risk of overlap or duplication of efforts. Another example is that TMEA’s logistics component built upon existing USAID-funded initiatives focused on training of freight forwarders with a three-week freight-management course and customs training schools. TMEA took it over and completed the project, partnering with the Federation of East African Freight Forwarders Association (FEAFFA) as a regional implementation support vehicle. Other activities on logistics in the region included FEAFFA’s work with USAID’s EA Trade and Investment Hub, for support in Rules of Origin, and an online E-Learning system. The EAC Secretariat signed an MOU with FEAFFA, which brought FEAFFA into the TFTA negotiation.

USAID’s COMPETE project also purchased simulators for the Kenya Transports’ Association (KTA) to use in training truck drivers and transport managers. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was active on the Northern Corridor, including developing an overarching Master Plan, and were in close coordination with TMEA, according to respondents: ‘they sponsored workshops on different areas’ of border operations. They worked actively on a small set of border posts and, in logistics specifically, offered support in developing a model self-regulation law for customs agents and freight forwarders in Kenya; they partnered with the Business Advocacy Fund to advocate for the legislation in Kenya. In Uganda, JICA helped develop a transport and logistics strategy for government, reported the TMEA staffer.

Logistics platform and TMEA respondents in Uganda noted the collaboration between the Private Sector Foundation of Uganda (PSFU) and WB and the European Union on rail, asking the logistics platform to help in the lobbying process. In one case the platform worked with Tanzanian and Rwandan counterparts, through the support of TMEA, which ‘gave the effort legitimacy’. The logistics platform in Uganda has also interacted with the German co-operation agency GIZ.

The NOCs and Programme Coordinating Committee (PCC) supported TMEA efficiency and effectiveness and despite some isolated areas for improvement, broadly provided space for sharing regular updates and information (by donors, government agencies and other interested parties) about ongoing initiatives. Respondents did not cite improved coordination as a result of TMEA per se but did refer to coordination as successful during S1.

12.3.8 DEQ5.14 What sorts of approaches have been more successful in working with regional institutions in Africa for this component?

The regional presence of FEAFFA provided a central body with whom TMEA could intervene and allowed for discussions about standardised training curricula in line with the Single Customs Territory (SCT) and coalescing messaging to government and the EAC. Without an equivalent trucking body, that was perhaps the weaker leg of the logistics platforms in terms of interfacing with regional institutions to ensure their collective voices were heard.

Some indirect collaboration efforts included the selection of partners from those with already strong ties to more than one regional organisation (e.g. Tanzania’s Freight and Logistics Platform’s focus is on logistical and regional trade integration issues in both on EAC and SADC).

12.4 Sustainability

12.4.1 DEQ5.17 What benefits (both social and financial) of the programme are likely to be sustainable and would continue with or without TMEA (staffing and funding)?

Interview data indicated that the skills gained through logistics trainings could yield sustainable results for the sector, given that ‘nearly a quarter’ of the industry has been trained. Firms must have two trained individuals on

188 A private sector apex body of freight forwarders’ associations in the Eastern Africa region that was established in 2006.
189 The PCC is chaired by the EAC Secretary General and meets annually with the NOCs.
staff, to ensure compliance and ongoing peer learning. However, the quality of trainings. However, building such structures and institutionalising their influence are longer-term proposals.

Associations have continued offering trainings to their members within their own means. TMEA HQ helped them set up training centres to hold classes, in an attempt to help the associations, become self-sufficient in supporting training, though TMEA continued to fund rent, salaries for training coordinators and some equipment. Given the costs, these centres seem to be difficult to sustain beyond TMEA using membership fees alone. This was confirmed one country’s platform representative: ‘If TMEA left today, the only way the platform secretariat would survive is membership fees. But you cannot sustain simply on membership fees.’

Respondents also said that regular formal meetings, workshops, and events played a key role in addressing issues by raising awareness and support for proposed changes with those empowered to take decisions, such as in Tanzania:

In 2015, introduction of the Single Customs Territory between Tanzania and the DRC in order to curb tax evasion in the DRC put Tanzania’s container throughput at the Port of Dar es Salaam in 2017 at a record low. The Logistics Platform developed and submitted ‘an issue paper’ to the President’s Office which culminated in changes to these regulations: the single customs territory agreement between Tanzania and the DRC was revoked, as a result of which pre-agreement levels of DRC-bound cargo traffic were nearly achieved; and C28 and C40 licenses-related inefficiencies: these are the types of transit licenses that truckers need to have for ‘transit cargo’ and ‘local cargo’, respectively. The issue was C28 licensed trucks were only allowed to carry ‘transit goods’, while C40 could only be used for ‘local goods’ transports. This caused large amounts of “empty backhaul”, meaning a truck carrying goods to a destination and then returning empty to the starting point. The Logistics Platform in Tanzania engaged with the Government of Tanzania by submitting an issue paper: now one truck can have both licenses at the same time and can carry both transit and local goods.

The meetings paused when TMEA funding stopped, until another source was secured (USAID). This disrupted maintaining the policy momentum. Without TMEA, it was also noted that it could have been difficult for the partners to undertake research within their own funds to support their cases.

12.4.2 DEQ5.20 How are stakeholders engaged through the programme and beyond its life, and how do they take TMEA lessons learnt into account?

Stakeholders were engaged in evidence-based advocacy through the projects and found this effective. A transporters’ association emphasised the importance of research in advocacy: ‘TMEA supported us to conduct a comprehensive baseline survey with our members to pick out the most critical issues in rules and regulations that were negatively affecting them and lobbying for policy reform in those areas’ so that ‘every time we went to the Government we had evidence to show them,’ according to an apex body. This approach made it easy to present persuasive evidence for the existence and severity of the problems and drawing on that helped with lobbying. These were lessons that the partners intended to sustain.

TMEA CSO and PSO partners came to see the effectiveness of both evidence-based policy advocacy and developing a unified voice through a national logistics platform in their work with this programme. TMEA support to the logistics platforms and apex bodies enabled the creation of ‘one voice’ for the logistics sector; helped present issues in one package from a number of stakeholders in the sector; and strengthened their position vis-à-vis the government as the private sector could push policy initiatives as a unified front.

Respondents reported that, as detailed as the PAR process is, implementation deliverables that are decided before a project is on the ground can often be improved – if the project is allowed to adapt in its politically fluid environment. Two options to consider for TMEA in responding to this: either setting the budget once the work is underway or being responsive to the need to revise budget as the project needs change.
Annex M: TMEA assumptions at strategic, impact and outcome levels
### Annex M

**TMEA assumptions at strategic, impact and outcome levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions at Impact level (RF)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased trade</strong></td>
<td>It will not be possible to measure TMEA’s contribution to increased trade due to the complexities and many varied factors that influence trade. Where TMEA can credibly estimate its contribution to decreased transport time, TMEA will estimate increased trade based on the Venables and Limao research that proposed that if transport time increased by 10%, there would be a negative impact of trade by 2.5x. TMEA will assume that the reverse is also true, that is if transport decreases by 10%, trade will increase 2.5x. Data availability depends on countries submitting information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Reduced transport time and increased volumes** | 1. Cooperation between respective governments and adherence to bilateral and EAC agreements is assured.  
2. National governments willing to undertake trade facilitation reforms.  
3. Willingness to eliminate protectionist measures to trade and logistics on behalf of governments.  
4. Ability of freight and logistic companies to pay charges, duties and taxes.  
5. Transport corridor and customs improvements lead to lower costs.  
6. Border officials are willing to support gender interventions and apply skills learned |

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<th>Assumptions at Strategic level (TOC)</th>
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| | There are sufficient buyers who are willing to pay for East Africa’s improved quality products and services;  
The private sector uses the opportunities of increased affordable market access to increase and/or expand the number and size of exporting firms;  
The private sector increases the sophistication of exports;  
The private sector have the capacities and will to utililise opportunities presented by an enhanced trade environment. |

| SO1 | 1. The activities must actually result in time savings (delay reductions)  
2. The value of those time savings must be greater than the cost required to achieve those savings  
3. The net savings must be passed along from transport services providers to consumers via the price of transported goods  
4. The resulting price reductions must induce additional trade in those goods (that is, the demand curve must be elastic) |

| SO2 | 1. Implementing the EAC regional trade agreements will contribute to enhancing the trade environment in the region;  
2. There is sufficient demand by partner state parliaments, public sector, private sector and civil society organisations to drive the regional economic community agenda forward.  
3. Regional trade policies will be prioritised by partner states over national trade policies and priorities. |

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<th>SO3</th>
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<th>Assumptions at Outcome level (RF)</th>
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| SO1 | 1. Cooperation between respective governments and adherence to bilateral and EAC agreements is assured.  
2. National governments willing to undertake trade facilitation reforms.  
3. Willingness to eliminate protectionist measures to trade and logistics on behalf of governments.  
4. Ability of freight and logistic companies to pay charges, duties and taxes.  
5. Transport corridor and customs improvements lead to lower costs. |

| SO2 | 1. Cooperation between respective governments and adherence to bilateral and EAC trade agreements is assured.  
2. Governments have capacity to prepare and negotiate laws and procedures. |
3. A strengthened EAC institution is able to negotiate between and on behalf of partner countries.
4. Regional integration is sustained and receives public support.
5. National bureaux have the capacity to implement regional harmonisation of standards.

**SO3**

1. Private sector companies and their representative organisations are willing and able to engage with TMEA.
2. Private sector companies and their representative organisations respond to advocacy around trade issues and implement investment opportunities.
3. Certification procedures are adopted by business, farmers and others.
4. There is a conducive environment encouraging women-led businesses and traders.
5. Barriers to entry of market traders into the formal economy are reduced.
6. Inefficiencies in ICT provision do not hamper adoption of innovative E-logistics and practices.

**Assumptions at country level**

**Kenya**

**Summary programme outputs**

The selected trainees will be interested and able to pass the course.

Private sector companies and their representative organisations are willing and able to engage with TMEA.

**Uganda**

**Outcome 1**

EAC partner states and governments willing and able to implement streamlined trade facilitation reforms within the timeframes; political stability in EAC states; transport corridor and customs improvements lead to lower costs; EAC partner states provide adequate finance and resources for national project implementation; DP and TMEA provide planned investment in corridor infrastructure and capacity building support including IBM, OSBPs and Mirama Hills Road; OSBP construction is completed on time and IBM is implemented; construction of new OSBPs is necessary, but not sufficient to decrease time it takes to cross the border; social and environmental impact safeguards are implemented; where related projects (border posts and road) implementation is sequenced and timely to allow for benefits to be accrued as soon as possible after the OSBP construction has been completed;

**Summary programme outputs**

Respective governments (GOU, GOR, GOSS, GOT) sign bilateral agreements in a timely manner and adhere to the principles of the agreement; the EAC OSBP Act enters into force; there are a sufficient number of competent construction companies in EA that are interested in and able to construct OSBPs and Mirama Road in a timely manner; GOU will provide agreed funding in a timely manner; DPs will provide committed funding in a timely manner; there is continuous uninterrupted political stability in South Sudan; social and environmental impact safeguards are complied with; implementation of IBM is timed in accordance with completion OSBP construction.

**Outcome 2**

All ECTs systems operationalised in EAC partners states can be integrated and linked to ensure faster movement of goods; partner states provide adequate resources for key national project implementing agencies; procurement processes are completed in a timely manner; organisations responsible for creating and maintaining NTBs are willing and able to them; fewer NTBs are created than removed; partner states can influence each other to remove NTBs through the EAC Time Bound Programme and bilateral agreements; GOU is committed to implementing the regional agenda; improved coordination and knowledge will increase implementation actions taken by the partner states to implement the CMP; GOU manages the legislative process cycle efficiently and fully supports the approximation of EAC protocols and laws at the national level.

**Summary programme output**

Registered clearing agents, the private sector, and MDAs recognise the benefits of trade systems (ESW, ECTS, EAMS, ASYCUDA World, AEO); the IT infrastructure network has the capacity to support the trade systems; internet connectivity is reliable; the private sector can...
afford to pay for internet costs associated with the use of the systems to process trade related transactions online; automating procedures and upgrading existing hardware and software significantly contributes to time savings; GOU agencies report NTBs and actions are taken to eliminate them; procurement processes are concluded in a timely manner; MTIC is bale to implement the QUISP project and SIDA funding is provided in a timely manner.

**Outcome 3.1**

Key apex private sector institutions have the capacity to implement initiatives; shippers, clearing agents, traders and women are interested and willing to attend training.

**Tanzania**

**Outcome 1**

1. Cooperation between respective governments and adherence to bilateral and EAC agreements is assured.
2. National governments willing to undertake trade facilitation reforms.
3. Willingness to eliminate protectionist measures to trade and logistics on behalf of governments.
4. Ability of freight and logistic companies to pay charges, duties and taxes.
5. Transport corridor and customs improvements lead to lower costs.

**Outcome 2**

1. Cooperation between respective governments and adherence to bilateral and EAC trade agreements is assured.
2. Governments have capacity to prepare and negotiate laws and procedures.
3. A strengthened EAC institution is able to negotiate between and on behalf of partner countries.
4. Regional integration is sustained and receives public support.
5. National bureaux have the capacity to implement regional harmonisation of standards.

**Outcome 3**

1. Private sector companies and their representative organisations are willing and able to engage with TMEA.
2. Private sector companies and their representative organisations respond to advocacy around trade issues and implement investment opportunities.
3. Certification procedures are adopted by business, farmers and others.
4. There is a conducive environment encouraging women-led businesses and traders.
5. Barriers to entry of market traders into the formal economy are reduced.
6. Inefficiencies in ICT provision do not hamper adoption of innovative E-logistics and practices.

**Rwanda**

**Outcome 1**

1. Cooperation between respective governments and adherence to bilateral and EAC agreements is assured.
2. National governments willing to undertake trade facilitation reforms.
3. Willingness to eliminate protectionist measures to trade and logistics on behalf of governments.
4. Ability of freight and logistic companies to pay charges, duties and taxes.
5. Transport corridor and customs improvements lead to lower costs.

**Summary programme output**

That respective governments will sign bilateral agreements in a timely manner and adhere to the principles contained in the agreements. There are a sufficient number of competent construction companies in East Africa who are interested in and able to construct OSBPs in a timely manner. Governments provides agreed funding; all procurement processes are followed in an accurate and timely manner; EIA are approved by relevant government agencies in a timely manner.
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<th>Outcome 2</th>
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<td>behalf of partner countries.</td>
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<td>4. Regional integration is sustained and receives public support.</td>
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<td>5. National bureaux have the capacity to implement regional</td>
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<td>harmonisation of standards.</td>
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<td>RBS re-organisation following the five year strategic plan proceeds as</td>
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<td>planned and sufficient staff are available/recruited.</td>
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<td>Laboratory testing equipment is delivered and installed on schedule.</td>
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<td>RBS fully utilises the new equipment and sufficient staff are available</td>
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<td>to be trained and to work on testing.</td>
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<td>RBS has sufficient capacity to achieve accreditation by target date</td>
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<td>with only limited support from external TAs.</td>
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<td>RBS is able to fund the accreditation process for 10 parameters.</td>
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<td>The private sector sees a clear advantage in time, cost and quality in</td>
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<td>using RBS' services rather than those available in the region/internationally.</td>
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<td>The private sector are willing to buy testing services for products;</td>
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<td>EAC institutions and member governments continue to encourage</td>
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<td>broad-based participation by private sector and civil society</td>
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<td>organisations in the regional integration process; an effective</td>
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<td>mechanism for public-private civil society dialogue is in place (PPD</td>
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<td>mechanisms, platforms and fora); Private sector and civil society</td>
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<td>organisations have the skills, capacities and resources to play a</td>
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<td>coordinating role</td>
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<td>Ministries of EAC's mandate remains intact; Ministries are able to</td>
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<td>effectively coordinate the work of others; Government agrees, enacts</td>
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<td>and implements regional integration reforms within EAC timeframes and</td>
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<td>provides adequate recurrent budget finance and human resources for key</td>
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<td>Ministries responsible for RI implementation.</td>
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<td>Government agencies are interested in developing SW and automating</td>
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<td>processes; have sufficient IT capacity to manage SWs</td>
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<td>All ECTS systems can be linked to ensure faster movement of goods;</td>
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<td>Partner states provide adequate finance and resources for key national</td>
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<td>project implementing agencies; procurement processes are completed</td>
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<td>in a timely manner and follow procedures</td>
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<td>Summary programme outputs (outcome 3.3)</td>
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<td>Suitable private sector companies are interested and follow through on</td>
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<td>investment opportunities</td>
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<td><strong>Burundi</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
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<td>A settlement to the ongoing Burundi socio-political crisis is reached</td>
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<td>before end of FY2015/16 or at least in early 2016/17, allowing for</td>
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<td>normal conduct of socio-economic activities by the private sector and</td>
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<td>for the Government to promote a business and trade conducive</td>
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<td>environment and to make the necessary infrastructural investments.</td>
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<td><strong>Programme intermediate outcomes</strong></td>
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<td>Burundi socio-political context does not deteriorate further between</td>
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<td>December 2015 and June 2016 which will allow for the implementation</td>
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<td>of the FY2015/16 activities as planned. The situation improves in FY</td>
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<td>2016/17, and allows for the implementation of the IBM component.</td>
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<td>Dar-Es-Salaam Port enhancement works are completed as planned.</td>
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<td>No new NTBs are created along the Dar-Es-Salaam-Bujumbura</td>
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<td>corridor. The socio-political crisis in Burundi finds a settlement and</td>
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<td>allows for the resumption of normal economic activity including</td>
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<td>imports and exports. An enabling environment is in place and resources</td>
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<td>to make investments towards the production of exports goods are</td>
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<td>available to the government and the private sector.</td>
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<td>The situation improves in FY 2016/17, and allows for the implementation</td>
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<td>of the IBM program which is the program through which OSBP-gender related activities are planned.</td>
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<td>Kobero OSBP construction is complete and in operation</td>
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Programme outputs

The socio-security situation does not determinate further during the rest of FY2015/16. No community members resistance to delocalisation for purposes of making room for the OSBP infrastructure. The contractor remains on duty until full completion and hand over of all works. The IBM program is implemented.

Outcome 2

The situation improves in FY 2015/16, and allows for the resumption of the full-blown Burundi program, TMEA donor engagement policy in Burundi changes and allows for working with Government institutions, funds are available to restore suspended relevant projects.

- Seven target border posts are fit-out and ASYCUDA deployed, ESW and e-payments are deployed and used by partners as planned and all the trainings are executed satisfactorily.
- The situation improves in FY 2015/16, and allows for the resumption of the full-blown Burundi program, TMEA donor engagement policy in Burundi changes and allows for working with Government institutions, funds are available to restore the full program.

Summary programme outputs

The situation improves in FY 2015/16, and allows for the resumption of the full-blown Burundi program, TMEA donor engagement policy in Burundi changes and allows for working with Government institutions, funds are available to restore suspended relevant projects.

Burundi socio-political context does not deteriorate further between December 2015 and June 2016 which will allow for the implementation of the FY2015/16 activities as planned. The Government of Burundi remains open to dialogue with the private sector and to reforms.

Outcome 3

Burundi socio-political context does not deteriorate further between December 2015 and June 2016 which will allow for the implementation of the FY2015/16 activities as planned and improves in 2016/17 allowing for project continuation.

South Sudan

Outcome 1

Political instability and insecurity don’t disrupt operations of the programme, allowing for provision of services. Imports to South Sudan through Nimule border post increases.

Outcome 2

Other TMEA IBM projects are implemented on time; other border agencies committed to implementing reforms to facilitate the movement of goods through borders; Political commitment to reform; Customs staff are not affected by the austerity measures and remain
paid though the existing deduction method of their expenses on revenue collected; Registered clearing agents and other border agencies see the advantage in using IBM. Automating procedures and/or upgrading existing hard and software significantly contributes to time saving.

Organisations responsible for creating or maintaining NTBs with South Sudan are willing and able to remove them. Fewer NTBs are created than removed. Partner states can influence South Sudan is willing to join EAC other partner states to remove NTBs through the EAC Time Bound Programme and bilateral agreements for NTB rationalisation or removal. Time savings from equipment testing and capacity is unlikely to happen until international accreditation of laboratories are received and this is normally a lengthy process.

Countries and border posts are willing to work together. EAC has political will to pass OSBP legislation. Implementation of the IBM is timed in accordance with the completion of construction of border posts. That respective governments will sign bilateral agreements in a timely manner and adhere to the principles contained in the agreements, or the EAC OSBP legislation enters into force, whichever is earlier.

**Outcome 3**

1. Private sector companies and their representative organisations are willing and able to engage with TMEA.
2. Private sector companies and their representative organisations respond to advocacy around trade issues and implement investment opportunities.
3. Certification procedures are adopted by business, farmers and others.
4. There is a conducive environment encouraging women-led businesses and traders.
5. Barriers to entry of market traders into the formal economy are reduced.
6. Inefficiencies in ICT provision do not hamper adoption of innovative E-logistics and practices.

Validation of the freight logistics platform strategies results in the operationalisation.

**Background:**

This Annex presents a full list of the TOC assumptions across TMEA programme from its strategy and other documents and its Results Framework (RF). These assumptions look at the strategic level, the impact level, outcomes level, and specifically national assumptions. The purpose of this annex is to examine and discuss the assumptions and their utility for TMEA planning throughout Strategy 1 (S1).

**Formulation and clarity of assumptions**

The TMEA TOC has identified assumptions at different level of results i.e. SOs, impact and outcome. The assumptions at the outcome and intermediate outcome levels identified in the RF are collapsed together. The assumptions for strategic and impact levels are presented in the TOC document where SO3 strategic level assumptions are missing. There are assumptions about the causal links between outcomes at different levels which are operational or implementation assumptions. There are also strategic assumptions or full pathway assumptions as well as purpose-level assumptions. The assumptions at SO, impact and outcome level do not include any operational assumptions about the external context, which are more present among the country level assumptions. Although there are
assumptions about behavioural changes required for the result, without assuming what other conditions might be useful for this result to be achieved and what other factor might affect it, such assumptions are almost useless. In other words, the risks opposing to certain assumptions to hold are not identified and therefore can undermine the success.

Some of the outcome level assumptions are identical to the impact level assumptions. SO3 outcome level assumptions are not reflected in the impact level assumptions and look somewhat irrelevant to the overall impact.

The assumptions at the country level vary greatly where Kenya has only a few and Burundi has a full set of assumptions formulated for each level of results. Tanzania’s assumptions are the copy of the generic sets of assumptions for outcomes and therefore do not represent the country context. In case of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and partly South Sudan, assumptions are more detailed and have specific bodies, activities, and etc. identified. Most of the assumptions for Burundi are about external context and not so much about causal assumptions showing the vulnerability of the programme to the country specific conditions.

Given the range of activities and multiple countries, the use and validity of strategic SO and impact level assumptions are debatable. The country level assumptions, especially Kenya and Tanzania have a considerable room for improvement and detailing their specific assumptions. Improving assumptions will allow the TMEA programme to have more effective teams (through simply understanding and discussing assumptions to work together), improve their design and innovation through understanding assumptions that most affect success, choose the most critical pathways on which to focus their efforts, more coordinated and focused actions through coming to a negotiated shared meaning that can help coordinate different action, better basis for adaptive management through focusing on critical assumptions and identifying what they need to ensure most and finally more focused learning and evaluation.

**Use of assumptions**

It is important to remember that assumptions are specific to each context and are not static which means they hold true for a certain period of time and need to be looked at regularly and updated. The PE team found no evidence that the assumptions TMEA recorded were checked through the lifetime of S1.

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1 Irene Guijt (2013) ToC Reflection Notes 3: Working with Assumptions in a Theory of Change Process
Annex L: Proposed Timeline
## Annex A  Proposed timeline

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<tr>
<td>TMEA and DFID report review</td>
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<td>Verification workshop</td>
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<td>EQUALS review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learning/verification missions</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex M: Contribution Tracing Case Study Tables
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### Summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CT Case Study: Mombasa Port</th>
<th>Evidence of the output, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused these outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More, and improved, container stacking and organisation</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased capacity for vehicle and cargo traffic</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration/ integration and planning between key institutions</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved staff capacity, improved port efficiency</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Corridor observatory data collected, shared</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import times reduced by 51% in S1</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export times reduced by 50% in S1</td>
<td>As likely as not</td>
<td>As likely as not</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CT Case Study: Busia OSBP</th>
<th>Evidence of the output, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused these outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed hard infrastructure</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM operational</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building and change management</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossing times reduced</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CT Case Study: Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP</th>
<th>Evidence of the output, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused these outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSBP structures and procedures in place</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM operational</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building and change management</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossing times reduced</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Contribution Tracing Case Study Tables

#### CT Case Study: Northern Corridor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the output, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused these outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faster port throughput at Mombasa Port</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crossing time at Busia</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in crossing time at Mirama Hills/ Kagitumba</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcome, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcome, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average reduction in transit time from Mombasa to Malaba and Busia</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time to transport goods from Rwanda to Mombasa Port</td>
<td>As likely as not</td>
<td>As likely as not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time to transport goods from Mombasa Port to Rwanda</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in costs of trade</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CT Case Study: ICT for Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the output, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused these outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of Customs Management Systems (CMS)</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking (RECTS)</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of Single Window systems and portals</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainings for systems users</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcome, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcome, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in trade time</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in trade costs</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CT Case Study: Elimination of NTBs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the output, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused these outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTB monitoring/ report systems developed; operationalisation support</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research/position papers developed and published</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional and national NMCs operational</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTB Act passed</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of the outcome, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA contributed to the outcome, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of High Priority NTBs eliminated (by country) against the total number of NTBs still reported as outstanding</td>
<td>Likely, but no outcome is found</td>
<td>Very likely, but no outcome is found</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CT Case Study: Harmonisation of Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the output, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused these outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Bureaus of Standards testing upgraded and staff trained</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of standards harmonised (and gazetted)</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of additional tests performed</td>
<td>Unclear evidence</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs certified by Bureaux of Standards</td>
<td>Likely for Rwanda and Uganda; Very unlikely for Kenya</td>
<td>Virtually certain for Rwanda; Unlikely for Kenya and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in time to test and issue certificates for selected goods for intra-regional export</td>
<td>Unclear evidence</td>
<td>Likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average reduction in cost of testing</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CT Case Study: Export Capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Evidence of the output, and probative value assigned</th>
<th>Evidence TMEA caused these outputs, and probative value assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer groups or companies (entities) trained on standards</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers, groups, and countries adopt standards and good practices</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration between government and private sector increased</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported business consultants assisted exporters w/ export business plans</td>
<td>As likely as not</td>
<td>As likely as not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in exports</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in export revenue for entities supported</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entities certified</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in the number of people employed in the sector</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access to markets, and renewed access</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>As likely as not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in rejections of the goods exported</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading standards implemented</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>As likely as not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved internal business practises of companies</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Northern Corridor Case Study

**CASE: The Northern Corridor**

**Narrative Summary:** The set of TMEA interventions across the Northern Corridor comprise a test case of the TOC logic behind TMEA’s S1. If this combination of elements was successful, outcomes should have accrued by the end of S1, and continue to the present day.

**Key contribution claim:** TMEA contributed to reduced transport times and increased trade volumes on the Northern Corridor through the conjoint efforts of the related SO1 and SO2 components.

**Evaluation finding:** Unsubstantiated. Border crossing times have dropped but overall corridor times have not, or if they have, there are no data that substantiate that reduction on the corridor.

**Activities Claimed**

As this aggregates lower-level outcomes, activities are the project-level outcomes from the SO1 and SO2 cases that follow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Evidence of outputs</th>
<th>Evidence that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Faster port throughput at Mombasa Port(^2)</td>
<td>1. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> (S1). NCTTCA data show time reductions at Mombasa Port. Customs time data remained stable (and was never a major component) but pre- and post-clearance times reduced. In 2019, Port may clear more quickly but KPA handles far fewer containers (per evaluation interviews – from 1250 to 550 per day) and more are handled at Embakasi container depot, where clearance performance is very poor.</td>
<td>1. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain.</strong> Documents and interviews on port efficiency from capacity building and port capacity from hard infrastructure. Results Meter estimated 20% of change in times attributable to TMEA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reduction in crossing time at Busia</td>
<td>2. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain.</strong> TMEA TTS data show Busia Ke→Ug times falling 79% and Ug→Ke 80% since 2011.</td>
<td>2. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain.</strong> TMEA provided important activities at Busia. Results Meter gives TMEA 100% credit for time savings at OSBPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reduction in crossing time at Mirama Hills/Kagitumba</td>
<td>3. <strong>L/U/Likely (S1).</strong> The TMEA TTS study (Sept 2017) showed 15m into Uganda and 1h 25m into Rwanda. A deterioration towards 2019 is seen in satellite data from NCTTCA at <a href="https://tinyurl.com/y548dgbo">https://tinyurl.com/y548dgbo</a>. USAID data show median times of 24m crossing time into Uganda and 2h 48m into Rwanda from January 2017 to January 2019, suggesting either deterioration or variability within a large range.</td>
<td>3. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain.</strong> Confidence high in TMEA doing much or all of the work at K-MH; no other donors were found to be implementing there. Results Meter gives TMEA 100% credit for time savings at OSBPs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^1\) For detailed evidence of TMEA activities see CT case studies on the selected PIAs (Annex J). This case builds up from component outcomes in those cases. Component outcomes serve as programme outcomes at the level of the overarching TOC where Northern Corridor results would manifest. Throughout evaluators’ review of cases, activities were supported by robust evidence. For this reason, the cases in this annex reflect ‘Virtually certain’ probability of seeing evidence if the activities did happen, and ‘Extremely unlikely’ if the activities did not happen. Belief in TMEA’s contribution claim after seeing activities’ evidence is therefore ‘Virtually certain’.

\(^2\) Not all outputs or outcomes reviewed contributed directly to TMEA’s key contribution claim, in all cases, per the re-created TOCs. **Those that are in bold** were judged to be required to generate the key contribution claim.

\(^3\) Using the reference table at the end of each case in the annex, each piece of evidence is marked for the probability of seeing the evidence that supports it if the output or outcome is true, then the probability of seeing the evidence that supports is if the output or outcome is not true; and finally by the belief in the output or outcome after seeing the evidence. This results in an abbreviated notation like this one, for each piece of evidence.
## CASE: The Northern Corridor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Evidence of outcomes</th>
<th>Evidence that TMEA contributed to outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Average reduction in transit time from Mombasa to Malaba and Busia (including also any benefits from eliminated NTBs and RECTS)</td>
<td>1. <strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Expanded NCTTCA data show 2010 baseline and 2018 average transit times for Mombasa Port exit to exit Kenya:&lt;br&gt;  o To Malaba 11.1 days (2010) to 4.3 days (2018); 61% reduction&lt;br&gt;  o To Busia 14.7 (2010) to 4.1 days (2018); 72% reduction&lt;br&gt;  o Standard deviation (STD) dropped as well, meaning some reduction in risk and uncertainty for private sector transporters. However, transporters experienced variations from two to ten days above or below average times.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;• A 2014 JICA GPS study (published in 2017) resulted in shorter transit times to Malaba; slightly variant processes in the use of GPS kits for this study and its small sample size explain the shorter times.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;• TMEA-supported NMCs reduced weighbridges in Kenya and Uganda to eight from at least ten; some also began to weigh in motion rather than static measurement. NCTTCA shows weighbridge data for only one point in time.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;• RECTS is used with ‘risky’ consignments, totalling roughly 20% of shipments. Current data show 30-60% time savings against non-monitored consignments, credited to monitoring driver behaviour.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;• External private sector respondents report consistent transport time gains.</td>
<td>1. <strong>Likely</strong>&lt;br&gt;TMEA’s work with NMCs to eliminate NTBs, particularly weighbridges and checkpoints, is in evidence, along with the work with first URA, then KRA, then RRA to establish a shared RECTS that automated and systematised risk assessment to prioritise consignments for e-monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Average time to transport goods from Rwanda to Mombasa Port (including also any benefits from RECTS and eliminated NTBs)</td>
<td>2. <strong>As likely as not</strong>&lt;br&gt;This outcome was not monitored, but given the likely positive outcomes on the import route and the shared use of TMEA-supported CMS, OSBPs, reduction in weighbridges and other NTBs, changes in standards regimes and inspections, etc., it is at least as likely as not that TMEA contributed to reductions in export times as well. It is not possible to estimate the value of TMEA’s contribution to any time reductions, as those time reductions are not quantified.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Average time to transport goods from Mombasa Port to Rwanda (including also any benefits from RECTS, eliminated NTBs, any savings from inland container depots (ICDs), OSBPs, CMS)</td>
<td>3. <strong>Likely</strong>&lt;br&gt;Reduction in times on this route is supported by the range of route data provided by TMEA’s partners in August, 2019; the combined work on Malaba and Busia OSBPs, RECTS, NTBs (esp. weighbridges), the ICD in Rwanda, ReSW, CMS in Uganda, testing/inspection savings is likely to have had an effect on these times. However, no effects from the Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP should be inferred, given the low volumes at that OSBP. It is not possible to set a reliable value for TMEA’s contribution relative to the myriad other factors on this route, such as government works and systemic changes in imports and exports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reduction in costs of trade (including any benefits from OSBPs, CMS, RECTS, testing/inspection, or any eliminated NTBs)</td>
<td>4. <strong>L/UL/Likely</strong>&lt;br&gt;No baseline available for this route. The EAC’s 2012 Time Release study cites 18.1 days with STD of 10.5 days for <strong>Mombasa to Kampala</strong>.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;• TMEA’s Results Meter says Mbsa → Kigali 5.7 days&lt;br&gt;• USAID source (2019) says Mbsa → Kigali 7 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

4 In the process of revising this report, TMEA questioned an earlier version which found no likely changes in the corridor transport times, and was able to access baseline and additional data from their partners, particularly URA, KRA and RRA, to support their assertion that overall transport times had decreased on key segments of the Northern Corridor, including the Mombasa to Busia and Malaba times. These newly accessed data better align with wider and disinterested reports from private sector respondents who nearly universally cited reductions in transport times along the Northern Corridor. These reductions (or their 2017 equivalents) were not included in TMEA’s Results Framework (RF), likely because of the use of TMEA’s Results Meter to show overall changes with more detailed case information for attribution.

5 STD is the standard deviation, a statistical measure of the degree of variance from the average. The higher the STD, the greater variance in times, which adds uncertainty and risk to the conditions of transport.

6 The Law & Development Partnership. 2016. Formative evaluation of TMEA projects on non-tariff barriers to trade. 17 February 2016. TMEA.

7 Kenya Revenue Authority, Rwanda Revenue Authority, Uganda Revenue Authority. 2018. Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System (RECTS). Half Year July-December 2018 Report. TMEA.
CASE: The Northern Corridor

- RECTS data (2018) say Mbsa → Magerwa (Rwanda) 8 days
- KRA/URA data show 13.3 days (2010) to 5.1 days (2018) Mbsa → Kampala; STD has reduced but significant variance remains (i.e., variance in shipment times is still significant in terms of uncertainty and risk for transporters.)
- Limited data for Mbsa → Kigali show 8 days (2014) to 6.2 days (2017).
- External private sector respondents report consistent transport time gains.

4. **L/U/Likely** NCTTCA data show some decrease in costs of trade from 2010 to 2018 between Mombasa and Kigali and between Mombasa and Kampala.

4. Cost reductions linked to time reductions, where these are in evidence (Busia, Mombasa Port, and corridor segments at least to Kampala), are linked in other case studies to TMEA contribution – but are discounted by other interventions and factors. Some of the other interventions and factors are not calculable, resulting in imprecise estimates of the TMEA contribution to the reduced costs; however, the reduced time at Mombasa Port and OSBPs alone (where TMEA’s contribution is estimable) ensure that a non-negligible component of these reductions in cost come from the TMEA interventions at the Port (some 10-20% of which is attributable to TMEA) and at Busia and Malaba OSBPs (of which likely 100% is attributable to TMEA). Other SCT-related interventions (elimination of NTBs especially weighbridges and checkpoints, harmonisation of standards/reduction of inspections, RECTS, CMS and ReSW) are also likely to have contributed to the reduction in costs.

**Impacts on trade**
Increased trade: We find no outcomes through the causal mechanisms proposed by TMEA in their RF, and so do not pursue the question of impacts. The TGIS examines this question through separate methodology.

**Reference Table for Calculating Beliefs after seeing evidence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of Seeing Evidence of Activities if Claim is True</th>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>VL</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>UL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About as likely as not</td>
<td>ALN</td>
<td>VUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>UL</td>
<td>ALN / L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>VUL</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionally unlikely</td>
<td>EUL</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2 SO1 PIO 1.1 Mombasa Port Case Study

### CASE: Mombasa Port

**Narrative Summary:** TMEA identified infrastructure projects that: a) would affect time and/or cost of trade; b) were prioritized by the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA); c) were in a certain cost range (that would not likely be undertaken by other donors or the government). Entrance and egress routes for trucks were widened and improved; and container stacking areas were improved and expanded. A mix of ‘green-port’ civil works and facility upgrades modestly boosted capacity, as well as having clear environmental benefits and improved working conditions for port staff. The programme also carried out necessary feasibility studies for berth upgrades that in themselves were out of TMEA’s budgetary reach, but on the basis of which other donors have come forward. Similarly, it commissioned a strategy document for the commercial integration of the new standard-gauge railway into the logistics of Mombasa port processes and the options for handling and storage at the other end of the line in Nairobi.

Infrastructure works were combined with a set of operational upgrades and capacity building – what TMEA calls soft infrastructure. TMEA performed a needs assessment and a time-and-motion study to identify capacity gaps and bottlenecks; helped create a one-stop centre to improve customs performance for KPA customers. Of critical importance was TMEA’s work to create the Port Charter and get signatures from 25 key agencies agreeing to work together to improve port functioning. A supported M&E system run by the Northern Corridor Trade Observatory provided periodic feedback to charter members by collecting, maintaining and reporting on key indicators. TMEA supported the review of KPA regulations and hired a consultant to draft a reform-based KPA Act.

**Key contribution claim:** TMEA contributed to efficiency and capacity gains at the port which contributed 10-20% of the support that reduced average time (by about half) to import and export goods through Mombasa Port, (and ultimately make trade more profitable and increase trade volumes) through a combination of hard infrastructure projects and institutional and soft infrastructure work.

**Evaluation finding:** VC/EUL/Virtually certain – for imports only

### Activities Claimed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hard infrastructure activities</th>
<th>Evidence that activities happened and that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Container storage work, Yard 5 and G-section yard</td>
<td>Contract for Yard 5 container-storage area: Contract PO/20130081 between TradeMark East Africa and Howard Humphreys (East Africa) Limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**CASE: Mombasa Port**

Institutional and soft infrastructure activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soft investments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TradeMark, Project appraisal report (PAR) – V9-2013-08-13: support to Kenya Ports Authority,</strong> ('The support to KPA focuses on a set of activities designed to increase capacity in container trade and improve efficiency in handling of cargo and ships. The components include Legal &amp; Regulatory revisions, Infrastructure &amp; Facilities Improvement, Mombasa Dry Port, Productivity Improvement Programme, Technical Assistance, Private sector/Civil Society Engagement, Environmental Improvement, Port Reforms Initiatives within the port of Mombasa'), Mombasa port programme 0923, 13th August 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Time &amp; motion study</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Port charter</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>One-stop centre</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Northern Corridor observatory</td>
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Interview with former donor employee: ‘A time and motion study [analysed] what happens to a good from arrival to departure, the steps and their costs.’ Inefficiencies identified included 1) multiple inspections (KRA, PH, others), 2) processes done on paper, 3) eight-man dockworker gangs. Joint verification, ICT interventions, and 4-man gangs introduced.

7. **Mombasa Port Charter:** The Charter and its annexes, branded by TMEA. Also:
   - MOUs between KPA and TMEA and GoK and TMEA
   - Results Framework for the Charter Community, validation meeting minutes from the process.
   - Private-sector organizations and civil-society organizations engagement reported in evaluation interviews, along with communications strategy

8. **Capacity building and Productivity Improvement Project – PAR, evaluation interviews with port and partner staff, PIP milestones on operational performance results framework**

9. **One-stop centre – site visit and donor interview:** ‘The one-stop office at the port where all countries are sitting together is very impressive. Even six months ago you walked through corridors of stacks paper. Now it’s just a small room with five people and no paper.’

10. **Northern Corridor Transport Observatory**
    - Site visit and interviews; interviews with other users; visits to the website to use data
    - Aide Memoire; MIS monitoring report; quarterly and annual reports; Observatory agreement with NCTTA; interview discussion of other funding.
    - Transport observatory reports, including KPA Mombasa Port annual reviews
## CASE: Mombasa Port

### Outputs

#### Hard infrastructure outputs

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Evidence of outputs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. More, and improved, container stacking and organization</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Before and after photos, e.g. Google Earth imagery for 18/03/2010 &amp; 25/12/2017; TMEA evaluation: deliverable 3A: Consolidative Evaluation of Ports and OSBP Projects. Also PE site visits.</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Extensive reports provided on yards, White House roundabout, gate 10 approach road. Site visit, evaluation interviews with KPA.</td>
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<td>2. Increased capacity for vehicle and cargo traffic</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Consensus among respondents that Port Reitz road decongested access to the JICA container terminal significantly. One interview with a former donor employee: ‘Port Reitz Road is one of the single biggest pieces DFID through TMEA undertook, partnering with JICA and GOK... Because of airport access the works had a secondary effect on tourism. Prior to this road you could spend hours in traffic to get to the airport. This has significantly improved.’</td>
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<td>3. Feasibility studies/designs facilitated and shared</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Donor conference: Ministry of Trade and TMEA • Presentation and meeting notes and evaluation interviews confirm the conference and TMEA’s role in bringing donors to the table. The completion and quality of the feasibility studies, including financial modelling, were sufficient to attract potential donors/lenders. At the end of S1 (per interview with former donor employee): ‘A consortium of EU [EIB] and AFD were in final stages of putting together 220 million Euros to finance relocation of Kipevu Oil Terminal and berth improvements. TMEA would just provide some supervisory funding.’ • KPA interviews confirm both the loan agreement with the creditors and an additional $20m grant for gender interventions at the Port. • Validation meeting of the SGR report galvanises GoK to reflect on how to ensure an efficient and profitable allocation of freight to rail and road from Mombasa to Nairobi, as well as how to handle and warehouse that freight at each end.</td>
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#### Institutional and soft infrastructure outputs

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<tr>
<td>4. Collaboration and integration and planning between key institutions</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Port Charter evidence: as noted in Activities above • Partner interview: TMEA had impact through the president’s signing and launching of the charter and the major stakeholders. Other port stakeholders noticed the important facilitating role of MPC and requested to join, such as KEPHIS. Port stakeholders now hold annual, quarterly and weekly meetings to discuss problems and propose mitigation measures. Corridor data from observatory is examined weekly for problems and to propose solutions.</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Extensive documentation on Mombasa Port Charter work, including photographed public signing. Mombasa Port Charter M&amp;E plan provided.</td>
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<td>6. Northern Corridor observatory data collected, shared</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain NCTTCA data repository online, evaluation interviews with the partner and Charter members who report its use</td>
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**CASE: Mombasa Port**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Outcomes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. Import times reduced.</strong>&lt;br&gt;a. Less time before customs processing, including faster registration of landed cargo&lt;br&gt;b. Faster customs processing (i.e. a shorter cargo release)&lt;br&gt;c. A shorter wait before the cargo leaves the port (including faster truck turnaround)&lt;br&gt;d. TMEA claim 20% of the reduced time to import; the TGIS (through different methodology) arrives at a figure of 10%.</td>
<td>1. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> NCTTCA’s observatory online updates of the three port processes accelerated for all import cargo and an update of one undifferentiated port-processing variable for containers.&lt;br&gt;   - Evaluation interviews with donors, shippers, logistics firms.&lt;br&gt;   - KPA Annual Bulletins of Statistics on port performance – throughput, ship turnaround&lt;br&gt;   - KRA data and 2015 CPCS study confirm reductions in port times, though at different rates and using different definitions. This likely confirms the reductions, though with some imprecision.&lt;br&gt;   - However the inland container depot (ICD) is working well over capacity with SGR-transported containers arriving. The delays once at the port are now at the ICD.&lt;br&gt;   - Major Kenyan importer/exporter said times have worsened at Mombasa Port in 2018-2019 because of 100% verification, which takes seven days but KPA begins demurrage charges after the 4th day. Attributes the failure to the ICD.</td>
<td>1. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> TMEA expenditures on these projects across Port operations to improve capacity and efficiency. JICA second container terminal came online too late to have affected these measures, though the presence of the terminal will have affected times since the end of S1, as has the advent of the SGR. World Bank interventions on capacity building were also underway during S1. Interviews with KPA and inspections agencies that operate at the Port confirmed the importance of TMEA investments, but other donor programming also contributed.</td>
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<td><strong>2. For exports</strong>&lt;br&gt;3. Donors/lenders agree to finance rehabilitation of berths 11 - 14 per the feasibility studies&lt;br&gt;4. TMEA supports GOK to develop its SGR policy following the TMEA logistics report &amp; business plan</td>
<td>2. <strong>ALAN/ALAN/As likely as not</strong> Limited NCTTCA data on exports. TMEA RF cites approximately 50% reduction in time to export through the Port from 15.4 to 7.3 days. However, NCTTCA do not monitor exports, so it is unclear where TMEA have accessed this figure. Still, most of the same interventions would have affected exports as well as imports.</td>
<td>2. <strong>L/UL/Likely</strong> Exports are probably affected by the same inputs as imports, in #1 above. But there are no data to substantiate that effect.</td>
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<td><strong>3.</strong></td>
<td>3. <strong>ALAN/ALAN/As likely as not</strong> Interviews with EIB and AFD confirm the central nature of TMEA investment in the feasibility studies.</td>
<td>3. <strong>ALAN/ALAN/As likely as not</strong> Interviews with EIB and AFD confirm the central nature of TMEA investment in the feasibility studies.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong></td>
<td>4. <strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong> TMEA proposed and spoke at/led meetings on a commercial strategy for the SGR with government, confirmed with interviews and documentation from the meetings. However the GoK is requiring that containers use the railroad, contrary to TMEA’s strategy and expert counsel from TMEA and elsewhere. Confirmed by multiple shippers and logistics firms.</td>
<td>4. <strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong> TMEA proposed and spoke at/led meetings on a commercial strategy for the SGR with government, confirmed with interviews and documentation from the meetings. However the GoK is requiring that containers use the railroad, contrary to TMEA’s strategy and expert counsel from TMEA and elsewhere. Confirmed by multiple shippers and logistics firms.</td>
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**Impacts on trade**

TMEA did not claim impacts on trade at the OSBP, so these are not included in the CT case study. The TGIS examines this question through separate methodology.
**CASE: Mombasa Port**

Reference Table for Calculating Beliefs after seeing evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of Seeing Evidence of Activities if Claim is True</th>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>VC</th>
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3 SO1 PIO 1.3a Kagitumba / Mirama Hills OSBP Case Study

**CASE: Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP**

**Narrative Summary:** EAC countries form a customs union, i.e. a free trade area with a common external tariff. Member states’ customs services apply the common tariff on imports across the common union’s border with non-member states; the customs services do not charge tariffs at internal boundaries on other member states’ goods but rather “facilitate collection of common duties and taxes for goods produced outside signatory states and confirm that goods crossing match the export/import documents and duties are paid when they enter signatory states”. (NEPAD et al. One-stop border post sourcebook, 2nd edition, May 2016) Other border agencies have additional responsibilities (e.g. immigration, animal and plant inspection, security).

Among inefficiencies affecting the free movement of goods along trade corridors, one important set of problems occurs at border posts where procedures have been cumbersome, repetitive and scattered. At most posts, several government agencies work in isolation on each side of the border, without sharing findings or collaborating to speed up their document checks and verification of cargo, slowing the movement of im/exports (and people, including truck drivers) across borders. There was a need to find an improvement in order to reduce delays. Mapping of existing flows led to proposals for improved systems and eventually for the design of one-stop border posts (OSBPs) for EAC countries.

OSBPs cluster government agencies from both sides of the border in one location for truck flows in each direction. In East Africa, a truck drives across the border, out of the exporting country, without hindrance, stopping at a joint border post in the importing country. There the customs and other government agents check electronic details of the shipment and, if necessary, scan or physically inspect it. The goal is to reduce delays at the border through a single stop, limited paperwork and (if necessary) speedy inspections.

OSBPs comprise border posts and complementary ICT. The border posts house the new bilateral combinations of government officials, with necessary parking, laboratories, banks, etc. The ICT links relevant government agencies in each country and facilitates links between agencies in adjacent countries. The bilateral links allow electronic details of shipments to arrive before the shipments themselves, thus reducing the number of irregular shipments arriving at the border and making all details available when the shipment arrives, so as to speed processing. In addition, in accordance with the EAC Joint OSBP Act, joint border committees oversee bi-lateral agreements, OSBP regulations and operational efficiency for all OSBPs on the border between a pair of adjacent countries. ‘Integrated border management’ (IBM) results from the efficient management of the border posts using ICT, in the framework of bilateral agreements and OSBP regulations. In each country, the lead operational agency is usually the revenue authority. Exceptionally in Rwanda, the Immigration Service is the lead agency.

Construction of OSBP infrastructure is a major expenditure, sometimes including new approach roads to facilitate traffic flows. Ideally, a single supervisor acts as contract administrator, though separate contractors may undertake the building and fitting out of the infrastructure on each side of the border.

Two border posts lie on routes that naturally link Kigali to Kampala (and much of the rest of Uganda). Currently most trucks that travel between Kigali and Kampala cross the border at Gatuna/Katuna. Another border post, Kagitumba/Mirama Hills, sits on an alternative route that is longer, though flatter and less twisty. The governments of Rwanda and Uganda have made this border an OSBP, with improved roads in Uganda (completed) and Rwanda (due to be completed in September 2019 (TMEA Rwanda) or January 2021 (Jean de Dieu Nsabimana, ‘Rwanda works on Rukomo-Nyagatare road begin’, allAfrica, https://allafrica.com/stories/201903080570.html)).

**Key contribution claim:** TMEA contributed to increased efficiency of trade through Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP through a combination of hard infrastructure projects, road work and institutional and soft infrastructure work that resulted in a reduction in average time to cross the border.

**Evaluation finding:** **L/U/Likely** – but because they created capacity that is underutilised, no effect on corridor times or trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities Claimed</th>
<th>Evidence that activities happened and that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hard infrastructure activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. TMEA issues offer to government</td>
<td>2. TMEA, Offer to fund, design and supervise the development of a One Stop Border Post at the Kagitumba/Mirama Hills border crossing, 20th July 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. TMEA recruits design &amp; supervision firm</td>
<td>3. TMEA &amp; Triad Architects, Contract for design &amp; supervision services for a juxtaposed one-stop border post at Kagitumba/Mirama Hills, contract reference PO/00066, 20th January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Procurement documents:</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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CASE: Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP

4. TMEA & lead government agency procure and hire construction firm
5. Government confirms land is available
6. Stakeholders approve construction design
7. TMEA commissions baseline TTS
8. TMEA participates in progress meetings & inspections
9. TMEA tarred the 37-km approach road

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributions</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TMEA</td>
<td>TradeMark East Africa, Letter from Scott Allan, Deputy CEO, Trademark East Africa, to the Commissioner General, Rwanda Revenue Authority, Re: tax clarification on Trademark East Africa sponsored infrastructure projects, 23rd January 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Rwanda Revenue Authority, letter from Ben Kagarama, Commissioner General, to Scott Allen, Deputy CEO, Trademark East Africa, concerning VAT exemption for contractor and secondary suppliers, 6th February 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>Rwanda Revenue Authority &amp; Dongil Construction, Contract for the construction of one stop border post facilities at Kagitumba, contract no. 068/W/RR/2012-13, 15th March 2013</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Institutional and soft infrastructure activities

10. Government sets up committees (joint bilateral, ad hoc)
11. Bilateral agreement including financing
12. OSBP operational processes developed and used in training of staff and stakeholders
13. TMEA procures furniture, ICT, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence of outputs</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Site visit, evaluation interviews. Activity evidence of civil works. Note, however, border official report that that there is no scanner.</td>
<td>OSBP structures and procedures in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Institutional/legal framework documents; bilateral CMS; interviews with immigration lead (Rwanda’s lead OSBP agency), Customs and Standards: ICT – computers, LAN, IP phones, and internet; furniture in place</td>
<td>IBM operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Training activities: Materials, attendance lists, interview confirmation from border staff. 2015 reports of training border managers, officers</td>
<td>Capacity building and change management</td>
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</table>

Evidence that TMEA contributed to outputs

1. VC/EUL/Virtually certain PE site visit; evaluation interviews; activity evidence of civil works; ESIA report
2. VC/EUL/Virtually certain Procurement/TORs; intergovernmental meetings minutes with TMEA participation; PGIS interviews with officials and users
3. VC/EUL/Virtually certain Branded training materials, documents on convening trainings and covering costs. No other donors were involved.
## CASE: Kagitumba/Mirama Hills OSBP

### Evidence of outcomes

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</table>
| 1. **Reduction in time (in at least one direction) to cross the border** | 1. **L/U/Likely** 2017 TTS showed significantly reduced delays (-93 minutes, -87%) against 30% target. TTS were carried out for a week each in different seasons: 2012 (May), 2016 (March), 2017 (September/October) making interannual comparisons not entirely credible.  
- TTS also shows low truck flows of only 55 per week, 74 percent of the two-way flow being empty returns to Mombasa.  
- Post-S1 Satellite data from NCTTCA [https://tinyurl.com/y548dgbo](https://tinyurl.com/y548dgbo) showed a deterioration in average times up through 2019  
- USAID data show median times of 24m into Uganda and 2h 48m into Rwanda from January 2017 to January 2019, also a deterioration, or at least variability within a large range. | 1. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** PE site visit; evaluation interviews; activity evidence of civil and IBM works; commissioned reports and procurement information; the lack of other donors or government involvement. |
| 2. Improved user satisfaction at the border (in parallel with user satisfaction due to the single window, reduced NTBs, cargo tracking options, the AEO system, etc.) | 2. **L/U/Likely** User satisfaction figures:  
- Overall satisfaction rose very slightly: 89% in 2016 to 91% in 2017  
- Ug staff cited lack of staff accommodation and transport, internet connection, communication with other border posts, and port-health staff; long working days without much work. Kagitumba staff noted lack of lab equipment, transport, cross border communication.  
- Some community respondents reported good service and faster crossing times; others the opposite. | 2. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** PE site visit; evaluation interviews; activity evidence of civil and IBM works; commissioned reports and procurement information; the lack of other donors or government involvement. Note that satisfaction gains were very small, and any gains would be 'shared' with gains attributable to AEO, ICT4T CMS and eSW work, etc. |

### Impacts on trade

Increased trade: Given the low usage of the OSBP the PE concludes no impact on trade. The TGIS examines this question through separate methodology.

## Reference Table for Calculating Beliefs after seeing evidence

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4 SO1 PIO 1.3b Busia OSBP Case Study

CASE: Busia OSBP

**Narrative Summary:** At a traditional border crossing a truck would stop twice for the clearance of both goods and people—in each of Busia-Uganda and Busia-Kenya. This two-stage process resulted in high transaction costs in time and money for traders and passengers. Moreover, conditions of work were poor. Staff were sleeping in “Uniports (cheap hostels) and manyatas (wattle-and-daub huts)” and renting far from the post. There were potholes at the border. Rain caused overflows and the border would get jammed with trucks. There was no verification bay.

The TMEA project developed the two border posts at Busia into a one-stop border crossing with integrated border management systems (OSBP/IBM). At an OSBP, traders/shippers and drivers/passengers travelling in each direction across the border meet all relevant border agencies for all exit and entry formalities in a single building located in the importing country. Agencies at the Busia OSBP include Port Health (MoH), Security, Immigration (MIA), Customs, police, plant health (MAAIF), and standards (UNBS). Other services found at the OSBP include restaurants, banks, forex bureaus, insurance, information desks, EAC offices, and women cross-border trader’s offices.

As early as 2000, when some trucks took a week to cross because of the duplication of all processes at the pre-OSBP border crossing, URA sought an OSBP. At that time the GOU signed a loan agreement with the World Bank (WB) under the East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme which provided several million USD in funding to Ke, Tz, and Ug. The WB sent consultants to design an OSBP, but the project did not take off.

From 2005 to 2009, URA began to modernise, transforming processes, systems and skills. URA received financial support from donors through a basket fund from WB, DANIDA, KFW, Netherlands Government (EKN), and Norway. The funding supported ICT projects, intranet, interconnectivity of URA offices, customs migration from AYSCUDA 2 to AYSCUDA++, ECT (WB money), the Balanced Scorecard, and others.

In 2010, TMEA began with the goal of supporting trade facilitation in the EAC. TMEA engaged different government agencies, including URA, which was undergoing a restructuring under a new director general at the time. URA approached donors (including TMEA) for support and created a framework of engagement with TMEA with an MOU. TMEA identified the projects they would support, with customs as a major beneficiary. They helped GoU revise the existing OSBP plans and constructed the OSBP, as the WB project had never been completed. Through negotiation with GoU TMEA included staff quarters. Migration to ASYCUDA World was part of the project as well.

The OSBP clearance times improved as a result, as people and cargo move more easily. Revenue collection is faster and more certain. Border staff morale has improved due to a set of factors that improved work-related infrastructure and housing. The post is no longer classified as “unfit for female employees”.

Representatives from several countries have come to benchmark the Busia OSBP on recommendation of the WB, IMF, and JICA. The Busia OSBP was presented as a case study of best improved border crossing points in Africa at the Geneva WTO meeting by the minister of MTIC trade. The images from Busia were broadcast live in Geneva.

**Key contribution claim:** TMEA contributed to increased efficiency of trade through Busia OSBP through a combination of hard infrastructure projects, road work and institutional and soft infrastructure work that resulted in a reduction of approximately 80% in average time to cross the border.

**Evaluation finding:** VC/EUL/Virtually certain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities Claimed</th>
<th>Evidence that activities happened and that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hard infrastructure activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offices, boardrooms, training rooms, toilets, cafeteria</td>
<td>1. Contracts, TORs, oversight reports, final reports on works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packing yards, oil interceptor</td>
<td>1. Notice of Third Site Meeting, November 21, 2013, TMEA and EATTFP plus contractors to review progress, with details from site inspection and guidance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CASE: Busia OSBP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Evidence of outputs</th>
<th>Evidence that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Completed hard infrastructure (implementing ESIA recommendations)</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain PE site visit found physical infrastructure present. TMEA RF reports that Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) was incorporated in design and implementation of construction.</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Evaluator site visit found physical infrastructure present. TMEA reports on ESIA. Partners confirm TMEA role and that other donors worked on complementary projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. IBM operational (and implementing gender action plans)</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Institutional/legal framework in place; EAC website. Act, regulation, procedures and tools, found in site visit; bilateral operation of ASYCUDA and SIMBA. Private sector interviews. Equipment in place (photos) a. RF reports gender action plans and full implementation; gender not mentioned in the EAC OSBP Manual or Regulations (2017) or Draft SOPs but one mention in a 2017 EAC training curriculum b. Synergies with RECTS, eSW &amp; AEO confirmed in interviews with border officials, such as: ‘The timing of OSBP/IBM with these other modernising initiatives in a framework of open collaboration and sensitisation allowed each to mutually reinforce the others &amp; greater incentives for compliance.’</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Procurement and TORs, coordination meetings between governments; Respondent interviews. Notes and presentations from two trainings on gender. Partners confirm TMEA role and that other donors did not work on IBM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Capacity building and change management</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Training: multiple reports, attendance lists, curricula</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain Training: TMEA shared curricula, attendance lists, training times/dates for multiple trainings. First training on IBM solely by TMEA; ongoing training by EAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Performance management tool in place</td>
<td>VL/VUL/Very likely EAC interviewees report piloting tool at some sites</td>
<td>VC/EUL/Virtually certain A TMEA-EAC report containing the performance measuring tool and meeting notes from its validation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Improved staff morale around infrastructure improvements</td>
<td>L/U/Likely Interview with URA staffer: ‘staff morale was higher because they had new offices &amp; internet, computers and necessary periphery hardware and</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### CASE: Busia OSBP

**Outcomes**

1. **Reduction in time (in at least one direction) to cross the border at selected locations**

2. Improved user satisfaction at the border (in parallel with user satisfaction due to the single window, reduced NTBs; cargo tracking options, the AEO system, etc.)

3. Reduction in costs of trade

4. Increased tax collection

5. Start of a transformation from informal to professional trade, and an improved trading environment for women.

**Evidence of outcomes**

1. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Nick Porée & Associates (Pty) Ltd. 2016 Time and Traffic Study. 80% reduction against baseline into Kenya, 79% into Uganda. Baseline may have been elevated due to a staff strike at Malaba that would have driven traffic to Busia. Corroboration comes from two additional sources:
   - Interviews with AEOs and other private sector users
   - URA RECTS times data; ASYCUDA World data on clearance times

2. **UL/L/Unlikely** TTS: Uganda ~50% satisfaction, Kenya ~18% satisfaction

3. **L/UL/Likely** AEOs and other external interviews report decline in costs

4. **L/UL/Likely** Uganda Customs Commissioner provided data. Also Busia customs supervisor: ‘URA used to experience delayed revenue collection, now it is faster, money collected today would have taken 3 to 4 days to collect. URA revenue collection has increased due to less avoidance, there are less transactions but less money is lost.’ There are no data on reduced avoidance.

5. **L/UL/Likely** A representative of a new cross-border trade association cited ‘Increased awareness among traders on how they are supposed to be served – less information asymmetries among business communities’. Busia GV interview [In context of lessons learnt:] ‘Transparency and Professionalism of TM – will try to take this forward.’ Evaluation interviews.

**Evidence that TMEA contributed to outcomes**

1. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Partner and stakeholder interviews confirm TMEA’s involvement; other donors’ and government said to be complementary. Results Meter cites 100% contribution.

2. **ALN/ALN/As likely as not** About 50% mentioned either faster processing or less delay on the Uganda side, and 30% referred to better facilities – all TMEA projects. Kenya responses were much lower, with much less satisfaction overall but also in categories where TMEA didn’t work.

3. **VL/VUL/Very likely** Partner/stakeholder interviews confirm TMEA involvement; other donors’ and government were said to be complementary. Results Meter cites 100% contribution.

4. **VL/VUL/Very likely** Interview data from border and revenue officials and the record of TMEA involvement in IBM procedures from Activities and Outputs, above

5. **L/UL/Likely** Interviews with women and men traders

### Impacts on trade

TMEA did not claim impacts on trade at the OSBP, so these are not included in the CT case study. The TGIS examines this question through separate methodology.

### Reference Table for Calculating Beliefs after seeing evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>VC</th>
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<td><strong>Probability of Seeing Evidence of Activities if Claim is True</strong></td>
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<tr>
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**CASE: Busia OSBP**

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<tr>
<th>Exceptionally unlikely</th>
<th>EUL</th>
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5 SO2 PIO 2.2 ICT for Trade Case Study – Regional and all four countries

**CASE: ICT for Trade**

**Narrative Summary:** The goal of PIO 2.2 was to make trade systems, agencies and procedures more effective throughout the EA region. Effective trade is facilitated by simple regulatory systems, non-duplicative requirements, and streamlined procedures. In S1 TMEA worked on Customs Management Systems, Single Window Information for Trade (SWIFT) systems, the Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System (RECTS) and transport observatory projects to collect and disseminate trade data online. Taken together, improving national systems for simplicity and streamlining should reduce costs and time taken to trade, incentivising trade.

Prior to the introduction of the electronic single window (eSW), clearing agents who represented im/exporters had to travel sequentially to the offices of many government agencies with a dossier of paperwork in order to meet the trade-related requirements of each. The procedures of each agency were paper-based and their offices were scattered, so the clearing agent (representing the importer or exporter) spent time travelling, filling in forms, and waiting for approvals. Approval at each level depended on personal interactions, ultimately providing opportunities for corruption. The results were high transaction costs and delayed shipments. SWIFTs and eSw enable international traders to submit regulatory documents at a single location and/or single entity. TMEA worked with different agency partners to automate trade facilitation business processes and set up trading regulations information portals.

Country projects included in the CT case study are the following:

In Rwanda, the Rwandan Revenue Authority, which includes the customs service, oversaw setting up the Rwandan eSW (ReSW) in parallel with the introduction of the one-stop border posts (OSBPs). TradeMark East Africa funded ReSW as a single set of customs-centred modules, based on the ‘ASYCUDA World’ version of UNCTAD’s Automated System for Customs Data. ReSW allows the customs service to capture transit information from border posts and other customs sites, to exchange data with other relevant agencies, to assess duties payable, and to release a consignment when agencies involved have all approve clearance. ReSW also includes modules that allow the clearing agent to input all required consignment details from their offices via computer. Similarly, the trader can pay customs duties electronically.

In Uganda an example of TMEAs ICT4T work was with the “URA - Customs Business Systems Enhancement Programme” The programme worked primarily through Customs, and the Customs Commissioner nominated project teams to work with systems developers procured by TMEA. TMEA worked adaptively with GOU agencies, such as when the Coffee Development Authority wished to be on the ESW and TMEA worked to include them, as coffee is Uganda’s main export. Key areas of work were:

1. Upgrade to ASYCUDA World to allow traders to submit their documents to system with automated reviews and document approvals.
2. Approve Authorized Economic Operators to self-manage in line with risk codes in ASYCUDA World.
3. Set up the Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System (RECTS).
4. Establish a Document Processing Centre (DPC).

In Tanzania, TCP worked with Zanzibar Food and Drugs Authority (ZFDA), and Ministry of Agriculture on SWIFT. Ministry of Agriculture SWIFT is about to be launched in March/April 2019. Tanzania disintegrated the ministry of Agriculture and Livestock into two separate ministries and because of that there was a standstill period in TMEA relations with the ministry in early 2016 – eventually they ended up doing SWIFT for nine crops and TMEA worked separately with the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries for its SWIFT.

In Kenya, TMEA developed the Port Health MIS system with software, a hosted data centre with a web application for registered users, housed in the Ministry of Health. They held validation workshops to review the system with users, then piloted the system with those users, trained them in the system and registered those users. All data were migrated from the old system to the new – including their registrations and their existing certificates. Traders no longer had to come to the agency to get their certificates. TMEA also trained Ministry users to certify regulations for the import and export of commodities, and trained inspectors. System automates health import/export certificates for plants, animals, food and people (commodities). All business processes were previously on the Single Window but this activity converted that to a separate bespoke system. The iCMS system planned for Kenya has not yet been completed or gone online.

**Key contribution claim:** TMEA contributed to increased ease of trading across borders through a combination of ICT for Trade interventions resulting in time and cost savings for traders.

**Evaluation finding:** VL/VUL/Very likely
**CASE: ICT for Trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities Claimed</th>
<th>Evidence that activities happened and that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Formulated projects in line with TMEA mandate and stakeholder interests | 1. Formulation documents:  
   - Terms of Reference for Local Project Implementation Team of Electronic Single Window and Customs Management System (Phase II) (Rwanda)  
   - Design and Development of a Web-based e-Portal for Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority Final Project Report Prepared by Softclans Technologies Limited (date estimated at around 2011) |
| 2. Developed PARs and results frameworks, Business Process Flow with engagement and validation from stakeholders. | 2. Multiple PARs reviewed and a Business Process Flow document from one project |
| 3. Complete technical analysis, including baselines and design | 3. No evidence of engagement with stakeholders at this stage |
| 4. Established management structures at three levels – a steering committee at high level, mid-level management committee, and a technical group. |  |
|  |  |
| Outputs | Evidence of outputs |
| 1. Delivery of CMS – software, data centre, registered users web application, housed in governments | 1. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Stakeholders confirm existence and use (Rwanda, Uganda); Physical evidence in site visits (URA Uganda and Busia OSBP); Formalative Evaluation of RRA eSW and ASYCUDA; URA list of AEOs; evaluation interviews with several of these confirmed Customs system and their operation as AEOs; fieldwork witnessed URA staff housed in AEO offices; Other trainees among customs systems users confirmed in external private sector interviews |
| 2. Delivery of Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking (RECTS) | 2. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** visit confirmed RECTS system in use; evaluation interviews with AEOs and external private sector confirmed its operation. |
| 3. Delivery of SWIFT systems and portals | 3. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Partners, AEOs and external private sector confirmed usage in Rwanda and Uganda; KenTrade provided usage figures for that system |
| 4. Trainings for systems users | 4. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Training data  
   - Tanzania Food and Drug Authority Swift Portal End of Project Report February 2018 reports comprehensive training and sensitization plan and |
|  |  |
| Evidence that TMEA contributed to outputs | 1. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Procurement, design and operationalisation evidence from Activities, above; confirmation from partners that TMEA was key funder in the systems cited here; straightforward evidence on the complementary involvement of other donors with other upgrades |
| 2. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Evaluation interviews confirm TMEA’s role and the complementary involvement of others elsewhere |
| 3. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Evaluation interviews confirm TMEA’s role along with multiple reports, including evaluation of SWIFTs and one of ReSW Rwanda. |
| 4. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Trainings confirmed in TMEA reporting, such as Formative Evaluation of SWIFT Projects: 241 users trained and sensitized’ And ‘The evaluation team found that the system had
### CASE: ICT for Trade

**intensive training of trainers (for TFDA staff - IT and process owners) who then gave refreshers to TFDA in regional offices.**
- Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya interviews with external companies confirmed they were trained in the new systems (SWIFTs and CMS) undergone validation, trainings and user acceptance testing by internal users and process owners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Evidence of outcomes</th>
<th>Evidence that TMEA contributed to outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Reduction in clearance time</td>
<td><strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong> Average times imprecise because of variation between systems.</td>
<td>1. <strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong> Evaluation interviews say TMEA’s responsibilities in delivering these systems were distinct from those of other development partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reduction in number of transit trucks under physical escort</td>
<td><strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong> External interviews (Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya – logistics firms, freight forwarders’ association, shippers) report no longer having to go from agency to agency, all online (except payment in Rwanda); no paper forms; can monitor progress online; SWIFTs made a difference in permit process and border crossing time. External Ugandan firm said average time better by half; RRA confirms in interview and press release.</td>
<td>2. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> AEOs and partner agencies confirm TMEA’s RECTS intervention and believe TMEA’s role complements government in achieving the results; escort drivers may have lost jobs</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Reduction in trade costs</td>
<td><strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong> TMEA Formative Evaluation of SWIFTs reports ‘Overall average key trade document processing time after automation reduced from an average of 86 hours (3.6 days) to 10 hours… 89% reduction against target of 80.’.</td>
<td>3. <strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong> Evaluation interviews say TMEA’s responsibilities in delivering these systems were distinct from those of other development partners.</td>
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</table>

**Impacts on trade**

TMEA claimed impacts on trade in the ICT4T component, based on URA export data volumes and Observatory data; the latter were consistently unavailable on the NCTTCA website, and so the impact claim could not be substantiated. The TGIS examines this question through separate methodology.
## CASE: ICT for Trade

### Reference Table for Calculating Beliefs after seeing evidence

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<tr>
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## CASE: Elimination of NTBs

### Narrative Summary:
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) have been a challenge to regional trade and integration in East Africa. They account for a significant proportion of high trade costs in the East African Community (EAC). They drive up business costs of importing and exporting goods, make business regionally and globally uncompetitive, and increase prices to consumers across the entire region. Article 13 of the EAC Customs Union provides for immediate removal of all existing NTBs on importation of goods originating within the region. Since 2010 TMEA has partnered with the EAC Secretariat, Partner State governments, the private sector and civil society organisations in the elimination of NTBs. The regional frameworks for the identification, monitoring, reporting and elimination of NTBs are the current interventions that are being carried out to address the problem of NTBs in the region.

### Evaluation finding:

**Key contribution claim:** TMEA contributed to easing trading across borders by eliminating NTBs, which decreased average time and cost to transit.

### Activities Claimed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities Claimed</th>
<th>Evidence that activities happened and that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Supporting Partner State NMCs with technical assistance and facilitating meetings at national and regional levels</td>
<td>1. Evidence of work with the NMCs at national and EAC levels: Concept Note For The Dedicated Session Of Permanent/Principal/Under Secretaries, Ministers/Cabinet Secretary For Trade And Ministers Responsible For EAC Affairs On Long Outstanding NTBs IN EAC Region, EAC SECRETARIAT, Arusha, Tanzania, October, 2017; Development Of A Legally Binding Mechanism On Elimination Of Non-Tariff Barriers In The East Africa Community Final Report September 2012; TMEA Gov of Rwanda National Strategy For Elimination Of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs); Uganda Report on NMC activities by quarter, April-June 2016 Evidence of working with Partner States and EAC Secretariat in bilateral, regional forums: Regional forum: 11th Regional Forum on NTBs 27th to 29th June 2012; Formative Evaluation of TMEA Projects on Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade 17 February 2016 reports on related expenditures; TMEA document: Development Of A Legally Binding Mechanism On Elimination Of Non-Tariff Barriers In The East Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Facilitating regional forums on NTBs, including working with</td>
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</table>
### CASE: Elimination of NTBs

| EAC secretariat and PS in bilateral channels | Community Final Report September 2012 Prepared by Simon Ihiga (file called ToRs for EAC Impact Study) ; Evidence of TMEA support to EAC NTB regional forum Nov-Dec 2016 in Dar es Salaam; EABC and KAM report bilateral meetings between Partner States to sort out NTBs; Records of long standing NTBs; The Status Of Elimination Of Non Tariff Barriers In East African Community As Of May, 2017 EAC Secretariat Arusha, Tanzania May, 2017 ; Updated Time Bound Programme. 25th EAC Regional Forum. Update in Nairobi.xlsx |
| Supporting a Tripartite Online NTB reporting system | 4. Embedded TA for the Tripartite NTB reporting system; TA’s monthly accomplishment reports |
| Drafting and reviewing the EAC NTBs Act | 5. TMEA support to the Draft NTBs Bill: Meeting Of Experts And Legislative Draftpersons Mombasa, Kenya 8th– 12th September, 2014 that gave Consideration And Drafting Of The Draft East African Community Non–Tariff Barrier Bill |

### Outputs

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NTB monitoring/ report systems developed; operationalisation support</th>
<th>Evidence of outputs</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td><strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> Systems reported operational in interviews; Kenyan manuals. Formative evaluation (Feb 2016) says systems are new and not in demand. Tanzania reports use but <em>no data are shared.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td><strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong> Research papers cited in the RF: 21 are listed, four are reviewed. No reporting of publication, nor dissemination by authors/developers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td><strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain (S1)</strong> NMCs operation:</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td><strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> NTBs Act: EAC Supplement Bill Jan 2015 referring to the EAC elimination of NTBs Meeting reports from the process of passing the NTB Bill; TMEA NTBs Impact Study In The EAC A Legally Binding Enforcement Mechanism For The Elimination Of Identified NTBs In The Form Of A Proposed Draft Bill On NTBs July 2012; Industry apex body note the Act was ratified by partner states in 2018 without regulations making it ineffective.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional and national NMCs operational</th>
<th>Evidence that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td><strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> Confirmation from interviews with implementers, traders, and NCTTCA. Tripartite NTBs Mechanism Report. MEACs report no support from other donors and limited budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td><strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> Four reports were found and reviewed; no evidence provided of publication, but the products did refer to TMEA or were carried out by NMCs supported by TMEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td><strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> Reports and evaluation interviews tie TMEA to NMCs: Transporter association respondent reported TMEA funding to NMC; women’s entrepreneurial organization confirmed TMEA invited her group to be on the NMC to eliminate NTBs faced by cross-border women traders; NMC report from Tanzania on Market Surveillance; Private sector apex bodies confirm TMEA coordination of NMCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td><strong>VL/VUL/Very likely</strong> TMEA role in NTBs Act: Report on the meeting of Draftpersons of the bill, in which TMEA participated; NTBs Impact Study report commissioned by TMEA; however, passage of the Act was strongly influenced by external factors, including political will.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CASE: Elimination of NTBs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of outcome</th>
<th>Evidence that TMEA contributed to outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of High Priority NTBs eliminated (disaggregated by country) against the total number of NTBs still reported as outstanding</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Formative Evaluation of TMEA Projects on Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade 17 February 2016 (page 5) reports ‘There has been significant progress in the number of NTBs that have been identified (112) and resolved (87) through the EAC Time Bound Programme… supported by TMEA’</td>
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<td>• Importer/exporters reported being happy with the removal of road blocks which in addition to delays had become NTBs, including for corruption.</td>
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<td>• Apex industry body: “All Partner States still apply NTBs related to sanitary/phyto-sanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, and cumbersome customs documentation”.</td>
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<td>• Logistics firm report there are more NTBs now than before, including on chemical exports.</td>
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<td>• Multiple press reports (please see the main body of the report for specific references, in the response to DEQ5.4 on political economy.)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts on trade</td>
<td>Increased trade: The PE finds no outcome-level results, and therefore does not pursue whether impacts have occurred. The TGIS examines this question through separate methodology.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Reference Table for Calculating Beliefs after seeing evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of Seeing Evidence of Activities if Claim is True</th>
<th>Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>VC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>ALN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>About as likely as not</td>
<td>ALN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>UL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>UL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionally unlikely</td>
<td>EUL</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>VC</th>
<th>VL</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>ALN</th>
<th>UL</th>
<th>VUL</th>
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<td>EUL</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Acronyms**

- VC: Virtually certain
- VL: Very likely
- L: Likely
- ALN: About as likely as not
- UL: Unlikely
- VUL: Very unlikely
- EUL: Exceptionally unlikely
7 SO2 PIO 2.4 Harmonisation of Standards Case Study – Regional, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda

CASE: Harmonisation of Standards

Narrative Summary: Businesses are faced with multiple technical regulations in each EAC Partner State, and different standards with which to comply. Correctly, TMEA see this as counterproductive for increased ease of trading across borders. It adds to the cost of doing business as the private sector must comply with different sets of standards and burdensome technical regulations. Therefore, the positive implications of a functioning Standards Quality Metrology and Testing (SQMT) infrastructure in all EAC Partner States is crucial for the EAC private sector to be willing to export regionally and internationally.

A common market protocol allows for the free movement of goods between countries in an economic community. However, there are standards-related technical barriers to trade (TBTs). The product a company makes according to national standard cannot be exported unless it meets the standards of the receiving countries. TMEA’s theory of change is to harmonise standards so producers can make products that are acceptable in each country.

TMEA undertook a study with the East African Business Council (EABC) to identify the top twenty most traded goods to prioritise for harmonising standards, among the thousands of traded products. A standards steering committee included members from different industry and apex bodies, such as KAM in Kenya. On request from the private sector, TMEA harmonised additional products including packaging, which affected many products.

TMEA worked with national actors to agree on a set of procedures for harmonisation, including how government, private sector, bureaux of standards, academia and the EAC would be seated on the committees: five members from each country. TMEA trained participants on the agreed principles and procedures. Thus backed by consensus, this procedure minimised the room for pushback from Partner States or the private sector.

TMEA then began a series of technical committee meetings by sector using the agreed-upon procedures. TMEA worked to ensure that those participating in the technical committees were cognizant that standards could not be designed to keep out new market entrants. Differences in consumer preferences were also not a basis for compulsory standards. Compulsory standards were to focus on safety and health.

The technical committees proposed the standards, then gave a timeline for feedback on the texts. The EAC notified the WTO of any compulsory standards, awaited response from WTO members, and gave at least six months so international companies could adjust.

The standards were gazetted by the EAC Secretariat organs. Countries had up to six months to withdraw their national standards and start using the harmonised EAC standards. Standards bureaux notified members and begin to certify according to the new standards. Other bureaux are obliged to accept products harmonised to regionally certified standards, without further testing or certification. In March 2019 the EAC examined the rate of adoption. EAC is going to all the bureaux to find out the rate of adoption of the harmonised standards. In 2015 only Rwanda and Uganda had adopted 100% of the harmonised standards, but TMEA says their new study will show that that has advanced. The principal standards officer is checking to see if all national standards have been withdrawn in favour of the harmonised standards. By April-May 2019 TMEA reported they will have those results.

In S1 three countries undertook projects in this area, focusing on equipment upgrades at HQ and border posts and training staff to use new equipment at HQ and border posts; these interventions were common to all three countries. Kenya also worked on reform of SQMT, Standards Act and technical regulations framework. Uganda had a public communications campaign to raise awareness of standard marks. In Rwanda and Uganda, the TMEA projects also included outreach to SMEs, through which they helped 85 companies become certified. Kenya also conducted outreach but for contractual reasons were not able to certify SMEs, which would have required direct budget transfer to the Kenya Bureau of Standards.

Key contribution claim: TMEA contributed to the ease of trading across borders by harmonising 196 regional standards and by increasing the capacity and effectiveness of national bureaux of standards

Evaluation finding: Cannot substantiate at outcome level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities Claimed</th>
<th>Evidence that activities happened and that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIONAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Study to select the top 20 traded goods</td>
<td>1. East African Business Council study - The Study on the Prioritization of EAC Standards and Technical Regulations for Development, Harmonization, Revision or Withdrawal. TMEA involvement confirmed in EABC interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Session to harmonise principles and procedures</td>
<td>2. Attendance list, minutes from meeting; five standards bureau attendees. Final document showing agreed procedures, special for fast-tracking standards, a flow chart and templates for reporting technical committee work. (report cited at 3a below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CASE: Harmonisation of Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL</th>
<th>Evidence that TMEA contributed to outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical committee review structure and EAC oversight of the transparent process</td>
<td>1. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> Documents: Uganda MinTrade MOU with TMEA for equipment; Kenya contracts, procurement and specifications; KEBS acknowledged receipt to TMEA; Rwanda PAR, evaluation interviews with RSB staff; Partner interviews, press: Kenya: ‘We have had several workshops on TBT agreement, staff capacity building, international meetings on standardization,’ attributed to TMEA; End of Project 2017 reported improved operations; Rwanda press release credits TMEA for funding upgrading to testing and certification for export campaign. End of Project Report credits TMEA for HAACP scheme; Uganda Formative evaluation credits TMEA 2. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> Sensitisation trainings: Kenya: SME trainings reported to TMEA; Rwanda monitoring data and partners confirm TMEA inputs; Uganda Formative Evaluation reporting to TMEA, shows 31 sensitisation workshops held. 3. <strong>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</strong> Legal documents drafted and consensual with stakeholders, progressed to Cabinet level; Kenya KEBS report addressed to TMEA from 2013 indicates Ace Consulting carried out the initial drafts and revisions. Report of the workshop on reform of the regulatory framework, 2017.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procurement of equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training staff on the new equipment at HQ, internal TA, and training SMEs for certification in Rwanda, Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upgraded SQMT legal framework in line with EAC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Outputs

1. **National Bureaus of Standards testing upgraded and staff trained**
   - Sites visits and training reports: Kenya: KEBS photos, reports ‘Aflatoxin kits procured for eight borders and two sets of equipment’. ‘Training under TMEA’ details all trainings. Draft TOR for TMEA support to KEBS; Uganda: UNBS site visit (photos); report lists new equipment; Rwanda: PAR, evaluation interviews with RSB staff
3. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Partner and TMEA reports: Regional: Standards Survey-Baseline 2015; Rwanda: Twinning reports 6 new companies meet HAACP standards; Kenya: Details of eleven SME workshops in one quarter, materials on TBT and WTO; Pre-export Verification of Conformity; National Enquiry Points; Product Certification; Consumer Protection. KEBS reported challenges following up with SMEs that closed or moved and that their staff turnover also affected it. TMEA reported that certification would have required a budget transfer to KEBS, which was not allowed; Uganda: Formative Evaluation annexes show 31 sensitisation workshops held.

#### Outcomes

1. **Number of standards harmonised (and gazetted)**
2. **Number of additional tests performed**

#### Contribution Tracing Case Study Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence of outputs</th>
<th>VC/EUL/Virtually certain</th>
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### Evidence that TMEA contributed to outcomes

1. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** TMEA RF reports 196 standards harmonised; formative evaluation and EAC Gazette from 2016 confirmed 79 at that time; UNBS confirms participation in harmonisation processes.
### CASE: Harmonisation of Standards

3. SMEs certified by Bureaux of Standards, access to markets, and reduced costs

4. Reduction in average time to test and issue certificates for selected goods for intra-regional export by country

5. Average reduction in cost of testing on the tests which TMEA supported

2. **Unclear evidence** Additional tests: Rwanda: End of Project 2018 reports 213 tests in 2015 and 357 in 2017; Kenya: KEBS report tests increased from 13,000 in 2013 to 45,000 in 2018 over 25 new parameters.; Uganda: RF data details additional tests against list of standards, citing UNBS reports. Evaluation interviews confirm.

3. **L/UL/Likely** for Rwanda and Uganda; **VUL/VL/Very unlikely** for Kenya RF data from Rwanda (28) and Uganda (57), latest data missing for Uganda; Interview data include dairy firm who certified but can’t find markets, and another firm that reports ISO 22000:2005 and HACCP certification through the project. KEBS said they could not certify SMEs but have certified some 700 SME products as a result of new equipment. RSB accredited in Food Safety Mgmt, HAACP, ISO 22000.

4. **Unclear evidence** RF, Formative Evaluation, evaluation interviews, and bureau reports to TMEA: In all cases, the data do not meet the indicator criteria of ‘selected goods’ nor whether the testing times reflect goods ‘for intra-regional export’. They are ‘lab times’ rather than OSBP times. Reduced time because new tests were in-house (Rwanda, 60d to 7d); KEBS says one test goes from ten days to two minutes, another from two days to 45 minutes. No data on given tests from Uganda.

5. **L/UL/Likely** Data on reduction in costs: Formative Evaluation – average reduction in cost of testing in our parameters from $500 to $250; Rwanda reports Mycotoxin cost reduced because it is done in-house; Kenya report rapid test kit cost to traders at a border were 2000Ksh versus 5000Ksh for sending a sample to a central lab.

### Impacts on trade

TMEA did not claim impacts on trade through the Standards component, so this is excluded from the CT case study. The TGIS examines this question through separate methodology.

### Reference Table for Calculating Beliefs after seeing evidence

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<tr>
<th>Probability of Seeing Evidence of Activities if Claim is True</th>
<th>Acronyms</th>
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<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>VL</td>
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<tr>
<td>About as likely as not</td>
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<td>Very unlikely</td>
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<td>Exceptionally unlikely</td>
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<td>ALN</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is not True

- **Virtually certain**
- **Very likely**
- **Likely**
- **About as likely as not**
- **Unlikely**
- **Very unlikely**
- **Exceptionally unlikely**
CASE: Export Capability

Export capability (EC) is important to the Business Competitiveness SO because exporting widens the market available to domestic producers and thus increases potential demand and the prospects for higher prices. In turn, larger scale production leads to economies of scale, reducing unit costs, increasing competitiveness, and boosting profit margins for domestic producers. The assumption underlying this component is that domestic producers are not able to export (or export more) because they are not well informed about export procedures and potential markets, and because their products do not comply with global and regional standards. Projects in this component were intended to improve the safety, quality and market access of the identified export products.

TMEA partnered with government organisations, PSOs and CSOs to improve export capability in three focus sectors: tourism, coffee and maize. The coffee project was regional; for staples, funds were disbursed to countries with regional oversight; and tourism projects were operated on a hybrid model both at regional and country level. In the pilot phase, TMEA worked with landlocked countries, i.e. Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.

Regional Coffee Export Capability. TWIN Coffee project in Rwanda and Burundi focused on improving standards and access to markets. Projects enabled export growth for producers who were already exporting or export-ready. The project helped them develop strategies and organised market visits to meet potential buyers. Projects across the countries delivered good results – twelve cooperatives received Rain Forest Alliance Certification, and nine Fairtrade, resulting in increased revenue and jobs for the groups engaged. The project adjusted to address emerging needs of producers during implementation.

Enhancing Market Access Project was a regional programme delivered by a national organisation – Fresh Producers’ Exporters Associations of Kenya (FPEAK). TMEA supported FPEAK to facilitate the certification of agricultural producers in Global Good Agricultural Practices (Global G.A.P.) standards in Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Kenya from 2011 to 2015. Auditors in each country were brought to Kenya for training. TMEA developed training manuals and a training guide for implementers and translated them to Kiswahili. The Global G.A.P. Secretariat approved the materials; trainings were conducted leading to certification of producers. Global G.A.P. provided access to markets and allowed businesses to negotiate better positions for themselves. Challenges in Burundi and Rwanda emerged, where partners did not mobilise companies/farmer groups for training, and projects were eventually dropped.

Uganda Staples Export Capability project. This project intended to address gaps in post-harvest management of grains by establishing warehouses for grain storage, to improve staples’ competitiveness in national and regional markets. The project improved quality and increased buyers’ confidence, leading to higher prices to producers who adopted regional standards. The project ran from 2014-2016 in three districts of Uganda. About 4 million households in Uganda grew the affected crops at that time, most of which had no chance of selling well in international markets due to poor standards.

Market Linkages Support to Rwanda’s National Export Strategy (NES). TMEA supported the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) with to develop exports through: (1) Market linkages between Rwandan exporters and regional buyers; (2) A market linkages advisor to support NES implementation; (3) An export development fund; and (4) Value chain development. Rwanda companies were exporting substandard products and/or under-exploiting existing markets. An assessment of firms identified gaps in exporting capacity to regional markets, and the project was intended to address those gaps. The project excluded commodities such as coffee, tea and minerals which are already exported on a relatively large scale. TMEA delivered this project from 2012 through to 2017.

Capacity Building and Implementation of the Recognised International Standards in the Tea industry in East Africa was initially planned for two years (2011-2013) but granted a six-month extension. The project objective was for Food Safety Management System (FSMS)/Quality Management System (QMS) certification for EATTA members to boost demand, prices, and international recognition. TMEA provided training to address quality problems, which led to certification of selected tea factories. One such problem that was identified was blending, which reduced the quality of tea sold at the auctions.

Key contribution claim: Through helping target sectors improve business competitiveness, TMEA contributed to increased export of those goods.

Evaluation finding: Cannot substantiate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities Claimed</th>
<th>Evidence that activities happened and that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Baseline study/market research to identify gaps and opportunities in respective VCs/markets for intervention and review of</td>
<td>1a. Baseline data/studies:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rwanda: a market scan was completed and a market feedback report prepared that discuss findings from market research prior to MarketLinked programme launch.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CASE: Export Capability

| 2. | Sensitising companies/farmer groups on EAC standards and training them in standards applicable to agricultural commodities produced (e.g. through ToT in Uganda and Kenya and radio in Uganda) |
| 3. | Developing (simplified) training materials and translating them in local languages (e.g. Kisiwahili in Kenya; Luo, Luganda and Runyoro in Uganda) |
| 4. | Training and technical assistance to entities (companies/farmer groups) on market access, development of export and marketing strategies, etc. (Auditors were also trained for inspection and certification at the regional level) |
| 5. | Marketing initiatives, including market visits/sales missions/study tours (meet-the-buyer events) organised for exporters to meet potential buyers and identifying potential buyers |
| 6. | National effort: Export-adviser initiative in Rwanda to support development capacity (working with Université Libre de Kigali – Kigali Independent University) |
| 7. | Partnership with national and global standards organisations (national bureau of standards, Global G.A.P. Secretariat, etc.) to facilitate capacity building and develop/meet standards |
| 1b. | Some PARs, end of project reports; TradeMark, *Empowering Rwanda manufactures and promoting export growth*, The formative evaluation of the Traidlinks programme (Rwanda & Burundi) case study, undated. |
| 2. | Meeting minutes or report on outcomes from the meetings with VC actors awaited from TMEA; Workplan and MoUs (Uganda) Partnership documents (MoUs, contracts, grant agreements); official documentation on the launch of standards. |
| 3. | TORs, training manuals and reports, including cartoon (illustrated) booklets and grower guides in Luo and Kisiwahili: 6,000 copies distributed in Uganda; 2016 Training manual on export capacity in MarketLinked programme, for Rwanda Development Board. |
| 4. | TORs, *awareness training on standard radio scripts* (SEATINI); copies of EAC standards; photos of trainings; meeting minutes |
| 5. | Photos of trainings; post-training reports; sample training certificates (FPEAK, SEATINI); End of project reports; close out/success story reports (Traidlinks); project monitoring plans (FPEAK, EATTA); |
| 6. | Regional: FPEAK sensitised 8,155 farmers directly on EAGAP standards in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. |
| 7. | Regional: The formative evaluation recommended that TMEA collect baseline data on target firms moving forward (p. ix). |
| 8. | Uganda: a baseline survey on awareness of East African maize grain standard; study to develop national sesame standards. SEATINI produced policy briefs on the challenges facing the VC actors in implementing EAC maize grain standards. |
| 9. | Kenya: during trainings, trainees reported on their farming activities for the prior year in lieu of baseline. Followed up to evaluate any changes in production (FPEAK End of Project Report). |

### Marketing materials: photos of events; end of project reports:
- Rwanda: TOR calls for an ‘in-market consultant’ to conduct ‘a brief initial scan of the market to see if the products exported is likely to be received well.’ The document provides a mission checklist that lays out general terms of the sales mission.
- Workshops and export missions were mentioned in the Formative Programme Evaluation reports/case studies.
- Rwanda/Burundi: according to Formative Evaluation report (see Ayaah Enterprises Ltd, Export Development Programme, January 2016), the project arranged five successful sales missions for supported companies to Uganda and Burundi. In some cases, companies were asked to pay a commitment fee (US$500 in Rwanda) to show their interest in expanding their market.
- FPEAK: project reports citing detailed plans for Hortifairs in three countries.
- Uganda: SEATINI organised exchange visits for farmers, traders and local government.
- TradeMark, *Enhancing delivery of export advisory services – the case of export advisers in Rwanda*: The Formative Evaluation of the Traidlinks programme (Rwanda & Burundi) case study, undated: Trained export advisers but of 19 trained only 9 graduated. The 6 month course was more theoretical than practical. Trainees could not spend the allotted time in class, and lack of market demand for the export advisory services resulted in the high drop-out rate.
### CASE: Export Capability

#### Outputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence of outputs</th>
<th>Evidence that TMEA contributed to outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Satisfaction surveys on trainings by EATTA; Partner (FPEAK, EATTA, SEATINI) reports, monitoring plans and end of project reports on producers’ level of awareness of standards applicable to their products:  
   - Uganda: findings of end of project evaluation indicate that 58.9%, 73.3%, and 53.3% of the farmers in Masindi, Nakaseke and Lira respectively, reported being aware of the maize standard.  
   - 95% of the participants of the sessions conducted by EATTA were able to be certified with Awareness and Internal Audit certificate by fully attending and participating in the practical and group discussions (from EATTA Monitoring Plan).  
   - End of project reports from FPEAK, SEATINI, TWCC; project monitoring plans (EATTA, FPEAK), project close-out reports (Traidlinks) and post-training reports (SEATINI, TWCC);  
   - PGIS visits to some projects. | \(\text{VC/EUL/Virtually certain}\) Evaluation interviews with companies and farmer groups supported; TMEA project reports, Partnership/Grant Agreements showing scope of TMEA support to the partner associations; evaluation interviews with producers; Media briefs and press reviews on TMEA-FPEAK grant agreement, pictures of the grant signing ceremony, meeting minutes and budget expenditures that show TMEA’s involvement in this process |
| 2. **VC/EUL/Virtually certain** Gazetting of sesame standard and the link to WTO where ratification is announced in Uganda; Bylaws and ordinances developed for maize and sesame standards  
   - End of project reports: Traidlink Closeout report acknowledges that key staff challenges in some supported enterprises disrupted the export actions plans and put sustainability efforts at risk.  
   - Evidence from the PE fieldwork suggested increased awareness and adoption of good standards among the companies and farmers trained, but data on this was not collected systematically. | \(\text{VC/EUL/Virtually certain}\) Evaluation interviews with partners (FPEAK, SEATINI, EATTA, TWIN and RDB) verifying certification of entities supported, numbers and some pictures of certifications |
| 3. **VL/VUL/Very likely** Stakeholder forum notes; approval processes; end of project reports, and workshop and meeting notes  
   - FPEAK: Kenya Plant Health and Horticulture Crops  
   - Traidlinks: Rwanda export strategy using export advisers after TMEA project | \(\text{VL/VUL/Very likely}\) Trademark reports on government collaborations |
| 4. **ALN/ALN/As likely as not** Rwanda programme built skills and capacity of 9 local consultants through training on export market studies. Market demand for these services is not clear (only 9 of 19 finished the course). | \(\text{L/UL/Likely}\) Evaluation interviews showing TMEA involvement; formative evaluation reports the export advisers |

#### Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence of outcomes</th>
<th>Evidence that TMEA contributed to outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. **L/UL/Likely** Export volume, value and quality data tracked by partners (FPEAK, EATTA; none from TWIN, RDB or SEATINI; unclear targets)  
   - Rwanda tea from certified factories increased average 0.15% and price increases of about a third for certified producers  
   - Traidlinks notes that larger companies increased exports. | \(\text{VL/VUL/Very likely}\) Evidence on inputs/outputs above confirming TMEA involvement |
| 2. **VL/VUL/Very likely** TMEA case studies on beneficiaries’ perspectives; evaluation interviews |  |
### CASE: Export Capability

2. **Entities (companies and farmer groups) certified**
   - FPEAK export values up 36% in Mwea and 24% in Meru in Kenya.
   - Formative Evaluation and RF cite gains of US $1.5m in Rwanda
   - Uganda maize growers report farm prices up from 400 to 1600 Ush.

2. **Increase in the number of people employed in the sector**
   - FPEAK and EATTA data on company and cooperative internal management documents; partner field visit notes and training manual for project management tasks. Baseline collected. Rwanda project training advisors for business planning. Interview data: PGIS respondents had learned prudence and savings, capital reinvestment, standards like Q-mark and S-mark (Uganda), customer engagement and business diversification. The CT interview with the TMEA programme staff echoed these findings.

3. **Reduction in rejections of the goods exported**
   - Limited evidence has been shared on standards being implemented.

4. **Trading standards implemented**
   - Limited evidence has been shared on standards being implemented.

### Impacts on trade

TMEA did not claim impacts on trade through the export capability component, so these are excluded from the CT case study. The TGIS examines this question through separate methodology.

### Reference Table for Calculating Beliefs after seeing evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of Seeing Evidence of Activities if Claim is True</th>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Probability of Seeing Evidence if Claim is not True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virtually certain</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>VL</td>
<td>ALN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About as likely as not</td>
<td>ALN</td>
<td>UL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>UL</td>
<td>ALN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>VUL</td>
<td>VUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionally unlikely</td>
<td>EUL</td>
<td>EUL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Acronyms**

- VC: Virtually certain
- VL: Very likely
- L: Likely
- ALN: About as likely as not
- UL: Unlikely
- VUL: Very unlikely
- EUL: Exceptionally unlikely